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ABSTRACT 
 
 
During the 2000s the terms ‘imperialism’ and ‘empire’ made a reappearance. This 
reappearance followed ‘unilateral’ military interventions by the United States and its 
allies. Because these military interventions were all justified using international legal 
argument that the international legal discipline also became increasingly concerned with 
these terms.  
 
Given this, it is unsurprising that there also arose two critical schools of thinking about 
international law, who foregrounded its relationship to imperialism. These were those 
working in the Marxist tradition and the Third World Approaches to International Law 
(TWAIL) movement. Both of these intellectual movements are contemporary examples 
of older traditions. 
 
Despite this popularity, there has been little sustained attention to the specific  concepts 
of imperialism that underlie these debates. This thesis attempts to move beyond this, 
through mapping the way in which Marxist and TWAIL scholars have understood 
imperialism and its relationship to international law. 
 
The thesis begins by reconstructing the conceptual history of the terms ‘colonialism’, 
‘empire’ and ‘imperialism’, drawing out how they are enmeshed in broader theoretical 
and historical moments. In particular it pays close attention to the historical and political 
consequences of adopting particular understandings of these concepts.  
 
It then examines how these understandings have played out concretely. It reconstructs 
earlier Third Worldist thinking about imperialism and international law, before showing 
how contemporary TWAIL scholars have understood this relationship. It then looks at 
how the Marxist tradition has understood imperialism, before turning specifically to 
Marxist international legal theory 
 
Finally, it turns to the interrelationship between Marxist and Third Worldist theory, 
arguing that each tradition can contribute to remedying the limitations in the other. In so 
doing it also attempts to flag up the complex historical inter-relation between these two 
traditions of thinking about imperialism and international law. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
1. Of Empires and Emptiness  
In March 2010, the London School of Economics held a workshop as part of the 
‘Kelsen-Schmitt-Arendt’ series. Despite the many issues discussed throughout the day, 
one topic remained conspicuously absent from the programme – that of imperialism. 
Given that imperialism played a central role in one of Arendt’s most important books – 
The Origins of Totalitarianism – and how important ‘land appropriation’ was to 
Schmitt’s work,1 this was odd. The word was only mentioned once, when one 
participant noted: ‘when we talk about imperialism, we forget the real reason that we 
are in these countries – to help people’.  
 
One might ask: is this really surprising? If one looks back at the history of the 
international legal discipline, questions of empire and imperialism have not been a 
particular preoccupation. As Koskenniemi notes, historically ‘there is an almost 
complete silence’2 on imperialism. Yet since the beginnings of the 21st century this has 
changed somewhat. In fact, as one critic notes, ‘charges of US empire’ are ‘a dime a 
dozen these days’.3 This critic (Stephen Humphreys) draws attention to the fact that, 
throughout the past decade and a half, the terms ‘empire’ and ‘imperialism’ have made 
a comeback.
4
 What has been true in the other social sciences has, eventually, been true 
of international legal scholarship. Particularly in the wake of the Iraq war, and the role 
that international law played in contesting and constructing its legitimacy, international 
lawyers have used terms like ‘imperialism’, ‘hegemony’ and ‘empire’ to characterise 
the relationship between the United States (US) and international law.
5
 
 
Alongside these developments within the mainstream of the discipline, there has also 
been the rise to prominence (more accurately resurgence) of two critical schools of 
thinking about international law, both of which foreground its relationship to 
imperialism. On the one hand, there have been a number of scholars from the Marxist 
tradition who have attempted to grapple with international law. On the other hand, we 
                                                 
1
 Schmitt 2003.  
2
 Koskenniemi 2002, 99, fn 6. 
3
 Humphreys 2008, 232. 
4
 Chibber 2004. 
5
 Bartholomew 2006; Byers and Nolte 2003; Koskenniemi 2004; Krisch 2005; Simpson 2004. 
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have witnessed the rise of the soi-disant Third World Approaches to International Law 
(or TWAIL) movement.  
 
If, on this basis, the absence of imperialism is surprising, what is less surprising is the 
statement ‘when we talk about imperialism, we forget the real reason that we are in 
these countries – to help people’. Although there is a temptation to dismiss this 
statement, it in fact reflects something important. To begin with, it advances a very 
specific understanding of imperialism. If imperialism can be counterposed to ‘helping 
people’, it implies an idea of imperialism whose defining feature is self-interest. Such a 
definition misses the fact that one of the targets of theorising about imperialism has 
been its appearance in the guise of ‘humanitarianism’. Indeed, if one were to examine 
the whole history of the term, one would find that the simple equation of imperialism 
with ‘self-interest’ has been a rare and quite conservative position.  
 
What this reflects is that, whilst imperialism may have gained greater prominence in 
international legal debates, this prominence has not necessarily been matched by a 
systematic rigour in the usage of the term. Generally, the term has been invoked in a 
manner almost entirely divorced from its own history, serving at best to denounce the 
actions of the US. It is against such conceptual sloppiness that Humphreys turns his ire. 
Focusing specifically on the argument of Leo Panitch and Sam Gindin,
6
 he argues that 
they do not specify why they use the term ‘empire’ and not ‘hegemon’ or 
‘superpower’.7 For Humphreys, such terms would be more appropriate because they are 
more popularly understood and carry with them less specific meanings than the term 
‘empire’. 
 
According to Humphreys, ‘the mere fact of unilateral US military activity is hardly in 
itself sufficient evidence of imperium’.8 He notes that the US may be ‘at liberty’ to 
invade other countries or be immune from sanction, but it does not have the right to do 
so.
9
 On the contrary, what is most evident from the war in Iraq, is the United States’ 
inability ‘to assert direct jurisdiction’ over the rest of the world and to constrain 
                                                 
6
 Who it ought to be said are not international lawyers, and in fact are theorists of Empire generally of 
some renown. That their analysis falters most when attempting to deal with international law might tell us 
something important about the discipline’s relationship to theories of empire and imperialism. 
7
 Humphreys 2008, 233. 
8
 Ibid. 
9
 Ibid. 
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violence. These facts all illustrate that ‘empire’ is an inappropriate term, since it 
conflicts with the ‘classical notions of empire as zones of enforced peace’ and the fact 
that capitalism ‘thrive[s] on peace and trade, rather than violence and insularity’.10 
Ultimately, for Humphreys, this is a weakness with the concept of empire itself, which 
he argues is ultimately ‘empty’ because: 
 
[E]mpire has, since mid-century, become a term rather of moral censure than of 
descriptive precision. It is also far too user-friendly: it is difficult, after all, to see 
how any universalizing project ... could escape the label’s looser applications ... 
Earlier empires have not merely been States in metastasis. How do they differ 
from States? Perhaps empires lack the sense of a shared ‘public’ we think of as 
necessary to the State. Perhaps empires can sustain legal pluralisms that states 
struggle with. Perhaps empires embed notions of transcendental authority that 
states refute ... But if so, this is not captured in Empire’s Law, where empire is 
instead elided with mere national self-interest ... and political power is confused 
with economic (empire ‘is’ capitalism).11 
 
In Humphreys’ discussion of why what Pantich and Gindin describe is not an empire, 
there is necessarily a vision of what an empire is. Clearly, he imagines ‘empire’ to a 
describe a large, multinational political unit that has formal legal control (or 
‘jurisdiction’) over its constituent territories. Such an empire, it seems, maintains peace 
within those areas. 
 
Beyond this, Humphreys argues, the term is too loose for any real deployment. In this 
respect, it is interesting to note that one of the figures most responsible for popularising 
the term ‘imperialism’12 expressed similar sentiments. V.I. Lenin argued that 
imperialism was quite frequently ‘reduced to the level of a cuss-word addressed to ... 
[one’s] immediate competitors, rivals and opponents’.13 For him, the only way to avoid 
this was to have a coherent and systematic theory of imperialism, which linked it to 
broader reflections about the nature of capitalism on the world stage. In this sense, then, 
Lenin anticipates Humphreys’ statement that there is ‘demand for a sustained analysis’ 
of the ‘precise reference and utility’ of terms like empire and imperialism.14 
 
                                                 
10
 Ibid., 234. 
11
 Ibid., 235. 
12
 For Humphreys there seems to be no distinction between the terms ‘empire’ and ‘imperialism’, with the 
latter essentially being the active form of the former. As will be discussed in Chapter 1, the terms actually 
have very different historical origins and functions, and this difference has important consequences.  
13
 Lenin 1972a, 10. 
14
 Humphreys 2008, 232. 
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At least in relation to the international legal scholarship, Humphreys is largely correct. 
There has been a swath of work which deploys the language of empire and imperialism 
without thinking through the complicated history of these terms. However, the above 
invocation of Lenin should also make us doubt – at least partly – that this sloppiness is 
an intrinsic feature of the terms ‘empire’ and ‘imperialism’. Humphreys argues that, 
since the term ‘imperialism’ was coined ‘late’ in the careers of the European empires, it 
was primarily a rhetorical device to justify their expansion. What Lenin signals is that, 
whilst the terms ‘empire’ and ‘imperialism’ may have been sloppily applied by those in 
power, this was not so with everyone who used them. In particular, imperialism was a 
structuring concept of the Marxist and Third Worldist traditions and movements. 
Whilst, like any term, its usage has not been entirely coherent, these movements did 
self-reflexively and rigorously define it. 
 
On this basis, it will be no surprise that of all the contemporary schools in the 
international legal discipline, Marxists and TWAIL scholars have been the most 
forthright in situating their understandings of imperialism within wider traditions. Yet 
even here, the reflection has been quite scattered and unsystematic. This has also meant 
that, despite a shared interest in the relationship between imperialism and international 
law, there has been very little sustained reflection on the relationship between TWAIL 
and Marxist scholarship.  
 
This thesis represents an attempt to intervene in and remedy this situation. It aims to 
examine, in a sustained and critical way, how Marxist and Third Worldist scholars have 
understood imperialism and its relationship to international law. In so doing, it also 
offers a historical survey of the way in which ‘colonialism’, ‘empire’ and ‘imperialism’ 
have been understood by scholars, activists, movements and parties in the global arena 
and how this has impacted upon their understanding of international law.  
 
 
2. The Importance of ‘Imperialism’ 
In essence, this thesis is composed of two interrelated tasks. The first is a kind of 
exercise in ‘conceptual mapping’ which attempts to understand, historically, how 
imperialism has been theorised and understood. This exercise will also show the way in 
which different understandings of imperialism have been linked to different political 
14 
 
 
 
movements and moments. When international lawyers invoke the language of 
‘colonialism’, ‘empire’ or ‘imperialism’ they are also invoking this history. The second 
task, inseparable from the first, is to understand how this has played out specifically in 
terms of the Marxist and Third Worldist traditions, tracing how the initial elaboration of 
the term in various political and economic analyses has been deployed to understand 
international law.  
 
Whilst there have been some attempts to attend to these tasks,
15
 they have not been 
systematic. Indeed one is hard pressed to think of any systematic reconstruction and 
analysis of either Marxist or TWAIL scholarship. Even the authors working in these 
traditions have very rarely attempted to concretely situate themselves within their own 
historical trajectories and there have been few attempts to understand how these two 
traditions relate to each other.
16
 In particular, although both Marxist and TWAIL 
scholars have been much more explicit than other scholarship in their accounts of what 
imperialism means, they ultimately have not reflected upon the wider history of this 
concept. 
 
In this sense, then, this thesis does aim to fill several ‘gaps’. However, novelty or 
originality are not necessarily indicators of importance. After all, just because no one 
has ever written an international legal reflection on pancakes, it does not follow that one 
ought to do so. However, imperialism is plainly a more important topic than pancakes.  
 
Most obviously, imperialism is important because people are talking about it. As above, 
in both the social sciences in general and international law in particular, there has been a 
resurgence of the language of ‘empire’ and ‘imperialism’. Equally, there has been a 
proliferation of historical works that seek to chart the relationship between colonialism, 
empire and the birth and consolidation of international law.
17
 Yet these invocations of 
empire tend to either be deployed in a haphazard fashion, or be unreflexive ‘historical’ 
categories. This ignores the fact that the concepts of ‘colonialism’, ‘empire’ and 
‘imperialism’ are embedded within larger theoretical and political debates. These 
                                                 
15
 Marks 2003a; Marks 2003c. 
16
 Obiora Okafor’s chapter in International Law on the Left is concerned with the role of Marxism in 
Upendra Baxi’s work, see Okafor 2008b. Aside from this, within the main works themselves there is 
some engagement. Miéville briefly engages with Antony Anghie’s work (Miéville 2005, 239). Rajagopal 
makes a slightly more sustained engagement with Marxism , arguing that it embeds a Eurocentric 
development narrative (Rajagopal 2003, 58, 242–257). 
17
 Anaya 2004; Bowden 2005; Fassbender and Peters 2012; Koskenniemi 2011; Lorca 2010.  
15 
 
 
 
debates mean that invoking particular understandings are not simply ‘neutral’ affairs. 
On a basic level, it is important to chart these consequences so as to sharpen what is at 
stake in particular invocations of the terms. This will also have important consequences 
for any ‘empirical’ or ‘historical’ work, since one’s choice of when to study, how to 
characterise what is studied etc. cannot be carried out in isolation from the ‘theoretical’ 
arena.  
 
Insofar as imperialism is important, so too are those schools that have been most 
prominent in popularising its use: namely Marxism and TWAIL. In scholarly terms, 
both have been increasingly intellectually productive. This fits more generally with the 
resurgence of approaches which emphasise the instability and violence of capitalism. 
Equally, those working, writing, thinking and acting within the Marxist and Third 
Worldist traditions have historically been at the forefront of analysing and contesting 
imperialism. In this respect, they have been perhaps the most important radical 
movements to interact with international law.  
 
From the perspective of the international legal discipline, a systematic examination of 
these two movements is important. It helps shed light on aspects of international law’s 
history in terms of the relationships it mediated and the movements that attempted to 
shape it. Perhaps more importantly, since these are both schools that seeks to understand 
imperialism in its contemporary guise, they can help shed light on international law’s 
current enmeshment with relations of exploitation and domination. This last observation 
also raises another important point. One of the vital things about both the Third 
Worldist and Marxist traditions is that they are not simply movements that seek to 
‘understand’ the world in a neutral sense. Instead, both seek to analyse the world with 
an eye to transforming it. As Selma James put it: 
 
Marx’s analysis of capitalist production was not a meditation on how the society 
‘ticked’. It was a tool to find the way to overthrow it, to find the social forces 
which, exploited by capital, were subversive to it. Yet it was because he was 
looking for the forces that would inevitably overthrow capital that he could 
describe capital’s social relations, which are pregnant with working-class 
subversion.
18
 
 
Very simply, to raise the question of imperialism is – by definition – to raise the 
question of anti-imperialism, of whether it is possible to live in a world free from 
                                                 
18
 James 2012, 51. 
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international inequality, domination and exploitation. In this respect, both Marxist and 
TWAIL scholars understand their work as contributing to the movement to end 
imperialism. On a very basic level, the act of raising awareness of the historical and 
continued presence of imperialism is a contribution towards this project. Yet James 
alludes to a deeper connection. Insofar as one wishes to contest, attack and overthrow 
any phenomenon, one must understand how it works, making a theory of imperialism 
indispensable. Only with a ‘theory’ of imperialism is it possible to identify whether 
imperialism still exists, what its weak points are and whether we might move beyond it. 
As Neil Lazarus puts it, anyone attempting to radically transform the world has to ‘get 
imperialism right’.19  
 
If this is true in general, it is particularly true in the context of international law. 
Historically, international law has been a vital arena in the struggle against imperialism. 
It played a key role in ending formal European colonialism, and discussions of ‘self-
determination’ continue to this day.20 Equally, the socialist and Third Worldist 
movements sought to leverage international law to mount legal challenges to the 
international economic order. 
 
The language of legalism continues to suffuse attempts to contest imperialism and its 
effects. One can reel off a few examples here. The war in Iraq was criticised for its 
illegality,
21
 as has been the war on terror, and attendant drone programme.
22
 Similarly, 
anti-globalisation scholars and activists have sought to contest globalisation by 
defending socio-economic rights.
23
 Palestinians and Palestine solidarity activists have 
consistently argued that Israel’s actions violate international law, and indeed have 
obtained international legal rulings to that effect. One could go on with this almost 
indefinitely. This is particularly true after the collapse of the great movements fighting 
for capitalism’s overthrow. Absent such systematic political movements, law has 
become one of the few viable tools left.  
 
                                                 
19
 Lazarus 2002, 54. 
20
 One need only think of Canadian Supreme Court’s discussion in Reference Re the Secession of Quebec. 
See Knop 2002. 
21
The Guardian 2003. 
22
 Amnesty International 2013, 43–55; Columbia Law School Human Rights Clinic and Center for 
Civilians in Conflict 2012, 51–77; Human Rights Watch 2013, 81–93. 
23
 O’Connell 2007; Wills 2014. 
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What this reflects is an implicit assumption that international law is, or at least can be, 
opposed to imperialism. Yet this is hardly an unproblematic assumption. A crucial 
aspect of ‘getting imperialism right’, therefore, is understanding its relationship to 
international law. It is only in so doing that we can ask how (or whether) international 
legal mobilisations can play a part in any struggle for global justice.  
 
  
3. Structure 
The problem of embarking on the tasks outlined above is that each of them is almost 
inextricably intertwined with the others. One cannot talk of imperialism ‘in general’ 
without mentioning the contribution of Marxist and Third Worldist theorists. Equally, it 
is nigh on impossible to talk about the history of Third Worldism without also 
understanding the Marxist tradition. The converse is also true. To represent 
developments in this way would be very complex, not to mention incomprehensible. 
Instead, this thesis adopts a more conventional structure, dealing with each subject 
distinctly, whilst always keeping in mind the ways in which they overlap. At certain 
points this will lead to some repetition but this seems unavoidable. 
 
Chapter 1, ‘Two, Three, Many Imperialisms’ seeks to map the history of the use of the 
terms ‘empire’, ‘imperialism’ and ‘colonialism’. In each case, it starts by tracing the 
etymological origins of the terms, describing the historical moments in which they were 
first deployed. In every case, their original meaning referred to something quite 
different from what they eventually came to mean. Part of the aim of tracing the 
evolution of these terms is to demonstrate the political and theoretical disagreements 
around the concepts. One of the most important tasks of this chapter is to outline the 
particular circumstances of the emergence of imperialism (as distinct from ‘empire’) 
and colonialism (as distinct from ‘colonial’ or ‘colonies’). These are both tied up with 
particularly bloody capitalist scrambles for colonies, and the movements these threw up. 
In both cases, it is the expansionary and transformative aspects of international 
intercourse that are foregrounded. The ‘ism’ is seen to denote the systemic logic of 
imperialism and colonialism.  
 
The chapter draws attention to the way in which the concept of ‘colonialism’ has been 
contested. Especially important is how a ‘conservative’ concept of colonialism was 
18 
 
 
 
articulated, which downplayed the systemic and economic nature of colonialism in 
favour of a vision centred around formal legal control and political domination. It was 
against such a vision that the concept of neo-colonialism was articulated. This evolution 
is tracked through to the debates around the idea of post-colonialism. Finally, the 
Chapter argues that the disputes as to the nature of imperialism are disputes about its 
place in history and political character, which have consequences for our understanding 
of international law. 
 
Chapter 2, ‘Imperialism, Third Worldism and International Law’ examines how Third 
Worldist jurists have understood imperialism and its relationship to international law. It 
begins by examining some of the original Third Worldist jurists. Drawing on the 
arguments of Chapter 1, it argues that the legal analysis of these jurists was rooted in 
particular understandings of colonialism. Those who situated their understanding within 
the radical tradition understood international law and colonialism as structurally 
related, with international law continuing to mediate neo-colonial relations. For them, 
international law could only be turned to the anti-imperialist cause through its radical 
upheaval.  
 
There were also those who drew on the conservative understanding of colonialism. For 
them, the Eurocentrism of international law lay not so much in its structural complicity 
with imperialism, but in the fact that non-European states had not participated in its 
formation. Since they did not understand colonialism as part of a wider system of 
imperialism, they did not see colonialism as giving way to neo-colonialism. On their 
reading, international law could be turned to anti-imperialism through inviting the 
participation of the former colonies. The chapter argues that these Third Worldist jurists 
all shared a commitment to a ‘sociological functionalism’, in which international law 
was a neutral vessel that ‘expressed’ the state of the social world.  
 
The chapter argues that the failure of the international law reform projects is one of the 
main planks around which contemporary TWAIL scholarship is organised. These 
scholars are first surveyed in terms of their ‘general’ approach to the nature of 
imperialism and its relationship to international law. A distinction is drawn between 
those who work within the Marxist tradition and those more influenced by post-colonial 
theory. The chapter goes on to examine how these theories have been deployed to 
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explain given historical moments. Finally, the chapter turns to the political implications 
of these theories. It traces a pattern whereby all TWAIL scholars ultimately return to a 
‘faith’ in international law. 
  
Chapter 3, ‘Marxism and the Critique of Imperialism’ attempts a similar manoeuvre for 
the Marxist tradition. It begins with an examination of Marx and Engels’ reflections on 
the international dimensions of capitalism. It then turns to the classical Marxist theorists 
of imperialism, all of whom argued that imperialism was rooted in the limitless 
expansion born of capitalism at a certain stage of development. This stage of 
development required the transformation of the rest of the world in line with capitalist 
imperatives and the extension military and political power. For these theorists 
imperialism was an epoch and a system. The chapter then turns to consider how these 
figures understood international law, arguing that for them it was largely a passive 
vessel which gives way to the ‘real’ force of economics.  
 
The chapter then examines Marxist theories of international law. It begins by 
reconstructing Marx and Engels’ positions, before examining three key Marxist 
critiques of international law: the commodity-form theory, ideology critique and the 
class struggle approach. In each of these, international law serves to consolidate the 
practices of imperialism. Having done this, the chapter examines how these 
understandings have been deployed to understand the changing conjunctures of 
imperialism. Finally, the chapter turns to how Marxists have understood the political 
potential of international law.  
 
The final chapter, ‘Towards Stretched Marxism’ attempts to draw all of this together. Its 
main aim is to tease out the historical and political consequences of the adoption of 
particular understandings of imperialism by Marxist and TWAIL scholars. It begins by 
re-examining the phenomenon outlined in Chapter 2, whereby TWAIL scholars 
ultimately return to a faith in international law. It argues that one can distinguish 
between the Marxist and postcolonial wings of TWAIL, since whilst both arrive at 
positive conclusions for international law, they do so in different ways. In the Marxist 
account, the conclusion flows logically from the analysis. By contrast, in the 
postcolonial accounts one sees a pessimistic analysis of international law, followed by 
an overly positive conclusion.  
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The chapter demonstrates that this particular argument holds because the postcolonial 
wing of TWAIL scholarship operates with two completely opposed concepts of 
imperialism. On the one hand, they understand imperialism as being driven by a 
transhistorical process of ‘othering’, and on the other they understand it as a contingent 
historical moment of territorial control. This leads to two different models of the 
relationship between international law and imperialism: in one, imperialism is an 
untranscendable horizon for all action; in the other, imperialism and international law 
have a contingent, historical relationship.  
 
This leads to a situation of both false necessity and false contingency, leaving these 
scholars unable to properly articulate a theory of social change. Against this, the chapter 
proposes a materialist theory of the dynamic of difference, in which its characteristics 
are traced back to the social relations of imperialism described by Marxists in Chapter 
3. Finally, the Chapter argues that it is not enough to ‘incorporate’ TWAIL concerns 
into a Marxist framework. Turning to Fanon, it argues instead for a ‘stretched Marxism’ 
in which concerns of racialisation and subjectivity are understood as being at the heart 
of imperialist capitalism.   
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Chapter 1: Two, Three, Many Imperialisms 
 
1. Introduction: Opaque Imperialism  
In an article from April 2012 entitled ‘Imperialism didn’t end. These days it’s known as 
international law’, George Monbiot argues that the international legal order is one that 
reproduces imperialist patterns of domination and exploitation.
24
 Using the conviction 
of Charles Taylor as an example of the unequal application of international criminal 
law, Monbiot proposes that ‘it sent two messages: if you run a small, weak nation, you 
may be subject to the full force of international law; if you run a powerful nation, you 
have nothing to fear’. 
  
Monbiot proceeds to enumerate the ways in which international law embeds 
imperialism – focusing on the International Criminal Court’s inability to prosecute the 
crime of aggression, unequal voting powers in the International Monetary Fund and the 
World Bank and the legal architecture of the war on terror. From this he concludes that 
international law ‘remains an imperial project, in which only the crimes committed by 
vassal states are punished’. 
 
Contrary to typical liberal accounts of international law, Monbiot does not argue that it 
is ineffective in the face of imperialism, or that it is being manipulated or ignored by 
great powers like the US. Instead, his claim is that international law is itself part and 
parcel of imperialism. Interestingly, however, Monbiot never defines imperialism 
explicitly, treating it as if its meaning should be obvious. Yet even a brief perusal of the 
piece shows that this is simply not the case. Despite being less than a thousand words, it 
is possible to count at least five broad senses in which the term is invoked.  
  
To start with, there is a ‘general’ understanding of imperialism as ‘powerful’ nations 
dominating ‘small, weak’ nations. Linked to this is another general understanding in 
which imperialism concerns great powers seeking ‘spheres of influence’. Alongside 
these general understandings is a more geographically inclined one, in which 
imperialism is specifically seen as the Western or European domination of non-
European societies. There is also a historically inflected understanding, where European 
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domination is understood specifically in relation to the history of European colonial 
expansion. 
 
Together with these nation-centric ideas of imperialism, Monbiot also deploys an idea 
of imperialism rooted in ‘private interests’, namely those of financiers. He likens the 
‘attacks’ of financial speculators on Asian countries to the Opium Wars and sees the 
British government not as ‘imperialist’ in itself but rather ‘[w]orking ... for ... the 
financial sector ... act[ing] as capital’s district commissioners’.  
 
 
2. What’s in a Word? 
What these multiple senses of the term ‘imperialism’ tell us is that it is a difficult term 
to pin down. Intuitively it seems relatively easy to come up with a broad definition: we 
might say that imperialism is a situation in which stronger countries or societies 
dominate weaker ones. However, such a definition gives us no idea about how 
imperialism is distinctive from international relations in general. If imperialism is to 
have any analytical value, it must be understood to refer to a more specific 
phenomenon. This task is fraught with difficulties.  
 
As Alejandro Colás notes, ‘like other key concepts in the social sciences’ imperialism 
‘is a category of meaning which carries considerable historical baggage’ that ‘is 
constantly contested and reaffirmed’.25 One can go further than this: along with the 
words ‘capitalism’, ‘class’, ‘socialism’ and ‘revolution’, imperialism is one of the 
defining political terms of the twentieth century. It became central to a series of political 
and economic struggles and, in particular, was taken up by the international communist 
movement, the anti-colonial movement and those within Europe who wished to assert 
their independence against the US.
26
  
 
Such was the power of the word that it was frequently turned against those movements 
who pioneered its use, hence the description of the Soviet Union as an ‘evil Empire’ by 
Ronald Reagan,
27
 or the Chinese denunciation of the USSR for ‘collaborating’ with 
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imperialism.
28
 What this tells us is that imperialism is not simply a social scientific 
concept; it is a word that is imbued with a great deal of rhetorical and political 
significance.
29
 Moreover, given its involvement in so many political struggles, it is a 
term of vital strategic importance.
30
 
 
Given this, it is unsurprising that the meaning of the term imperialism is by no means 
settled or fixed. Writing in the 1960s, Koebner and Schmidt argued that, since 1840, 
imperialism had ‘changed its meaning no less than twelve times’.31 One can only 
assume that this number has increased since then. Historians have frequently decried the 
confusion and looseness of the term, declaring that it has become so broad as to be 
essentially meaningless.
32
 This is further complicated by the fact that even within 
specific political traditions there have been disagreements over the nature and scope of 
the term, such that one cannot even talk of any single ‘liberal’, ‘conservative’ or 
‘Marxist’ theory of imperialism.33 Worse still, frequently ‘the same writer uses the word 
to mean different things in different part of his argument’.34 From Monbiot’s article one 
can also see that imperialism is part of a ‘family’ of concepts, all of which deal with a 
similar subject matter, and whose interconnections are difficult to disentangle. One 
cannot define ‘imperialism’ without also accounting for the terms ‘empire’ and 
‘colonialism’.35  
 
In the face of these difficulties, it is tempting to follow Giovanni Arrighi and argue that 
imperialism has ‘come to mean everything and therefore nothing’.36 In its place, Arrighi 
proposed the use of the term ‘hegemony’, which could be used ‘in a way that has some 
special meaning as opposed to ... terms like “dominance” and “supremacy”’.37 
Alternatively, there is a temptation to follow the advice of historians and replace the 
‘theoretical’ concept of imperialism with grounded, empirical accounts of historical 
periods of empire and imperialism.
38
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However, there are good reasons to resist these temptations. Firstly, one’s 
understanding of the term ‘imperialism’ necessarily delimits what subject matter is 
under consideration. There can be no ‘empirical’ solution to this question, because any 
empirical study already presupposes a theoretical classification of the types of actions, 
relations and periods that are to be studied.
39
 Equally, as Arrighi himself acknowledges, 
the term ‘hegemony’ will also have to grapple with the question of its precise definition 
and domain. Secondly, as Victor Kiernan remarked, imperialism is a theme which 
‘offers more glimpses than almost any other of the nature of man and of human 
society’.40 The use of the term ‘hegemony’ – with its purely international connotations41 
– seems to abstract from the fact that ‘imperialism’ has usually been a term that 
traversed the division between the domestic and the international.  
  
Thirdly, it seems unwise to abandon a word with such a long history. Although this 
history brings with it problems, one ought not to lightly abandon the actual term that 
historical actors have used to describe the system they live in and struggle against.
42
 
Finally, the changing uses of the term ‘imperialism’ may prove to be interesting in their 
own right. The ways in which it has changed its meaning reflect the changing historical 
and material conditions in which it was deployed.
43
  
 
Ultimately, many of the criticisms of the term ‘imperialism’ seem to stem from the fact 
that it is a word with stakes. Owing to its entanglement in vast political and economic 
struggles, it has acquired an emotional and political charge which renders it 
unsusceptible to easy definition. Yet surely this emotional and political charge results 
from the fact that imperialism has been so important. As such, to abandon imperialism 
because it is difficult to define is tantamount to abandoning it precisely for the reasons 
that it is important. This seems perverse. Moreover, the controversy around the word 
imperialism does not simply stem from its semantic character. Rather, it stems from the 
controversial and contested nature of the relationships and processes the term seeks to 
capture and describe. Any concept that ‘replaced’ it would surely be subject to these 
same pressures. 
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From the foregoing we can draw two conclusions. The first is that – as a concept – 
imperialism should not simply be discarded, it is too important for that. The second is 
that any attempt to pin down an exact ‘definition’ of the concept is likely to prove 
futile.
44
 This chapter will proceed along these assumptions. The aim will be to map the 
various tendencies and issues at play in invoking the terms ‘empire’, ‘imperialism’ and 
‘colonialism’. This will involve historical reflection on the ways in which these 
concepts have been deployed in broadly changing circumstances, as well as a 
description of the axes around which debates have been constructed. Finally, there will 
be a reflection on the inter-relation between the terms. 
  
 
3. Empire 
As is traditional to note, ‘empire’ derives from the Latin imperium. Although one 
cannot translate this word exactly, it denotes the attributes of command, authority or 
rulership.
45
 More specifically, the term was a technical one, derived from Roman public 
law. It described the legal authority – granted by the ‘Roman people’ (the imperium 
populi Romani) – which attached to specific offices such as consuls, proconsuls and 
praetors or supreme military commands.
46
 Whilst imperium was connected with 
administration, it initially was concerned with ‘the legal power to enforce the law’, as 
opposed to any vision of territorial domination or rule. Territory was not invoked 
directly, but rather insofar as it might be subject to the jurisdiction of one of these 
specific offices.
47
 The term imperator (the root of ‘emperor’) was also derived from this 
word, referring to an individual who had been granted imperium.  
 
As evidenced by the term imperium populi Romani, this conception of imperium was 
bound up with the Republican institutions of early Rome, and as these institutions were 
dismantled, its meaning began to shift. This process began with the rise of Julius 
Caesar, who, whilst formally remaining within the institutions of Republican Rome, 
pushed them to their limits. In 48 BC, during the Civil War between those loyal to 
Caesar and those loyal to Pompey, Caesar was appointed to the position of Dictator. 
Traditionally the Dictator was a type of magistrate granted an extremely wide imperium 
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in order to defend the Republic for a limited time.
48
 In 45 BC, following his final 
victory over Pompey, Caesar returned to Rome. His dictatorship became permanent
49
 
and was granted the hereditary title of imperator.
50
 Following Caesar’s assassination, 
another civil war erupted, with various factions vying for his mantle. Octavian, Caesar’s 
adopted son, won out, eventually renaming himself Augustus. When Augustus came to 
power he claimed to have inherited the title of imperator from Caesar, and consolidated 
the various consular positions.  
 
In order to build up support for this new Rome, supporters of Augustus sought to 
disassociate the idea of imperium from an administrative and legal vision to one in 
which the imperium was embodied directly as a cause to which one would pay 
obedience. There were two consequences to this. Firstly, the conception of the imperium 
populi Romani – which rooted imperium in the authority of the Roman people – was 
replaced by the notion of Imperium Romanum. In this vision, imperium was embodied 
territorially in the city of Rome.
51
 At the same time, the title of imperator was 
disconnected from its old consular roots and reconceived as belonging to the ruler of 
Rome. What was arrived at was a conception of imperium based on the dominance of an 
emperor, rooted in territorial dominance and control.
52
 Although imperium still 
maintained a loose relationship to the older, technical term, it had become less about 
legal office and much more domination. This was also the period that saw the Roman 
Empire make greater efforts to expand its rule. 
 
For centuries the Roman experience was the reference point for understanding ‘empire’. 
As Koebner notes, there were two essential concepts of imperium which served to 
structure the expansion of European powers. On the one hand, there was the singular 
notion of the Imperium Romanum. Here, imperium was taken to denote the specific 
collective personality of the Roman Empire and its successors. In this case, the term 
was not simply descriptive, but had real organisational consequences, as those regimes 
which could trace themselves to the Imperium Romanum claimed the right to rule its 
former territory. On the other hand, there was a more general understanding of 
imperium, describing any power based upon territorial domination and expansion. In 
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this understanding, there could be a plurality of empires. A consequence of this would 
be that imperium did not have the same organisational power. The period between the 
fall of the Western Roman Empire and the 1500s was characterised by a shift from the 
‘singular’ understanding to the ‘pluralistic’ one.  
 
The Holy Roman Empire was an example of the strict adherence to the specificity of the 
Imperium Romanum. In 800AD Pope Leo III crowned Charlemagne as Emperor of the 
Romans. The Holy Roman Empire was understood as the successor to the Western 
Roman Empire, taking on its direct and singular meaning. However, this Empire was 
much less stable than the Roman Empire. A number of different powers exercised rule 
and laid claim over territories which had historically comprised it, and the power of the 
Emperor was continually challenged by his supposed subordinates. Owing to this, 
scholars began to think more carefully about the meaning of ‘empire’. Leonardo Bruni, 
for example, put forward an understanding of imperium as embracing the notion of 
territorial power as well as legitimate authority. Accordingly, he understood any state 
which characterised by territorial expansionism as deserving of the title imperium.
53
  
 
At the same time, European monarchs and their advisors sought to understand how their 
own territorial rule related to the broader Empire to which they were nominally subject. 
In the case of England, this came to a head when Henry VIII sought to legitimise the 
annulment of his marriage, had himself declared an Emperor, and so not subject to the 
dictates of any other empire. However, it was not until the ‘unification’ of Scotland and 
England to form Great Britain that its claims to an empire could be taken seriously. 
These claims were only given substance by the growth of British sea power and its 
acquisition of territory abroad.  
 
Britain’s example is illustrative of the broader process at work in Europe. In the period 
of the 1400s-1600s a number of European nations (in particular Portugal, Spain, the 
Netherlands and Britain) began programmes of overseas territorial expansion. Whilst 
the configuration of which European powers were dominant changed, what did not 
change was the general European claim to rule non-European territory. It was only in 
the mid- to late-20
th
 century that these claims were given up. This experience has 
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provided the paradigm for the understanding of empire, disconnecting it from the 
specifically Roman notion of imperium.  
 
Empire came to be identified with the subjugation and domination of one society by 
another, with particular reference to the European experience. Although there have been 
many attempts to formalise a precise definition along such lines, one of the most 
influential has been that of Michael W. Doyle, who argued that: 
 
Empire ... is a system of interaction between two political entities, one of which, 
the dominant metropole, exerts political control over the internal and external 
policy – the effective sovereignty – of the other, the subordinate periphery54 
 
Doyle’s definition reflects a basic understanding of empire shared across the scholarly 
community. Stephen Howe, for example, characterises empire as ‘composite, multi-
ethnic or multinational political unit, usually created by conquest, and divided between 
a dominant centre and subordinate, sometimes far distant, peripheries’.55 
 
Importantly, by insisting that empire involves the interaction of two different political 
entities, this definition is able to distinguish between empires and states. In practice 
such a distinction can be messy, as empires such as the French incorporated overseas 
territories into a broader ‘nation’ of France.56 Moreover, the settler-colonialism that 
resulted from the expansion of empires involved the constitution of ‘nations’ on 
territory previously occupied by indigenous peoples. This points to a more general issue 
that has dogged attempts to define empire. Whilst there may be agreement that an 
empire involves the domination of a periphery by a metropole, there have been 
disagreements over three issues: 1) what type of ‘political entities’ are interacting; 2) 
what level of intensity of domination is necessary and, 3) what particular form this 
relationship needs to take.  
 
The contours of this debate can be illustrated by examining the controversy over the 
project of ‘Anglo-Saxon union’. Throughout the 1880s there was a debate over the form 
of the British Empire. The Federalists around Seeley argued that the British Empire 
could only be properly characterised as an empire insofar as it operated as a federated 
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political unit, linked by an overarching legal and political structure.
57
 To further this 
end, they participated in the creation of the Imperial Federation League, an organisation 
which agitated for greater constitutional connection between Britain and its colonies.  
 
Although these debates hinged on very specific questions, they shed light on the broader 
problem of the legal and constitutional dimensions of ‘empire’. In line with the 
historical experience of Europe many have argued that ‘empire’ is not simply a 
relationship of dominance but rather one in which this dominance is juridically or 
constitutionally recognised. For example, Arendt argued that in ‘true imperial structures 
... the institutions of the mother country are in various ways integrated into the 
empire’.58. 
 
Although such a position reflects various aspects of the European experience, it has 
been argued that it is unable to inadequately account for the entirety of this experience, 
as well as those of other empires. In particular, it downplays the degree to which an 
empire may be maintained through ‘informal’ methods of control. As early as 1899, the 
pseudonymous author ‘RITORTUS’ argued against the idea that empire was confined 
‘to the red lines of the world’s map’.59 Against this, he maintained that Britain had 
established a ‘species of World Empire’60 through its commercial prowess, that 
‘commands the productive forces themselves of other nations’ that ‘develop[s] or help 
to develop them ... draw[s] them into ... [its] orbit and bind[s] up their interests 
inseparably with ... [its] own’.61 
 
These debates became more pointed in the mid-twentieth century, when formalised 
empires were no longer the norm. In response to these developments, scholars 
increasingly turned to the idea of a division between formal and informal empire, with 
the former being ‘rule by annexation and government by colonial governors supported 
by troops’ and the latter ‘control by manipulation of collaborating elites over the 
domestic and external policies of legally independent regimes’.62 The classic statement 
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of such a position was perhaps that of Gallagher and Robinson, who in their landmark 
1953 article ‘The Imperialism of Free Trade’ argued:  
 
It ought to be a commonplace that Great Britain during the nineteenth century 
expanded overseas by means of ‘informal empire’ as much as by acquiring 
dominion in the strict constitutional sense. For purposes of economic analysis it 
would clearly be unreal to define imperial history exclusively as the history of 
those colonies coloured red on the map ... The conventional interpretation of the 
nineteenth-century empire continues to rest upon study of the formal empire 
alone, which is rather like judging the size and character of icebergs solely from 
the parts above the water-line.
63
 
 
For Gallagher and Robinson, any legalistic notion of empire failed to grasp the way in 
which the British Empire had expanded, which was through a combination of different 
methods. Whilst there is controversy over the particularities of Gallagher and 
Robinson’s account, some idea of ‘informal empire’ is widely accepted.  
 
However, whilst there may be agreement on the importance of ‘informal empire’, there 
is a great deal of disagreement as to what might constitute this. Gallagher and Robinson 
appear to collapse the idea of empire into that of an ‘expanding economy’.64 More 
specifically, they see empire as being driven by ‘commercial penetration’, in which 
‘economic expansion ... [is] aided and abetted by political action in one form or 
another’.65 In this vision, informal empire can be constituted through treaties of free 
trade and friendship made with weaker states.
66
 
 
For many scholars, any sound understanding of empire requires a higher level of control 
than this. William L. Langer, for example, argued in 1935, that unless empire was 
concerned specifically with territorial appropriation, ‘you will soon be lost in nebulous 
concepts and bloodless abstractions’ with a result that ‘you may as well extend it to 
cover any form of influence’.67 Whilst Langer’s particular focus on territorial control is 
not widely shared, his concern that a concept of empire had to be undergirded by 
effective control is.
68
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Thus, in the previously cited Doyle definition, an empire requires that the metropole 
exerts control over the ‘effective sovereignty’ of the periphery69 which involves 
‘controlling its political decision making’.70 Similarly, Colàs holds that empire involves 
‘political control’ and ‘domination’71 and for Stephen Howe empire involved the 
metropolitan state taking ‘complete power over the government of the territory it had 
annexed’.72 
 
Whilst such debates may occasionally take on the character of discussions about the 
number of angels that can dance on the head of a pin, they have become politically 
salient following the end of the Cold War. Two of the main features of this epoch have 
been the increasingly intense phenomenon of ‘globalisation’, and the ‘unipolar 
moment’, where an increasingly unopposed US flexed its military muscles in a series of 
conflicts. Partly as a result of these developments, debates about ‘empire’ re-emerged. 
Perhaps the most high-profile example of this was Hardt and Negri’s Empire. Hardt and 
Negri’s definition of ‘empire’ is rather idiosyncratic. Eschewing territorial control, they 
state that Empire is ‘a decentred and deterritorializing apparatus of rule that 
progressively incorporates the entire global realm within its open, expanding frontier’.73 
 
Whilst few have followed Hardt and Negri’s account, there has been a great deal of 
attention paid to the question of whether the US can be characterised as an empire. 
Whilst the US does exercise control over the political life of some peripheral states, its 
role is primarily achieved through its dominant position in the global economy and 
collaboration with local elites. As illustrated by a 2008 symposium on American power 
and empire in International Studies Perspectives, the predominant response has been to 
argue that the US cannot be seen as an empire because it is embedded in an 
‘organization of political space that rests on upholding the legal-constitutional and 
political autonomy of states’.74 However – against Hardt and Negri – this ‘denial of 
empire ... does not mean that the United States is not imperial or imperialist’.75  
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This of course begs the question of how it is possible to distinguish between ‘empire’ 
and ‘imperialism’ and it is to such a distinction that we now turn.  
 
 
4. Imperialism 
In many treatments of the subject, ‘imperialism’ and ‘empire’ are collapsed into each 
other. In purely logical-semantic terms this makes sense. Imperialism is also derived 
from imperium. It is the addition of the ‘ism’, derived from the ancient Greek suffix 
‘ismos’, which creates the word ‘imperialism’. On this reading, imperialism is 
derivative of empire. Despite this, it is worth considering imperialism and empire 
separately. Whereas imperium and empire are words that have a long provenance, the 
term ‘imperialism’ is a relatively recent addition to the global lexicon, emerging in 
Europe only in the 1840s.
76
 Similarly to empire, it was not initially a general term; 
instead it referred to quite a singular regime. Specifically, the first uses of the term 
‘imperialism’ were as a derogatory description of the Second French Empire, 
established by Louis Napoleon Bonaparte from 1852-1870.
77
 
 
4.1. From Bonaparte to Lenin 
Louis Napoleon was the first President of the French Republic. He won a landslide 
victory in 1848, appealing to the values he argued were embodied in the First French 
Empire. However, under the constitution he was ineligible to run for a second term. In 
defiance of this, he dissolved the National Assembly in December 1851 and one year 
later the Second French Empire was declared, with Louis as its Emperor – Napoleon III. 
Whilst this regime maintained democratic trappings, executive power was concentrated 
in the hands of Napoleon III.
78
 After the coup, the word ‘imperialist’ began appearing as 
a term of abuse, describing those who supported Louis’ regime, and the term 
‘imperialism’ appeared soon after. In this respect, ‘imperialism’ referred less to 
domination in the international sphere and more to ‘the internal conditions of a foreign 
country’,79 denoting the autocratic rule of an Emperor. 
  
Interestingly – given the later meaning of imperialism in the Marxist tradition – this was 
the only sense in which Marx ever referred to it (rendered Imperialismus), stating that 
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‘[i]mperialism is .... the most prostitute and the ultimate form of the State power which 
nascent middle-class society had commenced to elaborate as a means of its own 
emancipation from feudalism’.80 However, Bonapartism was not simply characterised 
by an internal autocracy. The Second French Empire also embarked on a policy of 
militant external expansion, attempting to acquire new colonial territories, as well as 
engaging in rivalry with other European powers – culminating in the Franco-Prussian 
War of 1870.
81
 Quite rapidly, the term imperialism began to take on an international 
dimension.
82
 
 
However, imperialism was not understood as a quality that inhered in all empires; 
rather, it was understood as a specific policy towards empire. This distinction is best 
illustrated through examining the dispute between Gladstone and Disraeli over the 
question of the British Empire. Disraeli had been intent on expanding the British 
Empire eastwards, focusing particularly on India. Since 1858 – following the 1857 
Indian Mutiny – the East India Company had been dissolved and the British Crown 
ruled directly. In 1876 this was ratified officially when Queen Victoria was crowned 
Empress of India. 
 
These ambitions were denounced by Gladstone as being ‘imperialist’. For Gladstone, 
‘imperialism’ did not refer to the British Empire per se, but rather to a particular 
conception of empire which was based ‘based on ostentatious splendour and militarist 
rule of force’.83 This form of empire was said to closely resemble the French and 
German Empires. Imperialism, then, was understood as a particular policy or attitude 
towards empire, which, as Robert Lowe – Chancellor of the Exchequer between 1868 
and 1873 – held, meant international rule involving ‘absolute force’84 and ‘fraud’.85 
 
In response to these kinds of attacks, there was an attempt by defenders of increased 
expansionism to ‘reclaim’ imperialism. From their time in government, Gladstone and 
the Liberals had gained a reputation for incompetence concerning the management of 
Britain’s colonies. Contemporaneously, there was an increasing amount of sympathy 
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towards ‘empire sentiment’. Publicists such as the aforementioned Seeley and 
Roseberry gained a great deal of traction by advocating greater union between the 
colonies and Britain. Similarly, throughout the 1880 and 1890s there was increasing 
interest in commercially expanding into the African colonies (the beginning of the 
Scramble for Africa’). Indeed, despite Gladstone’s rhetorical opposition to Disraeli, his 
government invaded and occupied Egypt in 1882.
86
 
 
Consequently, by the late 1890s, ‘imperialism’ had become a more neutral term. 
Essentially, it now referred the sentiment of those in favour of empire, which could be 
either bad or good. Those who strongly defended the British Empire maintained that it 
was founded on freedom and justice, meaning that imperialism too embodied these 
virtues. It was in this sense that Lord Curzon referred to himself as a ‘convinced and 
unconquerable Imperialist’ in 1908.87  
 
However, these developments did not occur without criticism. At the height of popular 
enthusiasm for the British Empire, a critical tradition was developing in which the name 
and concept ‘imperialism’ were to become central. The ‘Scramble for Africa’, clashes 
over spheres of influence in China (following its 1895 defeat by Japan), and the Boer 
War of 1899, led a number of radicals to posit that a new, aggressive phase of 
international expansion was beginning.
88
 These critics sought to link these changes in 
foreign policy to transformations in the European capitalism.  
 
The most famous of these critics was John A. Hobson, a radical liberal whose theories 
provided the bedrock for much later thinking about imperialism.
89
 In his 1902 book 
Imperialism: A Study, Hobson maintained that this new imperialism differed very much 
from the old visions of empire: 
  
[F]irst in substituting for the ambition of a single growing empire the theory and 
practice of competing empires, each motivated by similar lusts of political 
aggrandisement and commercial gain; secondly, in the dominance of financial or 
investing over mercantile interests.
90
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Hobson argued that the internal conditions of European capitalism had resulted in a 
class of economic ‘parasites’ coming to prominence, centred mainly in the finance 
sector.
91
 This class had accumulated a vast amount of profits. Since it was not based in 
the productive sector, it did not invest its profits, instead primarily saving them.
92
 This 
led to under-consumption and over-production, leading to a squeeze on profits.  
 
In order to offset this, whilst maintaining the wealth of the financial class, it was 
necessary to turn abroad.
93
 If capital was exported, it would be possible to take 
advantage of foreign demand and therefore maintain profits. Such demand was most 
readily found in undeveloped nations that had not yet acquired a large class of 
‘parasites’.94 However, in order to secure this, it was necessary for the state to forcefully 
open up such nations to this ‘investment’. Hobson characterised the period as one 
defined by attempts to annex and transform ‘backward’ territory through military force, 
‘diplomacy’ and economic measures as well as heightened competition between 
imperial powers.
95
 This was imperialism.  
 
As a liberal, Hobson thought that it was possible to remain within the coordinates of 
capitalism without succumbing to imperialism, by distributing wealth to the working 
classes, who were less likely to save.
96
 Although Hobson’s solution was not shared by 
all, his analysis was very influential. A whole host of radical commentators adopted 
Hobson’s ‘under-consumptionist’97 approach and all used the language of 
‘imperialism’.98  
 
Equally, defenders of the new expansionism advanced arguments similar to those of 
Hobson.
99
 For example, Charles Conant argued that if the US was to prosper it would 
need to deploy its excess capital in ‘countries which have not yet felt the pulse of 
modern progress’, in particular Asia and Africa.100 However, unlike Hobson, he viewed 
this resulting not from distribution, but from ‘a natural law of economic and race 
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development’.101 For Conant, the expansion of capital exports was the only way for ‘the 
entire fabric of the present economic order ... not to be shaken by a social revolution’.102 
 
Whilst Hobson’s theory was extremely influential, it has been the Marxist tradition that 
‘has been the dominant idiom in the analysis of modern imperialism’.103 Although 
Hobson was not a Marxist, his thinking on the question of imperialism bore a close 
affinity with the Marxist tradition and Marxists frequently cited him.
104
 The intellectual 
grandfather of Marxist theories of imperialism is undoubtedly Rudolf Hilferding. 
Hilferding was an Austrian Marxist and one of the most important figures in the 
German Social Democratic Party (SPD). In 1910 he wrote Finance Capital. In this 
work, he sought to analyse the transition from a liberal, competitive capitalism to a 
monopolistic capitalism and trace its attendant effects.  
 
Hilferding argued that Marx’s predictions as to the concentration of capital105 had 
proved correct, with the development of capitalist industries leading to the formation of 
economic cartels. Most importantly, it had led to the concentration of the banking 
sector.
106
 Large industrial cartels require continuous lines of credit in order to expand 
their production, which encourages the formation of bank cartels. These cartels are 
attracted to the higher profits and stability that come from industrial cartels and so 
encourage and participate in mergers.
107
 For Hilferding, contemporary capitalism was 
characterised by finance capital – a situation in which financial and industrial capital 
had merged into large monopolistic blocs. 
 
Hilferding argued that this had turned capitalists against free trade.
108
 Cartels pushed for 
tariff walls around their economic territory, within which profit could be assured. 
However, protectionism is obviously also problematic, since it limits potential markets. 
There were two ways to offset this. The first was to expand the territory contained 
within the tariff wall, through the acquisition of colonies. The second was the export of 
capital – whereby a subsidiary company would be set up abroad, which would transfer 
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profits back to the mother country. Since capital tended to flow into regions in which a 
higher rate of profit could be achieved, the export of capital would tend to take place in 
less developed regions. 
 
Both of these solutions required a policy of continuous state expansion. Additionally, 
the peasant-based social systems of the under-developed countries would have to be 
forcibly transformed so as to create a working class. Hilferding therefore maintained 
that ‘the export of capital ... encourages an imperialist policy’109 whereby ‘[t]he ideal 
now is to secure for one’s own nation the domination of the world, an aspiration as 
unbounded as the capitalist lust for profit from which it springs’.110 
 
As Brewer notes, Hilferding did not develop a systematic theory of imperialism. Whilst 
he had laid the elements for the dominant understanding of the term, he was primarily 
concerned with the internal dimensions of capitalism and lacked ‘any clear concept of 
imperialism’.111 It was only when Bukharin and Lenin drew together the threads of this 
theory, that the concept of ‘imperialism’ assumed its prime theoretical and political 
role.
112
 Bukharin’s Imperialism and World Economy and Lenin’s Imperialism: The 
Highest Stage of Capitalism are perhaps the most important texts in the development of 
the concept of imperialism. Lenin and Bukharin both accepted Hilferding’s description 
of the centrality of monopolistic finance capital. They agreed that this meant the export 
of capital became central and that advanced capitalist states were compelled to dominate 
and control territory. 
 
What was distinctive about Bukharin’s and Lenin’s approach was the argument that 
these developments taken together represented a qualitatively distinctive stage of 
capitalism.
113
 For them, as will be expanded below (see Chapter 3, Section 1.2.2. ), 
imperialism was not simply the contingent outcome of national aggression, or 
competing national interests. Rather these actions were part of a wider imperialist world 
system, and were determined by the economic imperatives of capitalist exploitation, 
expansion and accumulation. 
114
 In their accounts, imperialism was thus not a result of 
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arbitrary or selfish preferences, but was rather the product of tendencies generated by 
capitalist social relations. Thus,  and driving imperialism was a pattern or logic – that of 
capitalism – which drove and determined those actions which took place within it. 
This understanding of imperialism did not become important simply because of its 
intellectual strength. Instead it gained in importance for profoundly political reasons. 
Lenin and Bukharin initially articulated their theories of imperialism in response to the 
growing competition between European powers. They predicted that one of the 
consequences of this rivalry would be a war between them for control of the rest of the 
world. In the 1910s this was the central debate in discussions about imperialism.
115
 The 
Bolsheviks, as well as a number of their left-wing allies, predicted increased rivalry and 
war. Others thought that imperialism was headed towards a ‘combination’ of various 
powers that would ‘peacefully’ exploit the world together.116 These disputes had 
political consequences. If war was a structural feature of imperialist capitalism, then 
opposition to war needed to be part of any revolutionary programme. This entailed 
ignoring any justifications of ‘self-defence’ and transforming imperialist war into civil 
war.
117
  
  
The First World War seemed to confirm this analysis. The Social Democratic 
movement split, with some voting to support their own countries and the ‘Zimmerwald 
Left’ adopting the political line of Lenin and Bukharin.118 The bloodshed occasioned by 
that war, as well as the various revolutionary moments that arose in its aftermath
119
 lent 
the Lenin-Bukharin theory of imperialism a great deal of credence. A further result of 
this was that ‘imperialism’ essentially became a negative word. The examples of 
individuals, movements or states to declare themselves as ‘imperialist’ became 
increasingly rare. In this way, the Marxist usage of the term imperialism came to 
predominate.  
  
As a result of the ‘betrayal’ of the European Social Democratic parties, the Bolsheviks 
also looked to other political allies in the struggle against capitalism. They argued that if 
imperialism was a necessary aspect of capitalism, the struggle against imperialism was 
vital to any global socialist project. They made overtures to the non-European, anti-
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colonial movements, and enshrined self-determination in their international political 
programme.
120
  
 
The alliance between the Marxist tradition and the anti-colonial movement was 
important for a number of reasons, but what is vital for this story is that it meant that 
something approximating a Leninist theory of imperialism was at the core of the anti-
colonial movement.
121
 This was further strengthened by the Chinese Revolution and the 
aftermath of the Second World War, where the Communist strand in the anti-colonial 
movement was strong and the Soviet Union made ‘anti-imperialism’ and ‘self-
determination’ a centrepiece of its international policy.122 As Koebner and Schmidt 
point out, during the interwar period and afterwards, ‘an international communis opinio’ 
had formed for which ‘economic imperialism had become an accepted fact’.123 
 
The Cuban Revolution of 1959, as well as the wave of Third Worldist Marxist 
movements throughout the 1960s and 1970s all ensured the continued centrality of this 
alliance. This was also reflected in the centrality of anti-imperialist politics to radical 
movements within the metropolis.
124
 The theoretical consequences of these political 
developments meant that throughout the 20
th
 century, imperialism was primarily 
understood in the sense tentatively articulated by Hobson and concretised by the 
Marxist tradition. Essentially, it was seen to refer to an international capitalist economic 
system, in which an economic logic of exploitation predominated, occasioning political 
and military intervention.  
 
The Third World had always been characterised by a split between its more radical and 
more moderate elements. This was partly reflected in attitudes towards the Soviet Union 
or the People’s Republic of China, but also manifested in terms of the domestic and 
international political programmes pursued upon independence. Whilst a basic ‘lowest 
common denominator’ unity had been guaranteed in conferences like 1955 Afro Asian 
Conference in Bandung,
125
 more radical states constantly attempted to crate alternative 
Third World blocs and associations. These states advocated armed struggle against 
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imperialism and solidarity with other radical anti-imperialist movements. These radical 
states were proponents of a socialist programme, insisting that only a global overthrow 
of capitalism would liberate the Third World. As such, they also had occasion to 
condemn those Third World regimes who they claimed were acting to further the 
interests of imperialism.  
 
By the late 1970s these tensions began to concretise. There was now a much clearer 
divide between the more radical states (such as Algeria and Cuba), who sought to 
oppose imperialism tout court, and more moderate states (such as Singapore or India) 
who cast their project in terms of development and modernisation. This division shaped 
Third World efforts to act in common, making their actions vulnerable to co-optation by 
the major powers. By the end of this period, the Third World bloc had splintered along 
these political and economic lines.
126
 This was underlined by the debt crises 
experienced by numerous countries in the Third World towards the end of the 1970s, 
which opened the door to intervention from the International Monetary Fund.
127
  
 
By the 1980s this situation had hardened. The USSR and the socialist bloc had entered a 
period of stagnation and the metropolitan radical anti-imperialist movements had been 
roundly defeated. Thus, even before the fall of the USSR, there were powerful forces 
that had undermined the strength of movements invoking ‘imperialism’. This particular 
confluence of events was part of the broader arc of neo-liberal economic restructuring in 
both the metropolitan and peripheral states.
128
 As alternatives to neo-liberalism became 
increasingly rare, so too did explicitly anti-imperialist movements. The decline of these 
movements and the fall of the USSR (with the concomitant discrediting of Marxism) 
meant that usage of the term ‘imperialism’ both fragmented and decreased.129 Such was 
the situation in 1990 that Prabhat Patnaik could justifiably ask ‘whatever has happened 
to imperialism?’.130 
 
However, the situation has undergone something of a reversal. Just as in the late 1800s a 
wave of militarism stimulated thinking about imperialism, so too did a similar wave in 
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the 1990s and 2000s.
131
 To some degree, this began with the 1999 NATO intervention 
in Kosovo, which split the forces of the left, with some describing it as a necessary war 
against tyranny, but others invoking the language of imperialism.
132
 However, this 
language remained marginal. It was not until the combination of the War on Terror and 
the invasion of Iraq that the language of ‘empire’ and ‘imperialism’ made a comeback 
to public, academic and activist spheres.  
 
The aggressive ‘unilateralism’ of the George W. Bush Presidency, culminating in the 
invasion of Iraq, led to ‘a virtual cascade’133 of mainstream commentators reviving the 
language of empire to both endorse
134
 and denounce US policy.
135
 Although these 
commentators have not generally used the language of imperialism, it too has made 
something of a comeback. This has been reinforced by the revival of peripheral regimes 
utilising the language of ‘imperialism’ to condemn advanced capitalist countries, 
particularly Latin American left-wing governments. 
 
In popular and political parlance, imperialism has had a long journey. A large part of 
this journey has been the shift from ‘sentiment to theory’,136 with ‘imperialism’ 
increasingly coming to denote a systematic world order. However, this history also 
highlights a range of issues around which there have been huge debates.  
 
4.2 Imperialism or Empire-ism? 
One of the prime controversies around the term ‘imperialism’ has been its relationship 
to the idea of ‘empire’. As previously noted, on a purely linguistic level, imperialism is 
derived from imperium. A number of scholars have followed this linguistic priority in 
essentially treating ‘imperialism’ as the ‘ism’ of ‘empire’. In some instances, such as 
Curzon’s description of imperialism as ‘the essence or spirit of Empire’,137 imperialism 
is taken to mean a kind of ‘ideology’ of empire. However, in most instances of ‘empire-
ism’, imperialism is treated as the ‘more active cognate’138 of empire. In such a vision, 
imperialism is essentially empire-in-action, referring to the ‘actual process by which 
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empires are formed and maintained’139 or the ‘actions ... which create or uphold’140 
empires. Yet, as is evidenced from the foregoing account, imperialism emerged in a 
very different historical context and was actually counterposed to empire. 
 
The particular historical context in which ‘imperialism’ emerged illustrates 
imperialism’s distinctiveness. Imperialism’s popularity as a term solidified following 
the ‘Scramble for Africa’. The two factors that were seen to mark this period out from 
those which proceeded it were a newly unlimited desire for expansion into peripheral 
territories, and mission of fundamental transformation that this expansion now 
undertook.  
 
In the first instance, then, imperialism is understood as denoting an endless drive 
towards expansion. Schumpeter, for instance, was at pains to distinguish between a state 
pursuing ‘concrete interests of its own’ and imperialism. In the case of imperialism 
‘there is always the implication ... of an aggressiveness that is only kindled anew by 
each success; of an aggressiveness for its own sake’.141 Similarly, Hannah Arendt, went 
so far as to state that ‘[e]xpansion as a permanent and supreme aim of politics is the 
central political idea of imperialism’.142 Arendt contrasted this directly with conceptions 
of empire-building, in which expansion was not conducted for expansion’s sake, and 
which required stability.
143
 
 
As indicated by Arendt’s invocation of ‘stability’ and ‘institutions’, the term 
imperialism has also concerned the manner of the expansion undertaken by 
metropolitan powers. Whilst international expansion has always had some kind of 
economic basis, it had not historically been bound up with transforming other 
territories. Prior to the 1800s, European expansion had generally been concerned with 
trade, the extraction of raw materials and the levying of tribute. Whilst all of these 
necessitated control of peripheral territories, they did not require massive social 
transformation. Instead, pre-existing social forms were used to enforce discipline or 
were taxed for tribute.
144
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However, for those scholars who argue for a distinctive idea of imperialism, something 
specific happened in the 1800s. In this period expansion also involved massive 
transformation. This was both physical, in the case of building factories, roads and 
railways, and social, with peasants being transformed into workers, and internal forms 
of governance transformed to facilitate this. For many commentators at the time this 
was indicative of a transformation from the export of commodities to the export of 
capital. Once capital was exported directly, it was necessary to export capitalism (as a 
form of social organisation) as well. This also fundamentally altered the methods 
through which economic extraction would occur, with the role of finance and loans 
becoming more prominent. Brailsford described well the essential features of 
imperialism as ‘the epoch of concession hunting, of coolie labour, of chartered 
companies, of loans to semi-civilised Powers, of the “opening up” of “dying 
empires”’.145 
 
Taken together, these two features were seen to represent a fundamental break with the 
concept of ‘empire’. As A.P. Thornton proposed, imperialism was: 
  
[E]nergy. It was dynamic, a “happening” – as the spread of railways in India and 
the discovery of oil in the Persian Gulf, in the North Sea, and on the Arctic slope 
were and are happenings. Imperialism infiltrates and invades ... Larger than any 
one territory, it relates this territory to an outside and unheard of world whose 
purposes can only be conjectured. But the wish to know, rather than to guess, 
how all these things are done, is almost at once implanted. Imperialism thus 
creates new kinds of thinking and new states of mind ... It sets up new social and 
economic structures and, quite literally, dislocates and disorients those who had 
their place in the old social and economic structures ... Imperialism is therefore 
like the old-time religion: it is a mover and a shaker.
146
 
 
For Thornton, this is directly contradictory to ‘empire’, the essence of which ‘is not 
motion ... [i]t is control’. Empires are composed of ‘fixed structures’ and ‘organized 
institution[s], run by a bureaucracy, with set routines within stated territorial bounds’.147 
Here Thornton manages to capture the key issue that is said to distinguish imperialism 
from ‘empire-ism’. As noted previously, even with the concept of ‘informal empire’, 
empire has generally hinged on some vision of effective territorial control. Whilst this 
control may be achieved through formal or informal means, the element of control itself 
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is generally seen as vital. By contrast, for those using imperialism as a distinct term 
control is not vital. The focus is shifted to expansion, transformation and exploitation.
148
  
   
4.3. Capitalism, Atavism and the ‘Taproot’ of Imperialism 
What initially looks like a merely semantic disagreement, then, is actually one about the 
specificity of ‘imperialism’.149 As will be discussed in Chapter 3, for those following 
Lenin and Bukharin this specificity was rooted in monopoly capitalism. However, there 
have been other thinkers who, whilst holding to a concept of ‘imperialism’ as 
historically distinctive, did not link it to capitalist social relations alone. Perhaps the 
most prominent exponent of such a view was Schumpeter. According to Schumpeter, a 
‘purely capitalist world’ could not offer ‘fertile soil to imperialist impulses’.150 This was 
because capitalist competition had an individualising and rationalising effect, such that 
all warlike impulses would be absorbed into non-violent capitalist competition
151
 and 
free trade allowed goods to flow across the globe.
152
 
 
Accordingly, there must be something else that drives imperialism. For Schumpeter, this 
something else is the ‘living conditions of the past’.153 He argued that the bourgeoisie 
came into a world that had already been formed by absolutist monarchies. These 
monarchies had co-opted the rising bourgeoisie in order to pre-empt any possibility of a 
bourgeois revolution. What this meant was that when capitalist social relations finally 
established their dominance in Europe, they were saturated in autocratic militarism and 
nationalism. Hence, whilst not ‘creatures of capitalism’, nationalism and militarism 
became ‘capitalized’ and drew ‘their best energies from capitalism’.154  
 
Rather than understanding imperialism as modern, Schumpeter saw it as a kind of 
feudal hangover, which would be undermined by a ‘purer’ capitalism. Thorstein Veblen 
mounted a similar argument in respect of Germany in 1915, stating that German 
imperialism resulted from the combination of an industrial revolution brought about by 
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capitalism, and the dynastic ‘Prussian’ state bequeathed to Germany by its ‘late’ 
political development. Owing to this, the militaristic ambitions of feudal political 
organisation and culture were combined with modern methods of warfare.
155
 
 
Schumpeter and Veblen were part of a small number of scholars who both held onto a 
conception of imperialism as distinct from ‘empire’ but did not understand it as related 
to inherent tendencies in capitalism.
156
 In their accounts, imperialism is about the 
collision of an economic logic of modern capitalism with the cultural and political 
dimensions of pre-capitalist modes of governance. Although these approaches are 
different from Marxist explanations, they nonetheless did understand the importance of 
(capitalist) economic logic to imperialism, even if imperialism did not spring directly 
from inherent tendencies within this logic. What they underline is the number of 
debates about the causes and motives driving imperialism, what Hobson called 
imperialism’s ‘taproot’.157  
  
Other, non-Marxist, historians have focused on the expanding needs of Britain’s 
economy to explain British imperialism.
158
 However, these scholars have also paid close 
attention to the ‘official mind’159 of imperialism, seeking to explain the ways in which 
state actors came to promote policies of imperial expansion. For many historians such 
an approach is necessary because imperialism cannot be explained by economic 
motives.
160
 David Landes, for example, insisted that the British Empire was generally 
unprofitable, and that ‘[f]ormal imperialism ... rarely paid’.161 For Landes, this did not 
mean that some individuals did not profit from imperialism.
162
 However, he argued that 
looking at these specific individuals would necessarily involve constructing a theory of 
how they were able to ‘gain the ear’ of officials. In assessing the motives for 
imperialism, he suggested, it was vital to look at those factors which propelled officials 
and the general public into imperialist adventures, such as ‘amour propre’163 and ‘lofty 
sentiments of prestige and humanity’.164 
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Such an approach has been important to those scholars who subscribe to a view of 
imperialism as ‘empire-ism’. Given that ‘empires’ have existed for as long as 
‘civilisation’,165 the forces that drive it must necessarily be broad. One response to this –
common in International Relations – is to root imperialism in power politics. As Hans 
Morgenthau put it: 
 
What the precapitalist imperialist, the capitalist imperialist, and the 
“imperialistic capitalist” want is power, not economic gain. The captain of 
industry is no more driven toward his “imperialistic goal” by economic necessity 
or personal greed than was Napoleon I. Personal gain and the solution of 
economic problems through imperialistic expansion are for all of them a 
pleasant afterthought, a welcome by-product, not the goal by which the 
imperialistic urge is attracted.
166
 
 
Morgenthau located international behaviour in the categories of ‘power’ and ‘interest’. 
States act in order to acquire power and further their national interests. For Morgenthau, 
imperialism was simply a special subset of this, where particularly glaring imbalances 
of power encouraged more powerful states to engage in expansive foreign policies that 
threatened the status quo.
167
 This argument – that there is an inherent drive towards 
imperialism which is actualised in situations of extreme imbalance – forms the structure 
of a number of ‘political’ interpretations of imperialism. 
 
Benjamin Cohen, for example, proposed that in an ‘anarchical’ international system of 
sovereign states, imperialism is essentially inevitable. In a formulation reminiscent of 
Hobbes,
168
 Cohen stated that ‘in an anarchy there can be no such thing as absolute 
security’ since all states ‘are free to use force at any time to achieve their national 
objectives’.169 This means that any state, even a non-aggressive one ‘must be constantly 
prepared to counter force with force, or pay the price of weakness’.170 In such a 
situation, he continued, it is rational for states to have several strategic options open at 
any one time. But the only way in which several options can be kept open is through the 
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maximisation of power.
171
 For Cohen, ‘imperialistic behavior is a perfectly rational 
strategy of foreign policy’172 in a world structured around competing sovereignties and 
international anarchy.
173
 One could multiply infinitely the number of examples of 
scholarship making similar arguments.
174
 
 
What marks out many of the ‘political’ theories of imperialism is that they place stress 
on its ‘rationality’. In this, some have suggested, they share a ‘defect’ with the Marxist 
tradition, since imperialism in fact stems from ‘irrational’ drives. Max Weber stressed 
the role of ‘prestige’ in generating conflicts, rivalries and expansionism between Great 
Powers.
175
 Great powers sought ‘the glory of power over other communities’ through 
‘the expansion of power’.176 This striving for prestige in turn cane up against the 
striving of other Great Powers, leading to rivalry and conflict. This ‘irrational element’ 
had a ‘prominent effect’ in ‘all political foreign relations’,177 particularly those of 
imperialism.  
 
When such ‘irrational’ factors are seen as driving imperialism, the focus has tended to 
shift from questions of politics and economics to those of culture, ideology and 
psychology.
178
 Langer, for example, contended that ‘Neo-Marxian critics have paid ... 
too little attention to the imponderable, psychological ingredients of imperialism’.179 
Like Weber, Langer argued that ‘feudalistic ideas of honor and prestige’ structured how 
‘men ... interpret international relations’.180 However, unlike Weber, Langer sought to 
root this drive in the specific transformations of European culture and society. He 
suggested that the drive to imperialism had to be interpreted in the light of the newly 
enfranchised working classes. The ‘industrial and white-collar classes’ had a ‘craving 
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for excitement’ and ‘spectatorial lust’ which the media was able to satisfy through 
stories of ‘[c]olonial adventure and far-away conflict’.181  
 
At the same time, European political thought had come to be dominated by ideas of 
‘Social Darwinism’ and ‘the biological conception of political and international 
relations’182 It was believed that the ‘Great Powers’ were biologically destined to 
supplant the ‘weaker races’.183 This was reflected in theories of ‘divine will’ and 
‘manifest destiny’, which drove forward processes of imperial expansion. The 
combination of these two factors leads to Langer’s main conclusion about the driving 
force behind imperialism – nationalism. For Langer, imperialism was ‘a projection of 
nationalism beyond the boundaries of Europe’,184 with this nationalism rooted in social 
Darwinism and a lust for aggressiveness. Many historians have followed this 
argument,
185
 with D.K. Fieldhouse, for instance, claiming that imperialism was the 
outcome of ‘fevered nationalism’ and ‘irrational concepts’ which held ‘inherent 
attractions for the masses’.186 
 
Implicit (and explicit) in such theories is a condemnation of imperialism. Yet there have 
been those who have held to a cultural and psychological theory of imperialism without 
opposing it. Thus, Curzon rooted the rise of the British Empire in the ‘instinct’ to spread 
progress
187
 and Koebner and Schmidt opined that ‘the savage customs of African tribes 
could not leave Victorian Englishmen indifferent’.188 In this vision, the emphasis is 
shifted from the compulsion to dominate other societies to one of ‘tutelage’.  
   
4.4. From Rivalry to Development and Back Again 
As will now be clear, there has been a great deal of disagreement over imperialism’s 
particular place in history, and the forces which drive it. However, some of the most 
important disagreements have concerned imperialism’s relation to the violence 
occasioned by rivalry between imperialist powers. For the classical writers of 
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imperialism, rivalry was an absolutely central aspect of imperialism. Hobson argued 
that ‘the competition of rival Empires’ was the ‘leading characteristic of ... modern 
Imperialism’.189 Similarly, for Lenin, what made imperialism distinct was that the world 
was marked by ‘intense ... competition’ and a ‘desperate ... struggle for the acquisition 
of colonies’.190 
 
So important was this element of rivalry, that some have argued the concept of 
imperialism articulated by the classical theorists bears very little resemblance to 
subsequent accounts. Brewer, for instance, notes that ‘[f]or the classical Marxists 
[imperialism] meant, primarily, rivalry between major capitalist countries’ where ‘the 
less developed countries figure mainly as passive battlegrounds, not as active 
participants.
191
 Others have gone further than this, Eric Stokes held that Hilferding, 
Lenin and Bukharin were ‘concerned not to provide a theoretical analysis of the 
scramble for colonies ... but for the genesis of war in Europe’.192 Echoing this argument, 
but going further, Norman Etherington claimed that all of the major classical theorists 
had understood imperialism in these terms.
193
 Ultimately, such arguments are probably 
an exaggeration.
194
 But issues of rivalry certainly did occupy the locus of the early 
debates.  
 
The most important debate in this respect was the response to Kautsky’s claim that all 
of the imperialist powers would united together in an ‘ultra-imperialist’ bloc, which 
would collectively exploit the world. Kautsky rooted imperialism in the relationship 
between agriculture and industry.
195
 For Kautsky, it is necessary that the output of each 
these sectors must match the demand of the other.
196
 Under capitalism, this is a problem 
because industrial production is much more dynamic.
197
 Accumulation occurs much 
more rapidly in industry than in agriculture, leading to the overproduction of industrial 
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commodities destined for agriculture and underproduction of ‘foodstuffs and raw 
materials’ needed for industry.198 This causes crises. 
 
To stave off these crisis tendencies, industrial capitalist nations are driven ‘to conquer 
and annex an ever-greater agrarian zone’.199 In order to do so on a greater scale, it was 
necessary to create a modern transport infrastructure, which required the export of 
capital.
200
 Equally, the advanced industrial states wanted to secure the continued supply 
of agricultural production, and so sought to prevent the agrarian countries from 
developing into independent industrial centres.
201
 Kautsky argued that this did occasion 
rivalry between advanced industrial states, but that there was no economic necessity for 
this rivalry.
202
 Instead, he suggested that capitalism was threatened by this rivalry, and 
so cooperation was the rational response. He prophesised that advanced industrial 
powers might unite in an ‘ultra-imperialist’ bloc.203 
 
Lenin insisted that the only function of Kautsky’s conception of ultra-imperialism could 
be ‘a preamble to propaganda for peace and unity with the opportunists and the social-
chauvinists’ because it ‘obscures the very profound and fundamental contradictions of 
imperialism’.204 Following Hobson, Lenin argued that ‘competition between several 
imperialisms’205 was the defining feature of imperialism. For Lenin, imperialists were 
not simply driven to annex agriculture but all territory. Hence, rivalry was not simply a 
policy but was driven by an unceasing economic imperative to expand, which could 
only give way to occasional truce periods.
206
 
  
To some degree, the Second World War could be analysed through the rubric of inter-
imperialist rivalry, but this was complicated by the difference between the ‘democratic’ 
and fascist countries and the involvement of the USSR in the conflict.
207
 The Cold War 
seemed to lend credence to a Kautskyian account of ultra-imperialism, since the world 
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was dominated by ‘two super powers, only one of which was capitalist’.208 This was 
reinforced by the rise of the US to a position of unparalleled economic, political and 
military dominance. At this point it was plausible to suggest that imperialism in general 
could be identified with the US.
209
 Some Marxists, arguing that the Soviet Union was 
state capitalist
210
 or ‘social-imperialist’,211 characterised the Cold War as a new form of 
inter-imperialist rivalry. Others pointed to the growth of European and Japanese 
economies as a challenge to the power of the US.
212
 Even in these accounts, though, 
making rivalry the prime locus of an account of imperialism was untenable.  
  
While imperialism still remained a term for the capitalist world system, the focus was 
now on the relationship between the ‘advanced’ and ‘backward’ parts of this system. 
Military violence was still an important consideration. However, rather than the 
violence between imperialist powers, it was the violence deployed by these powers 
against peripheral states which was foregrounded. This was evident in the use of the 
language of anti-imperialism in radical opposition to the Vietnam war.
213
 This led to a 
shift in attention to questions of growth and development. Whereas the classical 
accounts focused on the economic pressures generating rivalry, the Cold War accounts 
‘present capitalism as a system of exploitation of one area by another, so development 
in a few places is at the expense of the ‘development of underdevelopment’ in most of 
the world’.214  
  
This was evident across a number of traditions. In the Marxist tradition, Paul Baran 
argued that the underdevelopment of certain regions of the world was not simply a 
‘matter of fortuitous accident or of some racial peculiarities of different peoples’, but 
was determined by ‘the nature of Western European development itself’.215 He 
continued that Western colonisation of the non-European world had smothered their 
infant industries and created lopsided forms of economic development specialising in 
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primary commodity exports.
216
 The majority of the ‘economic surplus’ from these 
activities was appropriated by the Western capitalists and transferred elsewhere, 
meaning it could not be reinvested in the underdeveloped state.
217
 This created a tiny 
class of ‘wealthy compradors, powerful monopolists, and large landowners’ that 
profited from the situation and would be displaced should any more extensive 
development occur.
218
 Consequently, this elite would block any form of social or 
economic progress.  
 
Baran’s work, and that of the Monthly Review School, were both influential and 
reflective of broader trends.
219
 World Systems theorists similarly located the dynamics 
of imperialism in the transfer of value from the periphery to the core. This transfer of 
value means that the accumulation of capital (investment) could therefore not occur in 
the periphery, leading to a structure of dependency. This was said to lead to, in Frank’s 
memorable words, was the ‘development of underdevelopment’,220 whereby the 
development of the core was dependent upon and caused underdevelopment in the 
periphery.
221
  
 
In a similar vein, the ‘dependency theory’ school maintained that terms of trade in the 
world economy disadvantaged primary commodity exports, such that countries reliant 
on these exports would face ever more unfavourable returns on their exports. 
Accordingly, they would be unable to invest sufficiently to secure domestic 
development, occasioning dependency.
222
 This had real policy impact in Latin America, 
where the economic regime of import-substitution-industrialisation was deployed in an 
attempt to reverse the effects of underdevelopment.
223
 All of these accounts were not 
identical but what is remarkable is the degree to which, by the 1960s, a concern with 
rivalry had been replaced by one of development.
224
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However, as with much of thinking about imperialism, the situation changed somewhat 
following the collapse of the USSR, when the nature of US imperialism was once again 
called to the fore. The interventions in the 2000s met with opposition from other 
powerful states such as Russia, China and some European states. Excluding perhaps 
China, the capitalist credentials of these states are not in doubt, making an account of 
rivalry between capitalist powers once again much more plausible. Consequently, a 
number of works were published which sought to understand imperialism in terms of 
geo-political competition and inter-imperialist rivalry.
225
 This has been accompanied by 
a number of works charting the rise in economic and political importance of Brazil, 
Russia, India, China and South Africa (the so-called BRICs).
226
 In this way, the debate 
has come full circle. Whilst issues of development clearly remain, the debate over 
rivalry has made a return. Moreover, in the debates as to the nature of the BRICS 
questions of development and rivalry have become inextricably intertwined. 
 
Even if the classical theorists of imperialism reserved that term ‘imperialism’ for the 
rivalry between advanced capitalist powers, they nonetheless dealt with many issues of 
‘development’ under the rubric of colonialism. This points to the need to understand the 
relationship between imperialism and colonialism.  
  
 
5. Colonialism  
Colonialism has received relatively little sustained theoretical attention. In 1972, Ronald 
Horvath went so far as to declare that ‘Western scholars have not really come to grips 
with the phenomenon’.227 Some twenty five years later, Jürgen Osterhammel was to 
repeat this, characterising colonialism as a ‘phenomenon of colossal vagueness’.228  
 
5.1. The Roman Inheritance  
As with empire and imperialism, colonialism finds its root in Latin. It is derived from 
the term colonia, which itself was derived from the term colonus. Colonus was the 
Roman word for a farmer or planter, referring to tenant farmers who worked on imperial 
estates.
229
 The attributes of farming and cultivation also gave rise to a second meaning 
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of colonus – the settler. In this meaning, the colonus was an individual who would settle 
upon previously ‘uncultivated’ land and ‘improve’ it. 
 
Consequently, colonia had the general meaning of a farm and a more technical 
meaning, referring to the public settlement of Roman citizens in hostile, newly 
conquered or ‘virgin’ territories. A group of Roman citizens would receive a grant of 
land from the Senate, allowing them to settle and work. Settlers were primarily 
composed of the lower orders of Roman society and military veterans. In the former 
case, coloniae operated as a ‘safety valve’ for overpopulation and, in the latter case, 
land was conceived as a reward for faithful military service. In both instances ‘[t]he 
creation of coloniae allowed Rome to extend its people, culture, and control over the 
hostile, foreign, or desired territories’.230  
  
The settlers ‘carried’ their Roman citizenship with them, retaining its privileges and 
benefits. Consequently, coloniae attained the legal status of ius Italicum, meaning that 
they were legally considered part of Italian soil. Vitally, this legal status meant that the 
colonies were not subject to the legal jurisdiction of provincial governors and were also 
not subject to direct taxation.
231
 With the spread of Roman influence, this juridical 
aspect came the fore. Across Italy a number of cities had been created by ‘foreigners’ 
which were later incorporated into the Roman system. Such cities were governed by the 
ius Latii, a system of less-extensive rights granted to ‘Latin’ peoples. These cities came 
to perform a vital role in Roman society and clamoured to be able to gain colonia as a 
status, so as to be subject to the ius Italicum. 
  
The establishment of the Roman Empire under Augustus solidified this. Colonia came 
to refer to a juridical status assigned to certain territories in the Empire, which would be 
entitled to the legal privileges of the ius Italicum. This meant that it could be extended 
to territories that had not been previously settled by Roman citizens.
232
 In this brief 
examination of the history of the term colonia one can observe a certain tension. On the 
one hand, colonia referred to the specific phenomenon settling Roman citizens in 
territory. On the other hand, it was a more general juridical status denoting the 
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relationship between an Empire and its foreign territories. This tension never went 
away. 
 
5.2. Settlement or Domination? 
The Roman system was perhaps the most developed example of a ‘phenomenon is as 
old as human settlement itself’ – the migration of settlers.233 Ancient Great Powers all 
engaged in projects of colonisation.
234
 In fact, as Olufemi Taiwo points out, such 
colonisation was not simply a prerogative of Great Powers, but was common within 
smaller societies, where fluctuations in population and food supply would regularly lead 
to migration.
235
 Etymological accounts of colonialism have therefore tended to identify 
the presence of settlers as the distinguishing feature of colonialism. For instance, in 
1900 Henry Morris insisted that: 
 
[T]he essential characteristic of a colony is the common nationality of the 
original settlers; these latter must recognize one flag, must have emigrated in 
some considerable numbers from the same fatherland, and must have been 
strong enough to transport with themselves their language, customs, and laws, 
transplanting them to the foreign soil.
236
 
 
Morris’ position reflects the general understanding of colonies and colonisation that 
prevailed until the late 1800s. As Moses Finley noted, ‘for more than three hundred 
years ... there was complete agreement that a colony was a plantation of men, a place to 
which men emigrated and settled’.237 Whilst Canada or the United States might be 
understood as colonies, India would not. However, as previously noted, this was only 
part of the story. Even in the canonical Roman example, the colonia was eventually 
distinguished not by the presence of settlers but through juridical fiat. In such a 
definition, the salient factor was not so much settlement, as the power dynamics of the 
Roman Empire.  
 
Analytically, the absence of power and domination from a definition of colonisation is 
highly problematic. As Ania Loomba notes, a focus purely on the question of settlers 
‘avoids any reference to people other than the colonisers, people who might already 
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have been living in those places where colonies were established’.238 Except in a small 
number of cases, the land that was to become a settler-colony was not empty of pre-
existing inhabitants. A vital aspect of colonisation was dealing with these inhabitants. 
In some cases this involved exterminating the majority of the native populations, but 
often European powers had to live with and ‘manage’ them.  
 
Whereas a vision of colonies focused on settlers tended to be romantic, one which 
focused on native populations tended to be more critical. As the radical theorists from 
Hobson onwards deployed the critical concept of imperialism, colonies became more 
associated with domination. Hobson himself represents something of a transitional 
figure. He frequently alluded to ‘true’ or ‘genuine’ colonies, based on settlement and the 
retention of citizenship by the settlers.
239
 These colonies had ‘responsible self-
government’ and could be considered ‘a genuine expansion of nationality’.240 
 
This genuine colonialism had to be contrasted with imperialism. Although a number of 
colonies had been established at the end of the 1800s, Hobson claimed that these were 
‘representative of the spirit of Imperialism rather than of colonialism’.241 Imperialism 
required the export of capital to under-developed regions. Consequently, the new 
‘colonies’ were established in tropical regions. Since the natives of these societies were 
also necessary to serve as the labour for the exported capital, they could not be 
exterminated. Accordingly, extensive migration and settlement of Europeans would not 
be possible. This meant these societies could not be subject to ‘free representative 
government’ whilst simultaneously ‘preserv[ing] good order in external affairs’.242 Such 
colonies were characterised by ‘small minority [of Europeans] wielding political or 
economic sway over a majority of alien and subject people’.243 
  
While Hobson insisted that these imperialist colonies were not ‘genuine’, he continued 
to use the word ‘colonies’ to describe them. In this respect Hobson both described and 
presaged a transformation in the use of the term ‘colony’. In this vision, the essence of a 
colony did not so much lie in the presence of absence of settlers, but rather on the fact 
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that a dominant metropolitan power exercised political control over a subjugated 
population.  
 
The radicals who followed Hobson all adopted this understanding. Rather than 
counterposing colonies to imperialism, they understood them as closely linked. This 
was especially important because during this period, radical writers generally 
understood imperialism in the context of the rivalry between major powers. Where 
imperialism referred to the system of rivalry as a whole, colonies referred to the regions 
that were the subject of these rivalries. This understanding mirrors the broader changes 
brought about by the ‘New Imperialism’ of the late 1800s. Although the primary form 
of the colony was still that of the settled territory, increasingly the term ‘was used to 
indicate the general condition of overseas dependency’.244 
 
5.3. The anti-colonial legacy  
This, however, is not the whole story. Right up until the middle of the 1900s one can 
find frequent reference to colonies, or colonial policy, but very little mention of the term 
‘colonialism’. Hobson occasionally used the term, but only in referring to the ‘ideology’ 
of ‘genuine’ colonies. This was true more broadly, with colonialism ‘most likely to be 
heard in a different sense as “a colonialism”, meaning a turn of speech or an aspect of 
life typical of British settler societies’.245 This was in part because there was no need for 
an independent ‘ism’ of colonial policy, since by the 1900s it had come to be seen as the 
flipside to imperialism. Ironically, it was not until the 1950s – during the twilight of the 
colonial system – that the term ‘colonialism’ came into wide use.246 During this period, 
the anti-colonial movement was becoming an important political force in its own right. 
This movement, gathering momentum in the period following the Second World War, 
and supported by the Soviet bloc, had achieved numerous successes.  
  
As the 1950s progressed, the movement also began to generate a sense that current and 
former colonies had a set of distinct interests. It was in this context, that the term ‘Third 
World’, as opposed to the First (capitalist) and Second (‘socialist’) worlds emerged. 
This was best exemplified by the 1955 Bandung Conference. The purpose of the 
conference was to set out an agenda for the cooperation of Asian and African countries 
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and opposition to the domination of the old colonial and advanced capitalist powers. 
The Conference was split by political differences between the ‘Left (China), the center 
(India and Burma)’ and ‘the Right (Turkey and the Philippines)’,247 with some states 
remaining allied with the US and Britain.
248
 Nonetheless, the Conference made some 
significant steps, it signalled the entry of the Third World as a player on the 
international stage, called for opposition to racism and colonialism, an end to nuclear 
proliferation and outlined a strategy of economic cooperation and development.  
 
The Conference is generally understood to have served as the basis for the institution of 
the Non-Aligned Movement, and the beginning of the broader ‘Third World’ 
movement.
249
 Tellingly, there was no use of the term ‘imperialism’ in the Final 
Communiqué. Instead, it proclaimed that ‘the existence of colonialism ... prevents 
cultural co-operation [and] suppresses the national cultures of the people’250 and 
declared that ‘colonialism in all its manifestations is an evil which should speedily be 
brought to an end’.251 This reflects the fact that for the anti-colonial movement, the 
word ‘colonialism’ essentially stood in for ‘imperialism’. As Koebner and Schmidt 
noted, ‘[a]mong the Arabs and other colonial peoples those two expressions became 
synonymous’.252 Specifically, they point out that, when asked to translate the word 
Ista’amar, ‘educated Arabs’ would translate it interchangeably as ‘imperialism’ or 
‘colonialism’.  
 
This interchangeability is significant. The metropolitan radical theorists of imperialism 
used ‘imperialism’ to refer to the system as a whole, with an emphasis on rivalry. 
Colonies were not the primary lens through which the system was viewed. The 
deployment of the term ‘colonialism’ by the anti-colonial movement can perhaps best 
be understood as an attempt to view imperialism from the perspective of the colonised. 
As Robert Young put it, the variance in terminology is ‘largely the result of 
identification with the different subject-positions’.253 From the ‘subject-position’ of 
those living in colonies, the main aspect of the imperialist system was colonial policy 
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and exploitation. Vitally, this meant focusing on how imperialism played out within the 
colonies themselves.  
 
As with the metropolitan radicals, the defining feature of colonialism itself was taken to 
be political control.
254
 As Kwame Nkrumah put it ‘[c]olonialism is that aspect of 
imperialism’ where an alien ‘government controls the social, economic and political life 
of the people it governs’.255 The difference from the metropolitan radicals lay in 
granting colonialism the status of an ‘ism’. In so doing, the anti-colonial movement 
emphasised that, despite the manifold differences in specific colonial situations, they 
could be subsumed under a more general category.  
 
Understanding colonialism as an ‘ism’ had two analytic consequences. The first was 
that it meant – in Jean-Paul Sartre’s words – ‘colonialism is a system’.256 For Sartre, 
colonialism was not simply ‘a series of chance occurrences nor the statistical result of 
thousands of individual undertakings’ but was instead a system ‘put in place around the 
middle of the nineteenth century’257 with a logic. This logic was understood as the same 
logic identified by the metropolitan theorists of imperialism, that of capitalist 
expansion.  
 
However, the theorists of anti-colonial movement went further than this, insisting that 
this logic was not simply ‘economic’. They stressed that colonialism was also structured 
by a racial, cultural and psychic logic, which posited natives as inferior and incapable of 
self-government. In what Frantz Fanon dubbed the ‘Manichaeanism of the colonist’,258 
it was argued that colonialism necessarily gave rise to complex systems and hierarchies 
of racialisation, designed to set natives against one and other, and legitimise the 
domination of natives by the metropolitan countries.
259
 To put it bluntly, in invoking 
colonialism as a system, the anti-colonial movement also understood that a ‘colonial 
country is a racist country’.260  
 
                                                 
254
 FRELIMO 1982, 3. 
255
 Nkrumah 1973, 172. 
256
 Sartre 2001. 
257
 Ibid., 129. 
258
 Fanon 1963, 50. 
259
 Fanon 1986, 103. 
260
 Fanon 1988, 40–41. 
60 
 
 
 
The role of race and culture also signals the second aspect of the ‘ism’ of colonialism, 
namely its specificity. The anti-colonial movement’s concept of colonialism as a system 
was not timeless. Despite the Latin origins of the term colonia, the movement did not 
tend to invoke the Roman experience. Instead, it focused on the commercial expansion 
which had begun – in a scattered way – with mercantilism in the 1500s, and was 
solidified as colonialism in the late 1800s. Such an understanding located colonialism 
firmly within the dynamics of capitalist expansion. However, this was not just a 
‘capitalist’ expansion. It was also one rooted in a very specific geographical and racial 
context. That is to say, the capitalist expansion that gave rise to colonialism was a white, 
European capitalist expansion.  
 
The system of formal political domination against which the anti-colonial movement 
had mobilised was essentially one of the European control of non-European territories. 
Pointedly, this did not include generally include the US. A simple perusal of any of the 
major theorists of anti-colonialism bears this out, where the enemy is ‘the European’261 
and the focus is on Europe’s actions.262 This is best captured in the opening to Aimé 
Césaire’s seminal Discourse on Colonialism, which bluntly declared ‘Europe is 
indefensible’.263  
 
Accordingly, alongside the presence of a systemic economic, cultural and racial logic, 
the term colonialism denoted a specifically European system. As Fieldhouse notes 
‘[c]olonialism ... emerged as a general description of the state of subjection ... of a non-
European society which was the product of imperialism’.264 However, just as the 
original meanings of ‘colony’ were structured by a tension, so too was ‘colonialism’. 
Whilst the various elements brought together under the concept could be put to radical 
use, it was also possible to disassemble and de-radicalise the concept. In particular, 
those movements associated with the more ‘moderate’ elements of the Third World 
project – such as the ‘right’ and ‘centre’ at Bandung – sought to foreground political 
domination as the defining feature of colonialism.
265
 In so doing, colonialism was seen 
as being embodied entirely by the existing European system. Decolonisation was 
identified solely with the dismantling of this system. 
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Whilst this was no mean achievement, it nonetheless eclipsed the broader challenge to 
capitalist imperialism embedded in the anti-colonial concept of colonialism. This was so 
in two senses. Firstly, it made the target of the decolonisation the European powers, 
whose global economic and political reach was at that very moment being outstripped 
by that of the US. The US had not tended to engage in the direct political domination of 
states, but had instead utilised various ‘indirect’ methods. Indeed, given the US’s own 
historical beginnings as a British colony, some form of anti-colonialism was a crucial 
aspect of its self-identity. The tenacity of this idea, even to this day, can be gauged by 
the fact that an episode of the US political drama The West Wing had the American 
President utter the line ‘[e]very time he talks about colonial Western imperialism, I 
always want to remind him that the United States is also a revolutionary country that 
threw off its colonial masters’.266 
 
This also sheds light on the second way in which the concept of colonialism was 
domesticated. In foregrounding political domination, but not its location in an economic 
and racial logic, the global economic system was cast as ‘neutral’. On this reading, the 
problem was that the colonies had been unable to participate ‘fairly’ because of political 
domination and exclusion. Whilst the more conservative elements of the Third World 
movement did not think that dismantling formal colonialism had ended all their 
problems, they did not cast these problems as being rooted in a wider system of 
exploitation. Rather, these problems were understood as generated by the unfair legacy 
of colonialism, which – once remedied – would enable the Third World to participate 
‘fairly’ in the global economy and achieve development.267 If, following Young, we 
understand the radical concept of colonialism to be an engagement with the Marxist 
theory of imperialism from the ‘subject-position’ of the Third world, then we can 
understand this conservative concept as similarly corresponding to the ‘empire-ism’ 
described in Section 4.2. 
 
As Sundhya Pahuja notes, such a vision of decolonisation was intimately linked to the 
rise of Cold War politics. The rivalry between the Soviet bloc (and China) and the 
advanced capitalist powers was often expressed through the colonies and former 
colonies. Whilst the US had ‘initially tempered its anti-imperial stance’ in order to win 
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over its European allies, this changed as the anti-colonial movements grew in strength. 
Since the Soviet bloc had a formal commitment to decolonisation, the advanced powers 
sought to break the link between ‘communism’ and decolonisation. The aim of this 
vision of decolonisation and ‘development’ was to insulate the global system as much 
as possible from the challenge of the anti-colonial movement. This meant supporting the 
more narrowly nationalist elements of the anti-colonial movement and sidelining its 
radical elements.
268
  
 
It was ultimately such an understanding of colonialism which came to prevail in 
international institutions and international law. Hence, General Assembly Resolution 
1514, the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and 
Peoples (the Colonial Declaration), defined colonial countries as those subject to ‘alien 
subjugation, domination and exploitation’. It stated this political domination ‘prevents 
the development of international economic co-operation, impedes the social, cultural 
and economic development of dependent peoples’.  
 
However, the fate of the former colonial countries following this type of decolonisation 
could hardly be said to have marked a transition to ‘normal’ development in either the 
political or economic field. Instead, many of the problems ascribed to colonialism 
persisted after the system had been dismantled. In order to grapple with this, it was 
necessary to go beyond even the radical vision of colonialism. Insofar as theorists and 
activists continued to adopt a subject-position that entailed viewing the system through 
the lens of the ‘colonial’ they turned to the concept of neo-colonialism. 
 
5.4. From colonialism to neo-colonialism  
Scholars generally date the term ‘neo-colonialism’ to the 1960s, with Kwame 
Nkrumah’s Neocolonialism: The Last Stage of Imperialism.269 In fact, the earliest 
usages of the term date back to the 1950s,
270
 when the colonial system was still in 
existence but under threat. As with ‘colonialism’, in its original invocation, neo-
colonialism did not so much refer to a system as an ideology. Essentially, neo-
colonialist was a term used to describe those who sought to defend or reform the 
existing European colonial system. Thus, in 1956, Sartre warned people to be on their 
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‘guard against ... “neo-colonialist mystification”’ which involved thinking ‘that there 
are some good colonists and some very wicked ones, and that it is the fault of the latter 
that the situation of the colonies has deteriorated’.271 
 
Over the course of the early 1960s the term began to be deployed in a different manner. 
Whilst it retained the vestiges of Sartre’s meaning, it increasingly came to be used to 
denote the continued presence of colonial patterns after independence. During this 
period, the term ‘neo-colonialism’ began appearing in two distinct contexts. Firstly, it 
became popular amongst metropolitan radicals and intellectuals.
272
 The second, more 
important, group using the term in the early 1960s were the activists, leaders, politicians 
and theorists of the ‘Third World’.  
 
By the 1960s, the anti-colonial movement had morphed into the Third World 
movement. From its genesis ‘[t]he Third World was not a place. It was a project’.273 In 
this project ‘the peoples of Africa, Asia and Latin America’ articulated a collective 
political set of ‘grievances and aspirations’ for dignity and ‘the basic necessities of 
life’.274 As with the anti-colonial movement, in order for this collective political project 
to achieve coherence, it required an analysis of the system it opposed and some factor 
which unified its diverse elements. For the more radical wing of the Third World project 
‘neo-colonialism’ served this function.275  
 
Underscoring the Cold War context of the term, one of the first sustained descriptions of 
neo-colonialism was not directly asserted against the former colonial powers. Instead, it 
emerged as part of the dispute between the Communist Parties of the People’s Republic 
of China (CPC) and the USSR (CPSU). In March 1963, the Central Committee of the 
CPSU drafted a letter to the CPC. The CPSU contended that ‘[t]he national-liberation 
movement has entered the final stage of the abolition of colonial regimes’.276 This was 
located in a broader series of arguments about the nature of the conjuncture, in which 
violent confrontation was to be replaced by ‘peaceful co-existence’. The issue of 
‘colonialism’ had been superseded. Instead, since ‘political independence has been won, 
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the struggle of the young sovereign states against imperialism, for their ultimate 
national revival, for economic independence, comes to the forefront’,277 which meant 
relying on the USSR for economic aid and support.
278
  
  
The CPC challenged this analysis, accusing the CPSU of ‘whitewash[ing] the 
aggression against and plunder of Asia, Africa and Latin America by neo-
colonialism’.279 The CPC declared that despite their formal independence, the ex-
colonies had ‘not completely shaken off imperialist and colonial control’.280 The 
imperialists had ‘been forced to change their old style of direct colonial rule in some 
areas and to adopt a new style of colonial rule and exploitation by relying on the agents 
they have selected and trained’.281 Consequently, neo-colonialism was characterised by 
various forms of indirect political control. The CPC argued that the imperialists did this 
through: 
  
[O]rganizing military blocs, setting up military bases, establishing “federations” 
or “communities”, and fostering puppet regimes. By means of economic “aid” or 
other forms, they retain these countries as markets for their goods, sources of 
raw material and outlets for their export of capital, plunder the riches and suck 
the blood of the people of these countries. Moreover, they use the United 
Nations as an important tool for interfering in the internal affairs of such 
countries and for subjecting them to military, economic and cultural aggression. 
When they are unable to continue their rule over these countries by “peaceful” 
means, they engineer military coups d’etat, carry out subversion or even resort 
to direct armed intervention and aggression. 
 
The CPC’s conception of neo-colonialism demonstrates how the Third World 
movement attempted to combat the conservative appropriation of colonialism. It 
represented an attempt to delink the idea of colonialism from the European colonial 
system and think through a world order dominated by the US. Indeed, the US was 
central to elaborations of the concept because it was generally seen as being a neo-
colonial state avant la lettre, through its policies in Latin America. This should alert us 
to the fact that neo-colonialism was not simply a temporal theory about what came after 
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colonialism. Rather, as Nkrumah insisted, neo-colonialism is a specific ‘tactic’ adopted 
by imperial powers which became predominant after the anti-colonial movement won 
independence.
282
 
 
Although the CPC captured the thrust of neo-colonialism as a system of colonial 
oppression and exploitation that co-existed with formal independence, the emphasis was 
placed more upon methods of political control than economic exploitation. This position 
might appear to share in the disconnect between colonial domination and the capitalist 
system. In part this was because the debate was conducted between self-identified 
Marxist-Leninists, who took for granted a Leninist theory of imperialism. More 
importantly, since the CPSU had connected economic competition to peaceful 
coexistence, the CPC downplayed this. 
  
Other accounts from the Third World stressed economic ‘control’ and ‘dependence’. 
The neo-colonial character of contemporary imperialism lay in the fact that although 
former colonies had achieved political independence, they remained tied to the imperial 
powers through the world economy. As Nkrumah, put it ‘[n]eo-colonialism is the 
granting of political independence minus economic independence ... a [neo-colonial] 
State [is] politically free but dependent upon the colonial power economically’.283 
 
Because this was an analysis of neo-colonialism the emphasis was not just placed on the 
‘external’ world market, but also on the ‘internal’ economic life of the former colonies. 
Theorists of neo-colonialism insisted that the capitalist development that had taken 
place under colonial conditions meant that the former colonies could not simply follow 
the same economic path as Europe. There were many variants of this account, but one 
of the most enduring was Fanon’s in The Wretched of the Earth. Fanon argued that the 
development of the advanced capitalist countries had resulted from their early adoption 
of capitalism. In these countries, a young, vigorous bourgeoisie had come to power and 
rapidly developed the productive forces.  
 
In the age of imperialism this progressive function had ceased. For Fanon, the colonial 
bourgeoisie had never had a chance to pass through a progressive phase. Under formal 
colonialism there was no native industrial bourgeoisie. Productive activities were 
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carried out by foreign firms linked to the colonial power, or the colonial state itself. The 
native bourgeoisie was confined primarily to ‘activities of the intermediary type’ such 
as trade, small enterprise and securing commissions.
284
 At the same time, colonial 
industrial development was highly uneven, focused mainly on the export of primary 
commodities and resource extraction.
285
  
 
As a result of this, the native bourgeoisie that emerges at the end of the period has 
‘practically no economic power’ and does so in a situation of extremely uneven 
development.
286
 This is a bourgeoisie that is quite different from the classical European 
one. However, what it shares with all bourgeoisies is a need for profit. Whereas in the 
European case this need for profit (unintentionally) created economic development, the 
peculiarities of colonial development mean that the native bourgeoisie seeks to ‘transfer 
into native hands of those unfair advantages which are a legacy of the colonial 
period’.287 The quickest route to profit was to continue with the old forms of export-
oriented production, with the national bourgeoisie serving as middlemen for the 
advanced capitalist countries. The national bourgeoisie thus turned towards the 
capitalists of the old mother countries and ‘[t]he economic channels of the young state 
sink back inevitably into neo-colonialist lines’ with the economy ‘literally 
controlled’.288  
 
This national bourgeoisie was so weak that it could not distribute material incentives 
and political rights in the same way as the European bourgeoisie. This meant it needed 
to resort to a combination of political authoritarianism and a stoking of racial, cultural 
and regional differences within the new state in order to secure its rule.
289
 For Fanon, 
this explained the politically dysfunctional nature of the decolonised state, as well as the 
continued presence of racism after independence (as well as its continued use by the 
metropolitan powers). Thus, the emergence of what was generally dubbed the 
‘comprador bourgeoisie’ is a focal point of the concept of neo-colonialism. It was the 
figure through which the political control and the economic exploitation that the 
concept attempted to embody were brought together.  
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Essentially, then, the concept of neo-colonialism carried through the radical concept of 
colonialism to a new situation. It continued to focus on the systematic character of its 
economic, cultural and racial logic, and located it inside of a broader capitalist 
imperialism. However, it stressed that these had taken on new forms. It provided a new 
political programme which prioritised political unity against external intervention; state-
led development at home and an attempt to undermine the unequal character of the 
international division of labour. Equally, it provided an agenda for internal political 
reform focused on building non-tribal, non-ethnic states and attempting to articulate and 
valorise a distinctive national-cultural identity. 
 
Consequently, the concept of neo-colonialism was heavily bound up with the political 
project of the Third World, especially its radical wing. With the defeat and decline of 
this movement, its usage began to decline. It was in this context that saw the rise of 
postcolonialism.
290
  
  
5.5. To Hyphenate or not to Hyphenate? 
5.5.1 After Colonialism 
In a pattern that will at this point be very familiar, the concept of the ‘post-colonial’ 
began life with rather a different meaning to its current one. Most initial references to 
the term are from the 1800s. Its original meaning was straightforward, referring that 
which follows colonial rule. In the late 1800s and early 1900s it was not generally 
applied to societies or states. It was either used to describe some object, practice or 
phenomenon which had come after a colonial period – such as ‘post-Colonial houses’291 
or ‘a post-colonial poet’292 – or was used to characterise the time period following the 
end of colonial rule.
293
 It is telling that in these examples, the post-colonial is not taken 
as a common characteristic or shared condition, rather it is a purely temporal 
description. It is also important to note that its main circulation was in academic 
writing. 
 
Decolonisation made the term more important. It was now applied to political and social 
phenomena connected to the newly decolonised states. In particular, the term post-
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colonial was applied directly to the newly decolonised entities. The primary meaning, 
then, of post-colonial in the 1950s and 1960s was a concrete political, social and 
economic one. The term was generally appended to the words ‘state’ or ‘society’.  
 
In this respect, the term covered similar ground to ‘neo-colonialism’ or the ‘Third 
World’. Unlike these terms, post-colonial was unattached to any political movement. 
Post-colonial became the term of choice for policy-oriented academic figures and 
policy-makers, as a description for the newly decolonised states. This reflects something 
of the politics of the term. It carried no radical connotations because it was not 
connected to any political movement and was seemingly more ‘neutral’ in its 
description, with ‘post’ not denoting any necessary or common condition following 
colonialism.  
 
However, this apparent formal neutrality carried substantive connotations. When using 
the term post-colonial ‘[t]he “colonial” in the “post-colonial” tends to be relegated to 
the past and marked with a closure’.294 Unlike the term ‘neo-colonial’, then, ‘post-
colonial’ tended to emphasise the discontinuities between colonial and decolonised 
states. Similarly, insofar as the post-colonial was presented as beyond colonialism, it 
downplayed the notions of agency entailed by concepts of colonialism and neo-
colonialism. As Ella Shohat noted: 
 
While one can posit the duality between colonizer/colonized and even neo-
colonizer/neo-colonized, it does not make much sense to speak of post-
colonizers and post-colonized ... Transcending such dichotomies, the term “post-
colonial” posits no clear domination, and calls for no clear opposition.295 
 
The cumulative effect of this was that the concept of the post-colonial was a 
depoliticised one. It recognised that there were distinctive problems of formerly 
colonised societies, but it did so without entailing any broader theoretical and political 
commitment. In so doing, it removed any notion of the idea that the post-colonial 
situation was one necessarily characterised by domination or exploitation. In positing 
the ‘post-colonial’ as a neutral situation, the concept also drew attention away from who 
gained and who lost from this exploitation and domination. Like the conservative 
concept of colonialism, it divorced the problems of post-colonial societies from a 
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broader capitalist system. In so doing, it posited these problems as accidental 
aberrations, often claiming they were caused purely by internal failings of postcolonial 
societies. Once again, therefore, it eclipsed the broader challenge to the capitalist system 
as represented by the concept of neo-colonialism. 
  
Over time, however, the term did become one used by radicals. Aijaz Ahmad traces the 
‘first major debate [on the left] on the idea of postcolonialism’ to the debates in the 
1970s. In particular he locates its genesis in Hamza Alavi’s article ‘The State in Post-
Colonial Societies: Pakistan and Bangladesh’. In this piece, Alavi argued that the social 
formations in post-colonial societies were fundamentally different from classical 
European ones, meaning that Marxist theory could not be unproblematically applied.
296
  
 
Alavi’s article was the first salvo in a long debate,297 the particulars of which are not as 
important as what it illustrates about the term post-colonial. Rather than being 
counterposed to neo-colonialism, it was as an adjective used to refer to certain particular 
phenomena that occurred under neo-colonialism.
298
 This usage of the term post-colonial 
had two important features. The first was that it denoted formerly colonised societies as 
being distinct from other societies. The second was that this concept of the post-colonial 
denoted a common set of experiences. ‘Post-colonial’ was not simply a temporal claim 
about what came ‘after’ colonialism, but a structural description of the common issues 
such societies would face. Taken together, this indicates that in these debates ‘post-
colonial’ began to function as a kind of problématique.  
 
5.5.2 Colonial Discourse Theory 
It was this idea of the post-colonial as a problématique that played a key role in the 
emergence of post-colonialism. Essentially, ‘from the late 1970s the term has been used 
by literary critics to discuss the various cultural effects of colonization’.299 Under the 
rubric of ‘post-colonial literature’, scholars suggested that a distinctive literary form had 
been thrown up through the colonial experience.
300
 In this sense, the term post-colonial 
was identical to Alavi’s usage. However, this work both prefigured, and was part of, the 
rise of postcolonialism as a more distinct concept.  
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The most influential current in the development of postcolonialism was what came to be 
known ‘colonial discourse theory’.301 The founding document in this regard was 
Edward Said’s 1978 book Orientatlism. The aim of Orientalism was ‘to expose the 
degree to which Western systems of knowledge and representation have been involved 
in the long history of the West’s material and subordination of the non-Western 
world’.302 In order to do this, Said elaborated a concept of ‘Orientalism’. By this he 
meant both the discipline of that name and a broader collective way of thinking about 
‘the Orient’ by the West. In basic terms, it was: 
 
[T]he corporate institution for dealing with the Orient – dealing with it by 
making statements about it, authorizing views of it, describing it, by teaching it, 
settling it, ruling over it: in short, Orientalism as a Western style for dominating, 
restructuring, and having authority over the Orient.
303
 
 
Orientalism ‘is a style of thought based upon an ontological and epistemological 
distinction between “the Orient” and ... “the Occident”.304 Its role is to constitute and 
represent ‘the Orient’ as inferior, so as to be compatible with Western domination of the 
East. Throughout Orientalism, Said is concerned to trace how the discourse of 
Orientalism produces a reality ‘on the ground’, and so transforms the ‘real’ Orient.305  
 
This discursive framework is composed of ‘latent Orientalism’ and ‘manifest 
Orientalism’. Latent Orientalism is a basic set of ideas about the Orient, associating it 
with backwardness, despotism, sensuality and inaccuracy, which operate with an 
‘almost unconscious positivity’.306 Manifest Orientalism refers to the various ‘stated’ 
views about the Orient. Changes in discourse tend only to occur at the level of manifest 
Orientalism, with latent Orientalism remaining ‘more or less constant’.307 Ultimately, 
Orientalism posits that ‘[o]n the one hand there are Westerners, and on the other there 
are Arab-Orientals; the former are ... rational, peaceful, liberal, logical, capable of 
holding real values ... the latter are none of these things’.308 Orientalism traces the way 
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in which this was reproduced throughout the colonial period, arguing that it has 
survived in the contemporary world.
309
  
 
This expansive definition of Orientalism is extremely important because Said made 
broad claims about the role of the imperial and colonial experience in the formation of 
Europe’s identity.310 He argued that the psychic and cultural dimensions of Orientalism 
are in fact a manifestation of a broader need of all identities to construct themselves 
through positing their opposite: 
 
[T]he development and maintenance of every culture requires the existence of 
another competing alter ego. The construction of identity... while obviously a 
repository of distinct collective experiences is finally a construction – involves 
establishing opposites and “others” whose actuality is always subject to the 
continuous interpretation and re-interpretation of their differences from “us”. 
Each age and society re-creates its “Others”.311 
 
For Said, therefore, Orientalism is less about the Orient on its own terms, than about 
creating the Orient in order to stabilise Western identity. More than this, at various 
points in the Orientalism, Said states that it was this need that in fact drove the process 
of colonial and imperial expansion.
312
 The net result of this is that imperial and colonial 
expansion is rooted in a wider set of psychological and cultural imperatives.  
 
According to Moore-Gilbert, these two positions are a contradictory tension. He thinks 
that Said ‘never quite solves the problem of how to conceptualize the relationship 
between the ‘latent’ and ‘manifest’ aspects of Orientalism’.313 When talking about 
‘manifest’ Orientalism, Said tends to trace it back to specific historical events, generally 
arguing that it came in the wake of European colonial ambitions and tended to justify 
and legitimate them. Yet when talking about manifest Orientalism he saw deep-rooted 
psychic structures driving the colonial experience, for which the state serves as a 
‘support system of staggering power’.314  
 
These contradictions represent a transitional moment for the ‘post-colonial’. On the one 
hand, the concept and Said’s analysis can be read as essentially continuous with the 
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anti-colonial movement’s work. Here, what we see is an account that stresses the 
centrality of colonial experience, and the importance of culture therein. Building on the 
work of earlier anti-colonial scholars, it reasons that since colonialism was a common 
and shared experience, so too is the post-colonial. Because of this connection with the 
earlier anti-colonial tradition it also shares its concepts of imperialism, colonialism and 
neo-colonialism.  
 
On the other hand, there is a vision which largely breaks from the above. It shares the 
focus on the cultural and psychological aspects of colonialism, as well as the line of 
continuity between the past and the present. However, it grants these aspects a radically 
more privileged role. The psychic and cultural dimensions are seen as driving the 
broader material processes of expansion and domination. Such claims cannot be 
confined to any particular historical period. Such a vision no longer sits in the tradition 
of the materialist concept of the post-colonial. Theoretically, it has much in common 
with poststructuralist theory and philosophy. 
 
These tensions can be found throughout Said’s work. Even in later accounts like 
Culture and Imperialism – which Moore-Gilbert characterises as more ‘materialist’315 – 
one can find statements such as ‘empire depends upon the idea of having an empire’.316 
Said muses that imperialism and colonialism are ‘perhaps even impelled by impressive 
ideological formations’ and that ‘all nationally defined cultures’ have ‘an aspiration to 
sovereignty, to sway, and to dominance’.317 
 
However, Said was a transitional figure because what was a tension in his work led the 
way to a wholesale re-envisioning of the ‘post-colonial’.318 A distinctive concept of 
postcolonialism was only constituted in the late-1970s, and consolidated throughout the 
1980s and 1990s.
319
 This was concurrent with the end of the post-war ‘boom’ in the 
advanced capitalist countries, the end of the Bandung era, and the rise of 
neoliberalism.
320
 In other words, this period saw the utter failure of the Third World 
project.  
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Since Said’s work, the number of writers and works identifying themselves in the broad 
field of ‘postcolonialism’ has multiplied tremendously. As with any intellectual field, it 
is extremely heterogeneous, but its ‘leading lights’ are Said himself, Homi Bhabha and 
Gayatri Spivak.
321
 Despite the heterogeneity, there are certain elements that mark out 
‘postcolonialism’ as a distinctive approach. The first element is taken directly from 
Said, namely the prominence of ‘othering’. In the key postcolonial texts, it is argued 
that the ‘West’ or Europe is only able to constitute its identity through defining itself as 
against its ‘other’. Although there are different variants regarding how precisely this 
process comes about, it is stressed that one of the driving forces behind the expansion of 
the ‘West’ is its need to consolidate the image of its ‘Self’ through creating colonial 
subjects as ‘others’.322  
 
However, this more general process of ‘othering’ finds its specific content in the 
experience of European expansion throughout the world. Consequently, the values 
which need to be consolidated in the self are those of the European Enlightenment. On a 
political level, these values are those of bourgeois liberalism: private property, liberal 
democracy and secularism. These values were framed by a set of more abstract concerns 
about history and human nature. European Enlightenment values were grounded on a 
form of universal reason, said to be property of all civilised societies. This was 
contrasted with the inhabitants of the non-European world, who lacked reason, and 
therefore also lacked the social mores of European modernity.
323
 
 
In order to consolidate European Enlightenment values, non-European societies were 
interpellated as savage or uncivilised. This interpellation was often achieved through 
‘science’: in positing that non-Europeans were innately racially or culturally inferior. At 
the heart of European expansion, therefore, was a process of racialisation, whereby 
‘universal reason’ was consolidated through the exclusion of non-Europeans. Although 
it was in theory possible to hold that non-Europeans were incapable of reaching 
enlightenment, this conflicted with the Enlightenment focus on the universality of 
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reason. It is for this reason that culture became vitally important, insofar as 
backwardness was a result of culture, it was subject to potential transformation.
324
  
 
This was mediated through another feature prominent in European thought – 
historicism. Essentially, European thinkers understood societies as entities that existed 
and developed over time. All societies were understood to progress towards some 
eventual state. Thus, although the ‘universal’ Enlightenment had started in a particular 
location, it would spread elsewhere.
325
 This historicist narrative was coupled with forms 
of ‘stadial’ thinking, in which societies were said to pass through distinct stages. Non-
European societies were seen as in an earlier stage of development than European ones. 
This provided the impetus – in the name of historical progress – for Europe to remake 
non-European societies in its own image. Such thinking was so widespread in European 
ideas that even radicals succumbed to it.
326
 
 
Concretely, the process of ‘othering’ was not simply a one-sided process of the positing 
of Self and Other. Rather, because of the universalising and transformative aspects of 
Eurocentric thinking, ‘the otherness of the Self [is] inscribed in the perverse palimpsest 
of colonial identity’.327 This signals another related theme of postcolonialism, that of 
ambivalence. Although the thinkers of the European Enlightenment sought to transform 
non-European populations, a full transformation of their identity would make them 
identical to the European Self. This would leave European identity with nothing to 
consolidate itself against. This meant that colonial discourse was structured around ‘the 
desire for a reformed, recognizable Other, as a subject of difference that is almost the 
same, but not quite’.328 Consequently, colonial discourse has to ‘continually produce its 
slippage, its excess, its difference’.329  
 
Rather than coloniser and colonised confronting each other directly, then, their 
relationship is structured around a ‘complex mix of attraction and repulsion’.330 This 
ambivalence did not just occur at the level of the coloniser, but also in the 
consciousness of the colonised through ‘mimicry’. Mimicry refers to the colonised 
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making use of the ambivalence of colonial discourse. In positioning themselves as 
almost the same as the coloniser, but not quite, the colonised are able to disrupt and 
menace colonial discourse by revealing its indeterminacy and limits.
331
  
 
What ambivalence and mimicry also indicate is that although Enlightenment 
universalism predicted all societies would develop along a similar path, it met a very 
different reality. European political modernity was inserted into societies that were 
radically different, with their own histories, traditions cultures and practices. The result 
was that throughout the colonial world, rather than the reproduction of some 
distinctively ‘native’ or ‘European’ subject, there were a whole number of hybrid 
entities. This hybridity is a key aspect of postcolonial theory.  
 
The totality of these observations constitute a distinct theoretical position, which 
demarcates postcolonialism. The fluidity, contingency and ambivalence of colonial 
discourse illuminate flaws in Enlightenment universalism. Far from societies 
developing along predictable paths, the colonial demonstrates that contingency is the 
norm of social development.
332
 This had important political consequences. In 
Elementary Aspects of Peasant Insurgency in Colonial India Ranajit Guha argued that 
to characterise the peasants as ‘pre-political’ was to incorrectly apply European 
categories to non-European development.
333
 Instead, he maintained, the politics of the 
non-European peasantry had to be located in the superstitions, rituals and practices that 
they practised in resistance to the domination of the colonial state. For other 
postcolonial theorists, this is a vital starting point. Insofar as colonialism is driven by 
hybrid, contingent and ambivalent discourse, the grand political gestures associated 
with European historicism are not viable. Instead, attention must be paid to the practices 
and rituals of the marginalised and the oppressed, as they seek to negotiate and contest 
structures of power.
334
 
 
This is also how the more traditional concerns of the ‘post-colonial’ enter into the 
picture. Postcolonial theorists note that the discourse of nationalism was central to the 
European Enlightenment. This meant that the anti-colonial movement’s embrace of the 
nation-state as the form of decolonisation was profoundly problematic. This grand 
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narrative of nationalism ‘left behind’ a whole host of marginalised, subaltern actors.335 
Postcolonial scholarship is marked by a close focus on the practice of these marginal 
groups, particularly the ways in which they cross boundaries and borders through their 
hybrid identities. 
 
As should be clear, examined in this way, the concept of the post-colonial has 
undergone several metamorphoses. Initially, it designated that which contingently 
followed the ‘colonial’. It then shifted in meaning, indicating that the period after 
colonialism might constitute a distinct problématique. With postcolonialism this idea of 
the problématique is taken to its logical conclusion. As an attentive reader may have 
noticed, in talking of postcolonialism, the hyphen originally present in ‘post-colonial’ 
has been dropped. The question of whether or not the term should be hyphenated 
generated a great deal of debate in postcolonial circles. Although it may seem trivial, the 
position of the hyphen does shed light upon the nature of the concept. As McLeod has 
noted, the hyphen tends to denote a temporal concept, whereas postcolonialism refers to 
‘disparate forms of representations, reading practices and values’.336 As Ahmad puts it, 
postcolonialism denotes a genre or a condition of ‘postcoloniality’ as opposed to a 
periodisation.
337
 
 
What we might say is distinctive is that, as an ‘ism’, postcolonialism denotes a set of 
theoretical propositions about understanding colonialism, imperialism and the wider 
world. In this respect, many have noted that the ‘post’ in ‘postcolonialism’ might be 
said to stand for ‘post-structuralism’. Ahmad goes so far as to characterise it as 
‘postmodernism’s wedge to colonise literatures outside Europe and its North American 
offshoots’.338 Such a position is not quite fair: whilst many postcolonial theorists admit 
their debt to post-structuralism, they have also frequently criticised it as Eurocentric.
339
 
The claim being made is actually a more subtle one, namely, that the experience of 
colonisation produces and pre-empts the kind of fluid, contingent and hybrid forms 
posited by post-structuralists. As such, postcolonial scholars claim that anti-colonial 
theorists – with their focus on questions of culture and identity, and their 
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problematisation of European universalism and historicism – were post-structuralists 
‘long before’ that was even a term.340 
 
Crucially, postcolonial theorists were writing in the shadow of the failure of the Third 
World movement. They claim that this movement was insufficiently attentive to the 
deep-rooted Eurocentric nature of modernity, its institutions (the nation-state, property) 
and its concepts (development). This turn to ‘post-structuralism’ – contra some of the 
more aggressive critiques – represents a genuine attempt to grapple with these issues. 
This has also meant that one of the key manoeuvres of postcolonialism has been to 
construct a canon whereby certain figures (such as Fanon and Cesaire) are posited as 
anticipating its critique. 
 
Importantly, this has involved uprooting those figures from the (Marxist) tradition in 
which they situated themselves.
341
 This sheds light on how postcolonial theory has dealt 
with the concepts of imperialism, colonialism and empire. Given the centrality of the 
European enlightenment, the main focus has been upon the experience of colonialism 
narrowly considered. This is framed by a more general identity-based account. Against 
this, the terms imperialism, and neo-colonialism do feature but are subordinated to the 
broader postcolonial condition. 
 
 
6. A Rose By Any Other Name 
Invoking ‘imperialism’ is a complicated matter. The aim of this chapter has been to map 
the use of the term, as well as ‘empire’ and ‘colonialism’. It has sought to demonstrate 
that these are not simply words. Instead they are theoretical and political objects, 
associated with long histories of debate and struggle. In choosing to invoke 
‘colonialism’, ‘empire’ or ‘imperialism’ one is also situating oneself inside of these 
histories and debates.  
 
On one level this is obvious. The historical evolution of the terms means that they have 
become more or less directly associated with certain political movements. Although 
these histories are complex, some terms have become firmly associated with different 
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political currents. Hence imperialism has generally been associated with political 
radicalism, in particular the Marxist tradition. Insofar as this has not been the case, it 
has been when scholars have attempted to recast ‘imperialism’ as ‘empire-ism’, in 
which case they have conceived themselves as engaging directly with Marxist analyses. 
This is probably even more true of the term neo-colonialism. The term ‘colonialism’ is 
more problematic. Although its initial rise to prominence was as a part of a radical 
movement, the success of this movement was paradoxical. The conservative 
appropriation of the term meant that to articulate an idea of colonialism did not 
necessarily mean placing oneself inside of a radical tradition. Similarly, ‘empire’ has 
never really been associated with any political movement.  
 
This leads on to a second point about the politics of invoking these concepts. Robert 
Young has proposed that ‘imperialism’ needs to be fundamentally distinguished from 
‘colonialism’ and ‘empire’. This is because both ‘empire’ and ‘colonialism’ have been 
‘widely used for many centuries’, whereas imperialism is a relatively recent word. This, 
he argues, reflects something broader about the nature of the phenomena. For Young, 
imperialism ‘operated from the centre as a policy of the state, driven by the grandiose 
projects of power’ meaning it was ‘susceptible to analysis as a concept’. By contrast, 
colonialism ‘functioned as an activity on the periphery, economically driven’ meaning it 
should be ‘analysed primarily as a practice’.342 This chapter has attempted to show that 
this was not the case, and that in fact the specific articulation of colonialism was an 
attempt to understand these ‘practices’ as systematically related and driven by a 
common logic.  
 
However, Young does flag up an important issue. The choice of a particular term does 
not just bring into play a political movement, it also invokes a number of theoretical 
positions. Thus, to state the obvious, invoking ‘imperialism’ or ‘neo-colonialism’ will 
generally bring to mind the Marxist tradition. ‘Colonialism’ again is more complicated 
than this, but it is probably true to say that whilst many still hold to a radical account of 
colonialism it is now not associated with any theoretical tradition. One can say similar 
things about the word ‘empire’.  
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More importantly, it is indisputable that empires have existed for almost as long as 
human history. Therefore to invoke ‘empire’ as one’s primary theoretical reference 
point often means holding that oppressive international relations will be a permanent 
feature of human history. This is the final and most important sense in which the above 
debates matter. The theoretical and political aspects of a concept have implications for 
historical specificity of the phenomena under consideration, and, consequently, how 
they interrelate. 
 
This rather abstract proposition is best illustrated by a quote from Nkrumah as to the 
relationship between imperialism, colonialism and neo-colonialism: 
 
Colonialism is that aspect of imperialism which in a territory with an alien 
government, that government controls the social, economic and political life of 
the people it governs. Neo-colonialism is the granting of political independence 
minus economic independence, that is to say, independence that makes a State 
politically free but dependent upon the colonial power economically. 
Imperialism is nothing but finance capital run wild in countries other than its 
own.
343
 
 
What Nkrumah shows is the consequences of a adopting a Marxist theory. Such a vision 
involves first understanding imperialism as driven by the logic of finance capital. He 
then understands both colonialism and neo-colonialism as aspects of this broader 
phenomenon. Consequently they are transformed through their integration into an 
imperialist system. Imperialism, colonialism and neo-colonialism are therefore 
understood as part of a historically specific system, with a logic that can be analysed. To 
invoke imperialism, colonialism or neo-colonialism in this sense, is to think of them as 
social relationships with beginnings and possible endings. At the same time, by insisting 
that imperialism is linked to capitalism, this approach imperialism as broader than its 
particular expression in any given moment. This historical specificity therefore provides 
a programme of anti-imperialist politics.  
 
This can be contrasted with the vision centred around ‘empire’. This is particularly 
prominent in mainstream scholarship, of both the ‘empirical historical’ and theoretical 
variety. Here, imperialism is cast as ‘empire-ism’, with empire being identified with 
political control. Since empires have always existed, imperialism is either an irreducible 
fact of ‘human nature’, or an inevitable outcome of power politics. Subsequently, the 
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best that any ‘anti-imperialism’ can do is limit the consequences of these inevitabilities. 
There is another, closely related strand to this type of theorising. Insofar as empire is 
identified with domination, what is foregrounded is the conservative concept of 
colonialism. In these accounts, empire ended with the dismantling of the European 
system and – as a result – the present order is one built on anti-imperialism.  
  
These historical, theoretical and political issues also have important consequences for 
international law. This is true on a simple level: international lawyers became partisans 
for the movements described above. Equally these movements frequently made use of 
international law. As a consequence of this, international law and international legal 
institutions have dealt openly and directly with colonialism.  
 
It is not just that international lawyers have talked about empire, colonialism and 
imperialism. The theorists of these concepts also grappled with juridical issues. Many of 
the debates around empire and colonialism turned on whether they needed to be 
juridically formalised. Even when this formalisation was regarded as unnecessary, those 
who write about colonialism, empire and imperialism have constantly invoked 
international law. Indeed, it is telling that theorists of neo-colonialism have emphasised 
international legal institutions and instruments as the vectors of domination, despite the 
absence of any directly juridified colonial relationship. 
 
These observations point to a more fundamental issue. In a 2003 intervention, Susan 
Marks argues that in talking about ‘empire’ one can trace three distinctive modes of 
theorising. The first is ‘empire as colonialism’, in which Europe’s formal political 
control over the non-European world is seen as paradigmatic. The second is ‘empire as 
hegemony’, here, empire is identified with the overweening power of a particular state 
in the international order and its ability to act outside of its ‘normal’ channels. The third 
is ‘empire as globalisation’, in this vision – essentially Marxist – empire is viewed as 
‘particular stage in the development of capitalism’.344 
 
This chapter has attempted to show that things are more complicated than this. But what 
is important is that Marks demonstrates that each of these particular concepts of empire 
comes with a particular theory about its relationship to international law. Insofar as 
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empire is understood as colonialism, international law is against empire, since 
‘international law has set its face against colonialism’.345 By contrast, if empire is 
understood as hegemony, empire is seen to oppose international law, since the hegemon 
is constantly trying to circumvent the will of the ‘international community’. In this 
understanding, ‘international law and institutions are casualties of empire, flung aside 
and trampled down as surplus to imperial requirements’.346 Finally, when we conceive 
of empire as ‘the political order associated with contemporary globalization, it becomes 
clear that ... empire and international law are institutions for one another’ because 
international law is heavily implicated in the constitution and reproduction of this 
order.
347
  
 
What Marks draws our attention to is that every theory of colonialism, empire or 
imperialism is also a theory of international law. Even if this is not explicitly stated, all 
theories will have implications for the understanding of the international legal order and 
its relationship to power, oppression, exploitation and domination. Given the complex 
political and theoretical debates outlined in this chapter, we can further understand that 
the consequences of a particular conception of imperialism for understanding 
international law will be equally complex.  
 
Finally, if every theory of imperialism is also a theory of international law, the contrary 
must also be true. Implicitly or explicitly, international legal scholarship will rely on 
some concept of colonialism, empire or imperialism. Whether international lawyers like 
it or not, they are always and already embedded in the debates described in this chapter 
and, consequently, these debates are absolutely vital to understanding the international 
legal discipline. 
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CHAPTER 2: IMPERIALISM, THIRD WORLDISM AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 
 
1. It is Good if we are Attacked by the Enemy 
In 2006, Christian Tomuschat – the German jurist and academic – wrote a piece 
responding to two articles in the International Community Law Review.
348
 One article, 
by Yasuaki Onuma, was the recipient of good deal of praise. Tomuschat described it as 
‘inspiring’,349 declaring that many of its points were ‘interesting and absolutely 
correct’.350 Of course, as with any scholar, Tomuschat had his disagreements, yet these 
remained respectful, and well within the bounds of scholarly discourse. The same 
cannot be said for the other article. 
 
Tomuschat claimed that its author ‘does not make any great effort to prove his main 
contentions’,351 describing the argument as ‘astounding’ and ‘disturbing’.352 He stated 
the author was ‘a bad observer of realities’ who ‘errs ... grossly’.353 Furthermore, the 
author dared to ‘portray Che Guevara as a hero’, when he ‘had embraced terrorist 
methods to enforce his confused revolutionary agenda’.354 Tomuschat allowed that 
‘[h]ere and there, the reader will find some useful ideas’ but immediately qualified this 
to the effect that ‘no useful insights can be gained’ for international law. Indeed, ‘[o]n 
the whole, the essay is of little help even in analyzing the current state of world 
affairs’.355 Most ominously of all, the piece is ‘a recipe for classs [sic] struggle on a 
worldwide scale’.356 
 
The piece in question was B.S. Chimni’s ‘Third World Approaches to International 
Law: A Manifesto’. In this piece, Chimni – Marxist and TWAIL scholar – argued that 
‘[t]he threat of recolonisation is haunting the third world’.357 In this trenchant critique of 
the newly emerging international order, Chimni put forward the proposition that 
globalisation and international law had come together in a configuration which 
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threatened to remove the veneer of autonomy Third World states had gained during 
decolonisation. 
 
Whilst Chimni’s argument is clearly a radical one, it still seems necessary to ask – why 
the ire? Certainly, this response seems out of the normal bounds of the normal rules of 
intellectual engagement. So what is the explanation? Given Tomuschat’s outrage at the 
mention of Guevara, one is tempted to quote another anti-colonial Marxist, one who is 
rather more controversial, and features on comparatively fewer t-shirts: 
 
It is good if we are attacked by the enemy, since it proves that we have drawn a 
clear line of demarcation between the enemy and ourselves. It is still better if the 
enemy attacks us wildly and paints us as utterly black and without a single 
virtue; it demonstrates that we have not only drawn a clear line of demarcation 
between the enemy and ourselves but achieved a great deal in our work.
358
 
 
Here, Mao contends that to be the subject of an attack, particularly a vicious attack, is a 
good thing. It shows that your analysis has shaken your opponent. Reading Tomuschat’s 
piece certainly lends this argument some credibility. Alongside the aggressiveness, 
there is also a tone of defensiveness. Tomuschat was adamant that ‘general international 
law has had a tremendous emancipatory effect’ and reproached Chimni for failing to 
differentiate between legal and illegal military interventions.
359
 
 
Following Schmitt, we might say that this is not surprising. For Schmitt, to consider 
someone as an enemy means to think of them as ‘different and alien, so that in extreme 
cases [violent] conflicts with him are possible’.360 Of course, disputes in law journals 
rarely bubble over into armed struggle. But what Schmitt does draw our attention to is 
another aspect of the friend-enemy distinction: fear. We designate someone an enemy, 
and attack them viciously because we fear them. Why might Tomuschat ‘fear’ Chimni? 
What does Chimni threaten? This seems clear enough, Tomuschat felt that Chimni was 
threatening the international legal order. But why had this threat reached such a level?  
 
Here, it is useful to turn to Marks’ piece ‘State-Centrism, International Law, and the 
Anxieties of Influence’.361 In this article, fortuitously written in the same year as 
Tomuschat’s, Marks argues that international lawyers labour under an ‘anxiety of 
                                                 
358
 Tse-Tung 1966, 15. 
359
 Tomuschat 2006, 75. 
360
 Schmitt 1996, 27. 
361
 Marks 2006. 
84 
 
 
 
influence’. At first sight – and with the looming legal arguments over the legality of the 
invasion of Iraq – this anxiety might be a fear of how ineffective international law seems 
in the face of power.
362
 Yet surely if one was anxious about international law’s 
weakness, one would respond by showing it was in fact strong. Instead, in response to 
Iraq, the war on terror and other events, international lawyers were keen to point out 
that international law had in fact been broken, or trampled on, or ridden over. Perhaps, 
Marks states: 
 
[T[he anxiety of influence felt by international lawyers is a not just a fear of 
irrelevance but a fear of relevance ... not just a shock at the recognition of 
politics in law, but a shock at the recognition of law in politics. If this is right, 
then what is troubling is not only belatedness, but also primordiality, and not 
only indebtedness, but also responsibility. John Bolton and Richard Perle may 
like to think ... that international law is irrelevant to the US administration, but 
John Yoo and Jay Bybee know better ... [T]heir intricately argued ‘torture 
memos’ only really confirm what historians can tell us anyway: that empire is a 
legal construct – not only encumbered by international law, but also partly 
constituted by it.
363
 
 
Read in this light, Tomuschat’s vitriolic response is part of a broader process. The 
international legal discipline has rarely confronted the question of imperialism. Whilst 
early international lawyers were heavily involved in the projects of colonialism and 
imperialism, they did not understand their involvement in those terms. Insofar as they 
engaged with the concept of empire, it was simply because that was the word used to 
describe the European polities engaged in colonial and imperial projects. Whereas the 
events around the Scramble for Africa had inspired Hobson and those who followed 
him to think critically about ‘imperialism’ as a category, international lawyers had been 
vital in ensuring its ‘success’. This ‘insider’ character of the international legal 
profession to the processes of imperialism meant international lawyers had little to do 
with the critical analysis of it.
364
 
 
The Russian Revolution was harder to ignore. Following that Revolution, a party 
formally committed to anti-imperialism held power. This was reflected in the 
Bolsheviks’ approach to international law. Very early on, they ‘denied the universality 
of international law’, claiming that the categories of ‘civilised’ and ‘uncivilised’ were a 
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legal codification of capitalist imperialism.
365
 As a result, they engaged in a number of 
practices which prefigured the anti-colonial movement’s international legal stance – 
they rejected secret and ‘unequal’ treaties; promoted the right to self-determination and 
denounced extraterritorial capitulations.
366
  
 
The Russian Revolution, therefore, fundamentally changed how the international legal 
discipline related to imperialism. It threw up a number of practical problems with which 
the discipline had to deal. Equally, those jurists who were part of the revolution put 
forward their own Marxist accounts of international law, which produced a response 
from the wider discipline.
367
 In a real sense, ‘Soviet Russia was perhaps the main power 
that made possible the demise of the international law of the era of European 
colonialism’.368 These events finally forced the international legal discipline to respond 
to the intellectual and political ferment around the concept of imperialism that had been 
growing since the 1890s. 
 
The great wave of decolonisation from 1950-1970 was the highpoint of international 
legal dealings with imperialism. The rising tide of Third World jurists forced the 
discipline as a whole to confront international law’s relationship with colonialism and 
imperialism, both theoretically and practically.
369
 In this context, the division between 
the radical and moderate wings of the anti-colonial movement became hugely 
important, with international law and lawyers tending to favour the conservative 
element and their understanding of colonialism. 
 
The decline and fall of the Marxist and radical Third World movements throughout the 
1970s and 1980s saw the victory of the conservative concept of colonialism. Since 
international lawyers were no longer forced to interrogate the relationship between their 
discipline and imperialism, the question of colonialism could be safely parcelled off as 
part of the ‘history’ of the field. Matthew Craven is correct to note that to talk of the 
colonial origins of international law ‘is arguably no longer a standpoint of dissent, or of 
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a radical revisionism’370 but this is only the case insofar as colonialism remains part of 
the discipline’s history. 
 
What Tomuschat’s article reflects is the changed context since the turn of the 21st 
century. As has been repeatedly noted, this has seen a resurgence in theorising about 
empire. This resurgence was ‘inspired’ by three military ‘moments’ – the ‘humanitarian 
intervention’ in Kosovo, the war in Afghanistan and the wider war on terror, and the 
second Iraq War. In each of these conflicts international law and legal arguments were 
directly foregrounded, with lawyers playing a prominent role in criticising
371
 or 
defending them.
372
 Once again, then, lawyers were forced to analyse the relationship 
between unequal global power relations and their own discipline.
373
 Labouring under an 
anxiety of influence, they have generally adopted the position described by Marks as 
‘empire as hegemony’, insisting that the US is against international law. 
 
However, mirroring the development of postcolonialism, throughout the 1990s a more 
critical trend developed in the international legal academy. Under the rubric of Third 
World Approaches to International Law (TWAIL) a number of scholars sought to 
understand the deeper connections between international law, colonialism and 
imperialism.
374
 They contend that international law was born in the ‘colonial encounter’ 
and that this encounter had enduring consequences for international law. These scholars, 
and the themes they have raised, have become more and more prominent.
375
 
 
Tomuschat’s response is indicative of the resonance these scholars have had. At a 
moment of profound anxiety for the discipline, they insisted that everything it feared 
was secretly true. In this respect, in Tomuschat we observe to re-enacting of the attempt 
to separate the conservative and radical Third Worldists. More than that, we see him 
declaring that Chimni’s prescriptions are in fact harmful to the Third World. Tomuschat 
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declares that by insisting on international law’s connection with imperialism and 
colonialism, Chimni is depriving the Third World of a vital shield against oppression.
376
  
 
However, despite this prominence, there has been very little systematic unpacking of the 
way in which this scholarship relates imperialism to international law, and how this is 
situated within the broader history of thinking about colonialism, empire and 
imperialism. This chapter attempts to fulfil this task. Section 2 examines the ‘first wave’ 
of Third Worldist jurists. It argues that their theoretical positions can best be understood 
in light of their commitment to different understandings of colonialism and imperialism. 
Following this, it argues that contemporary scholarship emerged in the wake of the 
Third World’s failure to fully problematise their engagement with international law, and 
the unsuccessful character of this engagement. Part of this failure owed to an 
insufficiently deep theory of the relationship between imperialism and international law. 
Section 3 examines the contemporary scholars who have attempted to remedy this. 
Having done this, Section 4 looks at how these accounts understand three ‘moments’: 
decolonisation, globalisation and military interventions. Finally, the Conclusion 
(Section 5) examines the emancipatory potential that these scholars have ascribed to 
international law. 
 
 
2. Anti-colonialism, Anti-imperialism and International Law 
2.1. Towards a Third Worldist Approach  
International law was a crucial component of the anti-colonial movement. It served as 
the vessel through which colonial independence was initially recognised, and was one 
of the prime mechanisms that integrated the new states into the world order. 
Accordingly, the anti-colonial movement developed its own cadre of jurists. These 
jurists attempted to relate international law to the broader issues of colonialism and 
imperialism against which the movement mobilised, with the aim of formulating 
strategic and tactical perspectives for the Third World. This became increasingly 
important in the 1960s and 1970s, when more and more former colonies won their 
independence and entered the United Nations (UN). At this point, the Third World was 
potentially in a position to articulate an anti-imperialist international legal programme. 
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As a result, a number of works were published that attempted to understand how the 
‘new states’ could relate to international law.  
 
There were a large number of writers in this vein, of course, but some of the most 
important and influential were R.P. Anand, Mohamed Bedjaoui, S. Prakash Sinha, 
J.J.G. Syatauw and U.O. Umozurike. Because the perspectives of these jurists were 
directly informed by the anti-colonial and Third World struggles, their work fully 
embodied its political cleavages and contradictions. Vitally important in this respect 
was the division identified in Chapter 1 between radical and moderate Third World 
states. Some of these jurists were directly involved in implementing the Third World’s 
legal agenda and others sought simply to analyse it. In so doing, they internalised the 
distinct understandings of imperialism generated by the different wings of the Third 
World movement, with these understandings fundamentally shaping their work. 
  
2.2. Radical Third Worldism 
Algeria was one of the states that most exemplified the ‘radical’ wing of the anti-
colonial and Third World movements described in Chapter 1 (Section 5.3.).
377
 On 1 
November 1954, the Algerian Front de Libération Nationale (FLN) officially announced 
its existence, proclaiming its goal to be the ‘restoration of the Algerian state’ and 
independence from France.
378
 Its military wing – the Armée de la Libération Nationale 
(ALN) – conducted a sustained campaign of guerrilla violence against French forces 
and colonists, provoking brutal reprisals.
379
 In so doing, the ALN consciously borrowed 
from the ‘era’s Marxist-Leninist tropes’, conferring with Chinese and Vietnamese 
revolutionaries and adapting their tactics to Algeria.
380
 Politically and economically, 
Ahmed Ben Bella, one of the FLN’s leaders, was an admirer of the Cuban and 
Yugoslavian systems.
381
 
 
However, the French government did not simply attempt to suppress uprisings in its 
colonies. In 1956 the ‘loi-cadre’ were passed, which ‘granted increased internal 
autonomy’ to France’s colonial territories. A number of these territories took advantage 
of this law, which the FLN condemned as a ‘reformist manoeuvre to undermine African 
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anti-colonial solidarity’.382 Such was the strength of this reformist bloc, that they took a 
long time to recognise the Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic (GPRA) 
and, at the UN, did not endorse an FLN-backed referendum on independence. The FLN 
was thus forced to look further afield than French Africa for allies, with the 
‘revolutionary unity of combat against the colonial situation’ in general becoming ‘a 
major theme of Algerian nationalism’.383 
 
This heady brew came together in 1962 Evian Accords, where – under de Gaulle – the 
French government attempted a negotiated settlement, granting independence and 
economic aid, on the basis of a guarantee that the rights of French colonists would be 
respected and that key sectors of the Algerian economy would be leased to the 
French.
384
 This deal had been concluded by the GPRA, and was opposed by the more 
radical elements of the FLN – led by Ben Bella and Colonel Houari Boumedienne of the 
ALN. Forming an alternative power bloc, they denounced the Accords as a ‘surrender to 
“neoimperialism” because they perpetuated European ownership of Algeria’s economic 
assets’ and articulated an alternative programme of ‘economic decolonization’ involving 
wholesale nationalisation. A protracted power struggle followed, in which the GPRA 
was defeated and the FLN’s ‘Political Bureau’ won out.385  
 
In power, Ben Bella’s regime adopted radical domestic measures. The French colonists 
had abandoned Algeria en masse, leaving vital administrative positions unstaffed. In 
response, Algerian workers took over their own industries. The Algerian government 
recognised this as a fait accompli, incorporating self-management into its economic 
programme. This was matched by a wider programme of nationalisation and planning, 
driven by ‘a circle of leftist advisers’ both from Algeria and abroad.386  
 
This domestic radicalism also saw a deepening of the FLN’s internationalism. Leading 
members argued that the unity of the Third World lay in its ‘the common political 
experience of colonialism’ and the ‘continuing influence of the west’ in the form of neo-
colonialism.
387
 These members thought that Algerian anti-colonial movement served as 
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a vanguard for the anti-colonial struggle and ‘spoke of a “vocation” to lead the post-
colonial movement from economic and political exploitation to economic sufficiency 
and political dignity’.388 The fight against imperialism was therefore central to Algerian 
foreign policy. Under Ben Bella, national liberation movements were given material and 
ideological support, and Algeria constantly attempted to radicalise bodies like the 
Organisation of African Unity. Accordingly, Algerian foreign policy attempted to go 
beyond the simple anti-interventionism which characterised ‘moderate’ states. It was 
Ben Bella’s flamboyant style in this respect that earned his disfavour among some 
elements of the FLN. This was one of the stated reasons for Boumedienne’s 1965 coup. 
The Boumedienne regime positioned itself as continuing the FLN’s radical programme 
but in a less haphazard way.  
 
Internationally, even after the coup, Algeria continued to chart a radical path. It retained 
friendly relations with the socialist bloc,
389
 cooperated closely with Cuba ‘in supporting 
revolutionary movements in Africa’390 and expanded its remit to those fighting 
imperialism and racism not in Africa, such as the Black Panthers and Palestinian 
militants.
391
 This was matched by a continuing emphasis on occupying the radical 
vanguard of the Third World.
392
 A fundamental element of this attempt to contest 
imperialism was the attempt to push for a programme of ‘economic liberation’.393 Under 
Boumedienne, Algeria called for the Third World to undermine imperialism through 
controlling the prices of raw materials. One can see then, that the FLN’s practice was 
driven by a radical understanding of colonialism. It was seen as a worldwide system 
driven by a capitalist logic which went beyond simple political control. Accordingly, it 
survived independence in the form of neo-colonialism and could only be undermined by 
‘socialist’ measures domestically and internationally.  
 
As noted in Chapter 1 (Section 5), this radical anti-imperialism – both in theory and 
practice – had unavoidable international legal consequences. Initially, there were 
questions concerning the legal status of the FLN and its actions under the laws of war. 
These gave way to wider foreign policy considerations: Algeria’s actions in 
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international institutions, its support for national liberation movements and its attempt 
to construct new economic arrangements all involved questions of international law.  
 
Bedjaoui was the most prominent jurist to emerge from this milieu and this radicalism 
deeply penetrated his understanding of imperialism and its relationship to international 
law. In a way, Bedjaoui’s legal career almost perfectly mirrors the material conditions 
in which the FLN found itself. He was a legal advisor to the GPRA during the struggle 
for independence and, once independence was achieved, was briefly the Dean of the 
Law Faculty at Algiers University, before becoming Minister of Justice between 1964 
and 1970.
394
 In this capacity, he embodied the revolutionary spirit of the FLN, seeing 
the law as a tool for social transformation, with the role of the judge to create ‘the most 
suitable conditions permitting our community to attain its objectives rapidly and 
easily’.395 
 
Again mirroring the direction of the FLN, he embarked on a diplomatic career, 
becoming ambassador to France in 1969 and UN delegate in 1979. He also represented 
the Polisario Front at the ICJ, before becoming a judge in 1982.
396
 Bedjaoui’s 
understanding of international law very much reflected his embeddedness within the 
political struggles of the FLN, sharing in the FLN’s radical understanding of 
colonialism and imperialism. His work also reflects the changing political priorities that 
flowed from this understanding. In 1961, during the war for independence he published 
The Algerian Revolution and the Law
397
 which attempted to articulate legal 
justifications for the Algerian national liberation struggle. After this struggle was 
successful Bedjaoui turned his attention to building an international legal front for the 
Third World. 
 
In so doing, Bedjaoui drew on the radical understanding of imperialism that the Third 
World movement had articulated. This was most evident in his book: Towards a New 
International Economic Order. This book was Bedjaoui’s contribution to Algeria’s 
attempt to enact an international policy of ‘economic decolonisation’. Such 
decolonisation was to be achieved through a Third World front in which an ambitious 
legal reform project would be carried out under the umbrella term ‘The New 
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International Economic Order’. This agenda had been pursued throughout the 1970s in a 
number of UN General Assembly Resolutions, eventually codified in Resolution 3202 
(1974) as the ‘Programme of Action on the Establishment of a New International 
Economic Order’. This programme aimed at securing ‘conditions under which the 
developing countries could grow toward collective self-reliance and take care of their 
own basic needs’.398 This was to be achieved through enabling Third World control of 
corporations, allowing Third World states to nationalise property on their own terms, 
guaranteeing the Third World’s ability to set up associations of primary commodity 
producers (such as OPEC) and reforming international trade to be more equitable.
399
 
 
Writing in the midst of the economic crisis of the 1970s, Bedjaoui argued that the 
various problems facing the world could not be considered as the causes of this crisis. 
Instead, they were ‘mere indicators of the crisis’, which was instead rooted in ‘the laws 
of profit, unequal trade’ and ‘imperialist dependence’.400 Hence, for Bedjaoui: 
 
The historical and political reasons for the present disorder can be mainly 
expressed in terms of imperialism, colonialism and neo-colonialism. 
Dependence, exploitation, the looting of the resources of the Third World, and 
the introduction of zones of influence, have marked international relations with 
‘organized’ or ‘institutionalized’ disorder. The cruel, inhuman law of maximum 
profit has finally succeeded in establishing disorder, with the Faustian power of 
multinational firms, the gigantism of military-industrial complexes, and the 
ecological disaster.
401
 
 
As should be evident, Bedjaoui’s understanding of imperialism was situated quite 
explicitly within the radical, Marxist-influenced, tradition. Drawing on Marxist theorists 
like Samir Amin, he understood the ‘[t]he world economy’ as ‘organized on the basis of 
asymmetrical relationships between the dominant “centre” and the dominated 
“periphery”’, with ‘the exploiting and the exploited countries being integrated in this 
inequitable system’.402 Although Bedjaoui did not focus extensively on colonialism, it is 
clear that he understood it as related to this broader system. He argued that Europe had 
first acquired colonies in the sixteenth century ‘under the pretext of combating the 
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infidels and evangelizing them, whereas it was in actual fact to reduce them to slavery 
and exploit their wealth’.403  
 
For Bedjaoui, each different phase of the world economy was matched by a distinctive 
international legal order. Following the Peace of Westphalia, international law was the 
law of the European state system. This system was largely uncomplicated by the 
European expansion into the ‘New World’ which was to be ‘europeanized and 
evangelized’. Since Asian states were strong and organised, they could not be subject to 
direct European domination; accordingly, ‘the relations between Asia and Europe were 
systematized in a sort of minor and marginal form of international law’.404 
 
The growth of colonialism and imperialism in the 19th century changed this. Drawing 
on the classical theories of imperialism,
405
 Bedjaoui saw this period as one in which 
‘domestic’ developments in European capitalism had compelled it to expand at an 
aggressive rate, assuming direct control over Asian and African states, in order to export 
capital. This gave rise to a rather different legal order. Bedjaoui argued that the 
international law of colonialism was composed of three elements: ‘(a) an oligarchic law 
governing the relations between civilized States members of an exclusive club; (b) a 
plutocratic law allowing these States to exploit weaker peoples; (c) a non-interventionist 
law ... carefully drafted to allow a wide margin of laisser-faire and indulgence to the 
leading States in the club’.406 
 
These elements were mediated through the legal concept of ‘civilisation’. Essentially, 
the ‘exclusive club’ of members of the international community were those states said 
to be civilised, which meant being organised ‘in conformity with the canons and models 
of nineteenth century Europe’.407 States which did not conform to this model were 
uncivilised, and hence lacked legal personality, meaning that ‘the right of conquest or 
occupation’ could apply to them.408 For Bedjaoui, this was a fundamentally Eurocentric 
legal order. It was Eurocentric both because it directly embedded prevailing European 
forms of social organisation, that is to say ‘the laws of the capitalist economy and the 
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liberal political system’,409 and because, in so doing, it permitted European colonial 
exploitation. 
 
‘Classical’ international law, therefore, was deeply imbricated with colonialism. There 
were two ways in which this was the case. The first was ideological, with the role of 
international law to disguise colonial exploitation.
410
 This was linked to the second – 
more expansive – vision. Bedjaoui held that ‘[t]he law itself does not create’ 
relationships of ‘exploitation domination, alienation or inequality’, but instead ‘merely 
translates and expresses them’.411 The problem, therefore, was that international law had 
a ‘laisser-faire and easy-going attitude’ which led to ‘legal non-intervention, which 
favoured the seizure of the wealth and possessions of weaker peoples’.412 The 
safeguards which European states had applied to themselves did not apply to non-
European states. 
 
Bedjaoui’s understanding of colonialism, therefore, was in line with the radical anti-
colonial movement’s. He understood it as part and parcel of a world system of capitalist 
exploitation, which threw up a systematic logic of Eurocentrism. This understanding 
carried through into his assessment of decolonisation. Bedjaoui insisted that the 
dismantling of the formal European system had not ended imperialism as a whole 
because ‘decolonization comes up against something even more powerful – the 
persistence of domination in the form of neo-colonialism’.413 Again appealing to the 
radical anti-colonial movement, he characterised neo-colonialism as a situation in which 
‘multinational firms show a definite propensity to run the national affairs of the younger 
States’.414 
 
For Bedjaoui, international law reflected this. Following World War 2, there ‘had been 
no radical change in international law’. It ‘had ceased to be a European law only to 
become a law of the great powers’ and whilst it no longer served ‘political colonization, 
it did not cease for all that to be a means of economic domination’.415 Very directly, 
therefore, this analysis of international law embedded a concept of neo-colonialism: it 
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tracked a shift in the geographical centre of exploitation (from Europe to the USA), and 
flagged up the importance of economic domination.  
 
Once again, Bedjaoui argued, this was facilitated by the veneer of ‘indifference’ of 
international law. International law’s ‘neutrality’ and focus on formal equality were 
artificial, and behind them one could discern ‘forms of real dependence, based on 
organized economic subordination’.416 He likened this to the role of law in a liberal 
state, where formal equality between citizens masked forms of domination and 
exploitation.
417
 This echoes Nkrumah’s definition of the neo-colonialist state as one that 
has ‘all the outward trappings of international sovereignty’, but whose ‘economic 
system and thus its political policy is directed from outside’.418 
 
On Bedjaoui’s reading, the prime problem was the ‘dichotomy between law and 
reality’.419 Legally, states were independent, but in reality they were dominated and 
controlled. At first sight, Bedjaoui’s argument might appear to be identical to ‘liberal’ 
arguments about the relationship between law and power.
420
 In such accounts, the two 
are sharply opposed, with the world’s problems stemming from a lack of legal 
regulation. Certainly there is some of this in his account. At the same time, Bedjaoui 
quite specifically insisted that law was not missing from the colonial situation. Instead, 
the ‘permissive’ attitude of law, and the exclusion of certain issues from legal 
consideration, was a legal assertion in and of itself. Thus, rather than arguing that law is 
‘absent’, Bedjaoui can be read as saying that law embeds the systematic Eurocentrism 
of imperialism, through its exclusion of certain issues. These two readings represent a 
source of some tension in Bedjaoui’s work; at points he seems to suggest that 
colonialism itself might have involved ‘distortion’ of the law,421 whereas elsewhere he 
clearly states that legal ‘formalism’ is a per se ‘imperialist international law’.422 
 
This analysis of international law conditioned Bedjaoui’s call for legal reform. In his 
account, the arrival of the anti-colonial movement had fundamentally called into 
question the old ‘indifferent’ law. He pointed out that one of the great achievements of 
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the anti-colonial movement had been to undermine the formal equality, neutrality and 
indifference of international law by recognising the specificity of national liberation, 
colonialism and racism.
423
 For him, decolonisation would have to take this further, 
ridding the principle of sovereign equality of ‘all its illusions’. The Third World’s call 
for a New International Economic Order would have to reframe sovereignty to take 
account of the ‘economic and political context’ in which it existed.424 If neo-colonialism 
rested on formal, legal independence and economic domination, then the Third World 
could undermine this through elaborating principle of ‘economic independence’, which 
would involve fundamentally restructuring the global economy.
425
 
  
As previously noted, Bedjaoui did not focus heavily on the relationship between 
international law and colonialism. Insofar as he did, it was as illustration for his 
reflections on neo-colonialism. In this sense, Umozurike provides an interesting 
counterpoint. Umozurike – a Nigerian – was less heavily involved in the anti-colonial 
and Third World struggles. He taught at several universities. In the 1970s he lectured at 
the University of Dar Es Salaam, Tanzania.
426
 Like Algeria, Tanzania was one of the 
more radical African states, and its governing party had committed itself – through the 
Arusha Declaration
427
 – to a form of ‘African socialism’, which would mobilise African 
unity against neo-colonialism.
428
 It was during this period that Umozruike wrote his 
most systematic account of the relationship between international law and colonialism – 
International Law and the Colonisation of Africa. 
 
In this book Umozurike articulated a radical, Marxist-inflected understanding of 
colonialism. He understood slavery and early colonisation as rooted in the need to 
consolidate capitalism, initially through the acquisition of raw materials for the 
industrial revolution, and later owing to the need of a market for manufactured goods.
429
 
Following Lenin, he located the genesis of imperialism, and its attendant systematic 
form of colonialism, in the period when ‘[c]apitalism in Europe reached a monopoly 
stage and became aggressively outward looking’.430  
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For Umozurike, this systematic European subordination of Africa played a crucial role 
in the formation of international law. He argued that international law ‘in its present 
form developed around the 16th century when the African Slave Trade was growing 
roots’. Since this law was ‘directed towards the promotion of European interests’, and 
the slave trade was vital to those interests, it recognised and legitimised slavery.
431
 
Emphasising the centrality of economic relationships to imperialism, Umozurike stated 
that international law only turned its face against slavery once it became unprofitable.
432
 
 
At this point, the slave trade was giving way to colonialism. This required the wholesale 
subordination and transformation of African societies, for which the legal justifications 
of slavery were not enough. In common with most Third World jurists, Umozurike 
thought that the doctrine of ‘civilisation’ was vital. Whereas this doctrine had been 
somewhat controversial during the early ‘colonization of the Americas’, he argued, by 
the time colonialism was being established in Africa, the debate was over. African 
polities were not to be regarded as legal subjects, and so were denied any sovereign 
rights, opening the door to wholesale European colonisation. 
 
Unlike Bedjaoui, Umozurike emphasised the active role of international law in 
colonialism. He noted that the spread of European domination was achieved through the 
use of commercial treaties or treaties of protection. These treaties facilitated the process 
of colonialism in a double sense. Firstly, they were a function of rivalry between 
imperialist powers. This was particularly true of the treaties which created protectorates, 
which generally gave the European power some form of ‘external’ control over the 
protected.
433
 In so doing, they excluded rival foreign powers from being able to interfere 
in the protectorate. Secondly, and more generally, treaties were one of the means 
through which European states were able to secure territory for commercial 
exploitation.
434
  
 
These individual treaties were conducted in the shadow of the larger General Act of the 
Berlin Conference, which represented ‘a collective European decision to appropriate 
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Africans and Africa for themselves’.435 Again underscoring the Leninist inflection of 
Umozurike’s understanding of imperialism, he viewed the Conference as an attempt to 
smooth out the growing inter-imperialist rivalries that had been generated by the 
‘scramble for Africa’. In this sense, then, Umozurike gave a detailed account of the way 
in which the distinctive economic logics of imperialism were realised in international 
legal form. 
 
At the same time, however, these international legal principles also embedded a racial 
logic. For Umozurike, this represented an issue of fundamental continuity between 
slavery and colonialism. In both instances, international law was embedded ‘with white 
racism’, insofar as it created distinctions between the (white) colonisers, and the (black) 
colonised in order to promote the interests of the former.
436
 Although the precise legal 
nature of this changed, it remained a ‘fundamental element’. This survived through to 
the League of Nations Mandate System, which, Umozurike held, reproduced 
colonialism in a new form.  
 
Umozurike’s radical approach also led him to characterise the period following 
decolonisation as neo-colonial.
437
 However, he was rather more sanguine in his 
appreciation of international law’s possibilities than this would suggest. For Umozurike, 
despite the continuing presence of colonial patterns in the form of neo-colonialism, 
‘[t]here has been a radical change in international law in relation to colonialism since 
the founding of the United Nations in 1945’.438 The anti-colonial movement had forced 
the UN to ‘outlaw’ colonialism and embed the principle of self-determination. Because 
of this, he continued, it might be turned against neo-colonialism. Echoing Bedjaoui, he 
believed that the ‘different aspects of the principle of self-determination can be 
effectively used to minimise or eradicate neo-colonialism’.439 
  
Despite their critical orientation towards international law, both Bedjaoui and 
Umozurike ultimately advocated the reform of international law. The reforms they 
proposed however were wholesale. This ‘radical reformism’ can be contrasted with the 
more timid accounts of Sinha and Syatauw. 
                                                 
435
 Ibid., 26. 
436
 Ibid., 36. 
437
 Ibid., 126–127. 
438
 Ibid., 79. 
439
 Ibid., 133. 
99 
 
 
 
 
2.3. Conservative Anti-Colonialism 
In terms of the distinction between radical and moderate forms of Third Worldism, 
South and East Asia offer an especially stark example. On the one hand, there were a 
number of states that fully embraced ‘communism’ of the Soviet or Chinese variety, 
including China, (North) Vietnam and North Korea. On the other hand, there were a 
number of more ‘moderate’ states, whose internal and external policies were much less 
radical. It was from these states – India and Indonesia respectively – that Sinha440 and 
Syatauw
441
 hailed. Both India and Indonesia were important members of the Non-
Aligned Movement, with the latter hosting the original Bandung Conference in 1955. 
They exemplified the spirit of Bandung, with its cautious line of maximum unity, 
oriented around the respect for territorial sovereignty. Sukarno (then President of 
Indonesia), for example, in at one of the most famous speeches of that conference, 
urged the Third World to ‘inject the voice of reason into world affairs’ and ‘mobilize all 
the spiritual, all the moral, all the political strength of Asia and Africa on the side of 
peace’.442 This is a far cry from the fiery rhetoric of the FLN. 
 
Both the Partai Nasional Indonesia (PNI) and the Indian National Congress Party had ‘a 
grab bag ideology, rooted in an anticolonial ethos, but in favor of a vague nationalism 
that attracted all social classes’.443 This was reflected in their domestic politics, which 
lacked a ‘clear agenda for the social development of their people’ and avoided mounting 
any attack on the old social classes.
444
 In both cases – in contradistinction to other anti-
colonial struggles – Marxist and Communist movements did not play a decisive role in 
the struggle for independence.
445
 After independence, Congress in India had a very 
strained relationship with the – flourishing but very orthodox – Indian Communist 
movement, with Nehru ejecting a Communist state government from Kerala in 1959.
446
 
Similarly, Sukarno and the PNI repeatedly repressed the Indonesian Communist 
Party.
447
 Over time, Sukarno grew closer to the Party, yet this was not reflected in the 
general attitude of the ruling elite. Following an unsuccessful coup by the Communists 
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in 1965, the military – under Suharto – massacred the Party, killing as many as 1.5 
million people in the process. Sukarno’s own association with the Party was the pretext 
for Suharto consolidating his power and deposing Sukarno in 1966. 
 
These domestic peculiarities were reflected internationally. Both India and Indonesia’s 
idea of non-alignment was one centred on peaceful co-existence and ‘development’.448 
Insofar as they sought to oppose imperialism, it was to be done through development 
and modernisation, at the expense of attending to the social and political forces that 
dominated and shaped international institutions and a ‘deep understanding of the 
changing forms and modes of imperialism’.449 Whilst, like Algeria, these states sought 
to utilise international law and international institutions to further the interests of the 
Third World, their conception of how this would come about was quite different. Thus, 
they understood the New International Economic Order as a device to make the Third 
World more able to compete in the global economy, rather than an attempt to 
fundamentally undermine imperialist social relations.
450
 
 
Consequently, it was the conservative concept of colonialism which animated much of 
the analysis of those scholars, theorists and activists in these countries who were not 
affiliated with the Communist movement.
451
 This was reflected in the work of their 
jurists.
452
 Sinha, in his New Nations and the Law of Nations, understood colonialism in 
a rather benign and unsystematic way. As with most of the authors of the period, he 
argued that the relationship between Europe and the non-European world had gone 
through a number of phases. The first was from the 16th and 18th century, where there 
was some colonisation, but not in Asia. In the second, occurring in the 19th and 20th 
centuries, these lands ‘became colonial domains of western powers’. The final phase 
was that of decolonisation, ‘when increasing rights are given to the peoples of these 
lands under international law, culminating, ultimately, in their emergence as states with 
full sovereignty’.453 
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However, the way in which Sinha described these stages is very different from the more 
radical accounts. This is most evident in his account of the economics of the colonial 
period. Sinha stated that ‘private economic initiative of entrepreneurs in the developed 
countries brought their trade and investment in the underdeveloped areas of the world’. 
The problem was simply that ‘considerations of economic development of the country 
or investment were incidental’.454 Thus, rather than stress that colonialism was a system 
founded on systematic exploitation, it was understood in more neutral terms. 
Underdevelopment was just an accident that came about because the regime of ‘private 
investment’ was not geared towards developing the colonies. Colonialism had no 
underlying logic. 
 
Consequently, Sinha focused much more heavily on the political aspects of colonialism. 
For him, what made the colonial period distinct was that ‘national units’ had all the 
power in world affairs, force was allowed to achieve national purposes, and only a 
limited number of political entities counted as ‘national units’.455 Thus, whereas the 
classical notion of colonialism meant viewing imperialism from the subject-position of 
the colonised, Sinha’s account focused on the interactions between European states. In 
this way, whilst he did recognise colonialism, it was only as a peripheral concern. This 
was in sharp contrast to the radical vision, which understood colonialism as a necessary 
accompaniment to European capitalism. 
 
This understanding of colonialism extended to Sinha’s considerations of international 
law. Like many Third World jurists, Sinha foregrounded the Eurocentric nature of 
classical international law. He characterised this international law as: 
 
[T]he law of a “compartmentalized society.” It corresponded to the 
characteristics and needs of a society which existed up to the time of the two 
world wars, in which a limited number of sovereign states maintained constant 
and close relations with each other. International law governed those relations, 
which were purely external relations between independent and sovereign 
powers. Thus limited to the indispensible minimum requisite for the functioning 
of the international society, the corpus of international law was relatively small. 
Its principal concern was to guard the independence of states ensuring their 
mutual non-interference.  
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It is interesting to note that this description does not in fact contain any mention of 
colonialism. Insofar as ‘colonialism’ is present, it is only through its absence, i.e. the 
fact that international law governs relations between ‘independent and sovereign 
powers’ must mean that it does not govern the colonies. This is important because it 
carries through into Sinha’s argument as to the basis of the Eurocentrism of classical 
international law. For him, the problem is that the ‘dominating influence in the 
formative process of international law’ was European.456 This was because it ‘grew out 
of usages of European state system’ and so ‘Asian and African peoples were excluded 
from the process of formulation of its rules’.457 The issue is not so much that 
international law helped create colonialism, but rather that its content was decided 
amongst European states. 
 
Superficially, there is some similarity with Bedjaoui’s position. Yet Bedjaoui’s position 
was that the ‘laisser-faire’ nature of international law was designed to support European 
expansion. For Bedjaoui and Umozurike, colonialism was not an accident of European 
capitalist development, but absolutely central to it. Accordingly, any ‘European’ 
international law was necessarily colonial. By contrast, Sinha treated colonialism as a 
peripheral concern and consequently treated the relationship between international law 
and colonialism as largely contingent.  
 
The foregoing considerations have important consequences for how Sinha viewed the 
post-colonial period. He admitted that the majority of new states were opposed to 
capitalism, and that this ‘stem[med] from the Leninist theory of imperialism’.458 He 
further acknowledged that many of the Third World states understood the post-colonial 
situation as one of ‘neo-colonialism’.459 Sinha, however, demurred from such an 
analysis. For him, the problem facing the post-colonial state was not neo-colonialism 
but ‘survival of their own economic position in a competitive world’.460 Since he 
identified colonialism with the formal European exclusion of the non-European world, 
the new order could not be neo-colonial, the new challenge was simply how to survive 
in a neutral ‘competitive’ space. Any residual ‘post-colonial attempts for retention of 
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control are not so much the production of capitalism ... as of the rivalries of powerful 
states’.461 
  
Of course, as with most Third Worldists, Sinha did not think that things could go on as 
they were. He contended that ‘[t]he economies of the Asian and African states must be 
rapidly expanded to achieve good life [sic] for their people’, which would require 
‘foreign capital to provide investment funds’.462 Whilst he admitted that developing 
countries would have to consider the impact of assistance ‘on their economic and 
political freedom of choice’,463 he in no way saw this as bound up in a broader system 
of exploitation. For Sinha, there was no neo-colonialism, only a much more neutral 
global competitive system in which development needed to take place. Given this, it is 
unsurprising that, for him, international law simply had to become more oriented 
towards development
464
 and more inclusive of the Third World. 
 
In Some Newly Established Asian States and International Law, Syatauw, like Sinha, 
argued that political rivalries between powerful states were the closest thing to 
‘imperialism’ in the world. For Syatauw, the most significant feature of the post-
colonial epoch was that ‘the entire world has come under the spheres of influence of 
only two nation-states, the U.S.A and the U.S.S.R’. Adopting a strikingly realist pose, 
he argued that in the ‘world power process’, all other nations were ancillary to this 
struggle.
465
 This reflected his broader thinking about international relations. Essentially, 
Syatauw traced the problems of ‘colonialism’ and ‘imperialism’ to the general issue of 
‘inter-dependence’. As he saw it, international developments had led to ‘more intensive 
contact’ between societies, which would lead to ‘more international tension’.466 
 
This general account of international relations framed his reflections on the relationship 
between colonialism and international law. Syatauw partly agreed with the Bukharin-
Lenin account of colonial expansion. For him, until the end of the 18th century, the 
West had interests that were primarily commercial, and so ‘could be achieved chiefly by 
peaceful means of negotiations and agreements’. However, decreasing profits ‘soon 
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made the Europeans aware that it would be more profitable to have one’s own 
establishments in these areas rather than to depend ... on the good will of the Eastern 
princes and chiefs’.467 
 
As with most of the scholars previously surveyed, Syatauw argued this had the legal 
consequence that Asian states were initially recognised as sovereign in a limited sense, 
whilst later being cast as uncivilised. Echoing Bedjaoui and Umozurike, he maintained 
that ‘Western theories on East-West relations ... represented in large parts an ex post 
facto rationalization of and justification for the establishment of a colonial empire’.468 
However, he immediately qualified this. Firstly, he stated that these developments had 
‘little actual relevance to international law proper’, since the colonial territories were 
governed by the ‘municipal law of their European motherlands’.469 Secondly, he argued 
that in exploring East-West relations ‘theories often made use of non-legal terms like 
“civilization” which were inadequately defined’.470 
 
The first point brings Syatauw very close to Sinha. Like Sinha, he argued that modern 
international law was not to be understood as shaped by the colonial experience; rather 
it ‘came into being as the product of frequent interactions among the nations of Western 
Europe’ who ‘shared a common cultural background’.471 The second point is more 
interesting. He argued that prior to the European contact with Asia ‘the area was already 
occupied by several kingdoms and other states’, which had their own international rules 
and customs, and had been dealt with by the Europeans on the basis of some equality. 
Consequently, this was an area ‘to which international law is not foreign at all’. This 
meant that to ‘many Asians ... European domination was just another illegal 
occupation’.472  
 
Accordingly, Syatauw sought to reconstruct Asian societies’ systems ‘of rules ... 
considered to be binding in their mutual relations’, claiming that such rules ‘may well 
have been quite similar in nature to the body of rules existing in Europe’.473 What this 
meant was that the claims as to Asia’s lack of civilisation could be proved untrue. In 
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practice, Syatauw was ambivalent about what effect this could have. He freely admitted 
that ‘the question whether Asia had a system of international law in the pre-colonial 
time is academic and irrelevant to modern international law’.474 Nonetheless, he insisted 
that it was essential to avoid looking at Asian states from a ‘Europe-centric point of 
view’ and instead to ‘see them through Asian eyes’.475  
 
2.4. The Politics of ‘Colonialism’ 
At this point, it is worth reflecting more broadly on the way in which particular 
understandings of colonialism and imperialism play out in legal scholarship, and the 
political and theoretical consequences that flow therefrom.  
 
Essentially, on the one hand there was a radical understanding of colonialism, rooted in 
the Marxist-inspired wing of the Third World movement. This view understood 
colonialism as part of a wider system of imperialism, rooted in a particular stage of 
capitalist development. In this account, European expansion into non-European 
societies was systematically driven by a need to increase profits. Colonialism, therefore, 
was not simply a peripheral activity in which Europe engaged, but rather was vital to its 
continued wealth and prosperity. If colonialism was central to European development, 
and racism was central to colonialism, then insofar as international law is ‘European’ it 
is also both of these things. Rather than understanding international law as Eurocentric 
because Europeans developed it, it was structurally Eurocentric. Furthermore, since 
imperialism is broader than colonialism, it was seen to persist in the form neo-
colonialism. This meant that international law continued to mediate neo-colonial 
relations after decolonisation.  
 
This had consequences for the politics of international law. If the above positions are 
held, then it is not enough to simply ‘universalise’ international law and ensure that all 
states are able to participate in its ‘formation’. Instead, it needs to be radically 
restructured, so as overcome its colonial content and to take into account the reality of 
neo-colonialism. All of this characterised Bedjaoui and Umozurike’s work.  
 
In Sinha and Syatauw we can observe accounts which drew on the more conservative 
conception of colonialism (and on elements of the ‘political’ and ‘empire-ist’ accounts 
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of imperialism). Here ‘imperialism’ is seen as resulting from a generic form of ‘power 
politics’ or inter-dependence, with colonialism referring to formal European political 
domination. In this account, colonialism is largely contingent to European development. 
Insofar as colonialism is therefore separable from European development, what is at 
issue is not the (necessary) exploitation of non-European states, but their exclusion. 
Eurocentrism is not a practice internal to colonialism, but rather the intellectual product 
of a common European culture. 
 
If Eurocentrism is understood in this way, it is not deeply embedded in the international 
legal project. From this, two approaches follow. The first is to universalise international 
law. If Eurocentrism is just about ‘excluding’ the voices of the non-European, then 
including them will change things. The second is to argue that Eurocentrism resulted 
from a distortion or mistake about non-European cultures. This involves giving an 
account of the fact that non-European social formations were in fact sovereign entities, 
with their own systems of international law. These two positions then come together in 
the assertion that the non-European world is now making its own distinct contribution to 
international law. Since colonialism is simply about European political domination 
international law ended it. Any residual Eurocentrism, therefore, is the legacy of 
colonialism, and can be overcome without radically transforming international law.  
 
Oscillation around these positions tended to structure the thought of the original Third 
Worldist jurists.
476
 Of course, it is better to view these positions as tendencies rather 
than outright positions as, in practice, many scholars hold multiple understandings of 
colonialism and imperialism. This is clear, for instance, in the work of Anand, another 
Indian scholar. At times Anand seems to adopt a directly Marxist inspired 
understanding of imperialism, yet at other times, he adopts a vision centred on the idea 
of White Man’s Burden.477 The consequence of this is that whilst he was clear that 
international law was deeply implicated in colonialism, he also thought colonialism had 
ended. Consequently, he locates the problems in the ‘lingering remnants of 
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colonialism’478 and the ‘legacy ... of certain rules and rights which are considered to still 
be valid today’.479 
 
2.5. International Law and Sociological Functionalism  
Despite their quite radically different visions of colonialism and imperialism, the above 
jurists shared some fundamental similarities. In order to unpack this it is useful to turn 
to the work of Jacques Vergès. Vergès is not generally mentioned in relation to Third 
World jurists. However, during the 1950s and 1960s, he was exemplified the radical 
Marxist Third Worldist tradition. He was both a Communist Party militant and a Third 
Worldist who formulated his legal perspectives reflecting upon his work defending the 
Algerian FLN. In this way, then, he represents an interesting counterpoint Bedjaoui. 
Both converge in holding to a Marxist-inflected Third Worldist account of imperialism, 
yet Vergès was a Communist whose political and theoretical priorities led to him fight 
for national liberation, whereas Bedjaoui was a nationalist, whose political priorities led 
him to adopt Marxism in order to understand his own situation. 
 
Focusing specifically on criminal law, Vergès maintained that the role of law was to 
resolve social contradictions in favour of the ruling class.
480
 This meant that to engage 
in legal argument on its own terms was to ultimately collude with and reinforce the 
existing order.
481
 In winning a legal argument, one might escape the wrath of the state, 
but it would be at the expense of legitimating the status quo. Against this, Vergès 
advocated the trial of rupture, where the ‘accused’ refuses to accept the status quo, 
using the trial as a platform to mount a direct attack on the status quo.
482
 In ‘legal 
terms’, such a defence will often not be successful, hence in the ‘normal’ ruptural trial 
‘the goal of the defence is less to acquit the accused than to illuminate its ideas’.483  
 
However, Vergès argued that in the wider context of the Russian, Chinese and anti-
colonial revolutions,
484
 it had become possible to spread one’s ideas and win a legal 
victory. These worldwide movements would mobilise ‘outside’ of the court in such a 
way that even if one lost in legal terms, political pressure could secure a victory. Vergès 
                                                 
478
 Ibid., 86. 
479
 Ibid., 44. 
480
 Vergès 1968, 18. 
481
 Ibid., 19. 
482
 Ibid. 
483
 Ibid., 104. 
484
 Ibid., 183. 
108 
 
 
 
focused closely on the example of the FLN, who ‘practised total rupture’, using the 
courtroom to stage a struggle for national independence.
485
 In particular, the FLN raised 
the question of torture not in order to vindicate a liberal prohibition against it, but rather 
to show that colonialism – by its very nature – aimed at destroying the Algerian 
people.
486
 We might say that this is the most direct example of how the radical concept 
of colonialism and imperialism played out in legal terms. If imperialism and 
international law are ‘institutions for each other’, then to inhabit international law on its 
own terms will only ever legitimise and consolidate imperialism. At best, for Vergès, 
the law could be temporarily ‘inhabited’ and used to directly attack colonialism, but 
could never serve as a vehicle to systematically challenge imperialist social relations.  
 
In Vergès, then, we see an account which analyses law as being structurally tied to 
capitalism and imperialism. This limited its ability to directly challenge these social 
relations. By contrast, the jurists previously considered, whatever their differences, all 
ultimately saw international law as part of the solution to neo-colonialism. This 
conclusion rested on a broader shared theoretical position as to the nature of 
international law. Essentially, all of the above jurists understood law in a ‘sociologically 
functional’ way.487 For them, international law was an essentially neutral vessel that 
performed a given set of social functions depending on its social context.
 488
 As Onuma 
put it in 2003: 
 
[I]nternational law has conducted, and continues to conduct, distinct societal 
functions based on a general understanding and perception of law .... There are a 
variety of international laws, depending on forms or ‘sources’, the particular 
area they are supposed to regulate, the way they are understood and perceived in 
different countries and in different historical periods, and so on. The functions of 
international law differ in relation to different conditions and circumstances.
489
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For the above authors, international law was seen to ‘express’ social and economic 
relations;
490
 develop ‘to meet the challenges of the times’;491 reflect ‘the impact of 
world developments’492 or be ‘determined’ by ‘sociological factors of a society’.493 As 
Onuma acknowledges, this functionalism could take on more or less critical variants. 
Thus, some of the above authors argued ‘a major function of international law is to 
provide a tool for achieving international justice’, whereas others understood 
international law’s function ‘as that of justifying global dominance and exploitation by 
the powerful developed countries’.494  
 
Crucially, however, since international law’s function reflected and expressed social and 
economic relations, it would also change with those relations. This was particularly 
important in the context of decolonisation. Both the radical and more conservative 
scholars shared the idea that if the forces of decolonisation were changing the world, 
then international law would also change. In this way, international law’s function could 
become one of securing national liberation.   
 
Here the contrast with Vergès is apposite. If, to greater and lesser degrees, these jurists 
were able to trace the impact that imperialism and colonialism had on international law, 
there was no account of why international law specifically served this role, and what 
made it so suited to perform the task of mediating imperialist social relations. Insofar as 
law ‘expressed’ social and economic relations, it was the same as any other social 
phenomenon.   There is little sense of law as specific social relation beyond its 
‘functions’, and hence the specificity of the relationship between law and colonialism 
(and imperialism) was left untheorised.  
 
As the Bolshevik jurist Evgeny Pashukanis said in another context, one is left with ‘a 
history of economic forms with a more or less weak legal colouring’.495 This meant that, 
despite the long history of intertwining between international law and colonialism, it 
was ultimately understood as a contingent relationship. It was this aspect that some 
scholars in the later Third World tradition sought to address.
496
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3. Third Worldism After the Third World 
3.1. Beyond Sociological Functionalism  
One of the most striking features about the ambitious programmes of international legal 
reform proposed by the Third Worldist movement is just how comprehensively they 
failed. It is telling that both Bedjaoui’s and Umozurike’s books were published in 1979. 
Whilst ‘[f]uture historians may well look upon the years 1978–80 as a revolutionary 
turning-point in the world’s social and economic history’,497 it was not because of the 
Third World’s call for a New International Economic Order. One might plausibly claim 
that a ‘new international economic order’ was born in these years, but it was not the 
vision promoted by the Third World. Instead, the period gave rise to neo-liberalism, an 
aggressive strategy of capitalist accumulation which broke the back of the Third 
Worldist movement.
498
 
 
How, then, to deal with this? As noted in Chapter 1, one of the reasons that 
postcolonialism came into being was because of this failure. In its attempts to utilise 
‘institutions’ like the nation state, or the UN, the Third World movement seemed to be 
casting these as ‘neutral’ empty vessels through which any political project could be 
expressed. Yet given the persistent and comprehensive failure of these institutions to 
advance the interests of the Third World, this belief seemed fundamentally misplaced. 
Given the centrality of international law to these institutions, doubts had to be cast on its 
neutral character as well. This need was reinforced by the fact that these institutions did 
not simply fail to advance the interests of the Third World, but rather were crucial in the 
creation and expansion of neoliberalism.
499
  
 
Accordingly, subsequent analysis had to go beyond the sociological functionalism of 
the original Third Worldist jurists, and ask whether there was something about 
international law in particular that steered it towards this fate.
500
 As Luis Eslava and 
Sundhya Pahuja note, ‘the project became less about trying to use international law to 
remedy the social and economic domination of the postcolonial world by the former 
imperial powers ... and more about how colonialism and imperialism and their ways of 
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knowing have been crucial to the formation and practice of international law as a 
discipline’.501 
 
This contemporary movement has come to be identified under the self-appellation 
‘Third World Approaches to International Law’, or TWAIL.502 In a move strongly 
reminiscent of scholars associated with postcolonialism, TWAIL scholars reach back 
historically and cast the older generation of Third World jurists as a ‘TWAIL I’ to their 
‘TWAIL II’.503 As such, TWAIL scholars tend to describe ‘TWAIL’ as a broad and 
longstanding ‘political’ project.  
 
On this basis, Anghie and Chimni state that the core insight of ‘TWAIL’ is that 
‘international law only makes sense in the context of the lived history of the peoples of 
the Third World’.504 The fundamental experiences of these peoples have been 
colonialism and neo-colonialism, meaning that attending to the ‘power relations among 
states and ... the ways in which any ... international rule ... will actually affect the 
distribution of power’ is the defining feature of ‘TWAIL’ scholarship.505 
 
Broadly speaking then, TWAIL scholars understand themselves as operating within ‘a 
political project’506 which emerged after the ‘moment’ of decolonisation.507 Makau wa 
Mutua has enumerated three elements to this project: 
 
The first is to understand, deconstruct, and unpack the uses of international law 
as a medium for the creation and perpetuation of a racialized hierarchy of 
international norms and institutions that subordinate non-Europeans to 
Europeans. Second, it seeks to construct and present an alternative normative 
legal edifice for international governance. Finally, TWAIL seeks through 
scholarship, policy, and politics to eradicate the conditions of underdevelopment 
in the Third World.
508
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The result of these quite broad political objectives is that TWAIL scholars have 
generally understood TWAIL as an umbrella label, which does not necessitate any 
particular theoretical position. Instead, TWAIL scholars adopt a diversity of theoretical 
approaches.
509
 However, this diversity is not unlimited and there are several points of 
unity. Firstly, insofar as TWAIL is positioned as a ‘political project’ oriented to fighting 
colonialism, imperialism and Eurocentrism, this implies understanding the world in 
these terms. Secondly, these positions are already situated within the debates described 
in Chapter 1, as well as those discussions described in the previous section. Finally, 
insofar as contemporary TWAIL scholars see themselves as ‘going beyond’ the original 
Third World jurists, they share a common interest in exploring the historical and 
structural connections between international law, colonialism and imperialism. 
 
By consequence, certain distinct theoretical patterns emerge from a close examination 
of TWAIL scholarship. The focus in the next section will be on some of the main 
contemporary figures, chosen for their influence as well as their representative nature of 
trends within contemporary theorising. 
 
3.2. Civilising Missions 
In 2007, David Kennedy stated that ‘TWAIL ... was forged in Anghie’s encounter with 
the history of international law’.510 Whilst this may be an exaggeration, it remains true 
that Antony Anghie’s work has been one of the main reference points for TWAIL 
scholarship.
511
 Interestingly, although Anghie’s major work is entitled Imperialism, 
Sovereignty and the Making of International Law, the book is not overtly concerned 
with thinking through the concept of ‘imperialism’. There are brief references to 
Hobson and Lenin
512
 and mention of World Systems theory
513
 but much of the wider 
theoretical framework remains implicit. Anghie does offer a description of imperialism 
at the beginning of the book, where, following Doyle (see Chapter 1 Section 3), he 
states that ‘“[c]olonialism” refers, generally to the practice of settling territories, while 
‘imperialism’ refers to the practices of an empire’.514 Despite this, he uses the terms 
‘interchangeably because of their close relationship to each other’.515 However, he also 
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notes that imperialism exceeds and survives colonialism, in ‘the practices of powerful 
Western states in the period following the establishment of the United Nations’.516 
 
That being said, this quite narrow definition of imperialism is matched by a broader 
vision of imperial and colonial relations. In this respect Anghie is similar to Said, who 
articulated a rather modest account of imperialism and colonialism alongside his theory 
of Orientalism.
517
 In Anghie’s account, colonialism is central to the birth and 
development of international law. He argues that the standard narrative of international 
law has tended to treat colonialism as a peripheral or side issue. In such accounts, 
‘international law came to the colonies fully formed and ready for application’, with the 
role of international law to simply assimilate different societies into an already existing 
‘European’ system.518 Here, there is no real ‘problem of difference’ because 
international law has pre-empted it. Colonialism was simply an issue that an already-
formed international law had to confront.  
 
For Anghie, these ‘traditional’ accounts are premised upon a particular way of thinking 
about international law. In this way of thinking, the task of international law is creating 
‘order’ among sovereign states. However, this cannot adequately answer a logically 
prior question, namely, how it is that certain social formations are excluded 
sovereignty? Before one can talk about ‘order among sovereign states’, one has to know 
what counts as a sovereign state.
519
 Anghie insists that unless such an approach is taken, 
we will inevitably arrive at a Eurocentric account of international law, which abstractly 
universalises the European experience. Such an account fails to capture the reality of the 
situation, since the transformation of non-European societies into sovereign states was 
not simply the abstract extension of ‘order’. Rather, it was bound up with the violence 
of colonial expansion.  
 
Anghie does not simply think that we have to pay attention to the history of those who 
were not international legal sovereigns. This would still imply that an international law 
concerned with ‘order among sovereign states’ came fully formed to the non-European 
world. Rather, he claims that international law has always been concerned with the 
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management of ‘cultural difference’.520 As a consequence of this, sovereignty actually 
emerges from the colonial experience. It was only through the management and 
confrontation of cultural difference that sovereignty as we know it today was born. 
Hence, for Anghie, developments of international law ‘cannot be understood simply and 
always as logical elaborations of a stable, philosophically conceived sovereignty 
doctrine’521 rather they were generated by colonialism.522 
 
In this way, Anghie directly addresses the issue of sociological functionalism. For him, 
international law is not simply a neutral receptacle which reflects a given balance of 
forces at any given point in time. Rather, ‘the colonial encounter, with all its exclusions 
and subordinations, shaped the very foundations of international law’.523 As Craven puts 
it, in Anghie’s account, international law was ‘profoundly shaped by ... [the colonial] 
encounter, encoding within its disciplinary structures ... the discriminatory features of 
cultural difference’.524 This has implications for any attempt to use international law for 
the purposes of liberating the Third World. 
 
Whilst Anghie may not explicitly situate himself within theoretical debates about the 
nature of imperialism and colonialism, his work shares in the problematic of 
postcolonialism.
525
 This is evident in his insistence that we move beyond Eurocentric, 
historicist accounts of the extension of sovereignty and recover a subaltern perspective. 
More importantly, his account of sovereignty is structurally analogous to Said’s account 
of ‘othering’. Thus, where Said argued ‘neither the term Orient nor the concept of the 
West has any ontological stability; each is made up of human effort, partly affirmation, 
partly identification of the Other’,526 one can substitute ‘sovereign’ and ‘non-sovereign’ 
to encapsulate Anghie’s argument. The ‘self’ of ‘sovereignty’ was created through the 
positing the ‘other’ of the non-sovereign.  
 
Further mirroring postcolonialism, Anghie contends that this process is an endless one, 
embedded in international law in a ‘dynamic of difference’: 
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International lawyers over the centuries maintained this basic dichotomy 
between the civilized and the uncivilized, even while refining and elaborating 
their understanding of each of these terms. Having established this dichotomy, 
furthermore, jurists continually developed techniques for overcoming it by 
formulating legal doctrines directed towards civilizing the uncivilized world. I 
use the term ‘dynamic of difference’ to denote, broadly, the endless process of 
creating a gap between two cultures, demarcating one as ‘universal’ and 
civilized and the other as ‘particular’ and uncivilized, and seeking to bridge the 
gap by developing techniques to normalize the aberrant society ... The dynamic 
is self-sustaining and indeed, as I shall argue, endless; each act of arrival reveals 
further horizons, each act of bridging further differences that international law 
must seek to overcome.
527
 
 
We might say that for Anghie, just as for Bhabha, international law is structured around 
‘the desire for a reformed, recognizable Other, as a subject of difference that is almost 
the same, but not quite’.528 The key moments in this process are when European 
expansion first confronts the non-European world. Two particular instances are 
especially important to his story: firstly, Francisco de Vitoria’s mediations on Spanish 
dealings with Native Americans (‘Indians’) in the 1500s, and, secondly, the reflections 
of the 19th century international legal positivists 
 
Vitoria was a 16th century Spanish jurist and theologian who is seen as one of the 
forerunners of international law.
529
 Anghie argues that in orthodox accounts Vitoria is 
seen as applying or extending a pre-existing European legal framework to the Americas. 
By contrast, Anghie suggests that, in fact, Vitoria was only able to articulate 
‘international law’ because of the ‘unique issues generated by the encounter between 
the Spanish and the Indians’.530 Prior to Vitoria, the relationship between the Spanish 
and the Indians was understood to be mediated through divine law. Essentially, the 
ability to hold property was said to be dependent upon divine law, and therefore upon 
Christian belief. As a result, the Indians could have no right to ‘their’ property, and so 
the Spanish could freely appropriate their land.
531
 Vitoria disputed this, holding that 
divine law had to be separated from human law, and that clearly it was human law that 
determined whether or not one could hold property.  
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Thus, rather than interacting within a single overarching framework of divine law, the 
Indians and the Spanish interacted through two separate systems of ‘human’ law. The 
confrontation was thus recast as one of jurisdiction.
532
 However, Vitoria then declared 
that alongside divine and human lawis the jus gentium (the law of nations). This law 
was arrived at through the use of human reason, and since the Indians possessed this, 
they too were bound by it. For Vitoria, the content of this jus gentium was a kind of 
secular state of nature, which created a series of reciprocal rights and duties. Chief 
among these were the rights to ‘sojourn’ in other territories, and engage in trade. Insofar 
as these norms were violated, they would enable redress. 
 
Anghie holds that, whilst this appeared ‘to promote notions of equality and 
reciprocity’,533 the practices contained within the jus gentium were in fact an abstract 
universalisation of the commercial practices of Spanish society. When this was 
combined with the fact that it was the Spanish who were present in the New World (and 
not the other way round), the practical effect of this ‘universality’ was to allow the 
Spanish to impose their models of trade and commerce on Indian society. Because 
violations of the jus gentium could be met with reprisals, the Spanish were entitled to 
engage in almost constant war against the Indians insofar as they resisted this economic 
penetration.
534
  
 
In this way, Vitoria exemplifies the dynamic of difference. He initially posited the 
Indians as belonging to the realm of universal reason, and therefore as being ‘like’ the 
Spanish. However, the practices of the Indians make them diverge from this ‘universal’ 
reason. Consequently, the ‘Indian is schizophrenic, both alike and unlike the Spaniard’, 
and can only be made perfect ‘by the adoption or the imposition of the universally 
applicable practices of the Spanish’.535 For Anghie, therefore, the birth of a secular jus 
gentium was tied up with the Spanish expansion into the ‘New World’. 
 
However, Vitoria is only a prelude for what is the most important element in Anghie’s 
story – the role of positivist jurists in 19th century colonial expansion. For Anghie, the 
experience of colonialism is especially vital because, bluntly put, ‘[i]t was only because 
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of colonialism that international law became universal’.536 In a direct sense, once 
European states controlled most of the globe so too did European international law.  
 
As noted above, the shift to 19th century colonialism was matched by a shift in the 
discipline. Whereas previously it had primarily taken a natural law approach, it now 
took an increasingly a positivist one, as exemplified by jurists such as Westlake, 
Lawrence and Oppenheim. Whereas natural lawyers understood law as existing 
‘objectively’ as a system above states, positivists understood law as being rooted in and 
resulting from sovereign will.
537
 At first sight, therefore, their theoretical position 
seemed to embed the ‘order among sovereign states’ perspective. It might appear that 
for positivists ‘[c]olonialism features only very incidentally’, because colonisation 
necessarily involves the action of a sovereign state as against a non-sovereign entity. 
538
 
 
Anghie argues that this was not the case. This was true in a double sense. Firstly, 
because the positivists were compelled by the internal logic of their doctrine to define 
sovereignty as against an ‘other’, and secondly, because they needed to account for the 
fact that European colonial expansion had been conducted via international law. In the 
former, internal, case, positivists had to deal with the fact that one of the most important 
theorists of positivism – John Austin – believed that international law could not be law 
properly so-considered because it lacked an overarching sovereign to effectively enforce 
it. Instead, he stated it was a species of ‘positive moral rules’.539 This reflected a more 
general anxiety about the legal character of international law, which has plagued it to 
this day. The 19th century positivists attempted to negotiate this by challenging the idea 
that the presence of an overarching sovereign was the defining feature of law. In 
particular, they claimed that law was present where participants regularly dealt with 
each other, regarded themselves as being bound by norms and where some punishment 
would follow a breach of these norms.
540
 In place of a sovereign, then, the law required 
a community. 
 
In this positivist vision a close link was established between law and social institutions. 
But this raised the question: what type of institutional arrangements gave rise to law? 
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By extension, it also raised the question of what type of institutional arrangements did 
not give rise to law. This left the door wide open to allow the ‘racialization of law by 
delimiting the notion of law to very specific European institutions’.541 Very quickly, it 
was decided that the mere fact of obedience would not signal the presence of law, since 
‘primitive tribes’ could compel obedience through the club. This then shifted attention 
to a notion of effective territorial control, which would exclude nomadic tribes. 
However, European jurists still had to account for the fact that many African and Asian 
social formations exercised a high degree of territorial control. What was settled upon 
was the idea of society. Asian and African societies might have appeared sovereign; 
they may have even had a number of superficially similar features to European 
societies; but they simply could not be the same. This was because they lacked 
‘civilised’ society, and so could not be members of the Family of Nations.542  
 
This meant that a dichotomy between the ‘civilised’ and ‘uncivilised’ became crucial to 
the self-constitution of the positivist enterprise. Although other societies might appear 
to have law, ‘any tendency to affirm this similarity must be immediately repulsed as it 
could result in the collapse of the language of sovereignty and therefore of international 
law itself’.543 However, such assertions seemed to contradict actual state practice in the 
19th century, which involved treating the natives as if they had some form of legal 
personality. Many European states derived their titles from treaties with tribal chiefs, or 
local polities. This ‘contradiction’ was easily ‘resolved’ through colonisation, whereby 
Europeans would extend their sovereignty over native territories, but European powers 
often did not wish to engage in the costly action of doing so. 
 
Positivists negotiated this through the ideas of quasi-sovereignty and recognition.
544
 
Essentially, if a non-European state had attained some element of ‘civilisation’, it could 
be recognised by a civilised state, and brought partially into international legal 
relations.
545
 An entity might, for instance, have sufficient international legal personality 
to hand over its lands to a European power. But here the law came up against inter-
imperialist rivalry. Recognition was a largely unilateral, ‘political’ act and might be 
challenged by other states eager to gain colonial title. In order to combat this, the 
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positivists attempted to develop a rigid taxonomy of degrees of civilisation, which 
would make it possible to judge whether or not a state had reached sufficient proximity 
to European civilisation to be able to engage in a given action.
546
 
 
Once again, a transformative dynamic was opened up. The ‘standard of civilisation’ 
could now operate as a goal for non-Europeans. This was the case with Turkey, which 
was admitted to the European system in 1856, and with Japan and Siam, which 
maintained ‘nominal independence’.547 However, the standard of civilisation that had to 
be reached ‘amounted ... to idealized European standards in both their external and, 
more significantly, internal relations’.548 Non-European states had to undertake to 
protect the ‘liberty’ and ‘property’ and transform their legal systems in line with 
European standards.
549
 
 
Legal positivism, then, with its putative focus on creating order among sovereign states, 
came full circle. Since all law must emanate from sovereign will, the positivists made 
recognition the fundamental criterion for the emergence of a sovereign state. This 
created a vicious circle of Eurocentrism. In putting forward a pure theory of ‘state 
recognition’, once again the question of who counted as a state was obscured. In this 
way, the operative role of a Eurocentric criterion of ‘society’ was obscured. This 
allowed sovereignty to be presented as ‘self-contained, coherent, comprehensive and 
all-encompassing’.550 By consequence, the European experience was naturalised, 
creating a ‘conceptual framework within which the only history of the non-European ... 
is the history of its absorption into the European world in order to progress towards the 
ultimate point of acquiring sovereignty’.551 
 
Ultimately, this naturalisation allowed the identity of the European state to be solidified. 
Europe’s legal identity was constructed as against the ‘other’ of the non-European 
world. The positivist international lawyers engaged in a form of historicist universalism 
which allowed them to posit European-derived sovereignty as the telos of historical 
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development. At the same time, this manoeuvre proved crucial to the constitution of 
European identity itself. 
 
It has been necessary to describe this process in some detail because this is the crucial 
moment for Anghie in the formation of a Eurocentric legal order. Anghie argues that 
‘the nineteenth century is very much an integral part of contemporary international law’. 
Many of the inequalities created during the colonial period remain, and it would be 
highly unlikely that ‘simple expedient of excising or reformulating the offending 
terminology’ of sovereignty and law could really alter a discipline ‘whose fundamental 
concepts ... had been so explicitly and clearly formulated in ways which embodied 
within them the distinctions and discriminations which furthered colonialism’.552 The 
conceptual ‘heart’ of the international legal discipline was in fact a heart of darkness. 
For Anghie, the consequences of this ‘primordial’553 relationship would play out 
consistently in future international legal episodes.  
 
Anghie’s emphasis on the civilising mission as the core dynamic of international law 
has found broader resonance. Makau wa Mutua, for example, connects the spread of 
human rights to ‘the impulse to universalize Eurocentric norms and values by 
repudiating, demonizing, and “othering” that which is different and non-European’.554 
For Mutua, international legal thought embeds Eurocentrism because it is founded on a 
abstract, universalising vision of liberalism.
555
 This is in sharp contradiction to what he 
sees as the historical tradition of non-European societies.
556
 
  
3.3. Developing Resistance 
One of the criticisms levelled at Said’s Orientalism was that at times he was overly 
pessimistic, putting forward ‘a model of colonial political relations in which all power 
lies with the with colonizer’.557 To some degree, the same might be said of Anghie. 
Although he does deal resistance in his work, it is clearly not his main concern. For 
Balakrishnan Rajagopal, by contrast, resistance – and the international legal response to 
it – is vital.  
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In International Law From Below, Rajagopal holds that ‘development’ and ‘resistance’ 
are the key phenomena for understanding international law. The aim of Rajagopal’s 
scholarship is, in a sense, quite straightforward. What he seeks to do is understand the 
history of international law by foregrounding the question of Third World resistance, 
which is a history of resistance to development. Like Anghie, Rajagopal does not 
explicitly deal with theories of imperialism. However, he does situate his work 
explicitly within the terrain of postcolonialism. Following Subaltern Studies, he seeks to 
‘write resistance into international law and make it recognize subaltern voices’.558 
 
Rajagopal’s theory of resistance draws from several diverse sources, in particular: 
Foucault, Fanon, Gramsci and Chatterjee. From Foucault, Rajagopal takes the idea that 
that one cannot simply regard the ‘power emerging from the state as the principal one’ 
instead, power is diffused to apparatuses of government.
559
 From Gramsci, he draws on 
the idea of hegemony, which suggests that controlling a social formation involves the 
‘production, reproduction, and mobilization of popular consent’.560 From Fanon, he 
takes the notion that symbolic and psychological practices are an essential part of Third 
World struggles, which cannot be reduced to ‘economic ones’.561 Finally, from 
Chatterjee, he takes the idea that the post-colonial state is not a neutral, but in fact has a 
long history of enmeshment with the ideology of ‘development’. 
 
Essentially, for Rajagopal, two points emerge. Firstly, that any ‘theory of resistance in 
international law must allow for the inter-penetrability of state and society, of domestic 
and international, and of law and politics’.562 Secondly, that institutions always develop 
through the struggle to manage and co-opt resistance. Adopting an explicitly ‘Saidian’ 
lens, he argues that when international law ‘encounters resistance, it can engage with it 
only by adopting certain unchanging essences of western or Third Worldness, as well as 
images of legitimacy and redemption’.563 What this means is that the Third World, and 
specifically its resistance, has been a kind of ‘other’ through which international law 
has been able to establish and consolidate its existence. Consequently: 
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[T]he very architecture of contemporary international law has been constituted 
by its continuous evocation of and interaction with the category “Third World” 
... The invocation of the “Third World masses,” whether real or imaginary was 
essential to the expansion of international institutions.
564
 
 
In this respect, Rajagopal occupies very similar intellectual ground to Anghie. In both 
accounts, the primary force for the consolidation and expansion of international law is 
its confrontation with the Third World ‘other’. Furthermore, like Anghie, Rajagopal 
argues that, when confronted with Third World resistance, international lawyers have 
attempted to transform it.
565
 However, whilst Anghie locates this dynamic in the 
question of sovereignty and the civilising mission, Rajagopal locates it in the – related 
but different – dynamic of development.566 
 
For Rajagopal, development is essentially ‘the desire to advance the “primitive” to 
civilization in a purely cultural sense, and the attempt to develop the “backward” to 
well-being in a material, developmental sense’.567 He argues that there are three 
moments in which international law internalised this. The first was the Spanish 
confrontation with the ‘Indians’. This involved positing a ‘cultural’ divide between the 
Christians and infidels. The second moment was the ‘construction of a civilizational 
divide’ in the 19th century.568 In this respect, then, Rajagopal’s account is similar to 
Anghie’s.  
 
However, for Rajagopal, these two moments do not give birth to a fully-fledged 
ideology of ‘development’. In both instances ‘it had not been the international policy 
objective of the imperial and colonial powers to bring economic development to the 
natives’.569 Instead, the natives had been seen as incapable of developing because of 
their racial or cultural characteristics. It is the third moment that does this. As with other 
critical scholars,
570
 Rajagopal traces the ideology proper of ‘development’ to Harry S. 
Truman’s 1949 inaugural address. In this speech, Truman laid out a plan which stated 
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that the West ought to share its ‘technical knowledge’ with peace loving peoples so as 
to secure them greater production.  
 
For Rajagopal, this represents the fullest realisation of ‘development’. Now the 
‘objective of developing the underdeveloped was firmly placed within the progressivist 
parameters of the project of modernity’.571 It is no accident that this occurs on the 
threshold of the great wave of decolonisation, since the development project was bound 
up with ‘the development of an apparatus of management of anticolonial resistance 
struggles’.572 Rajagopal insists that the relationship between the West and the Third 
World was no longer mediated through colonialism but through ‘a new discipline called 
development’.573 This ‘regime of representation’ has now become so important that 
‘everything that relates to the non-western world is governed by its logic, from popular 
media images ... to virtually all governmental practices’.574 
 
For Rajagopal, international law was vital to this process. He argues that the vast 
majority of international lawyers in the period following the First World War ‘shared an 
essential belief in the emancipatory ideas of western modernity and progress embedded 
in the new discipline of development’.575 Rajagopal goes further than this. One issue 
that has nagged scholars of development is how it managed to emerge so suddenly. 
Where once there was colonialism, suddenly a fully fledged ‘alternative’ sprung forth; 
Rajagopal sees the Mandate System of the League of Nations as the crucial transition 
mechanism between the two.
576
 
 
The Mandate System was set up under the Covenant of the League of Nations to deal 
with colonies of the defeated powers after the First World War. Created under Article 
22 of the Covenant, the System placed the territories inhabited by people ‘not yet able 
to stand by themselves under the strenuous conditions of the modern world’ under the 
‘tutelage’ of ‘advanced nations’, who, under the ‘sacred trust of civilisation’ would 
prepare these nations for independence. Whilst the system was criticised by the anti-
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colonial movement as a ‘cowardly compromise’,577 Rajagopal sees matters as more 
complex. 
 
Article 22(1) of the Covenant stated that Mandates were to be administered for ‘the 
well-being and development’ of their native inhabitants. For Rajagopal this ‘marked a 
turn from the narrow confines of European international law of the nineteenth century to 
the broader reaches of twentieth century cosmopolitanism’578 because it moved beyond 
the exclusionary positivism of the 19th century. Whilst there had been a prior history of 
using the language of humanitarianism, Rajagopal argues that this was the first time it 
became a central justification, and so came to structure the governance of the territory. 
More importantly, it was the first time that development had been ‘formulated in terms 
of an international administration’.579 
 
For Rajagopal, this is particularly important because the establishment of the League 
coincided with a crisis of the discipline of international law. The First World War 
appeared to show that international law had no ability to restrain sovereignty, 
fundamentally problematising the positivist emphasis on ‘rules’ and ‘consent’. As a 
result, international lawyers were increasingly willing to turn to pragmatism and take 
into account political, social, economic and psychological factors when formulating and 
applying norms.
580
 This became embodied in the Permanent Mandates Commission 
(PMC) of the League. In order to monitor whether or not states were fulfilling their 
obligations under Articles 21(1) and (3) of the Covenant, it was necessary to gather a 
huge number of statistics. The gathering of statistics had been previously carried out 
under colonialism. However, this was largely to secure information about the natives. In 
the Mandate System the data had to be ‘compared systematically to draw lessons and 
formulate standards and principles’.581 Colonial administration, and with it international 
law, took on the characteristics of being a science. 
 
This ‘scientific’ character came up against the fact that the practice of systematically 
observing the behaviour of sovereign states was without precedent. Added to this 
difficulty was the fact that the League had no ability to enforce sanctions upon its 
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members. Hence, the PMC was a kind of hybrid body, that had to engage in both 
cooperation and supervision. The PMC constantly had to resort to bureaucratic 
techniques in order to resolve this tension. This became an important aspect of the 
PMC’s self-definition, leading the it to ‘simply define, reproduce, and defend a field of 
reality as its terrain of application’, rather than actually fulfil its function: 
 
[W]hen confronted with the ‘reality’ of a legal violation through information 
from different sources, the PMC often chose to internalize the information in a 
series of bureaucratic maneuvers whose main purpose was their very existence 
and reproduction, without any further exterior objective. Such maneuvers 
included, for example, the appointment of rapporteurs and committees to study 
particular questions before the PMC, the consideration of on-the-spot visits, and 
draft resolutions for action by the Council. In other words, form, not substance, 
was key to supervision.
582
 
 
Essentially, for Rajagopal, the final result of this bureaucratic positioning was that the 
PMC became concerned with preserving its own position as a kind of supervisory, 
cooperative and technocratic body, concerned with governance, rather than rigid rules. 
This had serious consequences for the way in which resistance was able to be 
articulated through the system.  
 
There was a system of individual petitions to the PMC, whereby individuals could 
register their grievances. Yet the bureaucratic nature of the PMC meant that these 
complaints were mediated through a complicated process, with the PMC treating it ‘as a 
technocratic enterprise of obtaining information rather than legal determinations as a 
court of appeal’.583 When faced with particularly confrontational submissions, the PMC 
would employ a number of bureaucratic tactics, such as only considering written 
petitions, or refusing to hear those which went against the Mandate itself. Ultimately, 
the mechanism converted grievances ‘into questions of institutional self-preservation 
and identity of the PMC’.584 It thus served to de-radicalise and domesticate these 
grievances. 
 
For Rajagopal, these features have been carried over into all subsequent international 
institutions. They are technocratic bodies of governance, operating at the institutional 
level, which intervene to restructure the Third World. In so doing, they become driven 
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by a bureaucratic logic. Resistance which is channelled through these bodies is fatally 
compromised and becomes fodder for their reproduction.  
 
Rajagopal, therefore, like Anghie, moves away from the sociological functionalism of 
the earlier Third World jurists by arguing that international law was permanently 
marked through its encounter with the ideology of development. Like Anghie, his work 
is distinctly ‘postcolonial’ insofar as this development discourse is driven by a 
Eurocentric modernity marked by a ‘desire to embrace the Other’ and a desire ‘to 
advance the uncivilized’.585 Yet unlike Anghie, this encounter is not located in the 19th 
century, but rather the early 20th. It was ‘the techniques invented by the Mandate 
system’ which were to inform international law. Once again, this was to have profound 
implications for its later use by the Third World.
586
 
 
3.4. International Law and Global Capitalism  
Bhupinder Chimni’s role in TWAIL scholarship is interesting. Although his writing is 
clearly situated within the corpus of contemporary TWAIL,
587
 it actually stretches back 
far before that. For instance, in 1982 he authored the piece ‘Law of the Sea: Imperialism 
All the Way’,588 in which – as no doubt the title indicates – he alleged that the Draft 
Convention on the Law of the Sea ‘legitimises the loot of the seabed through a legal 
instrument’.589 In temporal terms, then, Chimni is much closer to the original wave of 
Third World jurists. This is more striking when we consider that his most systematic 
work, International Law and World Order
590
 was published in 1993. This means it 
appeared 14 years after Bedjaoui’s Towards a New International Economic Order but 
10 years before Rajagopal’s International Law From Below. We might say, therefore, 
that Chimni is something of an intermediary figure, standing between the older and 
newer generations of Third Worldist theorists. 
 
Of course, one cannot directly read theory from temporality. But this intermediary 
position is also borne out in Chimni’s theoretical positions. In 2010, he authored an 
article in which he stated the ten authors that had most inspired his work. The authors he 
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named were: Marx and Engels, Lenin, Gramsci, Poulantzas, Habermas, Alexandrowitz, 
Wittgenstein, Gandhi, Aurobindo, and Camus.
591
 Several things stand out from this list. 
The first is its syncretism. The particular combination of European radicals and Third 
World thinkers marks Chimni out as very much belonging to the Third World radical 
tradition.
592
 More important are the absences. Notably, Chimni does not cite any 
postcolonial theorists as influences.
593
 Finally, the list highlights the degree to which 
Chimni considers himself part of the Marxist tradition. In this respect, Chimni is much 
closer to the first wave of Third World jurists than many contemporary TWAIL 
scholars.  
 
Chimni’s Marxism is distinctively Third Worldist insofar as he attempts to analyse the 
question of imperialism from a peripheral subject-position.
594
 Given this Marxism, 
Chimni explicitly outlines his understanding of imperialism. His starting point is that 
there is an ‘internal relationship between structures of capitalism and imperialism’.595 In 
his account, capitalism has always had a tendency towards expanding spatially, and so 
assumed a global form. This means that, for Chimni, ‘capitalism has always been 
imperialist’,596 or rather capitalism has always existed as a ‘global social formation’.597 
 
This has wider implications for the way in which the global economy functions. Chimni 
argues that because of this intimate interconnection between the ‘domestic’ and 
‘international’ under capitalism, Marxists understand international relations as flowing 
from the internal organisation of states.
598
 Since every state sits atop a mode of 
production, with a given ruling class, ‘[t]he foreign policy of a state is integrally linked 
to its domestic policy’.599 However, because the capitalist mode of production is always 
and already global, it is not the case that the international economy is simply an 
agglomeration of various national economies. Rather capitalism produces a world 
market which ‘functions on the basis of an international division of labour which 
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defines the relations of the parts (domestic economies/states) to the whole (the world 
economy)’.600 
 
At the same time, Chimni holds to a classical Marxist account of law in which ‘law and 
legal relations are reflective of the social relations which constitute a particular 
society’.601 Chimni argues that these observations lead to ‘a perception of international 
law and institutions as a device which serves sectional global interests’.602 The 
dominant classes in the dominant parts of the international division of labour seek to 
realise their interests through international law.
603
 
 
For Chimni, the international division of labour has gone through a number of distinct 
configurations, each of which gave rise to specific international legal orders.
604
 Each of 
these legal orders did not simply mechanically express ‘economic’ content. Rather, each 
‘possesses its own internal structure and dynamics’ which shape ‘its content and 
discourse’; they only allow certain ‘sources’ to count as ‘law’ and in so doing, ‘define 
its boundaries’.605 In this way, it is possible to police the content of international law 
and prevent its transformation into a weapon used against the status quo. The first legal 
order was from 1600-1760, the period of ‘old colonialism’. This was characterised by a 
mercantilist form of expansion, and the consolidation of states in the ‘Westphalian’ 
model. Legally, it was characterised by a transition from feudal international law to 
bourgeois international law. 
 
Whereas old colonialism was based on the backwardness of European manufacture, and 
hence the need to accumulate materials and goods, new colonialism (of 1760-1875) 
reversed this. A greater stress was placed upon colonies as markets for European 
commodities. In this period, international law emerged on a firmer basis, more strongly 
structured around sovereignty. However, with the growing importance of colonies for 
European development, ‘[b]ourgeois international law shrank from a universal law of 
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nations to ... a Christian law of nations’.606 A whole series of developments on the issue 
of state responsibility sprung up in order to disadvantage the non-European world. 
 
These tendencies were exacerbated in the period of ‘imperialism’ (1875-1945), 
corresponding to that of monopoly capitalism. There was a strong push to acquire new 
colonial territory, particularly in Africa, and international law was key in enabling this. 
This period was also marked by the transformation of international law into one of 
‘civilised nations’, a secular and purportedly ‘universal’ model that ‘was inspired partly 
by the need to accommodate the rise of non-European great powers some of which were 
not Christian’.607 Equally, this law served the purpose of legitimising the domination of 
the colonies by the European powers. 
 
For Chimni, decolonisation was a contradictory phenomenon. He characterises the 
beginning of the period as a progressive phase, marked by the granting of independence 
and the adoption of texts like the NIEO. However, from 1975 it entered into a more 
regressive phase, in which these developments were rolled back.
608
 Chimni is keen to 
stress that, even though there was a progressive phase, this did not mark the end of 
imperialism, but instead ‘the beginning of a new phase: imperialism without 
colonies’.609 1945-1980 was marked by the rise of neo-colonialism. 
 
This is reflected in the character of international law. On the one hand, international law 
did posit the sovereign equality of all states. This was coupled with a formal 
universalism. A fundamental plank of the legitimacy of this order was that there was 
one international law, governing both the powerful and the weak. Any suggestion of a 
‘dual structure’, as had characterised ‘colonial and imperialist international law’, was 
‘no longer acceptable’.610 However, this was matched by an unequal distribution of 
power and wealth. Importantly, the new states acceded to a law which had been written 
in the colonial era. This was a ‘geometrical expression of the hegemony bourgeois 
doctrine exercises even today’.611 The international law of the neo-colonial period, then, 
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can be characterised as ‘bourgeois democratic’ because under it – as in a liberal 
democracy – ‘[f]ormal equality goes hand in hand with material inequality’.612  
 
This leads to the present period. In a series of recent works, Chimni has attempted to 
chart the economic and legal changes that have occurred under globalisation. Following 
a number of theorists,
613
 Chimni maintains that from the 1980s, capitalism has 
witnessed the birth of a ‘global imperialism’. What is distinctive about this new 
configuration is it that is driven by the interests of an emergent transnational capitalist 
class.
614
 This class is a truly global one, with no particular ties to any national economy. 
It is composed of the owners and managers of transnational corporations and financial 
institutions, whose productive and investment activities take place across national 
borders.
615
 
 
In order to facilitate this, it was necessary to constitute the world economy as a 
‘functional unified global economic space’.616 This involved guaranteeing the provision 
of free movement of capital, the proliferation of global standards and the creation of a 
climate conducive to the spread of intensified capitalist accumulation.
617
 For Chimni, 
international institutions have been vital in this process. In a role analogous to the state 
in the earlier stages of capitalism, international institutions have served to remove ‘local 
impediments to the process of capital accumulation’.618 The WTO, IMF and World 
Bank have remodelled the economies of peripheral societies along lines that make them 
much more attractive for transnational capital. Similarly, these institutions have – 
through the agendas of ‘good governance’ – reshaped political life.  
 
For Chimni, the sum total of these developments has been a fundamental transformation 
in state sovereignty.
619
 He sees them as giving rise to an ‘emerging global state’. The 
function of this state ‘is to realize the interests of transnational capital and powerful 
states in the international system to the disadvantage of third world states and 
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peoples’.620 For this reason, Chimni argues, one can say that this is a global imperial 
state. The global imperial state is not a state in a traditional sense of a centralised body 
with a monopoly on legitimate violence. Rather, the combination of international 
institutions and their interventions into formally sovereign states leads to an 
international network performing the functions of a global state.
621
 This marks a 
transition from bourgeois democratic international law – with its location of some 
elements of sovereignty within Third World states – to a bourgeois imperialist law.622 
Accordingly, Chimni speaks of the ‘threat of recolonisation’.623  
 
Immediately, then, we can note several important differences between Chimni’s work 
and that of the other scholars thus far analysed. Firstly, Chimni does not generally use 
the optic of ‘civilisation’ or ‘development’ in his account of the relationship between 
imperialism and international law. Insofar as he does invoke it, it is as a subsidiary 
concern, tied to the larger project of the accumulation of capital. Secondly, he does not 
locate a particular ‘moment’ at which international law’s confrontation with imperialism 
fundamentally shapes its content. Rather, his argument is that, on a material level, 
international legal institutions mediate relationships of imperialism, and so embed their 
particular contents.  
 
In this respect, Chimni is much closer intellectually to the radical wing of the old Third 
Worldist movement. In fact, his particular schema of the development of international 
law shows a degree of similarity to that outlined by Bedjaoui. The difference, however, 
lies in Chimni’s greater insistence on the structural interconnectedness of law and 
imperialism. For Bedjaoui, the fact of the anti-colonial movement as a social 
phenomenon had immediate legal consequences. Chimni is more cautious. He 
understands that a given legal order has a certain internal structure, meaning that it will 
not be equally useful for all purposes. This was reinforced by the fact that the 
developments Bedjaoui was celebrating were occurring under an overall system of neo-
colonialism. It is perhaps for this reason that, whilst Chimni is willing to grant that there 
was a progressive phase under neo-colonialism, and that formal equality was a real 
advance, he is unwilling to fully endorse the possibility of the NIEO breaking with neo-
colonialism.  
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If so far, to simplify, we have encountered Third Worldist scholarship influenced by 
postcolonialism on the one hand, and Marxism on the other, it is worth briefly 
examining the work of James Gathii. Gathii explicitly positions himself between these 
two tendencies, stating that whilst he does not ‘subscribe to the idea that cultural and 
nonmaterial forms of oppression underplay the real dynamics of oppression in economic 
structures and relations’, it is also important to unpack ‘homogeneous or universal 
categories of representation’.624 However, he thinks that these two approaches 
‘invariably contradict each other’.625 
 
Gathii argues that the international legal discipline is structured by a ‘Euro-American 
hegemony’, which conditions its theory and practice.626 This hegemony results from the 
fact that ‘law does not stand outside the raw interest of states’, but exists in a constant 
mutual interaction with these interests, shaping and being shaped by them. For Gathii, 
these interests are not simply ‘political’, instead they are deeply intertwined with the 
world economic system.
627
 Gathii, then, ‘foregrounds the existing reality of economic 
hierarchy and subordination between nations’.628  
 
In other words, Gathii’s work can be situated in the trajectory of radical and Marxist 
understandings of imperialism. Gathii explicitly defines imperialism ‘as the spread and 
expansion of industrial and commercial capitalism’,629 whereas colonialism is ‘the 
territorial annexation and occupation of non-European territories by European states’.630 
These two processes were associated with different legal regimes, the former, property, 
contract and tort; the latter, the laws of territorial acquisition. 
 
Gathii examines these social processes through the prism of the East African 
Protectorate in 1895. He argues that the ‘the project of territorial conquest and that of 
the expanding capitalist economy built on the extraction of surplus capital went hand in 
hand’.631 International law enabled and legitimated the process of territorial expansion 
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in order to create the preconditions for the creation and consolidation of capitalist 
property relations. This was a complex process that involved co-opting and 
transforming native hierarchies and practices.
632
 It was this process which guaranteed 
the emergence of ‘contemporary Kenya’ as a capitalist state.  
 
The internal life of the state had been so restructured that by the time of independence 
capitalism could be protected not ‘so much through force, but through “rights of 
property in the means of production and in the product and by the impersonal operation 
of the market”’.633 Consequently, for Gathii, the modern African state was created by 
international law, as part of a project to embed and entrench capitalist social relations. 
This close inter-relationship between international law and imperialism means that the 
former tends to reproduce Eurocentric ideas. This is particularly evident in the law on 
the title for territory, where the legacy of the colonial period continues to frame judicial 
accounts of the colonial past.
634
 Essentially, in these accounts non-European territories 
are treated ‘as mere geographical and economic sphere in respect of which colonial 
states entered into transactions, such as treaties, with each other’.635 Non-European 
nomadic practices are not treated as capable of generating territory, and so their 
experience is erased from history. 
 
 
4. Imperial Law’s Longue Durée  
As can be seen from the above, the essential characteristic of TWAIL scholarship is that 
its participants understand the enduring nature of the colonial and/or imperial character 
of international law. Owing to this, the consequences of this character manifest across 
diverse legal conjunctures. This section surveys three key ‘moments’ in the story of the 
Third World’s relationship with international law – decolonisation, globalisation and 
imperial war – to illustrate how these scholars have analysed the continuing relationship 
between imperialism and international law and how their different understandings of 
imperialism have framed this analysis.  
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4.1. An Anti-Colonial International Law? 
In a way, all Third Worldist international legal analysis pivots around the ‘moment’ of 
decolonisation. It was central to the first wave of Third World jurists and has been no 
less important for contemporary scholars. However, for the latter, this importance has 
taken a different form. Decolonisation is no longer viewed as the ‘foundational’ 
moment in international law – this is located in imperial and colonial encounters. 
Instead, TWAIL scholars write in the shadow of the failure of the anti-colonial 
movement. Hence, they have examined decolonisation through the prism of ‘what went 
wrong’.  
 
Decolonisation was a complex and contested process. However, its starting point was 
clearly the emergence of formerly colonial territories as independent sovereign states. 
Whilst this process initially seems innocuous, it has been a source of much criticism. As 
Mutua notes, the African states that we know today were only formed in colonial times. 
Prior to this, there had been a number of overlapping kingdoms and tribal territories 
with their own modes of social existence. During the colonial period, European 
concepts of sovereignty and statehood were deployed in order to occupy and divide 
Africa.
636
 Initially this was messy, creating overlapping claims and territories. The 
Berlin Conference was designed to ‘rationalise’ the process by through creating a series 
of rules for the acquisition of African territories. This was consolidated during the first 
two decades of the twentieth century. ‘New frontiers’ were drawn up based on the 
effective occupation of European powers and their spheres of influence. Through this 
process ‘[t]housands of independent pre-colonial states were compressed into some 
forty new states’.637 
 
The colonial state, then, was erected over a series of pre-existing tribal and ethnic 
identities. In essence, Africa was treated as ‘a blank slate’.638 Consequently, these states 
lacked legitimacy; they were artificially created and existed mainly to exploit the 
colonies, inspiring little loyalty in their populaces.
639
 During decolonisation, 
international law continued to enforce these boundaries. This was first evident in the 
Mandate system, where ‘self-government’ had to take place within the colonial 
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boundaries.
640
 The right of self-determination also took this route, which was achieved 
through the principles of territorial integrity and uti possidetis juris. The former held 
that claims of self-determination were unable to alter international territorial 
boundaries.
641
 This, of course, did not answer the question of what counted as a country 
for the purposes of self-determination. It was here that the principle of uti possidetis 
came in, ensuring that, for the purposes of international law, internal colonial 
boundaries counted as international boundaries.
642
 
 
The upshot of this was that ‘self-determination is linked to the administrative units 
established by the imperial powers’ which ‘validates the colonial state, retroactively 
ratifies colonial borders, and sanctions the denial of sovereignty’ of pre-colonial social 
formations.
643
 For Mutua, independence did not result in the significant transformation 
of the colonial state, but rather ‘the replacement of white by black faces in the state 
house’.644 As such, the post-colonial state did not have any internal legitimacy.645 In 
Mutua’s account, this is crucial in explaining the authoritarianism of post-colonial 
states, as well as their affliction by ethnic strife.  
 
In an analysis with echoes of Fanon, Mutua argues that self-determination ‘was not the 
same thing as liberation’.646 Instead, it decolonised ‘colonial state, not the African 
peoples subject to it’.647 Although Mutua’s precise analysis had not been followed by 
all, he points to an argument that has animated much of the TWAIL critique of 
decolonisation, namely the fact that ‘nationalist movements sought to express’ their 
non-European national identity ‘through the vehicle of an alien form, the nation-state 
which was emphatically European in its origins’.648  
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The achievement of independence immediately gave rise to an intractable question: 
could the Third World be bound by a law in which it had no part in making?
649
 This was 
not an abstract question. Upon achieving independence, many Third World states opted 
for a path of state-led, industrial development. This development required the control of 
natural resources. However, the majority of industry and raw materials were in the 
hands of foreign corporations. The question became, how might Third World states 
implement programmes of nationalisation? 
 
The jurists of the Third World declared that colonial international law should not be 
binding on the new states. In pursuance of this argument, they attempted to formulate a 
number of international legal arguments, particularly through the General Assembly, 
where the new states formed a majority. Chief amongst these was the doctrine of 
Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources (PSNR). Under this doctrine, ‘the Third 
World argued that the natural resources of a territory had always belonged to the people 
of the territory, and that this ownership continued through the colonial episode’.650 As a 
consequence, all concessions could be re-examined upon independence, assessing their 
legality and the profits they had generated. Should nationalisation then occur, 
compensation would be judged by domestic standards.
651
 These positions were codified 
in Resolution 1803 (1962). This was further reinforced by the Resolution 3821 (1974), 
the ‘Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States’ (CERDS).652  
 
European states countered that the new states were bound by pre-existing international 
law, and so their actions were framed by state succession. This meant that any 
obligations accrued by the former colonial state passed to the new state. Furthermore, 
whilst nationalisation was permitted, it was customary international law that determined 
the amount of compensation which needed to be paid.
653
 
 
These general arguments were fleshed out through specific engagements with CERDS 
and PSNR. With respect to PSNR, Anghie notes that the tendency was to argue that the 
natives of the colonial territory had not been international legal subjects and so could 
not have had sovereignty over their natural resources. Of course, this gave rise to the 
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question of how they could have alienated them in the first place. Anghie – examining 
the work of Karol Gess
654
 – argues that this contradiction was mediated through a 
notion of quasi-sovereignty: the natives had just enough sovereignty to enable them to 
alienate natural resources.
655
 Following this, Anghie continues, analysing the Texaco 
arbitration, the focus turned to the sources of international law. The Texaco Arbitrator, 
René-Jean Dupuy, held that the General Assembly Resolutions could not have the status 
of international law because the advanced states had opposed them. As a result, they 
were mere statements of ‘political intent’, with customary international law remaining 
binding.
656
  
 
For Anghie, it is at this moment that the 19th century resurfaces. Western jurists all 
claimed that the colonial moment had passed. At the same time, they relied on legal 
justifications from this period.
657
 Anghie sees this as a moment in the dynamic of 
difference: the universality of international law was asserted, yet this universality served 
‘to disempower the party to which it applies’.658 These arguments return ‘inexorably to 
that founding moment when the Third World enters the international realm to be 
bound’.659 The Third World had to renounce the idea that colonialism was relevant, 
even at the moment that it was being reasserted. Thus, ‘[w]hatever the other freedoms 
and empowerments offered by sovereignty, limitations apply’ and the ‘colonial past is 
unredeemable in international law’.660 As Gathii notes, the best that the Third World 
could hope for was that its legal interventions would be translated into ‘soft law’ which 
could only ‘put political pressure on governments’ and so lacked any real bite.661 
 
At first sight, Rajagopal’s account seems to be more optimistic as to the Third World’s 
international legal achievements. Focusing on the NIEO, he argues that whilst many 
dub it a failure, it was actually quite successful. However, this success was precisely the 
problem. According to Rajagopal, the Third World’s economic programme was rooted 
in an idea of ‘development as modernisation’ with ‘no call to preserve traditional ways 
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of living or other ways of protecting cultural spaces’.662 He continues that, despite the 
revolutionary rhetoric, the call for the NIEO arose from quite prosaic concerns. It was 
driven by a decrease in Western aid, the relative lack of success of political 
independence and OPECs strength as an oil cartel.
663
 The breadth of these reasons 
meant that – as noted previously– the coalition which launched the NIEO was 
composed of both radical and moderate states, with differing expectations. 
 
This tension played out across the course of the NIEO. At the Seventh Special Session 
of the General Assembly a series of specific, quite radical demands were put forward. 
These floundered in the face of concessions from the West, which were gladly accepted 
by the more moderate states.
664
 Although many have argued that this was indicative of 
the simple ‘failure’ of the NIEO, Rajagopal maintains that things were more 
complicated. Firstly, one of the main aims of the movement was not just to implement 
its substantive programme, but also to create a ‘common front’ of the Third World.665 
Secondly, this common front attempted to have its concerns institutionalised. Here, 
there was a relative success, as one important outcome of the NIEO was the direct 
politicisation of a number of international institutions such as UNCTAD.
666
 
 
And herein lay the problem. Because of their commitment to the development project, 
these jurists all identified ‘institutional proliferation as the means to bring about positive 
economic and social change in their countries’.667 But like the PMC, these institutions 
embodied a bureaucratic logic. Organisations like UNCTAD ‘became the institutional 
embodiment of the political compromises struck between moderate and radical 
positions within the Third World coalition, and thereby proved to be inherently 
moderate’.668 As with the Mandate System, international institutions channelled the 
resistance of the Third World through development discourse in such a way as to 
domesticate this resistance and increase the power of international institutions to 
intervene in the Third World.  
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4.2 Bad Governance? 
International financial institutions (IFIs) – particularly the World Bank and the IMF – 
have been one of the prime targets of the anti-globalisation movement. Scholars, 
theorists and activists have traced the role that these institutions have played in the 
spread and consolidation of neo-liberalism. However, many criticisms of these 
institutions have focused on their more ‘obvious’ shortcomings. A particular target of 
ire has been the IMF’s Structural Adjustment Programmes, which have forced Third 
World countries to restructure their economies along neoliberal lines.
669
 
 
Whilst TWAIL scholars have certainly couched criticisms in these terms, they have also 
focused on the seemingly ‘progressive’ aspects of IFIs. In particular, they have analysed 
how the discourse of ‘good governance’ – through which the IFIs have purported to 
promote democracy, transparency and human rights – has in fact embedded and 
articulated colonial and imperial patterns. For Anghie, it is notable that the target of 
‘good governance’ is always the Third World state. Whilst the problems of the 
advanced capitalist states may be recognised, ‘these are rarely if ever discussed in terms 
of ... of “good governance”’.670 He argues that the good governance agenda serves as a 
‘bridging concept’ by IFIs to enable them to reconfigure the relationship between 
human rights and development. As previously noted, the IFIs faced a great deal of 
criticism from human rights activists. The Bank responded that its policies were 
essential in promoting human rights, since human rights were founded on economic 
growth.
671
 
 
In this way, the Bank tied human rights closely to ‘development’ and its own 
retrogressive policies. However, it still needed an explanation for the failure of these 
policies. Having linked human rights and development, the Bank went on to claim that 
its development policies had failed because of bad governance. Consequently, the 
problem was not with the policies themselves, but with the implementation of these 
policies by corrupt governments in the Third World. In this way, the IFIs were able ‘to 
deflect criticisms ... shifting blame for the absence of development in recipient countries 
to those countries themselves’.672 However, for Anghie the process was deeper than 
this. According to Article IV(10) of the Bank’s Articles of Agreement ‘[t]he Bank and 
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its officers shall not interfere in the political affairs of any member ... [and] [o]nly 
economic considerations shall be relevant to their decisions’. In recasting economic 
development as dependent upon good governance, the Bank ‘massively expanded the 
range of domestic issues that can be subjected to IFI management’, enabling it to 
engage in the restructuring of the political systems of Third World states.
673
 
 
Essentially, then, the discourse of good governance pinpoints the source of 
underdevelopment as internal to Third World states.
674
 It then legitimates the 
intervention of Western states into the Third World, with the aim of restructuring its 
internal life in furtherance of ‘a particular set of economic arrangements, those 
prescribed by neo-liberal development policies’.675 Once again, for Anghie, this 
discourse ‘replicates the “civilizing mission” that has been such a prominent feature of 
the international relations’.676 Questions of good government have always been 
‘connected with commerce and a “right to trade” that, in reality, legitimates the 
presence of foreigners in non-European territories’.677  
 
However, for Anghie, the discourse of good governance most closely resembles the 
Mandate System. Like Rajagopal, Anghie argues that the Mandate System had 
legitimated the intervention of international institutions in order to secure 
‘development’, creating a ‘science’ of colonial administration in the process.678 The 
‘technologies’ that were developed through this system are those that underlie the 
language of good governance in the IFIs. Both the IFIs and the Mandate System are 
ultimately ‘ineffective’ at achieving their objectives. Since they locate the problems of 
the Third World purely endogenously, they are not able to address the international 
relationships which are the real causes of underdevelopment. But it is precisely because 
of this failure that ‘the IFIs can propose new initiatives and new approaches to 
development’.679 Once again, the attempt at ‘civilising’ opens up a gap which 
necessitates further ‘civilising’ interventions. 
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As should be evident from the above, Rajagopal’s understanding of the role of IFIs has 
much in common with Anghie’s. However, once again, he foregrounds ‘resistance’ and 
‘development’. Rajagopal notes that it is by no means obvious that the IFIs should be 
important. Both the Bank and IMF were not traditionally associated with broader ‘non-
economic’ issues and lacked political clout.680 According to Rajagopal, the reach of 
these institutions grew through the attempt to mediate resistance to development in the 
Third World. This process of extension began with the Cold War. Rajagopal argues that 
throughout this period, there was an increasing link between poverty and security. The 
US and its allies realised that under-development was an important generator of 
sympathy towards the radical left. Consequently, anti-communism could be promoted 
by allowing flows of aid to friendly regimes.
681
 This was one of the driving factors in 
the establishment – in 1961 – of the Bank’s International Development Authority 
(IDA).  
 
For Rajagopal, what is especially important about this development is that the IDA 
presaged a turn towards poverty reduction. Whereas under its old mandate the Bank had 
been concerned primarily with lending money for concrete projects, the focus on 
poverty entailed a shift to looser and more amorphous programmes. This meant that 
‘the Bank’s sectoral allocation expanded dramatically to embrace health, education, 
rural development, and agriculture’.682 This process was extended with the Bank’s ‘turn 
to the environment’ in the 1970s. Once again, this was a response to movements from 
below, in particular, radical peasant movements in the Third World and the ‘new social 
movements’ in the West. In order to avoid the legitimacy problems caused by its 
environmentally destructive policies, the Bank made an explicit turn towards ecological 
thinking.  
 
Similar issues came into play with the IMF. The IMF originally started life as an 
institution to deal with short term ‘balance of payments’ issues and prior to the 1970s it 
dealt primarily with the advanced capitalist countries. From the late 1970s to the 1980s 
there was a series of debt crises in the Third World and the IMF lent money in order to 
help resolve them.
683
 These engagements meant that for the first time the IMF was 
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focused on growth. Consequently, it focused more on effecting political changes to 
achieve this growth.  
 
Finally, both the IMF and the Bank come together in the drive towards 
‘democratisation’. As noted above, the language of democracy has become increasingly 
important to both institutions. Rajagopal argues that both have adopted a ‘modernist’ 
understanding, in which the meaning of development is transformed to incorporate 
‘democracy’ and ‘participation’.684 This is part of a broader notion of ‘development’ 
which includes ‘ecological and human aspects’.685 Yet even at its most progressive this 
idea of development embedded the perspective of modernisation theory in which 
‘tradition is synonymous with backwardness, lack of technology, stagnancy, oppressive 
human-rights conditions, and every aspect of life found in the Third World; whereas the 
“modern” is seen as progressive, embracing change, and ensuring rising living standards 
through better technology as in the West’.686 
 
Once again, therefore, Rajagopal argues that international institutions were driven by 
development. The IFIs confronted the Third World, and encountered resistance, this 
time in the form of democratic opposition. They ‘responded by embracing the 
democratic moment, just as they embraced the nationalistic moment at the time of 
decolonization’.687 Through their internal bureaucratic logic, this had the effect of 
increasing the scope of their own interventions and legitimating their further 
restructuring of the Third World. 
 
Chimni sees the IFIs as part of the emerging global state. This means that they are 
driven by the interests of the transnational capitalist class. On this basis, they are 
‘promoting a neo-liberal agenda at the initiative or behest of the advanced capitalist 
states’.688 As previously noted, therefore, Chimni sees these institutions as playing a 
role in removing impediments to the accumulation of capital. The discourse of ‘good 
governance’ has two principal aspects in this respect. The first is simply to provide 
ideological camouflage for the spread of neo-liberalism. The second, is that the rule of 
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law is conducive to the accumulation of capital itself, since it brings with it the stability 
and predictability necessary to attract investment.
689
 
 
Gathii characterises good governance as a ‘counter insurgency’ agenda. Like Rajagopal, 
he sees its emergence as rooted in the response to challenges from popular movements. 
Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, these movements had contested the equation of 
development and growth, which Gathii considers under the rubric of the ‘basic needs’ 
critique. There were two ‘versions’ of this critique. The strong version questioned the 
whole notion of development as ‘growth’, challenging the market system and 
advocating widespread changes to the whole international economic system. The weak 
version ‘takes for granted the existing distribution of wealth, power and resources’ and 
simply states that better provision must be made for the poor.
690
 
 
In Gathii’s telling, the advanced capitalist countries tended to favour the latter approach. 
Through adopting it they were able to co-opt and marginalise struggles against global 
capitalism. Equally, the welfare state implied by these models was important since it 
served as a mechanism of social control for the working classes.
691
 This enabled the 
Bank to continue with the development model whilst pacifying resistance.
692
 Gathii 
argues that this development has to be considered in the light of the growth of the 
international human rights movement throughout the 1970s. This movement had taken 
some of the insights of the basic needs movement and tried to have the ‘needs’ 
institutionalised as rights. This was a wide ranging critique, which was particularly 
concerned with institutionalising socio-economic rights at the level of the UN. 
However, one its main targets was the Bank. The movement argued that the basic needs 
programme was not enough, since it did not include human rights.
693
 
 
These two basic elements came together in the 1990s. At this point, the World Bank 
began to promote its good governance agenda. Like Anghie and Rajagopal, Gathii notes 
that this manoeuvre enabled the Bank to expand its mandate, and so interfere in ‘non-
economic’ issues.694 However, Gathii further holds that the reference to good 
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government can only be only understood against the background of debates on the role 
of government intervention in the economy.
695
 Insofar as the Bank is only able to 
consider ‘governance’ through the lens of economic issues, it does so according to the 
neo-liberal theory that what impedes growth is government intervention. Accordingly, 
its democratisation programme embeds and buttresses neo-liberal economic theory.
696
 
 
Moreover, Gathii continues, because of its Articles of Agreement, the Bank has to 
define certain issues as fitting ‘within this techno-economic logic’ and so re-casts 
‘ostensibly political issues as neutral’.697 This agenda therefore allows a neo-liberal 
economic and political vision to be sold as a technocratic necessity for growth. This 
agenda is one of counter-insurgency because whilst it does give the human rights 
movement a voice, it channels this voice in such a way as to legitimate and reinforce a 
neo-liberal agenda.
698
 This agenda is specifically targeted against ‘the socialist, 
Keynesian-welfare, and re-distributive/social justice oriented nationalist economic 
policies of the post-colonial African state’.699 It frames all government interventions as 
distortions in the market, resulting from kleptocratic or clientelist regimes.
700
 Aside 
from co-opting resistance to the expansion of neo-liberalism, therefore, it also 
ideologically represents the Third World as backwards and corrupt.  
 
As was noted by Anghie, the discourse of good governance locates the source of 
underdevelopment of the Third World almost purely endogenously. For Gathii this 
means that it performs a doubly Eurocentric function. Firstly, ‘it fails to acknowledge 
and take into account the external factors’701 which cause underdevelopment, 
particularly the legacy of colonialism and unequal world system. In so doing, it helps to 
naturalise the way in which the advanced capitalist states have benefited and continue to 
benefit from the global system. Secondly, the discourse relies on ‘racist stereotyping of 
post-colonial, sub-Saharan African states, their politicians, and their citizens’.702 The 
story of good governance represents the Third World as a ‘chaotic’ place, whose own 
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internal failures are responsible for its lack of development.
703
 This draws on ‘racially-
coded meanings’, drawn from the long history of Western confrontations with the Third 
World.
704
 The net effect of this is to cast the Third World as a savage zone which can 
only be developed through the interventions of the benign, neutral West.  
 
4.3. War? What is it Good For? 
In one of his more famous passages, Fanon proclaimed that in the colonies ‘the agents 
of the government speak the language of pure force’.705 Here, Fanon draws our attention 
to the importance that military violence has always played in imperialism. Whilst the 
scholars so far surveyed would not reduce imperialism to military violence, it remains 
true that many of moments in the conceptual history of imperialism have arisen in 
relation to war.  
 
As previously noted, this is the case with the contemporary ‘revival’, with the 
interventions in Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq setting off a wave of empire-theorising. 
In the case of humanitarian intervention, the analysis has been relatively 
straightforward. Many scholars have framed humanitarian intervention in terms of 
imperialism,
706
 often drawing connections between the language of humanitarianism 
and the justifications advanced historically to legitimise colonialism.
707
 Consequently, it 
has been relatively easy to link the international legal language of humanitarian 
intervention to that of the civilising mission. 
  
Mutua, for example, locates humanitarian intervention in the wider context of human 
rights promotion, built on Eurocentric universalism. For him, humanitarian 
interventions are structured around the metaphor of ‘savages’ ‘victims’ and ‘saviours’. 
He argues that the international human rights movement emerged in response to the 
European events of the Second World War, rooted in the values of a distinctly 
European liberalism and based upon and funded by primarily European and American 
organisations.
708
 At the same time, the prime targets of this movement are Third World 
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states, despite the fact that Western states are arguably responsible for numerous rights 
violations.
709
  
 
For Mutua, this is part of a wider dynamic of Eurocentric universalism. The discourse 
of human rights first posits Third World cultures as ‘savage’ and therefore predisposed 
towards the violation of human rights. It then constructs ‘victims’. Since these victims 
are constructed rather than ‘pre-given’ they take on a number of characteristics. In 
particular, the victim is both oppressed by the savage culture and a participant in it, and 
so, is racialised as ‘non-white’ and posited as powerless.710 This sets the stage for the 
final aspect of the metaphor, the saviour. Since the ‘victims’ are powerless, they require 
external intervention to be saved. This is the job of Western or international 
institutions.
711
 For Mutua, this mirrors the structure of Christian missionaries, with 
civilised Europe being sent to save the savage non-Europeans from their own culture.
712
  
 
Chimni’s response to humanitarian intervention is more straightforward. He roots 
military violence under imperialism in the need to ‘quell the possibility of any challenge 
being mounted to their vision of world order’.713 Whilst ‘there is no rule of international 
law that permits unilateral armed humanitarian intervention’,714 the doctrine nonetheless 
legitimises military interventions. Chimni claims that this legitimation has managed to 
secure ‘much of public opinion in the imperialist world’, as well as the approval of 
mainstream international lawyers generally.
715
 This is bound up with the broader growth 
of the global state and its concomitant undermining of ‘sovereignty’. Humanitarian 
intervention served the role of legitimising interventions of the ‘Western power bloc’ 
(acting in the interests of the transnational capitalist class) ‘against third world states’.716  
 
For Chimni, the war on terror has also been an integral part of this process.
717
 In some 
respects, Chimni’s argument is reflective of the broader approach taken by other 
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TWAIL scholars, who have proposed that the interventions carried out as part of the 
war on terror are illegal uses of force (since they cannot be understood as self-
defence).
718
 For these scholars, this illegality represents a fundamental break. They 
argue thatthe old law  on the use of force had a limited sense of non-interference and 
sovereign equality, which is now being undermined by aggressive US unilateralism. It 
is this aggressive unilateral character which makes US behaviour distinctly imperial. 
Okafor, for instance, claims that the war on terror has seen a number of ‘imperial-style 
international law reforms’.719 Similarly, Anghie has argued that the Bush doctrine of 
pre-emption constitutes an ‘imperial policy’.720 Gathii has perhaps been the most 
explicit on this front, arguing that we are witnessing a shift from a global empire based 
‘on coordination of economic exchange and security guarantees’ to one based on 
military violence.
721
  
 
There are two important analytical moves here. The first is to say that the interventions 
carried out under the war of terror are illegal, and thus represent a fundamental break 
with the older law on the use of force.
 722
 The second is to claim that it is this 
unilateralism which makes these legal arguments distinctly imperial. This seems 
somewhat at odds with the preceding analysis. All TWAIL scholars argue that 
international law embeds and mediates enduring colonial and imperial relations. On this 
reading, it is not ‘illegality’ or ‘unilateralism’ that marks out a particular legal argument 
as ‘imperial’ but rather its reproduction of the civilising mission or its embeddedness in 
global capitalist relations. Equally, given the enduring character of the connection, it 
seems odd to characterise this as a rupture with that which came before.
723
  
 
Notwithstanding these considerations, there have also been attempts to show that the 
arguments around the war on terror are not unprecedented. In particular, Anghie has 
demonstrated how such arguments are bound up in the dynamic of difference. The 
advocates of pre-emptive self-defence proclaimed that in a world of non-state, 
unconventional terrorist forces, the traditional doctrine of self-defence was not enough. 
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Since these forces had access to dangerous biological, chemical and nuclear weapons, it 
was no longer sufficient to wait for threats to ‘materialise’. Instead, it was necessary to 
attack threats before they emerged.
724
 Hence the old standard of ‘imminence’ in self-
defence was insufficient. Combining this doctrine with the formal equality of states 
could have disastrous results for the West. Since, in juridical terms, all states are 
allowed to act in self-defence, ‘both North Korea and Iran’ would be able to exercise a 
right of anticipatory self-defence against the US or its allies.
725
 
 
A response to this could have been to deploy Bedjaoui’s ‘dichotomy between law and 
reality’. Whilst North Korea or Iran could ‘legally’ have attacked the US, in reality, 
inequalities in power render this unlikely to ever happen.
726
 Yet pointedly, this was not 
the argument advanced by the Bush administration. Instead, the arguments around pre-
emption were also coupled with arguments about rogue states. The US administration 
argued that the threat against which pre-emption was articulated did not come from all 
states. Rather, it came from those states that harboured or gave material support to 
terrorist groups. As rogue states, they could not possibly possess the right to intervene 
pre-emptively. Instead they were the objects of pre-emption.
727
 
 
Anghie argues that this doctrine ‘disconcertingly resembles the rhetoric used by Vitoria 
to justify the Spanish conquest of the Indians’.728 However, the pattern runs deeper than 
this. Bound up in the notion of the rogue state is also a transformative dynamic. Insofar 
as rogue states are a source of global instability, it is necessary to convert them into 
democratic states that no longer harbour or support terrorism. At this point, then, 
‘humanitarian arguments are inextricably connected with .... self-defence’.729 In this 
way, the dynamic of difference again comes to the fore. Having posited the difference 
between the civilised and uncivilised, it proceeds to attempt to bridge that gap through 
the use of transformative violence. In a similar manner to humanitarian intervention, the 
war on terror ‘reproduces the structure of the civilizing mission’.730 Thus, as with other 
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developments, the war on terror marks a return ‘to a primordial and formative structure 
of international law’.731 
 
 
5. Against Nihilism  
Third Worldist jurists have provided an important critique of international law. Drawing 
on wider traditions of thinking about colonialism, empire and imperialism, they have 
shown that international law has been deeply imbricated with unequal and exploitative 
global social relations. This analysis has taken different forms. The anti-colonial 
movement gave rise to a number of scholar-practitioners. These jurists interrogated the 
relationship between colonialism and international law, in order to better understand 
how the Third World might deploy international law.  
 
This chapter has argued that the analysis of these scholars must be understood in light of 
their theories of imperialism and colonialism. For the more conservative theorists, 
colonialism was a peripheral phenomenon to European development, understood 
primarily through the lens of political domination. Accordingly, international law’s 
Eurocentricity stemmed not from its involvement in colonial oppression but from the 
lack of non-European participation in its creation. The Eurocentric bias of international 
law could therefore be overcome by universalising international law.  
 
The more radical theorists understood imperialism as a system of capitalist exploitation. 
For them, colonialism was an essential part of European capitalism and international 
law was structurally implicated in colonialism. Since colonialism was part of a wider 
imperialist system, they also maintained that colonialism had survived the dismantling 
of formal European domination in the form of neo-colonialism. International law thus 
continued to mediate imperialist social relations and would have to be radically 
transformed. 
 
Whilst these positions appeared distinct, they ultimately came to similar conclusions. 
Although they differed on how it might occur, both groups believed that international 
law could be a vessel through which the anti-colonial movement could achieve its goals. 
This embrace of international law stemmed from a shared understanding of the 
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relationship between international law and the global conjuncture. Both the conservative 
and radical positions subscribed to a ‘sociological functionalism’, in which international 
law was seen to ‘express’ the global balance of forces. If there was an anti-colonial 
movement, it would be able to express its interests in international law. 
 
But this did not come to pass. As a result, the next wave of Third Worldist international 
lawyers inhabited a world where the Third World movement barely existed. They 
sought to explain this failure. A vital part of this explanation involved going beyond 
sociological functionalism and grasping the more enduring connections between 
imperialism, colonialism and international law.  
 
As with first wave of Third World jurists, this is not a heterogeneous movement, but can 
be seen as embodying two basic approaches. The first, drawing on postcolonial theory, 
argues that international law embeds a ‘civilising mission’, where the European self 
consolidates itself against the non-European other, through the medium of international 
law. This mission is acquired through an ‘encounter’ between international law and the 
imperial project. Attempts by the Third World to use international law to further its 
interests come up against this dynamic, and are subverted accordingly. These scholars 
argue that this dynamic is constantly reproduced in different forms throughout 
international law’s history. The second, drawing more on the Marxist tradition, argues 
that international law draws its content from the global (capitalist) economy, and 
struggles of the classes within this economy.  
 
Of course, this theorising is not just idle speculation. In accounting for the failures of 
the Third World movement’s attempted use of international law, contemporary scholars 
are also giving an account of what use international law can be today. Thus, while 
Eslava and Pahuja are correct to emphasise that contemporary scholars have distinct 
analytical priorities, it is incorrect to characterise this as a shift away from ‘trying to use 
international law to remedy the social and economic domination of the postcolonial 
world’.732 
 
As with the first generation of Third Worldist scholars, a common theme emerges. This 
theme is best illustrated through the considerations on the issue of the use of military 
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force outlined in section 4.3. All of the scholars surveyed root contemporary legal 
arguments in a wider structural and/or historical interconnection between international 
law and imperialism and colonialism. By consequence, the imperial character of an 
action does not lie in its illegality and, since law is ‘part of the problem’, it would make 
little sense to invoke law against imperialism.
733
 Yet almost all of the scholars 
denounced the US for breaking international law, and understood its imperial character 
as inhering in the ‘illegality’, or the unilateral nature of its actions.  
 
This contradiction is representative of a broader trend in TWAIL scholarship. 
Notwithstanding the connections they trace between international law and imperialism, 
all TWAIL scholars return to international law as a site of possible emancipation. 
Anghie, for example, states that ‘the Third world cannot abandon international law’734 
and hopes that law might ‘play its ideal role in limiting and resisting power’.735 
Similarly, Chimni insists that we must not ‘reach the pessimistic conclusion that it is not 
possible at all to create a just world under law’.736 In most cases, the move is linked to a 
defence against the ‘legal nihilist’ position that international law has nothing to offer for 
the Third World. Against this, it is asserted that ‘the Third World cannot abandon 
international law because law now plays such a vital role in the public realm’ that it 
structures analysis and interpretation of global events.
737
 Consequently, to refrain from 
using international law, it would be to lose a ‘protective shield’.738  
 
However, one of the very conclusions we can draw from TWAIL scholarship is that 
international law has hardly functioned as a ‘shield’. Even at those moments where the 
acquisition of sovereignty appeared protective, it in fact served to reconstitute relations 
of exploitation and domination. As such, any attempt to formulate a ‘progressive’ 
international law must show what would be different ‘this time’. 
 
In this vein, Anghie holds that we might ‘imagine and argue for very different 
understandings of the meaning of sovereignty ... and ... international law’739 and should 
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‘continuously question developments in international law’.740 Yet turning to the 
imagination seems insufficient in the face of a tenacious, global pattern of the 
reproduction of colonial relations described in Anghie’s work. 
 
Chimni’s attempt to negotiate this is more successful. He argues that since each epoch 
of international law is structured by a ‘different historical and political’ context, each 
epoch will have a ‘differential social impact’.741 Thus, in the historical and political 
epoch of decolonisation, the anti-colonial and Third World movements were able to 
translate their politics into international law. Since universal applicability is such an 
important part of post-colonial international law, imperialist states cannot openly opt for 
a two-track system.
742
 Given international law’s stable core of meaning743 this anti-
colonial content can be turned against imperialist states.
744
 If this sounds familiar, it is 
because Chimni has essentially reproduced the sociological functionalism of the 
original Third Worldist jurists. Whilst he may characterise the connection between law 
and imperialism as more tenacious than was understood by the original Third World 
jurists, he nonetheless ultimately falls back on a similar explanation of international 
law’s progressive potential.  
 
Rajagopal has gone furthest in trying to think through how international law might be 
turned against imperialism. He claims that the distinctive characteristics of the ‘new 
social movements’ create the potential to use international law in a progressive way. For 
Rajagopal, these social movements are important because they reject both liberal and 
Marxist notions of linear, progressive development. As a consequence, they exhibit a 
form of ‘cultural politics’ which is anti-statist, focuses on symbolic practices and is 
local in scope. This leads to: 
 
[A] history from below leading to a theory of peoples, cultures, and power. This 
theory would need to transcend the limitations of realist statism and liberal 
individualism, and build on the radical cultural politics of social movements to 
enable alternative visions of governance that do not privilege particular social 
actors. This is necessary to transform international law from an international law 
of domination to one of resistance in the aid of marginalized communities and 
peoples. This project is in defense of an international law from below.
745
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Despite the tightly interwoven narrative Rajagopal writes of resistance being co-opted 
by international legal institutions, there is nonetheless the faith that new forms of 
organisation will be able to disrupt this. This is best evidenced in his later concrete 
proposals for a ‘counter-hegemonic international law’. Rajagopal is relatively 
pessimistic, concluding that the chances of transforming international law into ‘purely 
counter-hegemonic tool ... are bleak on [their] own’.746 However, he goes on to 
enumerate a series of possibilities for the transformation of the international legal order. 
The possibilities are ‘the growth of regional international law’,747 ‘a new front of Third 
World’,748 and ‘the emergence of coalitions of smaller states and social movements, 
forming tactical alliances with larger states in particular negotiations’.749 Rajagopal is 
most positive about the final suggestion.  
 
What is striking is how close all of these suggestions are to the various attempts of the 
Third World to use international institutions, as described above and theorised by 
Rajagopal himself. Given the deep-rooted tendency towards channelling resistance 
through the development project that Rajagopal identifies, one is left wondering how 
these interventions might be ‘counter-hegemonic’ in a way that the others were not. 
Absent an explanation premised on sociological functionalism (i.e. that as a neutral 
vessel law will just reflect a new progressive consensus), one is at pains to see how the 
characteristics of the new social movements truly allow them to transcend international 
law’s tenacious resistance-renewal dynamic.  
 
Ultimately, then, contemporary TWAIL work does seem to return to a kind of ‘faith’ in 
international law, often mediated through a new form of sociological functionalism. 
This stands in stark contrast to the rather more pessimistic message that their broader 
theoretical and historical approaches seem to warrant.  
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CHAPTER 3: MARXISM AND THE CRITIQUE OF IMPERIALISM 
 
1. Marxism Colonialism and Imperialism 
As discussed Chapter 1, the Marxist tradition has been central to the formation and 
propagation of ‘imperialism’ as a concept and a central player in the movements that 
sought to contest imperialism. As a result, all attempts to deal with colonialism and 
imperialism have had to situate themselves in relation to the Marxist critique, meaning 
that the previous chapters have of necessity engaged in some analysis of this tradition. 
This chapter attempts to grapple more directly with the Marxist critique of imperialism 
and chart how this critique has informed international legal scholarship. Section 1 
begins by examining Marx and Engels’ own writings on the subject, before moving on 
to the wider Marxist tradition. It attempts to understand the forces and dynamics that 
Marxists claim drive imperialism and reflects on what is distinctive about their 
accounts.  
 
Section 2 examines the attempts by Marxists to articulate theories of international law 
and the role that the concept of imperialism has played within these attempts. It begins 
with a brief reconstruction of Marx and Engels’ own legal theory. Following this, it 
details the three primary ways in which Marxists have understood international law: the 
commodity-form theory; ideology critique; and the class struggle approach. It then 
draws out the inter-relations between these approaches.  
 
Section 3 examines how these general positions can illuminate international law’s 
changing relationship to a number of imperial conjunctures. It focuses firstly on 
colonialism and the ‘civilising mission’, before moving on to the issue of 
decolonisation, finally it examines how Marxists have understood the relationship 
between imperialism and the law on the use of force. The chapter concludes by 
examining what political potential Marxists have located within international law.  
 
1.1. Marx and Engels 
It is often asserted that Marx and Engels did not have a theory of the international as a 
distinct realm, and so never articulated a theory of imperialism.
750
 It is certainly true that 
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neither of them ever used the terms imperialism (except in its sense of ‘Bonapartism’)751 
or ‘colonialism’.752 But although they missed the great wave of theorising about 
‘imperialism’ that followed the Scramble for Africa, both evinced a great deal of 
interest in Ireland and India
753
 and had much to say about specific colonial situations.
754
 
More importantly, their work engaged with a series of topics around ‘the emergence of 
capitalism, its spread throughout the world, the unequal development of different areas 
of different areas [and] the dominance of some countries over others’,755 all of which 
constitute the chief questions in any theory of ‘imperialism’. 
 
Marx and Engels saw capitalism as a global system from its beginning. They argued 
that a significant part of its genesis lay in the accumulation of raw materials from 
colonisation,
756
 and that it had created a world market that was drawing non-capitalist 
social formations into its orbit. However, one ought not to overstate this. Running 
through their work was a tension between two different visions as to the character of the 
international dimension of capitalism.  
 
One the one hand, as Brewer has shown, Marx’s Capital was based upon a model of ‘a 
closed, homogeneous, capitalist economy’. Here there was ‘no space for any differences 
in economic conditions between different countries’.757 In Capital this was largely a 
methodological assumption that Marx employed to analyse the ‘general laws’ of 
capitalism.
758
 However, it was also part of a broader ‘diffusionist’ vision of how 
capitalism operated on the world stage.
759
 In this diffusionist account, capitalism was 
seen as arising in Europe and then ‘diffusing’ throughout the rest of the world. This 
vision, particularly evident in the Manifesto of the Communist Party, placed stress upon 
the way in which the bourgeoisie had given ‘a cosmopolitan character to production and 
consumption in every country’,760 with ‘[n]ational one-sidedness’ becoming ‘more and 
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more impossible’.761 Here, the distinctiveness of capitalist development internationally 
was ‘flattened out’, with the ‘cheap prices’ of the commodities of the bourgeoisie 
serving as the beach head for the greater interconnection of the world.
762
 
 
This was accompanied by a celebration of the effects of capitalism. Because the 
bourgeoisie had made such great advances, it was seen as providing the material 
prerequisites for a communist society. Pre-capitalist societies were cast as ‘backward’, 
with Marx and Engels declaring that the bourgeoisie ‘has made barbarian and semi-
barbarian countries dependent on the civilised ones’.763 This was part of a broader 
theory of Eastern, pre-capitalist societies in which they were analysed in terms of an 
‘Asiatic Mode of Production’,764 marked by static and stagnant social relations, which 
were unable to advance without external intervention.
765
 It was in this context that Marx 
contended that the presence of British industrial capital in India was progressive, since 
it was transforming ‘backward’ social relations. In this way, ‘England’ was ‘causing a 
social revolution in Hindostan’ and so – despite its ‘vile’ motives – ‘was the 
unconscious tool of history in bringing about that revolution’.766 This was the type of 
analysis that led postcolonial theorists to characterise Marx and Engels’ work as 
Orientalist and Eurocentric.
767
 
 
At the same time, Marx and Engels recognised the violent, uneven and destructive 
characteristics of global capitalist expansion. Nowhere was this more evident than in 
Marx’s discussion of ‘primitive accumulation’. By ‘primitive accumulation’ Marx 
referred to the processes through which the preconditions for capitalism were 
secured.
768
 This process involved two aspects: the first was the creation of conditions 
whereby the majority of people would only be able to survive through selling their 
labour-power (proletarianisation); the second was the mechanism through which 
capitalists acquired sufficient assets to be able to utilise this labour power.
769
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The latter issue is where Marx came closest to articulating an account of colonialism 
and imperialism. Marx described the beginning of capitalist production as marked by 
the ‘discovery of gold and silver in America, the extirpation, enslavement and 
entombment in mines of the indigenous population of that continent, the beginnings of 
the conquest and plunder of India, and the conversion of Africa into a preserve for the 
commercial hunting of blackskins’.770 The colonies ‘provided a market for the budding 
manufactures’ and a source of wealth, whereby ‘the treasures captured outside Europe 
flowed back to the mother country’.771 The credit and debt systems that were bound up 
in this colonial expansion ‘endow[ed] unproductive money with the power of creation 
and thus turns it into capital’.772 This was crucial in displacing the role of merchant 
capital inside of Europe and strengthening the industrial capitalists who were to be at 
the heart of the emergence of capitalism as a fully fledged social system.
773
 Vitally, 
Marx did not understand this as a seamless process of purely ‘economic’ penetration. 
Rather, he argued, the colonial system depended on ‘brute force’ and that the expansion 
necessarily employed ‘the power of the state, the concentrated and organized force of 
society’.774  
 
This account lent itself to a rather different understanding of capitalist development. In 
contradistinction to Marx’s comments on its progressive character, in an 1881 letter to 
Vera Zasulich, he stated that capitalist development was only historically inevitable in 
‘the countries of Western Europe’775 and that in Russia the rural commune might serve 
as ‘the fulcrum of social regeneration’, provided one eliminated ‘the deleterious 
influences that are assailing it from all sides’.776 Indeed, many authors have suggested 
that the ‘late Marx’, with his reflections on indigenous societies, departed 
fundamentally from the ‘linear’ understanding evinced in his earlier work.777 Just how 
different these political conclusions were can be seen by contrasting Marx’s account of 
India with his account of Ireland. In an 1870 letter, Marx wrote that Ireland was ‘the 
cardinal means by which the English aristocracy maintain their domination in England 
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itself’778 because it enabled the English ruling class to divide the Irish and English 
working classes. Consequently, the English workers had to realise that ‘for them the 
national emancipation of Ireland is not a question of abstract justice or humanitarian 
sentiment but the first condition of their own social emancipation’.779 
 
Later thinkers in the Marxist tradition have not generally chosen to follow the ‘first 
path’.780 The colonial scrambles of the late 19th century, as well as the political issues 
leading up to the First World War, seemed to suggest that heightened international 
competition and intensified colonial exploitation were to be the order of the day. This 
made the ‘second path’ a more viable explanation of the world. Since these writings 
were often fragmented, scattered and unsystematic, later Marxists could not be content 
with Marx and Engels’ specific comments on the international dimensions of capitalism. 
Rather, these later Marxists adopted Marx and Engels’ materialist outlook, as well as 
their more general understandings of capitalism, and sought to develop these more fully 
within the context of the international situation, in the process elaborating a concept of 
‘imperialism’. 
 
1.2. Classical Marxist Theories of Imperialism 
1.2.1. Reproduction, Accumulation, Expansion 
Unlike Marx and Engels, later writers in the Marxist tradition thought that imperialism 
was of central importance to any understanding of the world. As Lenin stated in his 
introduction to Bukharin’s Imperialism and World Economy: 
 
The problem of imperialism is not only a most essential one, but, we must say, it 
is the most essential problem in that realm of economic science which examines 
the changing forms of capitalism in recent times. Every one interested not only 
in economics but in any sphere of present-day social life must acquaint himself 
with the facts relating to this problem.
781
 
 
Placed in the context of Marx’s own writings, this is a rather startling statement. Rather 
than seeing imperialism as simply resulting from the founding of capitalism, or as a side 
effect of capitalist development, Lenin saw it as the main aspect of capitalism, reaching 
into and shaping every aspect of social life. In this respect, Lenin is reflective more 
generally of the wider classical Marxist tradition, all of whom thought of imperialism as 
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being one of the primary problems of their conjuncture. This was in part because they 
understood imperialism as a type of crisis management to counteract the tendencies of 
advanced capitalism. The survival of capitalism was only possible because of 
imperialism. 
 
This approach is most evident in Rosa Luxemburg’s The Accumulation of Capital. 
Luxemburg’s main focus was on ‘reproduction’. In the political-economic context, 
reproduction refers to the way in which a given society is able to fulfil its needs and 
hence ‘reproduce itself’. This involves producing the requisite number of goods to both 
fulfil consumption needs and to recreate the conditions for continued production.
782
 
Reproducing society at the same level is ‘simple reproduction’. Since most societies 
experience population increases, they need to increase production too, this is ‘expanded 
reproduction’.  
 
Under capitalism reproduction assumes very specific characteristics. Firstly, it does not 
place directly. Instead, it occurs through the action of many capitals, producing and 
competing in order to realise surplus value. Consequently, reproduction is achieved 
through the exchange of commodities and thus mediated through the ‘anarchy’ of the 
market.
783
 Secondly, expanded reproduction assumes a more important role. Capitalists 
do not produce for its own sake, but rather to increase their profits. At any given 
moment, they can increase profits by decreasing prices, so as to undercut their 
competitors. In order to do this, it is necessary to increase the scale of production and 
sell more units, so as to counteract the effect of a lower price. However, this compels all 
capitalists to continually cut their prices in order to compete, meaning all must also 
increase production. Hence this tendency assumes the characteristic of a ‘coercive 
law’.784 In order to achieve this, capitalists have to engage in accumulation, continually 
reinvesting surplus value.
785
 
 
In order to understand reproduction, Marx – in Capital Volume II – divided capitalist 
societies into two ‘Departments’.786 Department I produces means of production and 
Department II produces consumer goods. Essentially, for Marx, Department I increases 
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production, meaning Department II will have to increase consumer goods to supply this, 
and so on, thus fulfilling consumption needs and recreating the conditions for continued 
production .
787
 For Luxemburg this approach did not work. If capitalist production 
always proceeds in the expectation of producing greater profit, then it needs demand for 
its products. Marx’s schema was unable to explain the source of this demand. 
Luxemburg argued that demand ‘cannot possibly come from [the consumption of] the 
capitalists of Departments I and II themselves’ since they refrain from using all of their 
surplus value for consumption, reinvesting it in more production.
788
 Similarly, it cannot 
come from the workers, who only gain a wage from the production carried out by the 
capitalists.  
 
As a result, Marx was unable to explain why reproduction under capitalism occurred at 
all. However, it clearly does. Luxemburg accused Marx of making a double error, both 
historical and logical.
789
 Logically, if demand could not come from inside of capitalism, 
then it had to come from non-capitalist strata. This was also historically true. Whilst 
Marx’s analysis presumed the worldwide domination of the capitalist mode of 
production, this was not the case. Capitalism had always coexisted with and interacted 
with non-capitalist strata. At the core of the reproduction of capitalism, Luxemburg 
argued, was its expansion into non-capitalist social formations.  
 
On a basic level, Luxemburg noted, capitalists necessarily have to ‘to dispose ever more 
fully of the whole globe ... so as to find productive employment for the surplus value it 
has realised’.790 However, these pre-capitalist strata have very little demand for foreign 
goods, since their production is self-sufficient. Consequently, capitalism needed to 
transform these ‘natural economies’ into commodity economies. This could only be 
achieved through the continuous application of force and violence. In this way, 
Luxemburg directly took up Marx’s arguments around the question of ‘primitive 
accumulation’, extending them beyond capitalism’s initial genesis. In her account, force 
is deployed as a ‘permanent weapon’, with ‘permanent occupation of the colonies by the 
military, native risings and punitive expeditions’ serving as the ‘order of the day’.791 
Luxemburg contended that this was true even of the apparently more ‘peaceful’ spread 
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of capitalism through the medium of commerce. She noted that ‘the relations between 
the East India Company and the spice-producing companies were quite as piratical 
extortionate and blatantly fraudulent as present-day relations between American 
capitalists and the Red Indians of Canada whose furs they buy, or between German 
merchants and the Negroes of Africa’.792  
 
This did not simply extend to the act of buying products and commodities. Luxemburg 
also argued that this applied to questions of labour. Since capitalism needed to ‘exploit 
territories where the white man cannot work’, it also needed to make use of foreign or 
native labour.
793
 In order to ‘free’ this labour, it was necessary to break up pre-capitalist 
social relations, or coerce people into working. Furthermore, the hierarchical conditions 
of pre-capitalist societies allowed for ‘the most peculiar combinations between the 
modern wage system and primitive authority’794 enabling ‘a greater drive and far 
ruthless measures’.795 In this way both aspects of ‘primitive accumulation’ were realised 
in global capitalist expansion.  
 
Ultimately, for Luxemburg, it was only ‘the continuous and progressive disintegration 
of non-capitalist organisations makes accumulation of capital possible’.796 Were the 
world ever to become fully capitalist, capitalism would collapse. It was this tendency 
that generated ‘the contradictory behaviour of capitalism in the final stage of its 
historical career: imperialism’.797 Defining imperialism as specifically concerned with 
rivalry,
798
 Luxemburg predicted that, as capitalism became globally hegemonic, the 
advanced capitalist powers would have to fight for ‘what remains still open of the non-
capitalist environment’.799 
 
Despite Luxemburg’s predictions, there has been no terminal crisis of capitalism. Whilst 
there may still be pockets of pre-capitalist social relations
800
 it is difficult to maintain 
that these are the only thing allowing capital accumulation to keep going. Theoretically, 
as Brewer argues, in identifying the ‘logical’ contradictions of Marx’s reproduction 
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schema, Luxemburg was operating at an overly high level of abstraction.
801
 By 
consequence, she failed to recognise that many capitals will be engaged in processes of 
accumulation at different times, and so ‘demand’ cannot be considered as a unitary 
property of a given Department. However, even if Luxemburg’s larger point was 
insufficiently nuanced, her most important point was ‘to insist that the mechanisms of 
primitive accumulation, using force, fraud and state power, were not simply a 
regrettable aspect of capitalism’s past, but persist throughout the history of 
capitalism’.802 This insight has been carried through into a host of Marxist theories of 
imperialism.
803
 
 
What is most important in Luxemburg’s account is that imperialism arises from the 
‘normal’ tendencies of capitalism. It is this insight that has most driven Marxist theories 
of imperialism. In particular, the previously mentioned approaches of Bukharin and 
Lenin strongly emphasised this. As stated in Chapter 1, Bukharin and Lenin’s work 
followed much of Hilferding’s analysis, but put it on an explicitly international plane. 
As Bukharin put it: 
 
The struggle between “national” states, which is nothing but the struggle 
between the respective groups of the bourgeoisie, is not suspended in the air ... 
On the contrary, the very conflict is conditioned by the special medium in which 
the “national economic organisms” live and grow ... This is why the struggle 
between modern “national economic bodies” must be regarded first of all as the 
struggle of various parts of the world economy ... Thus the problem of studying 
imperialism ... reduces itself to the problem of analysing the tendencies in the 
development of world economy, and of the probable changes in its inner 
structure.
804
 
 
Hence, his basic starting point was that capitalism has created a world economy, in 
which there is a world market and therefore world prices, which force national price 
convergence. Consequently, the world economy is a ‘a system of production relations 
and, correspondingly, of exchange relations on a world scale’,805 characterised by an 
international division of labour, in which given ‘national’ economies would have 
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different levels of development and functions in the global economy. As such, Bukharin 
understood the world economy as marked by global flows of surplus value.
806
 
 
Alongside this process of the ‘internationalisation of capital’, capitalism was also 
‘nationalised’. Following Hilferding, Bukharin and Lenin argued that in advanced 
capitalist societies free competition had resulted in the increasing concentration and 
centralisation of capital. Capitalists were increasingly compelled to come together in 
monopolistic cartels, usually directed by financial capitalists. This gave rise to the 
phenomenon of finance capital. These tendencies towards monopoly were intensified by 
the process of internationalisation. Capitalists initially came to being in particular 
territorial units, and became closely integrated with particular states. As they face 
increasing international competition, they band more closely together in cartels and 
cleave ever more closely to their national states. As a result of this, there is a close 
connection between finance capital and the state, with capitalists demanding various 
forms of protection and action from their respective states, especially in the form of 
tariffs.
807
 
 
For Bukharin and Lenin these two tendencies that produced the dynamics of 
imperialism. This resulted from a number of inter-related factors. Firstly, tariffs enable 
capitalists to make profits at home: prices can be raised in line with the price of the 
tariff (since foreign capitalists cannot outcompete them) and surplus products can be 
sold outside of the tariffs and outcompete domestic production. This is because less 
advanced capitalist countries have lower labour productivity, and so have to sell at 
higher prices in order to make profits. As with Hilferding, both Bukharin and Lenin 
argued that this also gave rise to a tendency towards annexing territory.
808
 
 
This process is buttressed by the crisis tendencies in capitalism. Following Marx, both 
Bukharin and Lenin argued that mature capitalism was marked by a falling profit rate. 
This leads to a greater drive to expand outwards in search of the higher profit rates 
generated from selling to countries with lower labour productivity. This gives rise – as 
in all the classical accounts of imperialism – to the export of capital as opposed to 
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commodities.
809
 This is because labour in less advanced capitalist countries is easier to 
exploit at higher rates, can be subject to greater discipline and made to work longer 
hours.
810
 Equally, the export of capital enables one to get around the problems of tariffs 
by transferring surplus value. 
 
Thus, for both Bukharin and Lenin, imperialism was concerned with an international 
division of labour between advanced and less advanced capitalist countries. Bukharin – 
ironically echoing Kautsky – argued that here the division between agriculture and 
industry was key. According to Bukharin, in the advanced capitalist countries there is a 
lopsided development in which industry develops much faster than agriculture. Since 
agriculture is a ‘naturally’ inelastic sector of production, the combination of these two 
factors leads to rapid price rises, which squeeze the profits of industrial capital.
811
 
Consequently, industrial capitalists seek out new sources of raw materials. The 
imperialist and colonial implications are obvious. ‘Backward’ economies are subject to 
both a natural division of labour (owing to an abundance of raw materials) and social 
division labour, whereby they exist to provide cheaper raw materials. This impels 
advanced capitalists to dominate them.  
 
Ultimately, this international division of labour is one of ‘a few consolidated, organised 
economic bodies (“the great civilised powers”) ... and a periphery of undeveloped 
countries with a semi-agrarian or agrarian system’.812 This is similar to Lenin’s account 
of capitalism as ‘world system of colonial oppression and ... the financial strangulation 
of the ... majority ... of the world by a handful of “advanced” countries’.813 Finally, as 
noted in Chapter 1 (section 4.4.) Bukharin and Lenin held that imperialism was 
characterised by conflict between the advanced capitalist powers for control of this 
‘periphery of undeveloped countries’. Since this territory was finite and exploitation 
necessarily involved excluding other capitalists, as the world was increasingly ‘divided 
up’, the struggle over what remained became more and more intense, giving rise to 
military violence between the advanced powers.
814
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1.2.2. Imperialism as Epoch  
What emerges from the above considerations is that, for Marxists, imperialism ‘is 
neither a transhistorical political form nor a state policy’.815 Although this sounds like a 
rather simple proposition, it gets to the heart of what is distinctive about Marxist 
understandings of imperialism. First and foremost, the Marxist tradition understands 
imperialism as a distinctive and historically specific phenomenon.
816
 In particular, 
Marxists have sought to connect imperialism with capitalism, rooting imperialism 
within certain tendencies in capitalist development. In Lenin’s – highly influential – 
rendering, imperialism was in fact understood as a specific stage of capitalism.
817
 
 
Of course, such a position immediately raises two issues: firstly, that there have been 
international inequalities of power and territorial rivalry throughout human history and 
secondly, that capitalism has always been characterised by inequality and exploitation. 
Given this, how is it possible to talk about imperialism as specific or distinctive? Lenin 
answered these points directly, noting that: 
 
Relations of this kind have always existed between big and little states, but in 
the epoch of capitalist imperialism they become a general system, they form part 
of the sum total of “divide the world” relations, become links in the chain of 
operations of world finance capital.
818
 
 
What singles imperialism out as historically specific is its systemic character. Although 
the constituent elements of imperialism have been present at various points in history, it 
is only under capitalism that they become systematically and continually impelled. It is 
not simply the case that there are more occurrences of actions that we might term 
‘imperial’. Rather this is evidence of the fact that these actions have become a systemic, 
necessary part of the totality of the world economy.  
 
For Marxist theorists of imperialism, then, capitalism gives rise to the specific 
phenomenon of ‘imperialism’ because it is the first social system to truly unify the 
world, and is driven by the ceaseless search for greater profits. This compels capitalists, 
and the states with which they are associated, to constantly expand globally, competing 
with each other, and transforming the world as they go. No other mode of production 
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has been driven by such a ceaseless logic. Whilst ‘[i]mperialism is a policy of conquest 
... not every policy of conquest is imperialism’.819  
 
The systemic character of imperialism also draws attention to a corollary of asserting 
the historical specificity of imperialism, namely, its historical necessity. As Bukharin 
put it, insofar as imperialism is understood as flowing from certain ‘tendencies’ or 
‘laws’ of capitalism, it cannot be viewed as ‘as a mere historical accident’, or ‘a kind of 
‘sin’ of capitalist development’.820 The classical Marxists insisted that the ‘bad sides’ 
characteristic of imperialism – war, uneven development etc. – were symptoms of the 
deeper structural logic of capitalism. According to Bukharin, one could only understand 
such events ‘as the consequence of a definite historic cause or historic causes’ and not 
as ‘an “accidental entity caused by nothing’.821 They argued that those who treated 
imperialism as just as a policy would be unable to properly fight all of its effects. 
Predictably, in this argument, the main opponent was Kautsky, who, Lenin argued: 
 
[D]etaches the politics of imperialism from its economics, speaks of annexations 
as being a policy “preferred” by finance capital, and opposes to it another 
bourgeois policy which, he alleges, is possible on this very same basis of finance 
capital. It follows, then, that monopolies in economics are compatible with non-
monopolistic, non-violent, non-annexationist methods in politics. It follows, 
then, that the territorial division of the world, which was completed precisely 
during the epoch of finance capital ... is compatible with a non-imperialist 
policy. The result is a slurring-over and a blunting of the most profound 
contradictions of the latest stage of capitalism.
822
 
 
For Lenin, the systemic character of imperialism was captured by the connection 
between politics and economics. This illustrates the fact that the classical Marxists 
understood imperialism as being structured by an economic logic. As Akbar Rasulov 
puts it, ‘from the Marxist point of view every global imperial structure is supposed to be 
understood ... as a historical solution worked out at the ‘political’ level in response to 
the fundamental contradictions of the corresponding globally dominant mode of 
production occurring at the ‘economic’ level’.823 
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Here one should be careful. This position does not hold that there is a one-to-one 
correspondence between every imperial action and economic ‘motives’. As Brewer 
notes, not ‘every incident in the history of empire can be explained in directly economic 
terms’, since ‘[e]conomic interests are filtered through a political process ... and the 
whole system generates its own momentum’.824 Imperialism’s economic logic operates 
at the level of the system as a whole, framing the way in which individual ‘actions’ will 
be carried out.  
 
One can see how this plays out in Lenin’s discussion of the question of ‘raw materials’. 
Lenin argued that, since ‘present-day technical development is extremely rapid, and 
land which is useless today may be made fertile tomorrow’, capitalists must be 
interested not only in ‘already discovered sources of raw materials’ but also potential 
ones.
825
 Capitalists are compelled ‘to seize the largest possible amount of land of all 
kinds in all places ... taking into account potential sources of raw materials and fearing 
to be left behind’.826 The economic logic of the system is such that capitalists in general 
are forced to expand, even if it may not seem to be in their immediate ‘economic’ 
interest. 
 
Here, one can detect a decidedly Hobbesian inflection. Hobbes thought that the ‘state of 
nature’ was violent not so much because all men were predisposed to violence, but 
because all men had to defend themselves against the possibility of violent of attacks.
827
 
This Hobbesian connection points to the way in which Lenin’s argument is close to the 
‘political’ theorists of imperialism – such as Cohen and Morgenthau – discussed in 
Chapter 1 (Section 4.3.), who argued the continual threat of possible violence in an 
anarchical state system compelled all states to continually maximise their power. 
 
The difference is that Lenin did not naturalise this drive for endless political 
accumulation as an inevitable feature of international relations (or human nature), but 
instead historicised it. The tendency towards endless political expansion is rooted in a 
historically specific drive towards capitalist accumulation. In this way, rather than 
denying the insights of ‘bourgeois’ theories of imperialism, the Marxist account locates 
these insights within a set of material conditions. One might say then, that just as 
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Marx’s critique of political economy in Capital sought to historicise the concepts of the 
bourgeois political economists,
828
 so too does the Marxist critique of imperialism 
historicise the insights of non-Marxist theorists of international relations. Thus, the 
classical Marxist concept of imperialism was opposed to those theories of ‘Empire-ism’. 
Instead, it understood imperialism as a distinctive, historically specific phenomenon, 
with its ‘taproot’ located in the economic logic of capitalism.  
 
1.2.3. A Materialist Theory of Eurocentrism 
The importance of this materialist analysis can be seen by examining how these 
Marxists accounted for ‘Eurocentrism’. The very concept of imperialism implies that 
capitalism has developed unevenly on a global scale. This unevenness gives rise to an 
international division of labour, comprised of an advanced capitalist core and a less 
developed periphery. It is clear that Marxists have also understood this international 
division of labour to be a geographically specific one, with the advanced capitalist 
countries located in Europe. For example, Lenin upbraided Europeans for forgetting 
that ‘colonial peoples too are nations’829 and similarly, Luxemburg repeatedly describes 
the process of imperialism in terms of the expansion of European capital.
830
  
 
However, geography was not the determining factor. As Luxemburg noted, this 
dynamic had to be understood in terms of ‘social economy rather than of political 
geography’.831 Although it was European capital that was exploiting the non-European 
world, this was not carried out because of something specifically ‘European’ about 
European culture. Instead, the connection between Europe and imperialism was – in 
some sense – accidental.832 Europe had developed capitalism before any other part of 
the world. As a result, when capitalism’s tendencies gave rise to global expansion and 
exploitation, it was in Europe that this first happened. Consequently, it was European 
capital which was imperialist, but not because of its European nature. Yet as Said noted, 
a theory of Eurocentrism cannot simply state why Europe was expansive, it also has to 
explain why it was that Eurocentrism ‘penetrated to the core of the workers’ movement, 
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the women’s movement, the avant-garde arts movement, leaving no one of significance 
untouched’.833 In other words, why it played a vital role within the advanced capitalist 
countries.  
 
Although the classical Marxists did not share Said’s broader commitment to the 
structuring role of culture, they nonetheless understood this was a real problem. Even if 
the expansion of Europe into the non-European world could be explained by reference 
to capital accumulation, it was nonetheless conducted under the banner spreading 
European ‘civilisation’. This project not only embraced the European capitalist class, 
but also infiltrated the European working class. Whole swathes of the European workers 
movement had chosen to support their own imperialisms in the First World War. 
Accordngly, for the classical theorists of imperialism, explaining the Eurocentrism of 
the workers movement was one of the most pressing political tasks.  
 
The starting point in their accounts was the centrality of imperialism for the continued 
existence of European capitalism. Bukharin and Lenin understood ‘Eurocentrism’ as an 
ideology that arises in the context of capitalist imperialism in order to justify and 
solidify it. This ‘grandiose ideological formulation’834 is so widespread because its 
material base – imperialism – is so important to the continued existence of capitalism. 
The material base was manifested in the ‘natural’ inter-dependence between labour and 
capital. Whilst there is no transhistorical necessity for capitalists; in the immediate 
context of capitalism, the bourgeoisie controls the means of production and provides 
wages to the working class. Thus, there can be a momentary ‘solidarity’ between the 
working class and capital, since – in a limited sense – they ‘need’ each other. However, 
this solidarity is only able to come properly to fruition where there is a differentiation 
between various sectors of the working class. If certain sectors of the working class are 
able to secure special advantages (such as higher wages) they may side with their ‘own’ 
capitalists against other workers. 
 
Under imperialism this situation is writ large. The wealth of the advanced imperialist 
countries is in part guaranteed because of the intensified forms of exploitation in the 
peripheral countries. Consequently, it is ‘the little peoples of the colonies’ who pay the 
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bill for imperialism, as opposed to the European workers.
835
 In this respect, the 
‘European workers, considered from the point of view of the moment, are the winners, 
because they receive increments to their wages due to “industrial prosperity”’.836 As 
other Marxists have later suggested, this also serves as the material foundation for the 
welfare state.
837
 
 
Thus, although Eurocentrism is an ideological formulation, it is not simply a sham. 
Rather, it has a material basis. Indeed, Lenin went further than this. He argued that in 
any industry where there is an imperialist monopoly, the capitalists will be able to make 
super-profits. These super-profits enable capitalists to pay a section of the working class 
wages that are much higher than they might otherwise achieve and so ‘bribe their own 
workers, to create something like an alliance ... between the workers of the given nation 
and their capitalists against the other countries’.838 
 
The net effect of this was the creation of a ‘labour aristocracy’ whereby to ‘a certain 
degree the workers of the oppressor nations are partners of their own bourgeoisie in the 
plundering ... of the oppressed nations’. These workers occupy ‘a privileged position in 
many spheres of political life’ and ‘[i]deologically ... are taught ... disdain and contempt 
for the workers of the oppressed nations’.839 In this way, the classical Marxist theorists 
of imperialism did not deny the Eurocentrism later analysed by postcolonial theorists 
(see Chapter 1, Section 5.5) but analysed it as an ideological formulation with real 
material foundations.  
 
1.3. Imperialism and International Law? 
Marxist theorists of imperialism did not tend to engage in explicit reflection on 
international law. However, as previously noted, any reflection on the nature of 
imperialism has international legal implications. On a very basic level, the theorists 
described above all thought that international law was one mechanism through which 
the advanced (imperialist) powers realised their interests. This was most obvious in the 
case of treaties. Luxemburg, for instance, was very aware of the way in which – 
following the Opium Wars – ‘the ambiguity of the treaty texts made a convenient 
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excuse for European capital to encroach beyond the Treaty Ports’, with European 
capital making use of ‘every loophole’ in order to guarantee its expansion.840  
 
Similarly, Bukharin, with his focus on trade, tariffs and the export of capital, noted the 
role of concession agreements and commercial treaties.
841
 He was keen to demonstrate 
that one could not contrast ‘peaceful’ treaties on the one hand, and armed force on the 
other. For Bukharin, these were ‘in substance the expression of the same tendencies’.842 
This is not least because the terms of these treaties could not be understood in isolation 
from the ‘state power of the contracting groups of capitalists’ and the ‘mutual relations 
of these states’.843  
 
What Bukharin and Luxemburg allude to is the function that international law could 
play in expressing, solidifying or codifying a given balance of forces at a given point in 
time. This could extend more broadly than individual confrontations or agreements. 
Lenin, for instance, understood that the Treaty of Versailles had been fundamental in 
creating an order ‘wherein seven-tenths of the world’s population are in a condition of 
servitude’.844 Lenin levelled similar criticisms at the international institutions of the 
time. Emphasising inter-imperialist rivalry, he described the League of Nations as a 
‘pack of wolves that are all the time at each other’s throats’845 and a ‘sheer fraud ... an 
alliance of robbers, each trying to snatch something from the others’.846 For him, 
‘without the revolutionary overthrow of capitalism, no international arbitration courts, 
no talk about a reduction of armaments, no “democratic” reorganisation of the League 
of Nations will save mankind from new imperialist wars’.847 
 
Although the classical Marxist theorists of imperialism understood imperialism as being 
wider than European colonialism, that was the form of imperialism with which they 
were faced. This led to some rather contradictory statements on whether or not 
colonialism needed to assume a directly juridical form. On the one hand, Lenin did 
understand that colonial domination need not be directly juridified. Since, for him, 
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imperialism was mainly centred around ‘economic annexation’, it was entirely 
foreseeable that states ‘enjoying the fullest political independence’ could also be 
subjected to the rule of finance capital, since it was ‘such a decisive force in all 
economic and in all international relations’.848  
 
Imperialism was composed of ‘diverse forms of dependent countries which, officially, 
are politically independent, but in fact, are enmeshed in the net of financial and 
diplomatic dependence’.849 Similarly, both Bukharin and Luxemburg drew attention to 
the role that finance played in this domination, particularly through the medium of loans 
with strict conditions attached to them.
850
 These relationships were generally 
characterised as ‘semicolonial’. However, they were not seen as the main means 
through which colonial relations were expressed. Lenin argued that political annexation 
‘often makes economic annexation easier, cheaper ... more convenient, less 
troublesome’851 and stated that the ‘semicolonial’ states were merely ‘transitional 
forms’.852 
 
Obviously, history did not bear this out. However, what is important is that Lenin 
argued the fundamental driving force of imperialism was its economic logic, which 
could manifest in many forms. He argued that ‘forms of the struggle’ between 
imperialists ‘constantly change in accordance with varying, relatively particular and 
temporary causes, but the substance of the struggle, its class content, positively cannot 
change’.853 In this way, the classical Marxist account held that formal colonialism could 
only be understood within the context of the wider dynamics of capitalist imperialism. 
Equally, imperialism was not exhausted by colonialism. In this way, one can see how 
this directly informed the Third Worldist understanding of colonialism, and paved the 
way for the concept of neo-colonialism. 
 
Crucially, law served as one of the forms through which the ‘class content’ of 
imperialism was articulated. However, this form was essentially a contingent one. 
Consequently, against those legalists who thought granting dependent states political 
                                                 
848
 Lenin 1970a, 97. 
849
 Ibid., 101.  
850
 Bukharin 1972, 98 – 100. 
851
 Lenin 1964a, 44. 
852
 Lenin 1970a, 96. 
853
 Ibid., 89. 
173 
 
 
 
independence would be sufficient, Lenin stressed the relative powerlessness of law vis-
à-vis economics, arguing: 
 
Laws are political measures, politics. No political measure can prohibit 
economic phenomena. Whatever political form Poland adopts ... there is no 
prohibiting or repealing her dependence on the finance capital of the imperialist 
powers, or preventing that capital from buying up the shares of her industries.
854
 
 
One might note that Lenin is erecting something of a false dichotomy. It is clear that 
Poland’s independence was ‘legally’ guaranteed. It is equally clear that this 
independence could be illusory in the face of financial or other forms of economic 
control. What is less clear is whether it is possible to characterise ‘economic 
phenomena’ as purely ‘economic’. Lenin mentions the act of capitalists ‘buying up the 
shares’ of Poland’s industries. But this is hardly an act that is not mediated through the 
law. As Marx himself acknowledged, the act of buying is always mediated through the 
basic juridical form of the contract.
855
 More importantly, to speak of ‘shares of 
industries’ is to presume the kind of disaggregation of ownership which demands a legal 
system. Once this is recognised, we can see that this is not a case of economics against 
law, but rather that different imperial configurations are mediated through different 
legal articulations and regimes.  
 
This is indicative of a wider issue. While Lenin and the other classical theorists of 
imperialism did trace the way in which imperialism and international law were 
‘institutions for each other’, this connection was understood as fleeting, conjunctural 
and contingent. Although international law was not understood as intrinsically opposed 
to or opposed by imperialism, it was nonetheless a passive vessel. This vessel would 
sometimes express imperialist content, but would always give way to the ‘real’ force of 
(imperialist) economics.  
 
Consequently, although Marxist theories of imperialism were able to provide 
considerable ‘raw material’ for Marxist understandings of international law, they 
ultimately lacked any theory as to what might be specific about law and its relationship 
to imperialism. Here, there is a great deal of similarity between with the first wave of 
radical Third World jurists. Both operated with a common materialist understanding of 
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imperialism. However, both are ultimately limited in their understanding of what is 
distinctive about the relationship between law and imperialism.  
 
One ought to note the differences though. The Third World jurists operated with a kind 
of sociological functionalism, in which international law would eventually come to 
‘reflect’ the interests of a rising tide of progressive forces. This meant that it could be 
used to oppose imperialism. By contrast, the classical Marxist theorists of imperialism 
viewed international law as weak in the face of imperialist realities. As such, they 
thought that any appeals to international law would ultimately serve to obfuscate the 
real driving forces of imperialism. This implied its uselessness in opposing imperialism 
 
It was to this kind of theorising that the previously mentioned Pashukanis quote – that 
older studies of law had been ‘a history of economic forms with a more or less weak 
legal colouring’856 – was referring. In this respect, Marxist theorists of international law 
were faced with a similar task to TWAIL scholars, that of unpacking the distinct 
relationship between imperialist social relations and their juridical articulations. 
 
 
2. Marxism and International Law 
2.1. Marxist Legal Theory  
Compared to other fields, Marxists have not devoted a huge amount of attention to law. 
Marx and Engels only dealt with legal questions in a scattered, unsystematic way.
857
 
One ought not to exaggerate. There have been two books written simply summarising 
and cataloguing Marx and Engels’ legal reflections858 and one can observe a juridical 
undercurrent operating throughout their work. What this reflects is the fact that issues of 
law are unavoidable when one is analysing social relations. This is a fortiori true for a 
political movement seeking to change the world. Questions as to the nature of law are 
vital components of broader questions of political transformation.
859
 This is why 
Marxists have developed specifically legal theories.  
 
These accounts have relied both upon Marx and Engels’ comments on the law, as well 
as their general reflections on the relationship between economy and society. 
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Consequently, a brief discussion of these positions is useful. In the Preface to the 
Critique of Political Economy, Marx most explicitly laid out his understanding of the 
relationship between ‘economy’ and ‘society’. He proposed that ‘legal relations ... are to 
be grasped neither from themselves nor from the so-called general development of the 
human mind’ but rather from ‘their roots in the material conditions of life’.860 
 
Specifically, the ‘material conditions of life’ referred to relations of production. For 
Marx, ‘[t]he sum total of these relations of production constitutes the economic 
structure of society, the real foundation, on which rises a legal and political 
superstructure’.861 Importantly, the nature of these social relations varied ‘according to 
the character of the means of production’. Different levels of productive forces led 
societies to arrive at definite stages of historical development, each of which possessed 
peculiar and distinctive features.
862
  
 
Marx did not suggest that in each one of the stages, the ‘economic’ was the most visible 
element. Rather, he argued that specific economic configurations would give rise to 
specific configurations of other social phenomena. Thus, against those who argued that 
it was only in capitalism that ‘material interests are preponderant’ and that the Middle 
Ages were ‘dominated by Catholicism’, and ancient societies were ‘dominated by 
politics’, Marx argued that it was only ‘the manner in which they gained their 
livelihood’ that could explain why politics or Catholicism were dominant.863 
 
Marx and Engels did not think of history as simply characterised by the unfolding of 
‘structures’. The modes of production they described were structured by groups of 
individuals who were able to exploit other groups of individuals. That is to say, they 
were composed of classes, whose struggle formed one of the motive forces of historical 
development.
864
 
 
These two basic facts formed Marx and Engels’ approach to questions of law. 
Essentially, they sought to analyse the material basis of legal relations and the way in 
which class struggle was carried out through law. In the German Ideology, Marx and 
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Engels held that ‘[c]ivil law’ had developed simultaneously with private property. In 
societies where property ownership was communal there was no need for law, since 
ownership was mediated through the customs of the community. But where there was 
private property and individual ownership, law was necessary. It was for this reason that 
in the Middle Ages, wherever trade occurred, ‘the highly developed Roman civil law 
was immediately adopted’.865 Only with the disintegration of feudalism could the ‘real 
development’ of law could begin.866  
 
Marx and Engels’ reflections in The German Ideology were concerned specifically with 
property. In On the Jewish Question Marx mounted a similar analysis, but did so for the 
spread of law more broadly. According to Marx, ‘modern’ societies are built on a 
distinction between ‘civil society’, where people act as private individuals, and the 
‘political community’, where people act as communal beings.867 This was in 
contradistinction to feudal and other societies, where ‘civil society had a directly 
political character’ and questions of ownership, production and association were 
mediated through status.
868
  
 
Under capitalism, such questions are necessarily mediated through the market. This 
militated against the direct fusion of state and civil society. Consequently, the 
‘formation of the political state, and the dissolution of civil society into independent 
individuals’ were two sides of the same historical process.869 Here law entered the 
picture. When civil society had a directly political character, the relationships of 
individuals were mediated through custom and status. But once civil society was 
composed of independent individuals, their relations needed to instead be mediated 
through law.
 870
 For Marx, the ‘so-called rights of man, as distinct from the rights of the 
citizen, are simply the rights of a member of civil society, that is of egoistic man, of man 
separate from other men and from the community’.871 
 
Marx and Engels drew a structural link between the emergence of private property and 
the emergence of law. At the same time, they thought that law was one of the 
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‘ideological forms’ in which people became conscious of class conflict and ‘fight it 
out’.872 In particular, Marx was concerned with the way in which struggles around 
wages and working conditions were mediated through law.
873
 Marx also focused on 
how law had been used by the nascent bourgeoisie to enact primitive accumulation.
874
 
While Marx did consider primitive accumulation to be an international process, his 
main legal focus was on its domestic aspects. He drew attention to the ways in which 
Acts of Parliament had been passed which turned formerly common land into private 
property.  
 
Marx’s lack of attention to the legal dimensions of the international process of primitive 
accumulation mean that he did not even leave fragments of an international legal theory. 
This is reflected in the historical record of Marxist international legal theory. Whilst 
Marxist domestic theory has had several ‘revivals’ through the years,875 interest in 
Marxist international legal theory has been less common. As explained previously, the 
Bolshevik and anti-colonial revolutions did throw up a number of Marxist international 
jurists, but always in fragmented way. This changed somewhat during the 1990s when 
there was something of an intellectual resurgence in Marxist scholarship on 
international law. This was further strengthened in the 2000s.  
 
As Marks has noted, despite the lack of explicit engagement with international law, the 
Marxist tradition has ‘left a rich legacy of concepts, insights and analytical practices’ for 
international legal scholarship.
876
 This legacy includes several interconnected concepts: 
materialism, capitalism, imperialism, ideology and totality.
877
 Simply put, in attempting 
to understand international law, Marxists situate it within a totality of social relations. 
The consequence of this materialism is that international law has to be understood in 
relation to global capitalism, whose contemporary form is that of imperialism. As a 
result, the question of imperialism has been at heart of Marxist international legal 
theory.  
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2.2. The Commodity-Form Theory  
2.2.1 Pashukanis and the Russian Revolution 
As previously noted, the Russian Revolution had profound legal consequences. As 
revolutionary Marxists, the Bolsheviks thought that the law would wither away under 
communism.
878
 Yet, immediately upon assuming power, they were faced with a series 
of concrete legal challenges. Domestically, laws and decrees were vital for 
accomplishing a number of tasks, from nationalisation, to land reform, to political 
reform etc. Internationally, the nascent Russian Federated Soviet Republic faced a 
hostile world. The Bolsheviks had come into power in the midst of the First World War, 
with much of their popularity derived from their promise to end that War. Immediately, 
therefore, the Bolsheviks began negotiations to withdraw, concluding the Treaty of 
Brest-Litovsk in March 1918.  
 
One might contrast this with Trotsky’s initial ‘diplomatic’ action of November 1917, 
which involved the publication of all the secret treaties of the Tsarist regime and 
declaring that the only foreign policy of the Russian government was the overthrow of 
capitalism. This contrast signals that, as the hoped-for international revolution never 
came, questions of law became more important for the Bolsheviks.
879
 Given the 
centrality of theoretical questions to the political practice and self-identity of the 
Bolsheviks,
880
 this gave rise to a whole series of ‘passionate debates’ about the nature of 
law and what role it would play in the transition to a post-capitalist society.
881
 In these 
debates Evgeny Pashukanis was one of the most important figures.
882
 
  
Pashukanis’ theory of international law cannot be separated from his theory of law in 
general. As previously noted, one of his primary criticisms of the Marxists who had 
preceded him was that rather than offering a theory of law, they had simply 
‘introduce[d] the element of class struggles’883 into a positivist theory of law. The 
particular target of Pashukanis’ ire was Piotr Stuchka. Stuchka defined law as the 
‘general system of norms corresponding with the interests of the dominant class’.884 
Pashukanis argued that such a position was flawed. Since – for Marxists – all social 
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relationships might be understood as corresponding to the interests of the ruling class, 
on Stuchka’s reading ‘law as a relationship is indistinguishable from social relations in 
general’.885 
 
By contrast, Pashukanis attempted to write a legal theory based on Marx’s Capital. In 
Capital Marx began his analysis not from the totality of capitalist society, but from the 
‘simplest categories of price, value and, finally, commodities’. On this basis, Marx 
‘reconstruct[ed] the concrete totality not as a chaotic, diffused whole, but as a unity 
replete with internal dependencies and relationships’.886 For Pashukanis, this meant that 
a general theory of law was concerned with the ‘basic ... most abstract juridic concepts’ 
which would be ‘equally applicable to any branch of law’.887  
 
The key issue for Pashukanis was how can we say that law regulates social 
relationships. If law is itself a social relationship, then claiming that law regulates social 
relationships seems to amount to saying that ‘social relations regulate themselves’888 
However, for Pashukanis, this position contained the germ of an answer. He pointed out 
that all relationships are capable ‘of colouring’ or giving their ‘form to other social 
relationships’.889 One could escape from the conundrum by understanding law as ‘a 
mystified form of some specific social relationship’ which gives it forms to other 
relationship’.890  
 
The question is, how does one understand this specific social relationship? Initially, 
such an approach might amount to the tautological statement that ‘law assumes the form 
of law’. However, for Pashukanis, we ought to instead pose this solution in a historical 
materialist manner. This means understanding that ‘under certain conditions the 
regulation of social relationships assumes a legal character’.891 Although this might 
appear overly abstract, the point Pashukanis was trying to make is that it was only under 
certain definite material conditions that the form we know as law emerged. The task of a 
theory of law was to inquire into these conditions in order to comprehend the specific 
nature of this form. 
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Following Marx’s reflections, Pashukanis located these conditions in commodity 
exchange. In Capital Marx noted that, in order for commodities to be exchanged, their 
‘guardians must ... recognize each other as owners of private property’.892 In every 
exchange of commodities, each owner must recognise the other as a mutual proprietor. 
This involves the recognition of the other party as the possessor of an equal right. 
Accordingly, the participants in commodity exchanges must recognise each other as 
equal in an abstract, formal sense. However, within exchange there is always the 
possibility of dispute and it is these conflicts of interests that elicit the form of law. 
When disputes arise within commodity exchanges they must be regulated and resolved, 
but such regulation has to recognise and uphold the formal, abstract equality of the 
individuals involved. This is law: a form of social regulation between abstract, formal 
individuals.
893
  
 
Thus, for Pashukanis, there was a structural link between law and capitalism. However, 
it is important to note that commodity exchange does in fact pre-date capitalism and so 
too did law.
894
 Since this commodity exchange was scattered, and integrated with a 
series of other practices, so too was law bound up with status, custom and religion.
895
 It 
was only with the rise and spread of capitalism that law became more important in 
governing social life. Because capitalism is structured around commodity exchange, as 
capitalism spread, so too did law.  
 
However, Pashukanis did not just state that more exchange leads to more law. 
Following Marx, Pashukanis argued that capitalism is not simply an ‘exchange’ society. 
Instead, capitalism is a system based upon the exploitation of labour power. Under 
conditions of generalised commodity exchange, all participants become commodity 
owners because even the members of the working class own their labour power. Thus, 
for Pashukanis, ‘simultaneously with the product of labour assuming the quality of a 
commodity and becoming the bearer of value, man assumes the quality of a legal 
subject and becomes the bearer of a legal right’.896  
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With ‘the full development of bourgeois relations’, value become increasingly abstract, 
and less concentrated in specific productive activities. In particular, labour becomes 
associated with ‘socially useful labour in general’.897 In this development, exchange 
value became ‘the embodiment of social production relationships which stand above the 
individual’.898 This increasing abstraction set the material conditions for the fully-
fledged emergence of the legal form.
899
 Under these conditions the legal subject 
emerges as an entirely abstract category, divorced from particular legal instances, 
enabling ‘man to be transformed from a zoological being into an abstract and 
impersonal subject of law, into a juridic person’.900 As capitalist social relations 
fundamentally restructure the social totality, law is divorced from specific acts of 
exchange and generalised, with the legal subject becoming ‘the abstract commodity 
owner elevated to the heavens’.901 
 
It is only against this background that one can understand Pashukanis’ remarks on 
international law. If, for Pashukanis, law is intimately connected with commodity 
exchange, then it is also connected intimately with imperialism, which is the form that 
this exchange takes on a global scale. Essentially, Pashukanis’ remarks on international 
law were an attempt to combine the above insights with a Leninist theory of 
imperialism.
902
 Pashukanis’ first point was that the commodity-form theory applied a 
fortiori to international law. The formal, abstract equality that Pashukanis ascribed to 
the legal form very closely resembles one of the key structuring elements of 
international law, that of ‘sovereignty’.  
 
Pashukanis argued that ‘sovereign states co-exist and are counterposed to one another in 
exactly the same way as are individual property owners with equal rights’.903 This is 
because the territory of a state is functionally its private property and states engage 
directly in exchange.
904
 In fact, commodity exchange had initially taken place between 
ancient tribes and communities.
905
 These societies therefore developed rudimentary 
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legal institutions. Accordingly, some form of (‘primitive’) international law was the 
oldest type of law. 
 
However, it was only with the international generalisation of capitalism that 
international law came to full flower. This was firstly because it was only with 
capitalism that exchange was generalised on a world scale. Secondly, Pashukanis 
argued that the emergence of the independent sovereign state was premised upon the 
victories of the European bourgeois revolutions. These revolutions separated ‘state rule 
from private rule, and transformed ... state into a special subject’, a subject ‘not to be 
confused with those persons who ... were the bearers of state authority’.906 
 
These facts meant that any attempt to portray international law as a neutral ‘totality of 
norms regulating ... regulations between states’ missed the point.907 Instead, it was 
necessary to understand the ‘historical’ and ‘class’ basis of international law, which 
were the social relations of imperialism. As such, Pashukanis understood international 
law as ‘the legal form of the struggle of the capitalist states among themselves for 
domination over the rest of the world’.908 On this reading, imperialist states act through 
international law, using it to articulate their own interests and international law serves to 
‘concretize’ economic and political relationships.909  
 
Following the Leninist understanding of imperialism, Pashukanis essentially saw 
international law as mediating two inter-related aspects. Firstly, international law 
expresses ‘the struggle between capitalist states’.910 In this respect, he noted that a host 
of international norms concern the conduct of warfare, and directly assume a ‘condition 
of open and armed struggle’. Following Lenin and Bukharin, Pashukanis held that even 
when this struggle was not directly manifested, it nonetheless continued in other, 
apparently peaceful, forms.
911
  
 
For Pashukanis, therefore, competitive violence was at the heart of international law. He 
argued that this was the case even in those international institutions which apparently 
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appeared to embed the ‘common interests’ of the world. These institutions allow 
imperialist states to protect ‘their particular interests, preventing the expansion of their 
rivals’ influence’.912 This was reflected in the particular compositions of these 
organisations, as well as the ways in which their participants continually attempted to 
secure their advantage through political manoeuvring. In this way, Pashukanis echoed 
Lenin’s observations on the League of Nations. 
 
Pashukanis did acknowledge that elements of international law could function as an 
‘ideal cultural community’. However, this community was not rooted in some general 
harmony of interests, but rather because capitalist states all had ruling classes with 
common interests. It was on this basis that Pashukanis traced a number of developments 
in the regulation of the law of war, which serve to protect ‘the general and basic 
interests of the bourgeoisie, i.e. bourgeois property’.913  
 
This is where the second element of Lenin’s account of imperialism – the relationship 
between the advanced capitalist countries and the rest of the world – came to the fore. 
Pashukanis noted that the strictures applied to protect ‘bourgeois property’ in Europe in 
no sense applied to colonial wars, where local populations were liquidated ‘without 
regard for age and sex’.914 Thus, for Pashukanis, the class structure of international law 
was revealed by the concept of ‘civilisation’, which directly reflected the international 
division of labour between ‘backward’ and advanced capitalist countries. 
 
For Pashukanis, therefore, international law was ‘the totality of forms which the 
capitalist, bourgeois states apply in their relations with each other’, with the rest of the 
world treated as ‘a simple object of their completed transactions’.915 In this way, he 
understood the ‘civilising mission’ as the result of the material compulsions of capitalist 
imperialism, which were realised in the legal form. Echoing Lenin’s comments on the 
semi-colonial, Pashukanis maintained that this division was not just embodied in the 
‘civilised’ and ‘uncivilised’ division. It was also a function of the fact that, while ‘in 
principle ... states have equal rights ... in reality they are unequal in their significance 
and their power’.916 Since international law lacks a body to enforce and vindicate rights-
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claims, it ‘includes a very solid dose of self-help’.917 For Pashukanis, the unequal 
violence and power implied by imperialism play a vital role in vindicating international 
legal rights. 
 
According to Pashukanis’ commodity-form theory, then, there are close structural links 
between international law and imperialism. This is true on an ‘ontological’ level, 
whereby the international legal form is systematically generated by commodity 
exchange. Because of this close connection, the content of international law is also 
provided by the social relations of imperialism, with the struggles and imperatives of 
imperialism playing out in international legal form.  
 
2.2.2. From Commodity Form to Legal Form 
Pashukanis’ theoretical positions are not uncontroversial. Over time the commodity-
form theory has been subject to a host of criticisms. This being said, his insights – and 
those of commodity-form theorists more generally
918
 – have been at the core of Marxist 
legal theory. This is particularly true of international law. Especially important has been 
China Miéville’s attempt to systematise Pashukanis’ insights into a Marxist theory of 
international law.  
 
For Miéville, Pashukanis’ theory is able to resolve one of the recurring problems of the 
international legal discipline, namely, whether or not international law is ‘really’ law. 
As noted in Chapter 2 (Section 3.2.), international lawyers have frequently had to 
defend international law from the accusation that it is ‘not really law’ because it lacks a 
centralised enforcement authority. With his insistence that the ‘law-ness’ of law inheres 
in its form, Pashukanis entirely sidestepped this dilemma, arguing that ‘[s]tate power 
injects clarity and stability into the legal structure but it does not create its 
preconditions’.919 Whilst the state might make law more effective, it is the form of 
abstract equality that signals the presence of a legal relationship. 
 
Of course, since international law acts to vindicate rights, it does require some form of 
coercive mechanism. For Pashukanis, this could be located in the parties themselves 
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through ‘[t]he principle of inter-dependence’920 as embodied in acts of ‘self-help’ and 
reprisals. Although this necessarily creates an ‘unstable’ legal form, Pashukanis noted 
that this was also true in domestic law, since the state is unable to ‘enforce’ every single 
law or ‘punish’ every violation. Especially in civil law, ‘a major portion of ... 
relationships are exercised under influence of pressures limited to the activities of 
subjects themselves’.921 For Miéville, this is vital. He argues that, on occasion, 
Pashukanis failed to properly account for the coercive violence at the heart of the 
commodity form. This is most manifest at those points where Pashukanis seemed to 
hold that direct violence contradicts commodity exchange.
922
 As a result, Pashukanis 
claimed that in periods of intense imperialist competition, law would simply be 
discarded in favour of military violence.
923
 
  
By contrast, Miéville argues that violence and commodity exchange are intimately 
interrelated, and, as a result, so too are violence and law. Essentially, for Miéville, 
private ownership necessarily ‘implies the exclusion of others’.924 One can only ‘own’ 
something insofar as one is able to stop others from taking it, or seek redress if they do. 
This is also true of exchange. In order for commodities to actually be exchanged, it is 
necessary that each party remain in possession of their commodities. If the commodity 
was simply taken, there would be no exchange. In order to guarantee this possession 
‘some forceful capacities must be implied’.925 Logically, therefore, coercion is implied 
‘in the very nature of commodity exchange and production’.926 This coercion is law, 
since the violence that secures ownership is the vindication of legal rights.
927
 
 
International law’s indeterminacy makes this violence absolutely crucial. Miéville 
largely understands indeterminacy with reference to Martti Koskenniemi’s work.928 
Koskenniemi famously proposes that the international legal order is structured by a 
fundamental tension between ‘apology’ and ‘utopia’. In the case of the former, the 
world is characterised as a collection of sovereign entities, each with their own interest 
and will. In the case of the latter, the world community is having some broader interest 
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which manifests itself above individuals states. In legal terms, this plays out as a tension 
between ‘concreteness’ and ‘normativity’. The ‘legal mind’ ‘attempts ensure the 
normativity of the law by creating distance between it and State behaviour, will and 
interest’. At the same time, however, this ‘legal mind’ cannot put forward an 
understanding of law ‘unrelated to State behaviour’, since this understanding would be 
naively utopian.
929
  
 
This tension structures international legal argument, such that, in any given instance, a 
legal argument could be made from either one of these positions. Since these arguments 
are both equally legitimate and mutually opposed, counter-claims are always available 
to any legal argument.
930
 Hence, international law cannot give determinate answers to 
given situations, it is always a matter of argument and interpretation. Miéville observes 
that Koskenniemi never shows how it is that – despite indeterminacy – legal arguments 
are resolved. Here, Miéville turns to Marx, who argued that ‘between equal rights, force 
decides’. Insofar as there are equally compelling legal arguments, it will be force which 
chooses between them. Domestically, this force is the state. However, as per the above 
considerations, in the international legal arena ‘[t]here is no state to act as final arbiter 
of competing claims’ and ‘[t]he means of violence remains in the hands of the very 
parties disagreeing over the interpretation of law’.931 
 
For Miéville, the question of what form this violence will take depends on the social 
relations of the time. Internationally, this form is that of imperialism. Drawing explicitly 
on Bukharin, Miéville argues ‘military competition in monopoly capitalism as an 
expression of the same competitive dynamic associated with capitalist economics’.932 
The dynamics of capital accumulation on the world stage are also dynamics of violent 
competition, generated by the tendencies of international capitalism. It is this coercive 
violence which resolves the interpretive conflicts generated by indeterminacy, and so 
secures the vindication of legal rights. This means that: 
 
Intrinsically to the legal form, a contest of coercion occurs, or is implied, to back 
claim and counterclaim. And in the politically and militarily unequal modern 
world system, the distribution of power is such that the winner of that coercive 
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contest is generally a foregone conclusion. The international legal form assumes 
juridical equality and unequal violence.
933
 
 
In this way, then, Miéville attempts to deepen Pashukanis’ account of the structural 
relationship between imperialism and international law. Aside from the connection 
already foregrounded by Pashukanis, Miéville adds a further dimension. Since ‘without 
violence there could be no international law’, and international violence takes the form 
of imperialism, ‘without imperialism there could be no international law’.934 The 
unfolding of international legal argument and doctrine can only be understood through 
the prism of the unfolding of imperialist social relations. For this reason, at the level of 
both form and content, international law is structurally dependent upon imperialism. 
  
2.3. The Critique of Imperialism and the Critique of Ideology  
Ideology has been one of the primary ways in which Marxists have sought to 
understand law. This has been especially true in domestic legal theory, where the last 
major revival of Marxism was organised concepts of ideology derived from Gramsci 
and Althusser. Ideology was also one of the major concepts that critical legal studies 
scholars took from the Marxist tradition in order to advance their own analyses.
935
  
 
The precise nature of ‘ideology’ in these analyses has been the subject of much 
controversy. Historically, it was closely associated with what Engels dubbed ‘false 
consciousness’.936 In this vision, ideology essentially connoted the misrepresentation or 
misunderstanding of reality. Thus, in The German Ideology, Marx and Engels that 
ideology was a problem of consciousness, whereby people perceived their 
circumstances ‘upside-down as in a camera obscura’.937 Because of their immersion in 
a certain form of material life, people were prevented from understanding their own 
material conditions, instead granting ideas an independent and autonomous power. In 
this way, as Engels put it, although ideology is ‘accomplished ... consciously’, it is done 
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so with ‘a false consciousness’, since the ‘real motive forces impelling [people] remain 
unknown to [them]’.938 
 
These ideological processes mean that both oppressed and oppressor refuse to recognise 
the transience and exploitative nature of the dominant mode of production. As Marx and 
Engels put it, ‘[t]he ruling ideas of each age have ever been the ideas of its ruling 
class’.939 Many later Marxists have found such ‘epistemological’ ideas of ideology to be 
theoretically and politically problematic. However, some sense of the way in which 
ideas and practices reproduce and defend the status quo has remained central. 
 
It is in this more general sense that Marxists have used the concept of ideology to 
understand the relationship between international law and imperialism. Particularly 
important in this respect has been Susan Marks. Marks explicitly disavows the Engels-
inflected account of ideology as misrecognition. Instead, she operates with a critical 
notion of ideology.
940
 Drawing on John Thompson, she defines ideology as referring to 
the ‘ways in which meaning serves to establish and sustain relations of domination’.941 
For Marks, ‘meaning’ does not simply refer to ‘ideas’ but the ‘broad range of forms’ 
through which ideas are communicated. This specifically includes ‘utterances, texts, 
actions, and images’.942  
 
There are manifold ways in which meaning can serve to establish and sustain relations 
of domination and exploitation. But Marks pinpoints a number of manoeuvres which are 
typical of ideology, each of which possesses its own particular ‘discursive strategies’. 
The moves that Marks identifies are ‘legtimation’, which is ‘the process by which 
authority comes to seem valid and appropriate’;943 ‘dissimulation’ whereby ‘relations of 
domination are obscured, masked or denied’;944 ‘unification’ through which social 
relations are made to seem harmonious and coherent;
945
 ‘reification’ which makes social 
relations seem as if they are not the product of human relations and therefore appear 
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eternal
946
 and, finally, ‘naturalisation’ which makes ‘existing social arrangements come 
to seem obvious and self-evident’.947 
 
Crucially for Marks, these strategies do not reflect ignorance or illusion. Although 
illusion may be involved in any of these, ‘it is not a simple case of error or ignorance of 
social reality’.948 Instead, ideology is concerned with the way in which we act, in spite 
of our consciously held beliefs or awareness. Marks cites Terry Eagleton on racism, 
where he notes that in sitting on a ‘whites only’ bench, even if one is consciously 
‘opposed’ to racism, one supports and perpetuates racist ideology.949 In this way, then, 
ideology is less about people believing in the justice or immutability of relations of 
domination and exploitation and more about the impact of acting ‘as if’ they believe 
this. Mystification enters in terms of ‘unawareness of the extent to which actions ... and 
the ideas expressed through them serve to shape social reality’.950 
 
Although the critique of ideology has generally been applied to cultural or textual 
forms, it has an obvious resonance for international law. International law is a medium 
through which ‘meaning is made and power is shaped’, it too is a form of ideology.951 
Since international law operates on the international plane, the ‘relations of domination’ 
that it establishes and sustains are those of imperialism. For Marks, this occurs across 
and throughout international law, but she focuses specifically on ‘democratic 
governance’. 
 
Marks describes capitalist (imperialist) globalisation as a system of extremely uneven 
development, in which an advanced capitalist core exploits a periphery and semi-
periphery. Following Gill and Robinson, she views the ‘promotion of democracy’ in 
this context. When one examines post-communist and ‘developing states’ one can 
observe that the democracy which is promoted for them is a ‘low intensity’ model, in 
which almost all the stress is placed upon the form of elections.
952
 Marks notes that we 
might best view this democracy promotion – as led by the US – as a form of 
intervention into peripheral societies, designed to influence their behaviour and to 
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contain any popular radicalism associated with social breakdown. In particular, she 
argues, low intensity democracy: 
 
[M]eets the immediate needs of anti-authoritarian crisis, easing tensions, and 
restoring order. Yet it does so in a manner that forestalls far-reaching structural 
change in peripheral and semi-peripheral regions. Thus, the concentration in 
these regions of relatively low wage, low profit, less monopolized economic 
activities is not endangered. On the other hand, low intensity democracy is 
linked as well to the project of expanding the reach of global markets and 
eliminating the remaining barriers to the transnationalization of capital. It 
facilitates the penetration and consolidation of capitalist relations ... Policies of 
economic liberalization ... have greater legitimacy when pursued by elected 
governments than when imposed by unelected regimes.
953
 
 
International law’s ‘democratic norm thesis’ is an important ideological battleground 
for these developments. Essentially, the democratic norm thesis rationalises low 
intensity democracy. It does this because, for international law, ‘the crucial factor is said 
to be that elections can be monitored by international observers’.954 Furthermore, it 
presents low intensity democracy as the ‘general rule’ of democracy, and therefore 
implicitly posits democracy as a ‘event’ which one reaches, placing it outside the space 
of political contestation. The ultimate result of this is that international law ideologically 
represents low intensity democracy as a self-evident definition of democracy, to which 
the only alternative is tyranny.
955
 Thus, In Marks’ account, the expansion of advanced 
capitalist social formations into peripheral countries is ideologically facilitated by 
international law. It helps legitimate the breaking down of barriers to capitalist 
accumulation and contains resistance to these processes within forms compatible with 
imperialism.  
 
Although in theory there are manifold ideological manoeuvres, in practice scholars of 
international law have stressed the particular role that international law has played in 
separating the effects of imperialism from their causes. Tor Krever, for example, has 
argued that international criminal law ‘abstracts individuals from a concrete context in 
which they act’ and so tends to ‘portray the incidents at its centre as resulting from 
“rotten apples” and their bad behaviour, or “monsters” and their demagogic thirst for 
power’.956 In so doing, international law obscures the way in which the international 
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institutions (and their interventions) have contributed to the problems that international 
law purports to address.
957
 
 
As Marks has shown, where international law does focus on causes, it tends to recast 
these causes in distinct ways. In particular, ‘the investigation of causes is halted too 
soon’, ‘effects are treated as though they were causes’ and ‘causes are identified only to 
be set aside’.958 The effect of this is to divorce the poverty and violence that result from 
imperialism from imperialism’s logic. Instead, these symptoms are treated as 
aberrations, which are pathological from the imperialism’s normal function.959 In so 
doing, this obscures the fact that some groups of people benefit from imperialism,
960
 this 
means that ‘[t]hose who ... live off the practices and processes that victimise others have 
been allowed to remain comfortably out of sight’.961 International law’s silence about 
‘systemic logics’ is thus a ‘silence about capitalism’.962  
 
Thus, a vitally important aspect of international law as an ideological form is its 
tendency towards ‘false contingency’.963 Such false contingency involves acting as if 
things are ‘random, accidental or arbitrary’.964. This ‘help[s] to sustain’965 the social 
relations of imperialism, because it occludes ‘awareness of what it will take to effect 
change’.966 In treating these effects as essentially ‘isolated problems, unrelated to wider 
processes, tendencies and dynamics at work in the world’967 international law’s 
ideological function obscures imperialism’s structural logic, and so naturalises it. In this 
way, international law structures resistance to imperialism, channelling this resistance 
into avenues which fail to challenge its broader systemic logic.  
  
2.4. International Law as/and Class Struggle 
At the beginning of this section, it was noted that Marx and Engels understood law both 
in terms of its structural connection with capitalism and in its ability to express class 
conflict. One might say that both the commodity-form theory and ideology critique are 
                                                 
957
 Marks 2009b, 45; Krever 2013a, 717. 
958
 Marks 2011, 72. 
959
 Marks 2008a, 300. 
960
 Marks 2009b, 48. 
961
 Marks 2011, 76. 
962
 Marks 2008a, 302. 
963
 Marks 2009a; Marks 2008a, 302. 
964
 Marks 2011, 75. 
965
 Marks 2004, 377. 
966
 Marks 2009a, 17. 
967
 Ibid. 
192 
 
 
 
concerned with this first aspect. By contrast, other approaches have put forward more 
agent-driven accounts of international law. In such accounts, the connection between 
international law and imperialism is generally understood via the fact that the imperial 
class relations are expressed through international law. This is so because various 
classes are able to operationalise international law and institutions. One obvious 
example is Chimni’s account (see Chapter 2, Section 3.4.).  
 
Bill Bowring’s account of international law is an important contribution to this account. 
In a similar parallel to Anghie and Rajagopal, we might say that whereas Chimni’s 
class-based account of international law is one ‘from above’, Bowring’s is one from 
‘below’. Bowring’s starting point is one rooted in the classical Marxist theory of 
imperialism, namely, that one cannot only understand the problems in the world as part 
of a systemic process. This systemic process ‘is “capitalism”, of which imperialism is an 
inescapable feature’.968 Bowring understands capitalism as driven by the ‘unceasing 
urge to valorise itself, in which every social relationship, every intellectual creation, and 
every human appropriation of the material world is reducible to money’.969 
 
However, capitalism and imperialism are also social relations composed of classes. For 
Bowring it is the struggles between these classes that have given substance to 
international law. For Bowring, one cannot simply characterise law and rights as 
‘deracinated empty forms’.970 Instead they must be understood as ‘the subjects and 
objects of real struggles in the real world’.971 Bowring attempts to give a ‘substantive 
account’ of international law, in which it is historicised and understood as the product of 
human struggle.
972
 
 
Bowring turns to Alain Badiou to examine how this takes place. For Badiou, human 
history is structured around ‘Events’. Events are unpredictable ruptures in the status quo 
which overturn seemingly stable sets of social relations in the name of radical 
alternatives. Obviously, in this respect, the locus of the concept is revolution, and 
Badiou identifies the French and Russian Revolutions as key Events. The Event is part 
of a wider process of social change which he calls a ‘truth procedure’. The truth 
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procedure is composed of the ‘fidelity’ – the continuing consequences of the event – 
and the ‘truth’ – the overall outcome of the whole process.973  
 
In Ethics Badiou presents ‘human rights’ as ‘blockages’ to Events, since they deny that 
there might be any radical alternative to the existing order.
974
 Bowring disagrees. For 
him, rights were in fact at the core of the great revolutions; far from being a ‘block’ on 
the Event, law and rights are part of its fidelity. That is to say the great struggles of 
particular events are concretised and embodied in law and rights. For Bowring, each of 
the great Events gives rise to a concomitant set of international legal principles. The 
French Revolution gave rise to civil and political liberties and the Russian Revolution 
gave rise to social and economic rights.
975
 Importantly, to Badiou’s two great Events, 
Bowring adds a third, decolonisation. Following on from the original Third World 
jurists, he argues that the anti-colonial movement managed to embed its legacy in 
international law. This was in the law around decolonisation and self-determination, the 
prohibition on the use of force and military intervention, and the ‘third generation’ of 
‘people’s rights’, such as the right to development and doctrines such as permanent 
sovereignty over natural resources.
976
  
 
For Bowring, the content of international law is now marked by the struggles of the 
various forces created by the material structures of imperialism. Imperialist powers seek 
to constantly roll back and undermine the gains made by the socialist and anti-colonial 
revolutions.  
 
2.5. Materialism, Imperialism and International Law  
Although the above approaches have been presented as distinct, one should not 
exaggerate this. It is wiser to treat each of them as constituent element in a broader 
Marxist understanding of international law and its relationship to imperialism. This is 
reinforced by the fact that all of the above-mentioned theorists explicitly invoke the 
other forms of analysis. Pashukanis, for instance, maintained that as long as the legal 
form exists ‘so too will the class struggle be conducted through the law’.977 Indeed, in 
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‘Lenin and Problems of Law’978 he explicitly attempted to show the ways in the class 
struggle was conducted through law, paying particular attention to the right to self-
determination.
979
 Similarly, Miéville notes that since ‘class struggle is intrinsic to 
capitalism’, it will be reflected in law.980 
 
Equally, commodity-form theorists have paid close attention to the ideological 
dimensions on international law. Pashukanis devoted an entire chapter of his General 
Theory of Law and Marxism to the relationship between law and subjectivity
981
 and 
more generally thought that the ideology of ‘legal fetishism’ accompanied the 
generalisation of legal form.
982
 Similarly, Miéville treats it as obvious that ‘international 
law ... does have an ideological function’.983  
 
In this respect, it is telling that many contemporary theorists of international law’s 
ideological functions have endorsed the elements of the commodity-form theory.
984
 This 
is especially true in the case of Marks’ more recent work. She argues that her earlier 
work on democracy over-emphasised the contingency of the particular ideological form 
that it took. She did not sufficiently focus on how  and why the idea of low-intensity 
democracy came to prominence.
985
 As a result, there has been an increasing shift in 
Marks’ work towards foregrounding the abstracting nature of legal ideology, a position 
that dovetails neatly with Pashukanis’ analysis of the legal form.986 Equally, Marks’ 
focus on the way in which law obscures who benefits from imperialism suggests a focus 
on class struggle. In the work of scholars like Chimni and Bowring we see the 
acknowledgement of law’s ideological role,987 as well some positive reference to the 
aspects of the commodity-form theory.
988
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Thus, whilst one ought not to minimise the explicit differences between these 
approaches, there are nonetheless important overlaps. Essentially, Marxists understand 
imperialism as a specific historical phenomenon, governed by a systemic logic. In this 
vision, imperialism is rooted in the capitalist imperative to export and accumulate 
capital. This generates the accompanying imperative to expand and transform the rest of 
the world, in a process as endless as the need to accumulate capital. This is a complex 
vision because imperialism embraces different class interests in both the advanced 
capitalist countries and the less advanced peripheral ones and (potentially) a series of 
rivalries around competitive accumulation.  
 
Imperialism is the material basis on which to understand international law. As above, 
the particularities of this relationship are different, but essentially, international law 
serves as an ideological and structural field through which the social relations of 
imperialism are articulated.
989
 The playing out of various international legal doctrines 
has to be rooted in the expansion of capitalist social relations and their changing 
configurations. 
 
Marxist international legal theory has gone beyond the more vulgar materialist 
treatments of international law by insisting on its constitutive nature. All of those 
surveyed above do not simply claim that international law reflects the ‘real’ life of 
imperialism. Instead, their analyses suggest that international law is an inextricable 
aspect of imperialism as a system, which both articulates its logic and also stabilises and 
justifies its particular configurations. As Miéville puts it ‘[t]he most realist, cynical, 
power-maximising state in the modern world system is a realist, cynical and power 
maximising juridical form’.990  
 
In this vision, then, there is a close link between international law and processes of 
capital accumulation. The vagaries of this process are engendered through and reflected 
in international law. It is this fundamental insight which has guided the way in which 
Marxists have understood various moments in the history of international law to which 
this chapter now turns.  
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3. Imperialism’s International Law 
3.1. Capitalism, Colonialism and the Civilising Mission 
In the Marxist account, formal colonialism is part and parcel of the broader systemic 
logic of capital accumulation. Insofar as this is accompanied by a ‘civilising mission’, it 
is connected to a larger project aimed at solidifying and justifying capitalist expansion. 
It is against this background that Marxists have understood the relationship between 
international law and colonialism. Thus, in one straightforward way, the international 
law of the colonial period can be understood as ideology.
991
 
 
Mark Neocleous, for instance, has focused on the link between law and primitive 
accumulation. Neocleous notes that the category of ‘waste’ was fundamental to classical 
political and legal thought. In Blackstone’s Commentaries on the Laws of England, for 
example, it was stated that the lord of the manor would be allowed to enclose any land 
‘waste’ land.992 Here, waste took on a very specific meaning. Essentially, it referred to 
land which could be made ‘more productive’ through cultivation. Neocleous argues that 
this found its ideological reflection in the work of Locke and Hobbes, whose theories 
were underpinned by the idea of a ‘state of nature’ in which land constantly went to 
waste. 
 
For Neocleous, the importance of this observation lies in the fact that both Hobbes and 
Locke did not simply treat the state of nature as an abstraction. Instead, they illustrated 
it with reference to ‘primitive’ and ‘Indian’ populations, whose nomadic character 
precluded the ability to ‘improve’ land and so led to waste.993 Since such improvement 
that gave rise to individual property rights, appropriation of native territories would be 
legitimate. Thus, Neocleous emphasises that primitive accumulation had an important 
international dimension in the form of colonial appropriation.
994
 
 
These understandings were highly important to the ‘founders’ of international law. 
Neocleous points out that throughout De Iure Belli ac Pacis Hugo Grotius claimed that 
mankind only gains dominion over God’s property through improving it.995 Similar 
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considerations animated the work of Emer de Vattel. Crucially, since there was a right 
to appropriate ‘waste’, any resistance to this right could be met with force. It is for this 
reason that ‘the question of just war, is shot through with the categories of the war on 
the commons and the language of enclosures’.996 As such, international law served as a 
‘key weapon used in the global class war’.997 For Neocleous, the categories of 
‘bourgeois ideology and political economy’ – those of waste, improvement and 
enclosure – ‘were central to international law’.998 There is a great deal of similarity 
between Neocleous’ account and Anghie’s reading of Vitoria’s confrontation with the 
‘Indians’. However, for Neocleous, the difference is that such confrontation was not 
concerned with ‘racial supremacy over “the other”’ but ‘with the violent enclosure of 
lands and resources for capital accumulation’.999  
 
This is particularly important when one looks to the changing forms of capital 
accumulation. In the earlier (mercantilist) period of colonisation (from the 16th to the 
18th century), European states did not interact directly with non-European societies. 
Instead, it was European trading companies – invested with legal power by the 
European states – that were the prime vectors of interaction.1000 In this context, there 
was no need for European states to directly intervene in and transform other societies. 
Owing to the monopoly nature of the trading companies, European states could exercise 
control without the costly assertion of formal sovereignty.
1001
 
 
Miéville argues that this material basis meant international law was marked by a 
‘structured silence’ about colonisation.1002 It was a ‘structured’ silence because – in an 
argument reminiscent of Bedjaoui’s – it was functional to the form of expansion 
associated with mercantilism. However, with the advance of industrial capitalism at the 
expense of mercantilism, this was no longer possible. Miéville argues that a series of 
colonial crises, struggles between capitalist powers and the need to more systematically 
exploit colonial territory all militated in favour of direct, formal control. International 
law was ‘forced to accommodate the colonies, to recognise them as existing within the 
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international legal universe’.1003 International law could do this in two ways, either the 
colony would be constituted as an independent state, or treated as part of the territory of 
the mother country. 
 
It was against this background that the doctrines of 19th century positivism were 
articulated. European states had secured their expansion through a number of what 
Miéville ‘ad hoc’ legal measures. In particular, they made treaties with tribal leaders 
and non-European societies. Legal positivists had to make sense of these decisions in 
legal terms. Crucially, however, they had to do this is such a way as to not spread ‘the 
bacillus of sovereignty’,1004 since imperialist exploitation required that European 
societies be able to exercise massive levels of control over non-European territories so 
as to transform them.  
 
Miéville reads the doctrine of civilisation as a way of solving this problem. Whilst it did 
not ‘finally answer the question of what legal capacity’ flowed from imperial treaties, its 
main role was to ‘formalise ... ad-hoc responses to the question’.1005 In Miéville’s 
account, the binary distinction between ‘civilised’ and ‘uncivilised’ was nowhere near 
as important as the intermediate category of ‘semi-civilised’. This was the category 
which was most important because it captured the primary dynamic of imperial 
expansion: limited legal contact between European powers which did not grant non-
European societies full legal sovereignty.
1006
 For Miéville, semi-civilisation was not ‘a 
mediating fudge between two opposites, but the generative problematic for the 
taxonomy of “civilisation”’ because civilisation ‘was not a discursive strategy for 
“othering”, but a result of the paradoxes of actually-existing sovereignty’.1007  
 
It is not just that the need for a category of civilisation was generated by the 
particularities of capitalist expansion. Equally, as suggested by Neocleous, the content 
of ‘civilisation’ was rooted in European property and legal relations. In this way, as 
Baars notes, we might better understand the ‘civilising mission’ as a ‘capitalising 
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mission’, through which capitalist social relations were spread and the conditions for 
capital accumulation perpetuated.
1008
  
 
3.2. From Decolonisation to Neo-colonialism 
As has been repeatedly noted, Marxists have always insisted that imperialism cannot be 
wholly identified with formal colonialism. Instead, imperialism has to be located within 
the wider historical dynamics of capital accumulation, of which formal colonialism is 
one form. Indeed, whilst earlier theorists of imperialism thought that colonialism was 
the prime form of imperialism, later theorists have claimed that in fact formal 
colonialism was less of a ‘natural’ fit with capitalism. This is because formal colonial 
administration imposed financial and political burdens on European states and the thrust 
of capitalist development is towards the ‘separation’ between direct coercion and the 
extraction of surplus value.
1009
 Consequently, Marxists have paid close attention to the 
way in which imperialism survived decolonisation. 
 
Miéville, surveying the decolonisation which took place before the mass anti-colonial 
struggles, analyses how international law enabled struggles against colonialism to be 
instrumentalised by imperialist powers. Following the American Revolution, the 
question of recognition became hugely important. Independence could only prove 
useful insofar as other states were willing to treat the US as a fellow member of the 
international community. 
 
At the time, ‘[t]he doctrine of effectiveness found in Vattel ... was gaining ground, with 
a positivism which treated facts of state control as primary’.1010 On this basis, the US 
could be recognised as an independent state insofar as it was ‘factually independent’. 
But – because of international law’s indeterminacy – such independence could not be 
‘objectively’ determined. Accordingly, Miéville argues, the act of recognition was 
necessarily a political one. In this respect, it is telling that one of the first states to 
recognise the US was France. At the time, France was in an antagonistic relationship 
with Britain and the recognition ‘was a political reaction to a changing situation, and an 
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interventionist act, designed to undermine British power’.1011 Through recognition, 
decolonisation was directly enmeshed in the struggles between imperialist states.  
 
This suggests that ‘the defeat of formal imperialism does not mean the end of an 
imperialist order’ since ‘the very legal fabric of postcolonialism can be constitutive of 
such an order, in a new form’.1012 Echoing the theorists of neo-colonialism, Miéville 
holds that this was evident in the relationship between the US and the countries of Latin 
America. The Monroe Doctrine, elaborated in 1823, stated that the US had an 
essentially proprietary interest in Latin America and would attempt to exclude European 
influence. However, this was not coupled with an assertion of juridical control, rather it 
accompanied a policy of recognising Latin American states that had declared 
independence from European empires. 
  
Through recognition, the US was able to undermine and undercut its rivals. It then used 
its economic and political power to dominate the Latin American continent. As this 
system developed, it was also increasingly coupled with specific legal conditions for 
recognition, in which the US would only recognise those states with ‘democratic’ 
constitutions. In this way, the US was able to shape the internal political life of Latin 
America without formal juridical control. Again, in an argument reminiscent of theorists 
of neo-colonialism, Miéville presents Latin America as a kind of laboratory which set 
the scene for post-colonial imperialism. Specifically, this combination of imperialism 
and formal independence was where ‘modern imperialism starts’.1013 
 
However, Latin America in the 1800s was a very different from the 20th century. The 
Latin American wars of independence occurred before the development of the mass 
workers’ movements, the radical left or the Marxist tradition that was to provide the 
conceptual and political basis for the later struggles.
1014
 As a result, whilst they may 
have challenged the particular make up of various empires, they did not articulate the 
idea of a system to which they were opposed. It was a result of these features that the 
‘strategic recognition’ described by Miéville could occur. Since the independence 
movements opposed only specific empires, their struggles could easily be assimilated 
into a legalised form of inter-imperialist rivalry.  
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Things were different when it came to the right to self-determination. Although this 
right is now recognised in international law, it began life as a political slogan. The 
socialist movement had a number of debates over the question of multi-ethnic empires. 
Luxemburg insisted that Marxists should not support a ‘right’ to self-determination. She 
held that the tendency towards the centralisation and concentration of capital was 
reflected in capitalism’s tendency to agglomerate disparate peoples into multi-ethnic 
nations. This was progressive insofar as it meant that the working class would be 
concentrated in greater numbers. She also argued that claims of self-determination 
would gloss over class divisions within particular ‘nations’. Consequently, Luxemburg 
was opposed to the idea of making the right to self-determination a part of any socialist 
programme. She alleged that it would commit socialists to a universal solution to the 
‘national question’, which could not be achieved under capitalism. Against this, she 
suggested that the movement agitate for equal rights for all nationalities within existing 
states.
1015
 
 
For Lenin and the Bolsheviks, this was unacceptable. If imperialism was central to 
capitalism, it was necessary to fight it directly. As such, liberating the colonies had to be 
high on the agenda. This could only be achieved through self-determination.
1016
 Lenin 
saw this as key to building an alliance between the working class in the imperialist 
countries and the oppressed people in the colonies. In this way, self-determination 
would serve ‘as grounds for mass action and for revolutionary attacks on the 
bourgeoisie’.1017 When the Bolsheviks came to power they made self-determination one 
of their policies, implementing it – unevenly – throughout the former Tsarist Empire.  
 
The intricacies of this debate are important because they illustrate the changed context 
in which self-determination was articulated. As a principle, it was linked very closely to 
the radical notion of anti-imperialism. For this reason, as Bowring notes, the imperial 
powers all initially opposed the notion of a right to self-determination.
1018
 Often, the 
genesis of the modern right to self-determination is traced to Woodrow Wilson’s ‘14 
Points’ speech. Although Wilson did address the question of national independence in 
this speech, it was nothing approaching a universal right. Instead, he thought that the 
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immediate right should be granted only in respect of the European territories of the 
defeated powers. For non-European colonial territories he suggested a ‘free open-
minded and absolutely impartial adjustment’ weighing equally the interests of the non-
European populations and the former colonial states.
1019
 The Mandate System largely 
implemented these proposals.  
 
In many respects, Wilson’s advocacy of some limited self-determination (and the 
system that implemented his proposals) was a response to the revolutionary energies 
that the Bolsheviks had attempted to mobilise. It was essentially an attempt to channel 
the grievances of the masses into support for an emerging order of liberal 
democracies.
1020
 Similarly, although the UN Charter contained ‘a statement of 
principles including self-determination’ it did ‘not proclaim a right’.1021 Instead, the UN 
dealt with the colonial question through the Trust system, which essentially reproduced 
the Mandate System. Bowring insists that anti-imperialist political struggle played a 
vital role in the transformation of self-determination to a legal right. It was the USSR 
that insisted self-determination be inserted into the preamble of the Charter
1022
 and 
submitted the Colonial Declaration to the General Assembly.
1023
 The driving force 
behind this was the action of the national liberation movements.
1024
 Their struggles 
compelled the USSR to support them and the Western powers to make concessions. As 
more and more of these states entered the UN, they were able to further transform 
international law. 
 
For Bowring, the international law that emerged from the height of the anti-colonial 
movement was fundamentally shaped by these struggles. The juridical transformations 
effected by the national liberation movements impacted the nature of imperialism itself. 
Through the transformation of the UN, ‘less powerful states’ were given a chance ‘to 
gather and speak’, and so give shape a sense of their own collective interest.1025 
Consequently, these states were able to embed a number of principles in international 
law which limited imperialist interventionism. In particular, he notes that the ‘principles 
of state sovereignty and non-interference’ were ‘brought to life by the hard-won legal 
                                                 
1019
 Wilson 1999, 363. 
1020
 Hobsbawm 1995, 67. 
1021
 Bowring 2008a, 30. 
1022
 Bowring 2013, 85. 
1023
 Ibid., 87. 
1024
 Bowring 2008a, 33. 
1025
 Ibid., 38. 
203 
 
 
 
right of peoples to self-determination’.1026 In this way, international law concretised the 
results of the struggle that occurred within imperialist social relations. Bowring situates 
his argument as contradicting Pashukanis and Miéville, who, he alleges, miss the 
political significance of these developments and the radical break with existing 
international law that they represented.
1027
  
 
Whilst Bowring does highlight the way in which international law mediated and 
impacted upon the struggles thrown up by imperialist social relations, he perhaps 
overstates his case.
1028
 The Marxist vision to which Bowring subscribes understands 
imperialism as a system that exceeds its particular colonial articulation. Given this, 
whilst one can accept that international law did end formal colonialism, imperialism 
remained in place. If this is the case, then – without wishing to diminish the struggles of 
the anti-colonial movement – one needs to ask what is the relationship between self-
determination and post-colonial imperialism. In this respect, it is interesting to note that 
Pashukanis did deal directly with self-determination. Engaging with Lenin, Pashukanis 
insisted that ‘the “abstract”, “negative” demand of formal equal rights [for self-
determination] was, in a given historical conjuncture, simultaneously a revolutionary 
and revolutionizing slogan’.1029 The conjuncture he referred to here was an imminent 
imperialist war. 
 
However, because this was a conjunctural analysis, it was not timeless. This became 
especially important in the 1920s when imperialists adopted ‘“Wilsonian” phrases’.1030 
At this point, Pashukanis insisted it was necessary to abandon ‘formal legal equality’ 
and consider the concrete economic situation of imperialist exploitation. For 
Pashukanis, this was especially important in the context of the Russian Revolution, 
which had begun to materially undermine the structures of imperialism. In this context, 
the slogan of self-determination was of less significance, with ‘overthrow the rule of the 
bourgeoisie on a world scale’ becoming the new ‘immediate practical slogan’.1031 
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In Pashukanis’ account, the Bolshevik adoption of ‘self-determination’ was a tactical 
gamble. Although the Bolsheviks understood imperialism as a system that transcended 
formal colonialism, in a given context the struggle against colonialism might be turned 
against imperialism as a whole.
1032
 Yet were this to fail, imperialism would itself remain 
ultimately compatible with formal equality. Although Pashukanis framed his analysis 
primarily in tactical and political terms, there is obviously a broader lesson to learn 
about the relationship between capitalism, imperialism and international law. This is the 
line that Miéville takes. 
 
As previously noted, for Miéville, the spread of the legal form is tied up with the spread 
of imperialism. In international legal terms, this meant that the universalisation of 
independent sovereignty also marked the universalisation of imperialism. At first sight, 
colonial expansion, whereby capitalism universalised through positing areas as non-
sovereign, might seem to contradict this. However, Miéville insists that even in this 
period, such a dynamic was at play. As previously noted, the initial mercantilist 
expansion of capitalism was marked by a ‘structured silence’ about colonialism. Yet as 
time progressed and exploitation intensified, there was also a trend towards 
juridification. The formalisation of international legal relations with the colonies after 
the Berlin Conference meant that those colonial territories were now either sovereign 
states in their own right, or ‘owned’ by a sovereign European state. There was a move 
from this ‘structured silence’ to one in which all territory had to be defined with 
reference to sovereignty. Moreover, non-European powers that wanted to participate in 
the international system adopted sovereignty as a form of political organisation.
1033
 This 
was continued in the Mandate System, which was envisaged as a system through which 
formerly colonial territory would be able to acquire sovereignty.  
 
In this way self-determination – the transformation of colonial territories into 
independent sovereign states – was part of a historical continuum. Consequently, for 
Miéville, whilst self-determination represented a radical change in the content of 
international law, it was ‘a continuation of the universalising trend in the form’.1034 
Although decolonisation was a result of the real struggles of the national liberation 
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movements, these struggles were articulated through a form that was generated by 
capitalism.  
 
One can bring all of this together. For Marxists, imperialism is a system that is wider 
than formal colonialism. Indeed, formal colonialism may in fact be an inefficient form 
of exploitation once capitalist social relations have spread globally. As a result, the 
acquisition of this independence is compatible with the continuing existence of 
imperialism. Going still further than this, for commodity-form theorists, international 
law is structurally interconnected with capitalist social relations. As such, self-
determination – the acquisition of juridical sovereignty – is not just simply compatible 
with imperialism, but is deeply intertwined with its spread. 
 
3.3. Imperialism as War 
Perhaps more than any other tradition, Marxists have emphasised the connections 
between imperialism and war. Both Bukharin and Lenin went so far as to maintain that 
the competitive pressures generated by imperialism made war an inevitability.
1035
 This 
was reflective a broader claim that war cannot be viewed as a unitary and 
undifferentiated phenomenon. Instead, military violence was seen as rooted in specific 
material contexts, embodying and enacting the imperatives of given modes of 
production. As Bukharin noted, ‘[e]very production structure has an equivalent model 
of state power and hence and an equivalent model of war’.1036 This owed to the fact that 
the actors in a war would be pursuing aims and interests determined by their role in the 
social totality.
1037
 
 
This materialist approach had definite consequences for questions of war. Despite the 
fact that both Bukharin and Lenin elaborated their theories of imperialism in 
anticipation of and opposition to the First World War, they were not pacifists. Lenin, for 
instance, wrote that it would be a ‘philistine’ position to oppose a war without ‘without 
stopping to think what issues are at stake in the war, which classes are waging it, and 
with what political objects’.1038 He thought it necessary to judge a war according ‘the 
policy pursued prior to the war [and] the policy that led and to and brought about the 
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war’.1039 On this basis, it was possible to distinguish between imperialist wars ‘designed 
to safeguard the interests of finance capital’ and wars of national liberation.1040 As he 
starkly put it: ‘if tomorrow, Morocco were to declare war on France, India on England, 
Persia or China on Russia, and so forth, those would be “just,” “defensive” wars, 
irrespective of who attacked first’.1041 
 
Vitally, then, the imperialist character of military violence stems not from ‘aggression’, 
but from the material roots of that violence, and the social relations it embodied, 
stabilised and spread. Evidently, this is not an understanding compatible with the 
contemporary law on the use of force. Despite this, some contemporary Marxists have 
attempted to invoke international law against (US) imperialism.
1042
 Samir Amin, for 
example, praises the UN Charter as ‘founded on a new principle, the illegality of war, 
because imperialistic rivalry and the fascists’ disregard for human rights and 
international law had produced the horrors of World War II’.1043 He continues that the 
US arguments around pre-emptive self-defence ‘directly [eliminate] international law’ 
and that its actions ‘since 1990 are completely illegitimate and thus in principle those 
who are responsible are war criminals’.1044 
 
Of course, Amin is not an international lawyer. However, a number of Marxist scholars 
of international law have – in less polemical fashion – articulated a similar position.1045 
As previously noted, Bowring holds that ‘the prohibition of the use of armed force 
except in self-defence or with the express authorisation of the Security Council’ had 
only come about through the concerted political action of the anti-imperialist, socialist 
and Third Worldist movements.
1046
 On this reading, the developments following the 
Cold War, when these principles were ‘degraded’, marked a resurgence of imperial 
power. Bowring likens this process to a ‘vampire-bride relationship between law and 
power’.1047 In this process, international lawyers willingly allied themselves with 
imperialism in the hope of becoming more effective.  
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The 1991 invasion of Iraq was the beginning of this process. Here imperialist power and 
international law appeared to be set for a mutually beneficial relationship in which law 
was made effective through power, and power was legitimised through law. However, 
for Bowring, even though the 1991 invasion appeared to have the trappings of legality, 
it was dogged with problems.
1048
 Biggest among them was the wide mandate granted by 
Resolution 678. By allying itself with imperialism, the UN had begun to undermine its 
own legitimacy. 
 
This process was deepened by the 1999 Kosovo intervention, which international 
lawyers legitimated through doctrines of humanitarian intervention. Following 9/11, this 
process reached its nadir. This was the moment at which international law was rejected. 
Bowring notes that the US and the UK did not seek Security Council authorisation for 
the invasion of Afghanistan, relying instead on the doctrine of self-defence against 
terrorism, a justification that was partly endorsed by the Security Council in Resolution 
1373. This culminated in the final rejection of international law by the imperialist 
powers in the 2003 invasion of Iraq. For Bowring, the legal arguments around this 
invasion represent a rupture with the anti-imperialist international law that emerged 
from decolonisation. Consequently, for him, ‘the invasion and occupation of Iraq were 
... illegal, and the fact of their illegality makes a difference’ given the anti-imperialist 
content that international law embeds.
1049
 As Rasulov notes, this account is in tension 
with the theory of imperialism to which Bowring holds allegiance.
1050
 Here Bowring’s 
argument seems to be rooted in a theory of ‘empire as hegemony’, in which the 
character of imperialism lies not in a system of exploitation and competitive 
accumulation, but rather the action of the US in ‘defiance’ of the ‘international 
community’. The end of the Cold War is identified as the rupture that gives rise to an 
imperial moment.  
 
However, Rasulov continues, even throughout the Cold War ‘the hegemonic privilege 
of a global superpower to intervene at will to promote its preferred ideological vision 
abroad was ... as an integral ... part of the objective reality of the existing international 
order’.1051 Two elements stand out here. The first is that ‘hegemonic interventionism’ is 
in no sense a new phenomenon. The second is that this interventionism was never 
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articulated outside of the law, but was always articulated in juridical terms.
1052
 The 
same is true of the 2003 invasion of Iraq and the war on terror. Although Bowring 
characterises the US and its allies as rejecting international law, both the Bush and 
Obama administrations expended a great deal of energy legally justifying them. 
  
In the Marxist tradition, ‘unilateralism’ has never been the defining feature of 
imperialism. As a system of exploitation and accumulation, imperialism encompasses 
both unilateral and multilateral moments. Miéville has advanced this point in relation to 
the UN intervention in Haiti. In 2004 there was a coup d’etat against Haiti’s President 
Jean-Bertrand Aristide. In response to a request from the interim President, the Security 
Council passed Resolution 1529, authorising the use of force. Pursuant to the 
Resolution, the United Nations Stabilisation Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) was 
created – a multi-country military force. In this respect, then, Miéville notes that – in 
legal terms – Haiti was ‘effectively the anti-Iraq’.1053  
 
Yet despite the impeccable multilateral credentials of this intervention, it nonetheless 
remained a thoroughly imperialist one. Miéville details the way in which one of the 
actions of MINUSTAH involved, under the rubric of ‘anti-gang’ activity, suppressing 
pro-Aristide militants.
1054
 This is indicative of the wider imperial character of the 
intervention. Following Peter Hallward, Miéville holds that the main motivation for the 
coup was the fact that the Aristide regime had passed a raft of progressive social 
legislation, which had strengthened the position the Haitian working class. In particular, 
the Aristide government had increased the minimum wage in Haiti’s textile sector, a 
part of the economy in which foreign capital was heavily involved. It was not accidental 
that one of the first moves of the post-coup government was to reverse these social 
protections.
1055
 
 
The imperial character of the intervention in Haiti therefore lay in the fact that it aimed 
at securing the conditions for capital accumulation. Through propagating ‘instability’ 
and unleashing ‘murderous violence’ it was able to undermine a possible threat to the 
rate of imperialist exploitation.
1056
 Given this, to think of imperialism in terms of the 
                                                 
1052
 Simpson 2004. 
1053
 Miéville 2008, 72. 
1054
 Ibid., 81. 
1055
 Ibid., 89. 
1056
 Ibid., 90. 
209 
 
 
 
contradiction between multilateralism and unilateralism is to miss the point. Neither of 
them are ‘drivers of state behaviour’ but rather ‘functions of underlying interests’.1057 
Unilateralism and multilateralism are particular imperial tactics deployed in different 
contexts in order to advance the process of the accumulation of capital.
1058
 Indeed, for 
Miéville, far from being ‘anti-imperialist’, multilateralism may in fact be a more 
effective form of imperialism, since its veneer of legality helps to legitimate 
interventions.
1059
 
 
What is vital, then, is that imperialism is not opposed to the law on the use of force, but 
rather is articulated through it. The law on the use of force is one site in which the 
dynamics of imperialist accumulation – in all its dimensions – play out. On this basis, as 
previously noted, Neocleous understands the colonial legal justifications for the use of 
force as rooted in the need to ‘improve’ native land. Where this was blocked by 
resistance, it was cast as an act of war, justifying military violence which would expand 
capitalist social relations.
1060
 Once capitalist social relations have been fully established, 
this continues in a different form, with international law legitimating and guaranteeing 
interventions by advanced capitalist states into peripheral states in order to secure better 
conditions for the accumulation of capital. For example, following the invasion, Article 
25 of the Iraqi Constitution embedded a commitment to private enterprise and the free 
market.
1061
  
 
In this way, Marxists have a similar understanding to TWAIL scholars as to the role of 
the law on the use of force, although they trace its imperial basis to a different source. 
However, because the source of this dynamic is different, so too is the analysis. In 
particular, Marxists have drawn attention to the way in which rivalries between 
different imperialist states have shaped articulations of the law on the use of force.  
 
As Haiti demonstrates, interventions authorised under Chapter VII of the UN Charter 
are clearly able to secure greater international legitimacy than unilateral interventions, 
owing to their legally uncontroversial character. Moreover, authorisation under Chapter 
VII brings with it a number of legal advantages. It does not involve the complicated 
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questions of thresholds that arise under Article 51 and the amount of force to be used is 
that which is necessary to restore peace and international security (as opposed to 
proportionate to an armed attack).
1062
  
  
These advantages raise the question of why other forms of legal argument have been 
pursued at all. Tony Carty has attempted to explain this through tracking the 
transformations in imperialism following the end of the Cold War. For Carty, the Cold 
War was marked by a specific imperial configuration in which there were ‘only two 
(maybe three) sovereign states in the world, i.e. states with the power to declare and 
wage war’.1063 For Carty, the bipolar dynamics of the Cold War meant the US was able 
to present itself as the guardian of the imperialist system as a whole.
1064
 This was 
buttressed by the US’s unrivalled military, political and economic power. In particular, 
the fact that the US had – in the 1970s – managed to impose a global credit system in 
which the dollar was the primary currency granted it a huge influence on other 
states.
1065
 
 
However, this situation was increasingly subject to the contradictions of capital 
accumulation. In the 1980s there was a ‘radical bifurcation of military and financial 
global power’, whereby the US became dependent on the manipulation of the financial 
markets in order to finance its military build-up.
1066
 This tendency became more marked 
as time went on, with the US becoming increasingly financially dependent. The rise of 
finance also meant already unstable economy became more and more crisis prone.
1067
  
 
Hence, the US found itself in a position of ‘decline’ or weakness. At the same time, it 
was confronted by a reinvigorated rivalry with other imperialist powers. This is true 
both in terms of those states with which it is friendly but dependent, such as Germany or 
Japan, but more importantly with states like China and Russia. For Carty, the US is no 
longer a ‘hegemonic power which ... enjoy[s] international legitimacy’ but instead must 
‘rely exclusively on its own political and military strength to force through its will’.1068 
Carty reads the Iraq war and the war on terror in this light. He claims that US 
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policymakers realise the ‘economic pre-eminence [of the US] in the global system is 
very seriously threatened in the medium term’ and so choose to exercise ‘political 
power in a primarily coercive military dimension, in order to force an acknowledgment 
of its supremacy’.1069  
 
Carty argues that the contradictions of imperialism are causing the US to behave 
irrationally. This forces it to discard ‘traditional international law’ in favour of 
unilateral action. For him, therefore, the contradictions of imperialism explain why 
international law ‘is being systemically, or structurally, violated’ by the US.1070 Like 
Bowring, he understands there to be a degree of rupture follow the end of the Cold War. 
Similarly, he understands this largely to be a case of illegality. Crucially, however, this 
rupture is not characterised as a shift from an anti-imperialist international law to an 
imperialist one. Rather, there is a shift in the material configuration of imperialism, 
whereby the dominant hegemonic state is displaced. 
 
It is unclear why Carty characterises US unilateralism as ‘violating’ international law. 
As previously noted, such a position seems to presuppose a positivistic account of 
international law, in which its content is known and transparent. More importantly, on 
this basis it is difficult to explain why US administrations have gone to such lengths to 
legally justify their actions. In dismissing these actions as ‘violating’ international law, 
Carty misses the way in which the particular legal arguments advanced were shaped 
very directly by the issue of rivalry. This is true in the obvious but important sense that 
that the US’s arguments all allow it to circumvent the Security Council. This was 
necessary because in all of these cases, rival states on the Security Council were 
prepared to translate their economic, political and military power into a veto. 
 
Thus, whilst the 1991 invasion of Iraq was carried out when the USSR was in political 
and economic turmoil and had become heavily dependent on Western aid.
1071
 China was 
absent from the vote and Resolution 678 was able to be passed without any veto. As 
time went on, China and Russia gained in relative power and prestige and this translated 
into an increasing willingness to use the veto. Hence the 1999 Kosovo intervention had 
to be justified in terms of ‘humanitarian intervention’ because Russia would veto any 
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Chapter VII authorisation.
1072
 Similarly, although both China and Russia were 
favourable to an intervention in Afghanistan, both were likely to impose quite strict 
conditions upon any deployment of force.
1073
 By the time of the wider war on terror, 
both China and Russia were running up against the interests of the US in various ways.  
 
This background is important for understanding the specific legal arguments used to 
defend these interventions. In the case of both humanitarian intervention and claims of 
pre-emptive self-defence we can observe a similar pattern. The US alleges that there is a 
threat to the international order which the Security Council should deal with, but cannot 
because of the actions of ‘selfish’ or irrational states. In response, the US and its allies 
must act outside of the ‘normal’ channels (although tracking to them as closely as 
possible) to remove the threat.  
 
Crucially, these legal arguments are not available to rival states. It is for this reason that 
in 2008, when confronted with Russia’s claim to be intervening in Georgia for 
humanitarian reasons, President George W. Bush declared that Georgia was a 
‘sovereign nation, and its territorial integrity must be respected’.1074 Thus, in a 
development which complicates Anghie’s story1075 the US did not simply hold that 
‘rogue states’ did not have access to certain legal arguments. Rival states – who are not 
the target for these legal rationales – are also unable to invoke these arguments. In this 
respect, it is interesting to note that alongside the doctrine of rogue states, the 2002 
National Security Strategy also had extensive denunciations of the internal regimes of 
China and Russia. 
 
Thus, for Marxists, the law on the use of force is one of the sites in which the 
contradictions of imperialism play out. In a very real sense, it embodies the drive 
towards the accumulation of capital that is at the heart of imperialism. At the same time, 
however, it mediates the complexities that this throws up, both in terms of resistance to 
imperialism and inter-imperialist rivalry. 
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4. The Point is to Change it 
This chapter has sought to show the way in which a particular understanding of 
imperialism has shaped Marxist engagements with international law. It began by 
examining the classical Marxist understanding of imperialism as being rooted in the 
capitalist compulsion towards endless accumulation. This accumulation must 
necessarily transcend the boundaries of the nation state in order to realise greater profits 
and stave off crises. Advanced capitalist states expand into ‘backward’ social 
formations, transform them, and attempt to guarantee the continued conditions for the 
greater accumulation of capital.  
  
This gives rise to an international division of labour characterised by a core of advanced 
capitalist countries which export capital to the less developed periphery. The ‘super 
profits’ accrued in this division of labour also transform the class structure of the 
advanced countries, with substantial sections of their working classes having a material 
stake in the imperialist system. At the same time, because capitalism involves 
competition between capitalists, imperialism is also characterised by rivalry. In this 
materialist vision, imperialism is understood as a historically specific phenomenon, 
rooted in certain inherent tendencies within capitalism. Formal colonial domination is 
just one form that imperialism may take. 
 
Such an understanding has implications for international law. The classical Marxist 
theorists only touched briefly on international legal issues, but generally claimed that in 
the face of the economic imperatives of imperialism, international law is powerless. By 
contrast, Marxist international legal scholars argue that international law and 
imperialism have a deep interconnection. This interconnection in understood in several 
(sometimes conflicting) ways: as a structural connection at the level of the legal form; 
as an ideological relationship in which international law serves to establish and stabilise 
imperialist social relations; and because international law mediates the (class) conflict 
thrown up by imperialist social relations. At the same time, all insist that international 
law is crucial for the establishment and working of imperialism. If imperialism is a 
system driven by the endless accumulation of capital, and international law has to be 
understood as embedded within imperialism, then one needs to understand international 
legal doctrines with reference to the logic of capital accumulation. It is this process 
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which accounts for the continuity between colonial and post-colonial international law 
and conditions the imperial articulations of contemporary international law.  
 
As with the Third Worldist scholars described in the previous chapter, Marxist 
scholarship is not simply an attempt to neutrally ‘describe’ the world. The early 
theorists of imperialism were revolutionaries, leading parties and movements that were 
actively contesting capitalism. Bukharin and Lenin were leaders of a party that was to 
take state-power and both played roles in the Soviet state and government. One can say 
the same of Pashukanis. By claiming an intimate link between capitalism (and 
imperialism) and law, he was consciously making claims as to what role law could 
serve in a post-capitalist society. The practical importance of this is confirmed by the 
fact that when the Stalin regime turned to a vision of ‘socialist legality’ Pashukanis was 
executed.
1076
  
 
As with TWAIL scholarship, contemporary Marxist theorists of international law 
cannot claim quite this level of practical commitment or effect. Nonetheless, the 
question of what role international law can play in progressive political struggles has 
been a recurrent theme.
1077
 At first glance, Marxist scholars have quite divergent 
‘strategic’ reflections. Probably the closest in approach to TWAIL scholarship is 
Bowring’s account. As previously noted, Bowring views international law as the 
material repository of historical struggles.
1078
 He therefore sees the current imperial 
conjuncture as one in which the revolutionary content of international law has been 
‘degraded’. However, for Bowring, this situation is not inevitable. He believes 
international law and human rights can be ‘re-invested with political – even 
revolutionary – content’ when they are deployed in struggle.1079 Consequently, he 
advocates a strategy of ‘revolutionary conservatism’.1080 This involves defending the 
legal gains of the anti-colonial and socialist movements, in particular ‘[s]tate 
sovereignty, the prohibition of the use of armed force except in self-defence or with the 
express authorisation of the Security Council [and] the rights of peoples to self-
determination’.1081  
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As noted above, one might wish to question this. Security Council resolutions, the right 
to self-determination and ‘state sovereignty’ are all compatible with imperialism as 
understood by Marxists. Moreover, revolutionary movements have very frequently 
sought to go beyond the narrow confines of these principles in their more expansionary 
phases, one might think for instance of India’s invasion of Goa to liberate it from 
Portuguese colonialism.
1082
 What this points to is a larger issue with Bowring’s strategy, 
namely that it presupposes international law has a determinate content and that certain 
aspects of this content will always be anti-imperialist. 
 
This is the starting point for Marks’ reflections. Whilst partially concurring with 
Bowring as to the progressive potential of international law, Marks does not locate this 
in a particular determinate, ‘revolutionary’ content. Rather she argues that it is in its 
indeterminacy that international law might be turned to progressive ends. Marks draws a 
distinction between ‘sceptical’ analysis and ‘critique’ more properly considered.1083 
Scepticism is exemplified by the work of critical scholars such as Martti 
Koskenniemi
1084
 and David Kennedy.
1085
 These scholars, seek to ‘put the system into 
question’ by showing that law is contradictory, contingent and political. Marks endorses 
all of these points. However, she holds that these sceptics present their criticisms of 
international law as a kind of ‘external’ position, simply pointing out its problems.  
 
By contrast, ‘critique’ is concerned with transforming relations of oppression and 
domination. This necessarily involves urging participants to reflect on their own social 
practices. Consequently, it cannot impose external standards on these practices, but 
must locate emancipatory resources within the practices themselves. In the case of 
international law, its indeterminacy means that it can be used to articulate ‘counter-
systemic logics’.1086 In particular, Marks advocates ‘immanent critique’. For her, the 
most effective way to transform the existing order is to examine the principles with 
which that order justifies itself and ask ‘why it is that those principles do not enter more 
on our material circumstances’.1087 In pointing out the contradictions between what the 
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system claims and what it achieves, one can push for fundamental transformations in 
the system. 
 
This position has been challenged by Miéville. He argues that it is necessary to ask why 
– in the face of indeterminacy – some legal arguments ‘stick’ and others do not. As 
previously noted, he argues that between equally valid interpretations it will be ‘force’ 
that resolves legal arguments. In the context of the international system, one without an 
overarching sovereign, Miéville holds that in the vast majority of instances it will be the 
powerful imperialist states who will be able to make their interpretations ‘stick’.1088 For 
Miéville, the best that can be achieved is ‘occasional victories in a constant struggle 
over categories’ which will generally ‘be actualised in the coercive interpretations of the 
very states and other bodies whose interpretations and actions the radical lawyer is 
critiquing’.1089  
 
Although Miéville may be right that these contests of interpretation will be won by 
powerful states, he operates with an overly narrow conception of ‘force’ and fails to 
account for the way in which groups that are not ‘actors’ in the international legal 
system can ‘internally’ influence states and tribunals.1090 However, this is ultimately 
unimportant. What characterises all of the approaches described so far is that they 
concern how international law might be deployed to defeat specific, imperial 
challenges. However, what has only been touched upon is whether international law 
could be turned against imperialism as a whole. 
 
As previously noted, Marks’ position has changed somewhat on this issue. She has 
argued that ‘social misfortunes’ are the product of systemic causes. By consequence, 
meaningful social reform must involve systemic change, and ‘curbing the power and 
curtailing the privilege of those on the “winning” side of current global relations’.1091 
However, in line with her focus on necessity, Marks is doubtful as to whether 
international law is capable of doing this. Although – as ideology – it might be used to 
promote for systemic change, in practice its tendencies towards false contingency limit 
this possibility. In this respect, one might read Marks as arguing that international law 
structurally predisposed towards excluding issues of systemic or structural causation.  
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This is the theme that Miéville ultimately picks up. For him, quite straightforwardly, 
since the international legal form is a product of the generalisation of commodity 
exchange, one can only ‘fundamentally change the dynamics of the [imperialist] 
system’ by eradicating ‘the forms of law’.1092 Ultimately, therefore, any project of 
radical anti-imperialism will have to go beyond international law. 
 
Both Bowring and Marks flag up imperialism’s political and ideological contradictions. 
Since these contradictions are manifested in international law, one can push them in a 
certain direction. Miéville, on the other hand, maintains that the structural 
interconnection between international law and imperialism renders such a project self-
contradictory. Ultimately, what accounts for the divergence between these approaches is 
the level of analysis. Both Bowring and Marks propose that international law might be 
deployed against specific imperial actions, or within given imperial conjunctures, but do 
not suggest how it might challenge imperialism itself. Given that both understand 
imperialism as a system, this is an important qualification, and it is to this issue that 
Miéville gives most attention. What this disjuncture means will be one of the issues that 
the next chapter attempts to think through. 
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CHAPTER 4: TOWARDS STRETCHED MARXISM 
 
1. Theory, History, Politics 
The previous chapters have attempted to show that, as concepts, ‘imperialism’, 
‘colonialism’ and ‘empire’ have had long and complex histories, and that these histories 
have theoretical and political consequences. The chapters have sought to demonstrate 
that these consequences are also of great importance for the understanding of 
international law, and have played a key role in some of the most important examples of 
radical international legal theory and practice. These complexities are neatly captured 
by Amílcar Cabral’s 1966 speech ‘Presuppositions and objectives of national liberation 
in relation to social structure’. In this speech Cabral stated that: 
 
The ideological deficiency, not to say the total lack of ideology, on the part of 
the national liberation movements – which is basically explained by the 
ignorance of the historical reality which they aspire to transform – constitutes 
one of its greatest weaknesses, if not the greatest weakness of our struggle 
against imperialism ... To those who see this view as being theoretical, we would 
recall that every practice gives birth to a theory. If it is true that a revolution can 
fail, even though it be nurtured on perfectly conceived theories, nobody has yet 
successfully practised Revolution without a revolutionary theory.
 1093
 
 
First and foremost, Cabral captures here the political importance of having a theory of 
imperialism. In essence Cabral is paraphrasing Lenin, who famously stated that without 
revolutionary theory there can be no revolutionary movement.
1094
 Only by 
understanding the nature and logic of imperialism, Cabral insisted, could it be contested 
and overcome. Indeed, for him, it was this lack of theory that had held back the national 
liberation movements. A corollary of this was that different theoretical understandings 
of imperialism carried with them different practical and political consequences.  
 
This led Cabral to discuss the difference between colonialism and neo-colonialism. For 
him, to understand colonialism as direct political domination led to ‘a nationalist 
situation’ where ‘the nation gains its independence and theoretically adopts the 
economic structure it finds most attractive’. In that account, decolonisation is ‘simply’ a 
matter of throwing off foreign domination. By contrast, if one understands things in 
terms of ‘neocolonialism’, then the ‘class of workers and its allies’ must ‘fight 
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simultaneously the imperialist bourgeoisie and the native ruling class’ to destroy the 
‘capitalist structure implanted in national soil by imperialism’, which would necessitate 
a ‘socialist solution’.1095 It was only with the ‘Weapon of Theory’ that national 
liberation movements could properly understand the (neo-colonial) situation in which 
they found themselves and win real liberation from imperialism. 
 
Whilst Cabral does not mention international law, except (elsewhere) to note its 
irrelevance,
1096
 Chapters 2 and 3 above have attempted to illustrate how these 
understandings also shed light on important international legal questions. Cabral’s 
account is particularly apt in relation to the first wave of Third Wordlist scholarship 
examined in Chapter 2 (Section 2), whose understandings of the relationship between 
imperialism and international law were conditioned by whether they understood 
colonialism in terms of political domination, or as part of a wider system of 
imperialism. 
 
Cabral’s words also signal the second complexity that the previous chapters have sought 
to trace. Cabral was the leader of the African Party for the Independence of the Guinea 
and Cape Verde (PAIGC), a political organisation whose aim was to secure 
independence for Guinea-Bissau from Portuguese colonialism.
1097
 He delivered the 
speech at the plenary of the First Solidarity Conference of the Peoples of Africa, Asia 
and Latin America (the Tricontinental). This conference, held in 1966 in Havana, was of 
quite a different stripe to that of Bandung. Whereas Bandung had been a broad affair of 
newly decolonised nations, the Tricontinental was representative of the radical trend 
within Third Worldism, and ‘aligned itself with a radical anti-imperialism located 
firmly in the socialist camp’.1098 In the words of assassinated Moroccan socialist leader 
and organiser of the Conference, Mehdi Ben Barka, the Tricontinental aimed to ‘blend 
the two great currents of world revolution: that which was born in 1917 with the 
Russian Revolution, and that which represents the anti-imperialist and national 
liberation movements of today’.1099  
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The conference brought together representatives of radical Third World governments, 
national liberation movements that had not yet achieved state power and even leftist 
movements that opposed their own (Third World) governments.
1100
 In keeping with this 
radical orientation, the conference condemned imperialism, colonialism and neo-
colonialism, declaring its solidarity with the Vietnam struggle against the US and 
denouncing the US’s imperial ambitions.1101 This solidarity with the Vietnamese had 
wider implications, with the participants in the conference calling for an intensification 
of the struggle against imperialism and demanding that the Third World ‘take up 
arms’.1102 It was at this Conference that Che Guevara’s famous ‘Message to the 
Tricontinental’ was read out, in which he looked forward to a future of ‘two, three or 
many Vietnams’ challenging imperialism.1103 
 
Cabral’s speech therefore – both in terms of its content and its context – captures quite 
acutely the complex political entanglements between Marxism, national liberation and 
Third Worldism. As Chapter 1 demonstrated, the Marxist tradition at the core of 
defining and popularising the ‘radical’ concept of imperialism. This concept went on to 
play a central role in the anti-colonial and Third Worldist movements. Of course, there 
was not a simple ‘transmission’ of the Marxist concept of imperialism to the anti-
colonial movement; it was mediated through (radical) concepts of colonialism and neo-
colonialism, concepts which were challenged both from within and without the 
movement.  
 
However, as time went on, not only the political but also the theoretical fortunes of 
Marxism went into steep decline. Equally, the Third World’s radical challenge to the 
international order was roundly defeated. This was the particular context that saw the 
rise of postcolonialism. Even more so than the Third Worldist movement, 
postcolonialism has an ambivalent relationship to the Marxist tradition. Certain 
elements and figures from the Marxist tradition served as an ‘inspiration’ for 
postcolonialism, but postcolonial scholars have tended to see Marxism as embedded 
within a fundamentally Eurocentric problematic. This has affected the way in which 
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postcolonial theorists interpreted and received their own ‘canon’, with their Marxist 
commitments downplayed and problematised. 
 
While these various strands have been dealt with in previous chapters, this chapter aims 
to bring them all together and interrogate them more fully. The aim is to draw out the 
theoretical and political consequences of the Marxist and Third Worldist understandings 
of imperialism, and see what light they can shed on one another. In Section 2, the 
chapter attempts to analyse the political consequences of TWAIL scholarship. 
Developing the argument made in Chapter 2 (Section 5), it traces the way in which 
TWAIL scholarship ultimately produces a faith in international law. Distinguishing 
between the Marxist and post-colonial tendencies in TWAIL, it argues that latter is 
structured by very specific – a contradictory – understandings of imperialism, and it 
traces the consequences of these understandings. Section 3 suggests that the limitations 
of this concept of imperialism can be highlighted by revisiting the historical and 
theoretical relationship between the Marxist and Third Worldist traditions. Through a 
reading of Fanon it proposes that many of the limitations of postcolonial theory can be 
remedied through a materialist account of race, culture and identity-formation. Section 4 
argues that taking these issues seriously also means fundamentally recasting Marxist 
theory.  
 
 
2. Against Culturalism  
2.1. The Politics of Theory 
The full complexities described above are best captured in the attempts of Third 
Worldist jurists to articulate an anti-imperialist legal strategy. This was particularly 
obvious with the case of the first wave of jurists (Chapter 2, Section 2). Here, one could 
see how ideas about the nature of imperialism directly influenced accounts of 
international law’s political potential. Equally, one could see how the it was the specific 
relation of each author to the Marxist tradition which determined in large part of the 
character of these political accounts.  
 
Bedjaoui and Umozurike, adopting a Marxist-inflected theory of imperialism, traced its 
logic to the system of international capitalism, with Eurocentrism and racism an 
intrinsic part of this system. At the same time, imperialism was seen as a wider 
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phenomenon than its embodiment in European colonialism. The consequence of this 
was that international law could not simply be turned towards anti-imperialism by 
‘outlawing’ colonialism and inviting the participation of the non-European world, it 
would need to be radically transformed. 
 
By contrast, jurists such as Sinha and Syatauw operated with a more conservative 
understanding of imperialism and colonialism. In their vision, colonialism was defined 
primarily as the direct juridical domination of subject territories, as embodied within the 
European experience. A logical consequence of this was that colonialism was largely 
understood as a contingent phenomenon. Since colonialism and Eurocentrism were seen 
as contingent phenomena, the problem was not so much that international law had 
enabled colonialism, as that non-European societies had been excluded from the 
creation of international law. Since international law had now been deployed against 
colonialism, and non-European societies could become full members of the 
international legal order; international law was – almost by definition – anti-imperialist. 
 
This division illustrates quite effectively Marks’ earlier cited claim that different 
understandings of imperialism will produce distinct understandings of its relationship 
with international law. However, as was also shown in Chapter 2, the utility of this 
explanation is not immediately apparent with contemporary TWAIL scholarship. In 
their own way, all of these scholars sought to go beyond the failure of the jurists of the 
anti-colonial and Third Worldist movements. A corollary of this was an understanding 
of international law as more deeply intertwined with imperialism. However, despite 
this, a common pattern was observed, with all of the scholars under consideration 
insisting that – despite its pitfalls – international law might be used to further 
progressive political projects.  
 
Thus, despite their different understandings of imperialism, both Marxist scholars and 
those who align more closely with postcolonial theory end up in the same place with 
regards to international law’s political potential. All maintain that it is too important a 
‘shield’ to be abandoned, and that it might be transformed in such a way as to serve 
anti-imperialist ends. Although this is a well-acknowledged pattern within TWAIL 
scholarship, it has not generally not been the subject of much sustained attention. Those 
who do pay attention tend to simply view this as ‘quirk’ in their work, separate from the 
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broader thrust of their analysis.
1104
 Whilst there may be a deeper truth to this insight, it 
fails to account for the tenacity of the ‘faith’ in international law, and for why it has 
recurred amongst a number of different TWAIL scholars.  
 
The most sophisticated attempt to grasp this phenomenon is the analysis carried out by 
Eslava and Pahuja.
1105
 They argue that this pattern can only be grasped through an 
understanding of the relationship between law, justice and universality. In their 
taxonomy, there are three primary ‘attitudes’ evinced by international lawyers towards 
political struggle, each of which is determined by a specific understanding of the 
relationship between law and justice.
1106
 The first position is that of the ‘conservative’. 
The ‘conservative’ wants to protect the current order, and will only change this order 
through mechanisms authorised by the order itself: in this vision, law and justice are 
either seen to coincide or it is believed that the world is best served by suspending 
ethical judgments when dealing with legal questions.
1107
 
 
The second position is that of the ‘reformist’. Here, the ‘gap’ between law and justice is 
seen to be relatively small, with no better alternative system available or viable. 
Consequently, reformists argue that it is sometimes legitimate to break the law in the 
name of some higher justice, but will generally work within the system for change.
1108
 
Finally, there is the ‘revolutionary’. The revolutionary wants to overturn the existing 
order, and only appeals to the law is a ‘strategic’ sense. This is because the 
revolutionary thinks the system is fundamentally unjust and so must be utterly 
transformed.
1109
 
 
Eslava and Pahuja argue that the original wave of Third World jurists were in some 
sense reformists, since they sought utilise the ‘promise’ of international law, calling for 
a ‘revolutionary re-reading of ... [its] history and tenets’.1110 They cast this as a kind of 
‘revolution from within’, whereby international law would be made to live up to its own 
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promise of justice and universality.
1111
 It was this impulse that was embodied in 
initiatives like PSNR and the NIEO. With the failure of these projects, the two obvious 
choices remaining were to become conservatives, and deny the problems of 
international law, or to reject international law altogether and become revolutionaries. 
 
This is analogous to the position that Chapter 2 (Section 3.1.) described, where TWAIL 
scholars sought to go beyond sociological functionalism. However, Eslava and Pahuja 
claim that TWAIL scholars have not, in fact, shifted ‘from reformist to revolutionary 
[positions], not even in disguise’.1112 Instead, they have enacted a ‘secret fourth 
choice’.1113 This position represents a ‘combination of hope and frustration’ which 
involves neither ‘remaining within the reformist page, or by committing fully to the idea 
... [of’] a world without or beyond (international) law’.1114 TWAIL scholars adopt a 
position of ‘resistance’, which involves contesting international law’s problematic 
aspects and pushing constantly for reforms. In so doing, TWAIL scholars embody 
revolutionary politics whilst remaining with a ‘reformist’ frame. 
 
For Pahuja and Eslava, the crucial element in this process is the use of the ‘universal’. 
Focusing on Anghie, they argue that in his account of the ‘dynamic of difference’ a 
particular set of European values are cast as ‘universal’, with non-European societies 
seen as ‘lacking’ because they fail to embody these universal values. However, this 
universalism also represents a source of instability in international law. In a manner 
similar to Marks’ account of immanent critique, Eslava and Pahuja argue that Anghie 
attempts to mobilise international law’s promise of universality, as against its casting of 
particular European values as universal.  
  
In order to avoid being caught up in a new dynamic of difference, this critical 
universalism cannot simply assert a new set of universal values. Instead, the universal 
‘as such’ is asserted. This is a ‘quasi transcendent’ idea which ‘recognises the 
impossibility of genuine universality, but also recognises that the impossibility of 
universality is precisely what makes a fruitful plurality possible’. Such a vision is 
structured by an ‘open ... idea of justice’ which recognises its agonistic and contingent 
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nature.
1115
 Thus, on their reading, TWAIL scholars have articulated a project whereby 
continuous struggle and rebellion within the law opens it up to progressive possibilities, 
through the assertion that international law ought to be universal, without ever giving 
content to this universal. 
 
Although Eslava and Pahuja’s argument is sophisticated, it suffers from some 
limitations. The most apparent problem is how quickly their taxonomy breaks down. 
While the category of the ‘conservative’ is a relatively stable one, the line between 
‘reformist’ and ‘revolutionary’ seems almost entirely porous. For example, the first 
wave of Third World jurists, whilst initially treated as the quintessential reformists, are 
immediately cast in a more complicated position: figures who sought to enact a 
‘revolution from within’.  
 
Of course, in terms of their taxonomy, this makes a certain kind of sense. Reading the 
work of Bedjaoui, for instance, one can hardly suppose that he thought there was only a 
small gap between the existing order and ‘justice’. Equally, it is clear that his version of 
the NIEO can be seen as ‘revolutionary’ since it envisages a rather radical break with 
capitalism and imperialism.
1116
 Yet at the same time, the methods he proposed for this 
clearly are reformist. He advocated remaining within the structures of international law, 
and forcing through an agenda that relied on the power of the newly emerged Third 
World bloc. The fact that Eslava and Pahuja are forced to invent a ‘new’ category 
perhaps suggests that it is not the ‘gap’ between law and justice which best explains 
Bedjaoui’s political attitudes. This can be seen more starkly when we compare Bedjaoui 
with Sinha. It seems clear that Sinha believed that there is a smaller ‘gap’ between law 
and justice than Bedjaoui did. Although he thought of colonialism as being an ‘evil’, he 
ultimately did not see it as a recurring and systemic threat. Yet both are ‘reformists’ in 
the sense of Eslava and Pahuja’s taxonomy.  
 
What then explains this? As Chapter 2 attempted to argue, the difference in the content 
of Bedjaoui’s and Sinha’s politics stemmed from their differing ideas as to the nature of 
imperialism. Yet at the same time, both shared a theoretical commitment to the idea that 
law essentially ‘expressed’ the balance of forces at a given moment, and so might give 
expression to a rising tide of anti-imperialist sentiment. Hence both could advocate 
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reformist measures. On this reading, what is at issue was not how big a ‘gap’ each 
believed existed between law and justice, but rather the analysis of the nature of 
imperialism and its relationship to international law.  
 
In light of the history of the terms ‘reform’ and ‘revolution’ this makes sense. The 
opposition between ‘reform’ and ‘revolution’ is most strongly associated with a series 
of debates that characterised the social democratic, socialist and communist movements 
throughout the twentieth century. This debate took different forms: from the dispute 
between Luxemburg and Bernstein,
1117
 to that between Lenin and Kautsky,
1118
 to 
debates as to the nature of the ‘dictatorship of the proletariat’,1119 to the arguments 
around Allende’s government in Chile1120 and so on.1121 What was at issue in all of 
these debates was whether capitalism could be gradually dismantled without the seizure 
of state power, or whether it would be necessary to have a violent rupture with the 
existing order. 
 
Crucially, these debates were not centred around differences in goals. Although many 
avowed reformists did eventually give up the viability of transcending capitalism, many 
– perhaps even the majority – were committed to its transformation. However, they 
argued that capitalism could best be transformed through winning elections and 
gradually introducing social ownership. By contrast, revolutionaries held that such 
methods were self-defeating, since capitalism would ultimately undermine any reforms 
undertaken within it. Rather than a question of the ethical question of the relationship 
between law and justice, then, the division between ‘reform’ and ‘revolution’ was one 
based on efficacy. That is to say, the question was – given the nature of the social 
system, how is it that we can transcend it and achieve ‘justice’? As such, the crucial 
factor distinguishing ‘reformists’ from ‘revolutionaries’ was their analysis of the nature 
of the system.  
 
This also seems to be what is at issue as regards the Third Worldist jurists. In simple 
terms, Bedjaoui had the goal of a radical rupture with imperialism, seeking to replace it 
with (at a minimum) an interventionist, egalitarian social order. Since he understood 
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imperialism as structured by a systemic economic logic (of capitalism) he did not 
believe that this rupture could not simply be achieved through ending formal 
colonialism, but would have to tackle the neo-colonial economic order. At the same 
time, he understood imperialism as rife with contradictions, with the exploited 
constantly contesting and fighting against the system. Since international law was an 
‘expression’ of these material forces, it could embody the goals of those fighting against 
imperialism. Thus, his goal was a ‘revolutionary’ one. But, since international law could 
express these forces, it was possible to remain within international law. Hence his 
political proscriptions were ‘reformist’. 
 
2.2. You Won’t Know the Difference Between a Cycle and a Revolution 
2.2.1. Universalisms  
It seems, therefore, that we have come full circle. The above argument seems to confirm 
what was put forward in Chapter 2. Yet how can this explain the convergence between 
Marxist and postcolonial theorists within TWAIL scholarship on the question of 
international law’s progressive potential? Once again, Eslava and Pahuja help provide 
an answer. It is telling that in their account, the focus is primarily on Anghie’s work. By 
contrast, Chimni is only mentioned briefly. Essentially, his account is assimilated into 
their broader reading, understanding him as mobilising international law’s potential for 
universalism (‘as such’) against the particularism of the actually-existing international 
order.
1122
 
  
Yet it cannot really be said that Chimni mobilises universalism ‘as such’. His work and 
political approach is very much situated within a definite political and theoretical 
tradition: that of Marxist socialism. For Chimni, the existing order is a determinate one 
– capitalism – with a distinctive logic. ‘Justice’ is understood in relation to this logic: 
one overcomes unjust capitalism by replacing its logic with the democratic control of 
production. Equally, Chimni derives the agency to undertake this task from his analysis 
of capitalism. He argues that those who can transform capitalism are those who are 
oppressed and exploited by capitalist social relations. As capitalist social relations have 
transformed and globalised, so too does the composition of this group change. In 
particular, he argues, the old vision of the working class has given way to a larger group 
of people struggling against forms of capitalist dispossession. This ‘transnational 
                                                 
1122
 Eslava and Pahuja 2011, 118, n.32. 
228 
 
 
 
oppressed class’ includes indigenous and tribal peoples, peasants, the working class and 
various social movements.
1123
 
 
For Chimni, in a manner similar to Bedjaoui, this transnational oppressed class will be 
able to make certain inroads into the international legal order. He understands 
international law as able to embed and express the demands of subaltern classes and 
projects. Since, for him, international law is determinate, this content can then be turned 
against imperialists, providing a context in which oppositional movements can better 
articulate their demands. It is precisely for this reason that Chimni characterised neo-
colonial relations as ‘bourgeois democratic’, since they had genuinely managed to 
embed the results of certain progressive struggles. Thus, Chimni is not mobilising an 
abstract universalism, but rather articulating a concrete project. 
 
Importantly, whilst one can disagree with Chimni, his political commitments flow quite 
directly from his broader analysis of imperialism and its relationship to international 
law. Thinking as he does that international law is a class project, it is feasible – given 
the contradictory nature of imperialist class relations – that some ‘progressive’ content 
might be expressed through it. It is here that we can see a difference between Chimni’s 
account of international law and that of Anghie or Rajagopal. Their accounts disclose 
the ways in which even seemingly progressive invocations of international law serve to 
reinforce imperialism and Eurocentrism. Whereas Chimni argues that the neo-colonial 
period was contradictory because real advances against imperialism were coupled with 
attempts to undermine these advances, Anghie and Rajagopal argue that the supposed 
advances were themselves poisoned chalices.  
 
Both trace this to a wider dynamic, whereby international law has internalised the 
civilising mission, such that it constantly reproduces a division between a ‘civilised’ 
core and an ‘uncivilised’ periphery (or between the developed and the undeveloped). 
This is a pessimistic picture and the pattern described is extensive, seeming to leave 
very little room for a ‘progressive’ international law. Unlike in Chimni, there seems 
nothing in the analysis to warrant the political conclusions they draw. In particular, they 
are unable to answer the question why this particular usage of international law would 
be progressive, where all the others have not been.  
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This seems especially important because the attempt to mobilise universalism ‘as such’ 
seems remarkably similar – in form – to the Third World’s previous attempts to 
challenge imperialism. In the wider ‘fronts’ of the Non-Aligned Movement (such as at 
Bandung) no particular political or economic model was preferred to any the others. 
This was in fact a necessity given the desire for the unity of the Third World, the 
ideological heterogeneity of its participants and the perceived need to avoid taking a 
side in the Cold War. This was one of the reasons why the ‘common programme’ of 
these fronts was the advocacy of non-intervention in internal affairs. In this respect, to 
return to Eslava and Pahuja’s taxonomy, although they claim it was TWAIL which 
enacted a ‘secret fourth choice’, by characterising the original Third World jurists as 
enacting a ‘revolution from within’, they seem to already be granting these jurists a 
similar role. 
  
In Eslava and Pahuja’s telling, the trap of Eurocentrism can be avoided by a change in 
political focus. For them, concomitant to a move to ‘universalism as such’ is a shift in 
attention from the level of grand international politics to the smaller politics of everyday 
resistance to the existing order. They urge our attention to the ways in which 
international law shapes people’s everyday lives, and how people consequently 
negotiate with and subvert international legal norms in order to survive. Eslava and 
Pahuja propose that ‘charting the international as it unfolds in people’s lives’ will allow 
international lawyers to create a ‘map to resist, revolt and strategise against the effects 
of the regulatory proliferation of international law’.1124 This ‘seems to offer a way to 
overcome the (post)colonial biases’ of international law, since the focus is now on its 
subversion and redeployment.
1125
 In this way, will be possible to move beyond binaries 
of optimism and pessimism and instead see that ‘[t]iny revolutions are everywhere, 
every day’.1126 
 
Yet, as above, one is uncertain why exactly ‘everyday’ attempts to ‘subvert’ 
international legal norms will be any more able to escape the trap of the civilising 
mission. The mere act of ‘subversion’ cannot be what is at issue, since all of the (failed) 
attempts by the Third World to use international law and institutions could be framed in 
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those terms. Equally, one is unclear why the ‘local’ or ‘everyday’ character of these 
actions renders them any less vulnerable to cooptation.  
 
Furthermore, as Owen Taylor has noted, one wonders what is at stake in dubbing these 
acts of resistance ‘revolutions’.1127 Revolution generally denotes forms of action which 
manage to fundamentally overturn the existing order. In proposing that any act of 
subversion is a ‘tiny revolution’ one ends up not ‘focusing on the consequences ... [of 
subversion] or the ways in which those acts form part of a complex whole that 
incorporates them’.1128 What Taylor alludes to is the fact that, insofar as this investment 
in subversion seems divorced from any theoretical or political moorings, there is no 
sense in which this practice might be directed to overcome the existing order, nor is 
there a sense of which social actors might be best placed to carry it out. Instead, the 
practices of certain subaltern groups are essentially selected, with the job of politics to 
valorise these practices, without stating how they might effectively undermine the 
existing order. In this way, politics is less a guide to action than a form of moralism.  
 
2.2.2. Analysis and Politics 
One can now see that there is a fundamental distinction between the different types of 
‘embrace’ of international law in TWAIL scholarship. In Chimni, and other Marxist 
inflected approaches, the embrace of international law is directly connected to their 
broader theoretical analysis. One can of course disagree with the analysis itself, but 
there are grounds for arguing that international law might have some useful potential. In 
Anghie and Rajagopal, by contrast, there is a combination of an incredibly pessimistic 
analysis of the international legal order, followed by an unexpected embrace of 
international law. This embrace is unable to specify under what conditions subversive 
practice can work, or how such practice might be able to overcome imperialism.  
 
Once again, therefore, it cannot simply be a ‘gap’ between justice and the law which 
explains one’s political attitude towards international law. But what does? The kind of 
account described here is not without precedent. Bhabha, for instance, insists that it is 
not possible to rigidly separate ‘theory’ and ‘politics’.1129 For him, to do so is to assume 
an elitist conception, whereby theory is simply ‘insulated from the historical exigencies 
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and tragedies of the wretched of the earth’.1130 Instead, it is necessary that ‘theory’ and 
‘politics’ are understood as ‘forms of discourse’ existing ‘side by side’ with their 
difference lying in their ‘operational qualities’.1131 This means that theory and politics 
exist in a constant state of ‘negotiation’, with neither taking primacy. Importantly, since 
theory could not be taken to be all encompassing in relation to politics, the ‘corollary is 
that there is no first or final act of revolutionary social ... transformation’.1132 
 
What are important here are the political conclusions that Bhabha draws from this 
position. For him, the role of theory is to reflect on the practices of ‘those who have 
suffered the sentence of history – subjugation, domination, diaspora, displacement’ and 
‘learn our most enduring lessons for living and thinking’.1133 In a move analogous to 
that taken by Eslava and Pahuja, Bhabha claims that this allows theory to move beyond 
the opposition between ‘the nihilism of despair or the Utopia of progress’ and look to 
the ‘reality of survival and negotiation’.1134 Bhabha sees examples of these kinds of 
politics in various acts of resistance to the colonial authorities, which embodied the 
characteristics of indeterminacy and undecidability.
1135
 
 
Very directly in Bhabha, then, we see the combination of utter pessimism about the 
ability to overcome domination, with a re-valorisation of the everyday practices which 
take place within this domination. These positions have been subject to a number of 
criticisms, particularly from the Marxist tradition.
1136
 For instance, Neil Lazarus and 
Rashmi Varma accuse him of ‘transmut[ing] ... the political project of anticolonial 
struggle and decolonisation into an ethical one’.1137 In this ethical project ‘emphasis [is] 
placed upon the effects of globalisation ... rather than on its determinants or 
structures’.1138  
 
This argument is not simply confined to Bhabha’s work. Although his is the clearest and 
most explicit statement to this effect, this oscillation between despair and hope (with the 
claim to have displaced this oscillation) has marked a great deal of postcolonial 
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scholarship. Accordingly, if we combine this insight with the prior accounts of how 
concepts of imperialism have shaped understandings of international law, we might 
argue that there is something distinctive about how postcolonial theory, and work 
influenced by it, understands imperialism, and that this understanding produces a 
distinct theory of international law.  
 
2.3. Between Continuity and Rupture 
2.3.1. Clash of the Concepts 
In her A Critique of Post-Colonial Reason Gayatri Spivak argued that: 
 
Postcolonial studies, unwittingly commemorating a lost object, can become an 
alibi unless it is placed within a general frame. Colonial Discourse studies, when 
they concentrate only on the representation of the colonized or the matter of the 
colonies, can sometimes serve the production of current neocolonial knowledge 
by placing colonialism/imperialism securely in the past, and/or by suggesting a 
continuous line from that past to our present.
1139
 
 
Here Spivak draws our attention to two aspects of postcolonial scholarship. On the one 
hand, postcolonial theorists understand European domination as rooted in and driven by 
the psychological and culture imperative of a European ‘self’ to consolidate itself in a 
non-European ‘other’, which itself is part of a broader psychological and cultural 
process of ‘othering’. On this reading, as Spivak notes, there is a tendency towards 
drawing ‘a continuous line’ between the past and the present. On the other hand, the 
focus of much postcolonial scholarship is on the period of formal European colonialism, 
taking this as the defining instance of imperialism. In this instance colonialism and 
imperialism are placed ‘securely in the past’. 
 
One can observe how this plays out in Said’s work. As noted in Chapter 1, Moore-
Gilbert suggested that Said’s work was structured by a tension between a ‘latent 
Orientalism’, which was an unchanging psychic structure, and a ‘manifest Orientalism’ 
which was embodied in specific imperial practices towards the ‘Orient’. On the one 
hand, Said argued imperial processes are driven by the ‘aspiration’ of all cultures to 
‘sovereignty, to sway, and to dominance’.1140 This ‘aspiration’ was rooted in a 
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transhistorical psychic process in which a ‘self’ needed to be consolidated against an 
‘other’, and accordingly intervening and transforming that other.1141 
 
At the same time, Said also articulated a more bounded, conservative account of 
imperialism, which matched the particular historical periods upon which he chose to 
focus.
1142
 In this vision, imperialism was specifically concerned with the control and 
rule of territory, with imperialism as concerned with ‘thinking about, settling on, 
controlling land that you do not possess, that is distant, that is lived on and owned by 
others’.1143 For him, imperialism was ‘the practice, the theory, and the attitudes of a 
dominating metropolitan centre, ruling a distant territory’.1144 Said emphasised the 
direct control of territory by a ruling centre, an account of imperialism in tune with the 
formal colonialism of the European empires. Here, imperialism is delimited by a kind of 
historical ‘fiat’, whereby the European experience, and the concept associated with it, 
are asserted as the paradigm through which one understands imperialism. In such an 
account, the contemporary experience of ‘imperialism’ is in fact a historical legacy of 
formal European colonialism.
1145
  
 
Importantly, these different positions are not just different ‘styles’ of argument. Looking 
back to Chapter 1, we can see that in fact such positions correspond with different 
concepts of imperialism. These concepts bring with them very different political and 
theoretical assumptions. Insofar as imperialism is seen to embody a transhistorical 
process of ‘othering’, it very closely resembles the realist or political account of 
imperialism as embodied in the work of Morgenthau or Cohen, which rooted 
imperialism in certain natural human drives (Chapter 1, Section 4.3). By contrast, 
insofar as imperialism is identified primarily with a given historical period, then the 
account of imperialism moves much closer to the conservative vision of colonialism 
outlined in Chapter 1 (Section 5.3.) and to the account of imperialism as ‘Empire-ism’, 
in which imperialism is simply the ‘active’ part of controlling and holding territorial 
empires (Chapter 1, Section 4.2.). 
 
                                                 
1141
 Ahmad 2008, 178. 
1142
 Larsen 2001, 44. 
1143
 Said 1994, 5. 
1144
 Said 1994, p.8.  
1145
 Said 1994, 44–45, 341. 
234 
 
 
 
This is important. Insofar as one can locate these different approaches to imperialism in 
intellectual traditions with distinct ways of understanding imperialism, one cannot 
simply look at them as mutually complementary ways of examining the same 
phenomenon. As different concepts of imperialism, they operate with radically opposed 
notions of its historical specificity, and, accordingly, the particular forces that drive it. 
Each of these concepts also carries with it a series of limitations. 
 
2.3.2. Transhistoricism  
As Moore-Gilbert has noted, the transhistorical concept of imperialism suggests that 
Eurocentrism ‘was always, somehow, simply there’. It fails to account for how and why 
Eurocentrism arose, why it takes certain forms and how these forms were able ‘to 
become, and remain, dominant’.1146 Crucially, it needs to explain why Europe was the 
particular ‘self’ consolidated through an ‘other’.1147 More broadly, within this dynamic, 
there is little room for the various ways in which the civilising mission was negotiated 
and transformed. On a very basic level we might ask why ‘Eurocentrism’ has 
sometimes been manifested in terms of formal colonial claims, and at other times has 
been couched as neo-colonialism. In this way, it is unable to ‘produce its own account 
of change, discontinuity, differential periods’, bringing with it ‘a danger of distinctive 
moments being homogenized’.1148 
 
Arguably, this points to a more general issue of the structuralism of the transhistorical 
position.
1149
 Since imperialism is seen as rooted in certain transhistorical cultural and 
psychic dynamics, there is very little room for agency. It is always difficult to account 
for changes within a basic, overarching structure, without some theory of what agents 
operate within it, and how their actions are mediated through the structure. Indeed, as 
Lazarus has pointed out, in the absence of an account of agency, the categories of 
‘West’ or ‘Europe’ are frequently treated as if they are agents in themselves, despite the 
fact that they are supposed to be unstable products of the process of ‘othering’.1150 
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As Lazarus and Varma argue, the net result of such a transhistorical understanding of 
imperialism is that Eurocentrism is addressed in terms of ‘an episteme or intellectual 
atmosphere’. In such a vision, Eurocentrism serves as ‘an untranscendable horizon 
governing thought – its forms, contents, modalities, and presuppositions so deeply and 
insidiously layered and patterned that they cannot be circumvented, only 
deconstructed’.1151 This means that it is not vulnerable to political critique or 
transformation.  
 
This is not new. In Black Skin White Masks Fanon mounted a similar criticism against 
Octave Mannoni. Mannoni had rooted the problems of colonised people in a 
psychologically deep inferiority complex. Fanon insisted that such a position was 
problematic because it led to political passivity: 
 
[I]f a society makes difficulties for him because of his color, if in his dreams I 
establish the expression of an unconscious desire to change color, my objective 
will not be that of dissuading him from it by advising him to “keep his place”; 
on the contrary, my objective once he motivations have been brought into 
consciousness, will be to put him in a position to choose action (or passivity) 
with respect to the real sources of the conflict – that is towards social 
structures.
1152
 
 
For Fanon, by locating colonial psychology in inaccessible, naturalised and 
transhistorical processes, it was rendered invulnerable to critique or transformation. 
Fanon argued that such a position ultimately provided only two options – ‘turn white or 
disappear’.1153 Fanon’s phrasing is dramatic, and it would be unfair to ascribe such a 
position to those who seek to contest imperialism in the name of the Third World. 
However, there is a clear similarity. Insofar as imperialism is seen as an inevitable and 
transhistorical fact, rooted in certain basic psychological drives, it cannot be overcome. 
Either one can ‘turn white’ and attempt to become one of the beneficiaries of this 
system, or one can ‘disappear’ and negotiate one’s existence from within the system.  
 
2.3.3. Historical Fiat 
Things are different when imperialism is understood by reference to historical fiat. 
Here, imperialism is seen as related to a given historical phenomenon, that of European 
colonial domination, and so takes on its salient characteristic, namely the rule or control 
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of territory. In this aspect of the account, insofar as we continue to live with 
imperialism, it is because European rule has bequeathed consequences to the rest of the 
world.  
 
The results of this understanding are almost the direct inversion of a transhistorical 
understanding. To begin with, then, such an account is unable to understand the unity of 
different moments of the imperial experience. As noted in Chapter 1 (Section 3), it fails 
to capture how the European experience itself often rested on very different forms of 
control and rule. It is also difficult to account for the experience of the US and its 
relationship to Latin America, which was contemporaneous with some of the periods of 
European colonial domination, but did not adopt that form. Since this is the case, such a 
position also has a hard time explaining post-colonial forms of exploitation and 
domination. If what is at issue is merely the legacy of colonialism, then it cannot 
explain the uniformity of the post-colonial experience, as well as its continuity with 
other aspects of imperial rule.  
 
Ultimately, this stems from the fact that an account based on historical fiat is unable to 
locate the phenomenon of imperialism within a wider explanatory framework. 
Imperialism is presented as a very specific phenomenon, unrelated to broader processes 
and historically unique. Unlike the ‘unreconstructed structuralism’ of the transhistorical 
account, the explanation is much more agent-driven. Explanations for European 
expansion, and its defeat and transformation can only be sought in the contingent 
actions of different actors.
1154
 Crucially, the actions of these actors cannot be set within 
a broader historical framework, since this would involve making wider claims about 
those processes which drive imperialism.  
 
Fanon also attacked this kind of position in Black Skin, White Masks. Addressing the 
politics of a theory based primarily on description, he noted that ‘[i]n principle ... the 
decision to describe seems naturally to imply a critical approach’, since in highlighting 
the phenomena of oppression and exploitation, one would call into question these 
relations and seek to combat them. This was not enough. For Fanon, the ‘real task’ was 
not simply to catalogue or describe a series of problems, but instead ‘disclose their 
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mechanics’ and ‘find their meaning’.1155 If colonialism was simply a catalogue or 
collection of abuses, it would not be possible to attack colonialism itself. One would be 
limited to engaging with individual abuses. Only in situating the facts within the logic 
of a broader system would it be possible to understand and therefore overthrow them. 
 
2.3.4. False Necessity and False Contingency 
The almost perfectly reflective nature of these two opposed concepts of imperialism 
tells us something important about their function in relation to one another. Because 
each concept points in an entirely different direction to the other it also fills a lack. In 
adopting a transhistorical account of imperialism, one is left with a number of questions 
as regards its specificity. There are questions of how it began, how it can change forms 
and whether it might be ended. It is therefore necessary to turn to the concept of 
imperialism as historical fiat, which is able to answer these questions through a 
contingent and agent-based account of imperialism. Changes can be explained by virtue 
of the actions of certain agents, and the specificity of imperialism delimited by reference 
to a given historical period.  
 
Similarly, the account by reference to historical fiat raises questions about generality: 
why does imperialism occur, how can one account for its commonalities, etc.? Here a 
transhistorical account is able to fill in the blanks. A general tendency towards 
expansion serves as the background explanatory mechanism that unifies distinct 
historical periods and accounts for the recurrence of international expansionism 
throughout history. 
 
On this reading, rather than an accidental juxtaposition of two opposed concepts, each 
is a necessary function of the other. If one adopts one position, it is also necessary to 
adopt the other. This enables us to discern something of an explanation for the 
recurrence of these two concepts of imperialism. As noted in Chapter 1 (Section 5.5.), 
postcolonialism was articulated in a very particular set of circumstances. Writing in the 
shadow of the failure of the Third Worldist movement, these theorists sought to explain 
why this failure was so systematic and why the national-liberation movements had 
collapsed into authoritarian caricatures of ‘liberation’ upon taking power.  
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This was rooted in an intuition that the Third World’s attempt to deal with Europe on its 
own terms – using ‘European’ political forms and the language of development, 
modernity and progress – was doomed to failure because it failed to recognise the deep 
connection between these forms and Eurocentrism. In order to emphasise this deep-
rootedness, postcolonial theorists turned away from colonialism and imperialism’s 
contingent political aspects, and sought to focus on their deep-rooted cultural and 
psychological dimensions. In so doing, they insisted, one could see that the world order 
was not a neutral space to which the Third World could accede and then transform. 
Instead, it was structured around transhistorical processes of ‘othering’ – manifested 
concretely through Eurocentrism. These cultural and psychological processes went so 
deep that they rendered European institutional forms an inherently hostile terrain. 
 
In a real sense, postcolonialism was a genuine attempt to address the seemingly 
intractable persistence of imperial and colonial relations following decolonisation. 
Postcolonial theorists accounted for this persistence by understanding psychic and 
cultural forms as the driving force of a universal, transhistorical process of imperialism. 
Yet immediately, such a position ran into the problems outlined above, both political 
and theoretical, and so had to be supplemented by a more bounded account. This 
account rooted colonialism and imperialism in the specificity of the European 
experience and the concepts derived from it.  
 
Read in this light, Fanon’s criticisms become especially interesting. If one was to 
translate his critique into a more contemporary idiom, we might state that he criticises 
the transhistorical account for embodying ‘false necessity’, and the account by historical 
fiat for embodying ‘false contingency’. False necessity was a concept first articulated by 
Roberto Unger. It refers to the process whereby ‘we surrender to the social world, and 
then begin to mistake present society for possible humanity, giving in to the ideas and 
attitudes that make the established order seem natural, necessary or authoritative’.1156 
As Marks puts it: 
 
The basic idea of false necessity ... is that things do not have to be as they are. 
Actuality is not destiny, and we need to search out and expose the various forms 
of thought which obscure that fact and lend an aura of solidity and self-evidence 
to what must instead be revealed as precarious and contingent.
1157
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In rooting imperialism in a transhistorical process, one is also naturalising it as a 
condition which cannot be challenged. By contrast, Unger insisted that we ought to 
understand the world as structured by incompleteness, conflict and choice – in other 
words as contingent and changeable.
1158
 
 
Susan Marks departs from Unger’s argument, holding that alongside false necessity, one 
can also observe the phenomenon of false contingency. As noted in Chapter 3 (Section 
2.3), Marks maintains that, whilst Unger is correct that ‘current arrangements can 
indeed be changed’, it is also true that this ‘change unfolds within a context that 
includes systematic constraints and pressures’.1159 In this sense, although Unger is right 
to insist that the status quo is contingent – i.e. could be changed – it would be incorrect 
to say that this contingency means things are ‘random, accidental, or arbitrary’.1160 
Drawing on elements of the Marxist tradition, Marks argues that we can understand 
social processes as being driven by a logic, without necessarily reducing these processes 
to that logic.
1161
 In this way, we can speak of a determination of social processes, 
without falling foul of determinism.  
 
Similarly to Fanon, Marks insists that it is only through disclosing the ‘logics of a 
system which must also be brought within analytical frame’ that we are able to 
effectively act in order to change the world.
1162
 For Marks any genuinely ‘anti-
necessitarian’ critique – i.e. one which seeks to change the world – will also have to be 
one rooted in a critique of false contingency. Here Marks is suggestive. If a 
thoroughgoing critique of ‘false necessity’ also requires the critique of ‘false 
contingency’, then the converse is also true. The presence of false necessity in an 
argument will frequently also signal the presence of false contingency. 
 
2.4. An Anti-Imperialist International Law? 
2.4.1. Presence or legacy? 
The above dynamic is key in understanding the politics of those TWAIL scholars 
influenced by postcolonial theory. Whilst, as will be explained below, one cannot 
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simply say that these scholars have ‘internalised’ the limitations of postcolonial theory, 
an analogy can certainly be drawn. It is straightforwardly the case that one can observe 
a similar duality in terms of accounts of imperialism. All of these authors claim that 
international law is driven by a transhistorical, cultural process of imperialism, as 
demonstrated in Chapter 2 (Section 3.2. – 3.3.). This is most evident in Anghie’s 
description of the ‘dynamic of difference’ whereby international law consolidated its 
(and Europe’s) identity through constantly creating a ‘gap’ between the civilised and 
uncivilised and then attempting to bridge this gap.
1163
 Similarly, Rajagopal traces the 
root of international law’s relation to imperialism to a dynamic whereby international 
law continuously invoked the ‘Third World’ in order to consolidate its own identity.1164 
In Rajagopal’s particular understanding, this is represented through the discourse of 
development which is motivated by an ‘essential belief in the emancipatory of ideas of 
western modernity and progress’.1165 
 
As with postcolonial scholars, these processes appear to be transhistorical. Anghie, for 
example, muses that imperialism might well be rooted in ‘inequalities in power: the 
strong dictate and the weak must comply’, inequalities in power have – of course – been 
around since time immemorial.
1166
 It is perhaps for this reason that Anghie opines that 
the ‘experience of being both colonizer and colonized ... is a common one’, with Third 
World states too being ‘imperial in their ambitions and practices’, and with the division 
between ‘civilised’ and ‘barbarian’ ‘central to many of the major non-European 
civilizations’.1167 Similarly, Rajagopal’s account of ‘development’ is rooted in both a 
‘Saidian’ account of ‘othering’ and a broader historical ‘civilising’ sweep, located back 
to at least 1200AD.
1168
 
 
At the same time, all of these scholars also place a great deal of explanatory emphasis 
on European colonialism. Both Anghie and Rajagopal argue that it is a certain 
‘encounter’ between international law and colonialism that ‘encodes’ the international 
legal discipline with the ‘the discriminatory features of colonial difference’.1169 In 
Anghie’s case, this is very much the particular colonial encounter of the 19th century, 
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with ‘[c]olonizer and colonized’ forming the ‘basic dichotomy that has structured the 
“civilizing mission”’.1170 For Rajagopal, the PMC served a similar role, embedding a 
‘pragmatic’ idea of interventionism with international legal structures (Chapter 2, 
Section 3.3.). Vitally, each of these moments is connected both to the historically 
specific European colonial experience and to those particular moments that involved the 
formal assertion of European political control. 
 
On this basis, the considerations described in the previous section also apply: these are 
essentially opposed concepts of imperialism. Crucially though, these considerations are 
not just political and historical but also – following Marks – legal. To put it simply, if 
every account of imperialism brings with it a particular understanding of its relationship 
to international law, then holding to two opposed accounts will have a distinctive legal 
effect. 
 
Although Marks does not mention a ‘transhistorical’ concept of imperialism, one can 
see what kind of international legal consequences it would have. Inasmuch as 
imperialism is understood as being driven by a process with no determinate starting 
point and – seemingly – no end, it must be inextricably and inevitably bound up with 
international law. International law is unable to transcend imperialism because nothing 
can. This provides grounds for a pessimistic reading of international law, in which it 
can only serve to reproduce the civilising mission. 
 
By contrast, when imperialism is understood as a given ‘historical moment’ – closely 
associated with the European colonial experience – things are different. This account 
closely resembles Marks’ concept of ‘empire as colonialism’. It will be recalled that in 
Marks’ telling of this account, international law ended empire, since it was central to the 
dismantling of formal colonialism. As such, international law is anti-imperialist. It 
would be fatuous to allege that TWAIL scholarship – with its complex analysis of the 
relationship between international law and decolonisation – could subscribe to such a 
point. However, there is an ambiguity. 
 
The corollary of understanding imperialism as embodied in formal European 
colonialism is that international law acquired its imperial character through an 
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encounter with colonialism. Thus, as Anghie puts it, what is at issue is the ‘constitutive 
presence of colonialism’1171 which ‘shaped the very foundations of international 
law’.1172 In such a vision, international law is not co-extensive with an actually-existing 
imperialism. Rather, the historical encounter between international law and colonialism 
fundamentally shaped international legal categories, which now exist as a legacy of this 
encounter. Thus, in understanding imperialism as confined to a given historical period, 
one further understands that its relationship to international law can only be contingent, 
as a result of a chance historical encounter. 
 
It is on this basis that towards the end of Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of 
International Law Anghie writes that it was not his intention to ‘be deterministic, to 
relentlessly demonstrate that colonialism has always been reproduced by international 
law ... and that this will therefore inevitably continue to be the case’.1173 Rather, he 
viewed his project ‘as expressing certain historically based concerns which, if 
recognized, can surely be remedied’.1174  
 
One can see how this plays out in the discussions around decolonisation (discussed in 
Chapter 2, Section 4.1.). Anghie, for example, argues that the limitations of 
decolonisation result from the fact that mainstream international lawyers continued 
relied on arguments that had been articulated in the period of high colonialism. As such, 
international law was dependent on ‘those relationships of power and inequality that 
had been created by [the] colonial past’.1175 Similarly, in Mutua’s account of 
decolonisation, the issue was that international law sanctified the unfair division of land 
brought about by (historical) colonialism.
1176
 In these accounts, international law is seen 
as ending imperialism, but at the same time internalising its consequences.  
 
Recalling the discussion of the ‘Bush Doctrine’ and ‘war on terror’ in Chapter 2, 
Section 4.3 also illustrates the tenacity of this approach. It was noted that many TWAIL 
scholars saw that these doctrines as a fundamental break with the previous international 
law on the use of force. Whilst the section initially supposed that this might be a 
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‘political’ manoeuvre to contest these wars, it also fits with the general pattern described 
above. Essentially, these legal doctrines are treated as distinctly imperial because they 
draw on arguments that were articulated in the period of classical colonialism. Here, 
then, the imperial character of international law lies in the US invoking the legacy of an 
older international legal order in contemporary conditions.
1177
 It is on this basis that 
Anghie can talk of a ‘recent revival of imperial relations’.1178 
 
It seems, then, that we can observe a similar pattern in TWAIL scholarship as we do 
with postcolonial theory. This is not simply because of an explicit or implicit reliance 
by TWAIL scholarship on postcolonial theory. Rather it is because TWAIL’s 
relationship with the Third Worldist jurists is analogous to that of the relationship 
between postcolonial theory and Third Worldism. As has been previously noted, one of 
the driving forces behind TWAIL scholarship has been the attempt to understand why it 
was that the Third World’s legal reform projects failed so repeatedly and systematically. 
At the heart of these reform projects was a sociological functionalist theory in which 
law was seen to be a ‘neutral’ vessel that would reflect any given balance of forces. On 
this basis, it was argued that the numerical strength of the Third World states would be 
reflected in a new international legal order. Yet this sociological functionalism proved 
to be disastrously wrong. Each international legal victory seemed to reinforce and re-
embed imperialism.  
 
Just as the postcolonial theorists attempted to go beyond Third Worldism, postcolonial 
TWAIL scholars – in their attempt to understand this pattern – have sought to go 
beyond sociological functionalism. In an analogous move, this involved pointing out the 
enduring relationship between imperialism and international law, by drawing attention 
to imperialism’s psychic, cultural and racial dimensions. As with the postcolonial 
theorists, this understandable desire to highlight the tenacious and deep roots of 
imperialism led to the articulation of a transhistorical vision, in which those dimensions 
are seen as driving imperialism. This immediately ran into all of the problems that such 
a vision brings: it cannot explain when imperialism started, its changing forms, whether 
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it could be transcended etc. This is why it had to be accompanied by account of the 
historical ‘encounter’ between imperialism and international law.  
 
2.4.2. Strategy and/or tactics? Structure and/or agency? 
What is crucial, then. is that the two concepts of imperialism bring with them two 
opposed ideas of its relationship to international law. The transhistorical concept of 
imperialism is responsible for the pessimism as regards international law’s relationship 
to imperialism. It suggests that since imperialism cannot be transcended, international 
law will always reproduce it. Yet the concept of the historical fiat suggests that 
international law’s complicity with imperialism is the result of a specific encounter that 
shaped its foundations. On this reading, international law incorporates the legacy of the 
imperialism. Because this legacy is a contingent one, it is possible to throw it off and 
articulate a new, ‘non-imperialist’ international law. 
 
International law’s relationship with imperialism, therefore, is both untranscendable 
horizon and contingent legacy. Straightforwardly, this helps explain the disjuncture 
between analysis and politics in TWAIL scholarship. The transhistorical account 
informs the overall analytical account, producing a pessimistic vision in which 
international law constantly reproduces Eurocentrism and European domination. Yet 
because this relationship is also treated as the result of a contingent historical 
‘encounter’, it could simply be ended. It is this concept that gives rise to the idea that 
international law could be anti-imperialist.  
 
Although this provides the bare bones of an explanation, one can go further than this. In 
any analysis of (radical) social change, there are two key, and distinctly inter-related 
oppositions. These oppositions are: structure and agency and strategy and tactics. The 
distinction between structure and agency is a familiar one to any social scientist. 
‘Structures’ are those institutions and relationships of relative permanence in which 
agents conduct their lives. Agents are those individuals and groups who act within these 
structures. In the context of social change, the relationship between structure and agency 
always throws up the questions of: to what degree agents are free or able to change or 
challenge a given structure; to what degree the behaviour of agents is responsible for 
structural changes; and what motivates agents to challenge of change structures. A 
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corollary of these questions is the question of which agents tend to challenge or defend a 
given structure, and which agents are best placed to do so. As Taylor puts it: 
 
[T]he modern concept of revolution took shape as part of a shift in the 
understanding and use of history as part of the development of modernism. 
Among the epistemological consequences of this changing concept was a 
conceptual separation between the ‘structures’ that define social life, and the 
‘agency’ of humanity to conduct its own activities within. The ‘structure’ could 
contain conditions conducive to revolutionary change, and within that structure, 
social groups would have the agency to participate in such a process.
1179
 
 
The contrast between strategy and tactics is perhaps less familiar. Schematically, one 
can say that strategy is concerned with achieving social change to relatively permanent 
structures, institutions or social relations. This usually – barring revolutionary situations 
– means that strategy concerns one’s long term actions and goals. By contrast, tactics 
are concerned with navigating specific conjunctural moments. Whereas strategy 
concerns social change in the grand sense of transforming social structures, tactics 
concerns the negotiation of moments in and effects of these structures.
1180
  
 
Whilst these oppositions might seem rather abstract, their importance can be seen by 
examining Cabral’s account, as detailed at the beginning of this chapter. The structure 
which Cabral sought to contest is that of imperialism, which took the form of neo-
colonialism. For Cabral, one could only understand agency in relationship to this 
structure. He saw the contending agents in neo-colonialism as the working class and its 
allies on the one side and the imperialist bourgeoisie and the native ruling class on the 
other.
1181
  
 
Fairly straightforwardly, these are the principal agents within the structure of neo-
colonialism because of their role in imperialist capital accumulation. On the one hand, 
there are the exploiters and those who benefit from the system – the imperialist 
bourgeoisie and the native ruling class. These agents, since their interests are embodied 
in imperialism, will seek to preserve and protect it. On the other hand, there are the 
exploited and those who are the victims of the system – the working class and its allies. 
These actors’ interests ultimately lie against the system and so – in the right conditions 
– they will fight against it. Importantly, we can go further than this: for Cabral, the 
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working class was not important simply because it was exploited. It was also the case 
that they occupied a vital role within its reproduction. Because it is their exploitation 
which is the motive core of the structure, their action is best placed to overthrow it.  
 
Cabral’s particular diagnosis of the structure he is fighting also framed his 
understanding of strategy. Since he understood neo-colonialism as situated within a 
wider structure of capitalist imperialism, the strategic goal had to be the overthrow of 
capitalism and the establishment of ‘a socialist solution’.1182 This strategic goal had to 
shape the particular tactical activities pursued in negotiating and contesting 
imperialism.
1183
  
 
Simply put, from Cabral’s account of the imperialist structure he is able to account for 
what agents act within it. This analysis of structure also furnishes a strategic goal: the 
overthrow of capitalist imperialism. Cabral’s mode of operation has two distinct 
consequences. The first is that his political account flows from and is consistent with his 
analysis. The second is that his analysis is therefore able to reflect upon political 
practices and direct them in ways which might be more effective. Thus, certain forms of 
struggle or agents are understood as more important, not because of their ‘moral’ value 
but because of their effectiveness in attacking the structure which is being opposed. In 
this account, ‘theory’ is able to inform politics.  
 
This approach was borne out in the practice of PAIGC, whose ‘flexible use of tactics 
based on a strategic anti-imperialist program’ made it one of the more successful 
national liberation movements.
1184
 Such an approach is the polar opposite to 
postcolonial TWAIL work. What is evident in these accounts is the gap between theory 
and politics. The outcome of this – outlined in section 2.2. of this chapter – is that one is 
unable to state what principles might guide a progressive international legal practice and 
how such a practice might avoid the pitfalls of Eurocentrism.  
 
In Cabral’s account, there is a concept of imperialism derived from the Marxist 
tradition, in which imperialism is rooted in a historically specific logic. Precisely 
because this logic is historically specific it can be overcome. At the same time, this 
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logic means that is wider than European colonialism. Very directly, on this account, 
imperialism can be ended, but has not yet been, because it is tenacious and possesses a 
deeply-rooted logic. On this level, then, there is a strategic goal – the ending of 
capitalism. This goal frames specific engagements with imperialism and provides a way 
of evaluating specific tactical practices. At the same, agency is framed by structure. 
Since imperialism is understood as a social structure, operating according to a given 
logic, the behaviour of agents is understood with reference to this logic. It is on this 
basis that we are able to understand why some will defend and some will contest 
imperialism. More importantly, such a theory enables us to understand whose resistance 
to imperialism might be best-placed to overthrow it. 
 
By contrast, the dual concepts of imperialism as transhistorical ‘dynamic of difference’ 
or historical legacy cannot do this. Indeed, each of these concepts rigidly embodies one 
pole of the analysis. The transhistorical understanding of imperialism is essentially a 
structuralist one, in which there is no room for agency, whereas the account of the 
historical fiat is largely agent-driven. Accordingly, it is impossible to hold together 
structure and agency – as Cabral does – because they run in opposite directions. Either 
everything is a transhistorical structure or everything is the actions of agents, acting in 
contingent ways.  
 
A similar problem recurs as regards the relationship between strategy and tactics. If 
imperialism is a transhistorical dynamic then it cannot be overthrown, meaning that 
‘strategy’ simply drops out of the picture. By contrast, if imperialism was a contingent 
phenomenon embodied in European domination then it has already been overthrown 
and we simply live with its legacy. Thus, there is no ‘strategy’ which needs to be 
tailored to the broader goal of overthrowing the system.  
 
The point is simple. In holding to these opposed concepts, the kind of analysis that 
Cabral is able to provide cannot occur. Indeed his analysis is essentially inverted. On 
this basis, we can explain how it is that the ‘analysis’ of international law’s relationship 
with imperialism bears no resemblance to the political conclusions. The structural 
relationship of international law to imperialism cannot be connected to the question of 
what agency might overthrow it. Equally, owing to the exclusion of any strategic goal, 
structural questions are unable to inform particular tactical actions in pursuance of this. 
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The net result of this is that questions of social change must simply be read from 
contingent questions of agency, and so are unrelated to the broader analysis of the 
relationship between international law and imperialism. 
 
By consequence, the second aspect of Cabral’s analysis also cannot occur. If questions 
of agency, tactics and change are purely contingent, then a theoretical account is not in a 
position to specify what types of political action will be more or less effective. This 
leaves two roads open. The first is that taken by Anghie, which is to leave the 
possibility as an open question, and hold that it might be ‘possible to imagine and argue 
for very different understandings of the meaning of sovereignty ... and ... of 
international law’.1185  
 
The second option available is that taken by Rajagopal, and captured fully by Eslava 
and Pahuja above. In this vision, it is the ‘resistance’ of those who are dominated by 
international law and attempt to negotiate it that provides the possibility of its 
subversion. Yet, as noted above, this suffers from the fact that it is unable to say why the 
resistance of a particular group is important and how it will be able to transcend wider 
relations of exploitation and domination. At best, it collapses back into a kind of 
moralism which celebrates ‘resistance’ on its own terms, without being able to prioritise 
different forms of political action. 
 
The question, then, is: can the insights of postcolonial TWAIL scholars as to the 
persistent and enduring connection between imperialism and international law be 
articulated in such a way as to avoid these pitfalls? Can we overcome sociological 
functionalism without falling foul of false necessity and false contingency? As Marks 
puts it, might there be a way for us to pair their insights with a conception capable of 
investigating ‘what individual and collective action can achieve, what relation is 
established between structure and agency [and] how the world works as an organic 
totality’.1186 
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3. Imperialism, Materialism and the Dynamic of Difference 
As noted in the introduction to this chapter, the previous chapters have been structured 
by two interconnected themes. The first has been the political, historical and intellectual 
consequences of adopting a particular ‘theoretical’ concept of imperialism, empire or 
colonialism. The second has been the complex historical, political and theoretical inter-
relationship between the Marxist and Third Worldist traditions and their understandings 
of imperialism. Thus far, this chapter has primarily examined the first theme, although it 
has also inescapably touched on the second, by invoking figures such as Cabral and 
Fanon. 
 
The chapter now turns more fully to this dimension, turning to materialist Third 
Worldist theorists – particularly Fanon – to understand how it is that one might preserve 
the insights of TWAIL scholarship whilst avoiding the pitfalls described above.  
 
3.1. The Political Economy of Identity  
Although Wretched of the Earth is probably Fanon’s most famous book, Black Skin, 
White Masks has been in many respects his most influential. The book is well-known 
for Fanon’s tracking of the cultural and psychic dimensions of colonialism. In this 
respect, it was hugely influential on postcolonial theory, prefiguring its themes and 
preoccupations with the colonial, particularly in its psychic, racial and cultural 
dimensions. Indeed, in his introduction to the book Bhabha eulogised it as setting the 
scene for postcolonial theory insofar as it ‘challenges ... [the Western] historicist ‘idea’ 
of time as progressive ordered whole ... alienates ... the Enlightenment idea of ‘Man’ ... 
[and] challenges the transparency of social reality, as a pre-given image of human 
knowledge’.1187 
 
Fanon’s writings on the psychological dimensions of race are frequently credited with 
anticipating (and inspiring) the centrality of ‘othering’ in postcolonialism. Fanon argued 
that the ‘black man’ is not a man but a black man. For him, this was ‘the result of a 
series of aberrations of affect’, rooting the black man ‘at the core of a universe from 
which he must be extricated’.1188 He traced the manner in which colonial relations 
produced a certain psychic affect within the black race, creating a colonial 
                                                 
1187
 Fanon 1986, xi. 
1188
 Ibid., 10. 
250 
 
 
 
Manicheanism where white is ‘good’ and black is ‘bad’.1189 This Manicheanism was not 
simply felt on the part of the white colonial masters, but was psychologically 
internalised by black, subject peoples. Consequently, black people aimed to ‘become’ 
white: by going to the metropolis and learning to be ‘civilised’. In this way they sought 
to differentiate themselves from other black people. Ultimately, for Fanon, this created a 
situation in which black individuals became neurotic.
1190
 
 
All of these elements seem like a recipe for Fanon to reproduce the pattern described 
above. We have both the close attention to psychic processes of identity formation and 
the focus on the specificity of European colonial dominance. In this way, one can see 
how Fanon’s work might be said to have pre-empted postcolonial theory, and therefore 
to embody some of its limitations. Yet, as this chapter has indicated, even in Black Skin, 
White Masks – usually considered his most ‘postcolonial’ book – Fanon does quite the 
contrary, anticipating and disputing such positions. In fact, Fanon went further than this. 
In one particularly stark – and not often quoted – passage he argued that: 
 
The Negro problem does not resolve itself into the problem of Negroes living 
among white men but rather of Negroes exploited, enslaved, despised by a 
colonialist, capitalist society that is only accidentally white.
1191
 
 
The significance of this passage cannot be overstated. Although Fanon thought that the 
psychic, cultural and racialised dimensions of colonialism were of paramount 
importance, they were not for him the driving force behind colonialism. Instead, he 
rooted colonialism within the material relations of capitalist imperialism.  
 
Crucially, for Fanon, the psychic and cultural dimensions of colonialism could only be 
understood within this wider material context. For him, the ‘juxtaposition of the white 
and black races has created a massive psychoexistential complex’.1192 The dynamics of 
this psychoexistential process could not be explained from an individual psychological 
standpoint, since it was incapable of accounting fully for the widespread and systematic 
nature of this complex.
1193
He argued that this complex was the ‘outcome of a double 
process’. This process was primarily an ‘economic’ one, which was then 
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psychologically internalised by colonised populations.
1194
 As such, it was necessary to 
turn to the wider social and economic processes of imperialism to explain how these 
‘neuroses’ were produced and sustained. 
 
Fanon outlined a picture of identity formation that departs quite startlingly from that of 
postcolonial theorists. In his account, the inferiority complex is a relative one since as 
‘long as the black man is among his own, he will have no occasion, except in minor 
internal conflicts, to experience his being through others’.1195 It is only in relation to the 
white man that the black man is able to experience his status as an (inferior) black 
man.
1196
 Crucially, this is not a transhistorical process of identity formation. Fanon 
explicitly stated that although the black man is only ‘black’ in relation to the white man 
the converse is not true. For Fanon, the white man does not only become white through 
the assertion of his identity against a black man, since ‘[t]he black man has no 
ontological resistance in the eyes of the white man’.1197 This is because in the colonial 
situation ‘the white man is not only The Other but also the master’.1198 
 
What Fanon alluded to here was the fact that the Europeans were not accidentally in the 
non-European world, but were in fact there for very definite reasons. It was these 
reasons that fundamentally shaped the dynamic of ‘identity formation’. Thus, it was 
necessary to inquire into the specific material dynamics which determine how and why 
Europeans have come to be in the non-European world. It is here that we return to 
Fanon’s observation above that the problems of colonialism stem from the slavery and 
exploitation of a colonial, capitalist society. Fanon held that European expansion took 
place owing to the imperatives of capitalist expansion, and that ‘othering’ only occurred 
in this context.  
 
Fanon’s argument was that the Manichean division into black and white was a 
necessary material product of any system in which a foreign minority were exploiting a 
native a majority.
1199
 This is so for two reasons. Firstly, Fanon argued that a system 
based on geographically differentiated exploitation necessarily produces great 
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concentrations of wealth in the hands of a minority. The nature of capitalist imperialism 
meant that only a small number of the native bourgeoisie would receive a share in this 
surplus value, with the majority flowing to the ‘mother country’ or to settlers within the 
colonial territory.
1200
 In a very real sense, the Manichean division develops because 
whiteness and wealth are directly and materially associated. 
 
Secondly, the deployment of race is a necessary strategy (and tactic) on the part of the 
coloniser. Here, the distinct form of capitalist imperialism has very particular 
consequences. For Fanon, racism is the ‘most visible’ and ‘day-to-day’ element of the 
‘systematized hierachization’ that results from imperialist exploitation.1201 Any system 
that involved the ‘shameless exploitation of one group of men by another which has 
reached a higher stage of technical development’1202 would be racist because any 
country that ‘lives, draws its substance from the exploitation of other people’ must 
necessarily make those people inferior.
1203
 Fanon understood racism as a way to justify 
the exploitation of oppressed people and unify the populations of metropolitan societies, 
which were themselves riven with various social and class divisions.
1204
 It was in this 
limited sense that a formation of an ‘other’ identity was necessary for the consolidation 
of a European ‘self’, not as a transhistorical supplement, but rather as a concrete 
historical and political phenomenon.
1205
 
 
Fanon also maintained that race was deployed to manage the antagonisms thrown up by 
colonialism and imperialism. The racial inferiority complex was used to weaken the 
resistance of the victims of imperialism; insofar as they internalised its message they 
began to think that, without European ‘guidance’, they ‘would at once fall back into 
barbarism, degradation and bestiality’.1206 In this way, many would be convinced to 
support the colonial project, or at least not oppose it openly. This also enabled colonial 
populations to be stratified and turned against each other, with a racialised hierarchy 
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formed which would allow some natives to share in the benefits of imperialist 
exploitation: 
 
The Frenchman does not like the Jew, who does not like the Arab, who does not 
like the Negro … the Arab is told: “If you are poor, it is because the Jew has 
bled you and taken everything from you.” The Jew is told: “You are not of the 
same class as the Arab because you are really white and because you have 
Einstein and Bergson.” The Negro is told: “You are the best soldiers in the 
French Empire; the Arabs think they are better than you, but they are wrong.” … 
Unable to stand up to all the demands, the white man sloughs off his 
responsibilities. I have a name for this procedure: the racial distribution of 
guilt.
1207
 
 
Equally, in order to properly enslave and transform the ‘natives’, it was necessary to 
totally destroy their (pre-capitalist) cultures. This was both to allow for the implantation 
of capitalist social relations and to reduce the natives to passive actors who could be put 
to work.
1208
 Again, this too served to pacify their resistance, as historical and cultural 
bonds of kinship could also aid in political organisation. 
 
It has been necessary to recount Fanon’s position at some length because he serves a 
vital role in understanding how one might articulate a materialist theory of imperialism 
that is able to take what is best from postcolonial theory. Whilst Fanon thought that 
questions of culture and identity were important, he did not think that these relations are 
the primary drivers of imperialism. Instead, through his materialist analysis, he traced 
the way in which they are the necessary accompaniment to the expansive characteristics 
of capitalist imperialism.  
 
Crucially, this means that he is able to escape the problems of false necessity and false 
contingency outlined above. ‘Othering’ is no longer an untranscendable horizon, but 
rather one linked to a specific set of imperialist social relations, which could be 
overcome through concerted action. At the same time – as evidenced in his discussions 
of neo-colonialism – he understood the colonial situation as rooted in a broader logic of 
capitalist accumulation, meaning that simply overturning the European system would 
not be enough to guarantee liberation. 
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Accordingly, then, we might say that Fanon is a prime example of materialist 
postcolonial theory.
1209
 His work adopts the Marxist-derived materialist theory of 
imperialism, but also is concerned with the distinctive elements of imperialism that 
characterise postcolonialism: namely a focus on identity, culture and ‘othering’. What 
this means is that the type of negotiation between ‘structure and agency’ and ‘strategy 
and tactics’ epitomised by Cabral can be undertaken, even whilst preserving the insights 
of postcolonial theory.
1210
  
 
In keeping with the thrust of the previous chapters – namely that one’s understanding of 
imperialism will always have consequences for one’s understanding of international law 
– one ought to ask how this Fanonian manoeuvre might be carried out in international 
legal terms.  
 
3.2. A Materialist Dynamic of Difference 
In order to contemplate this, it is worth returning to Anghie’s outline of the ‘dynamic of 
difference’. Anghie writes that he: 
 
[U]se[s] the term ‘dynamic of difference’ to denote, broadly, the endless process 
of creating a gap between two cultures, demarcating one as ‘universal’ and 
civilized and the other as ‘particular’ and uncivilized, and seeking to bridge the 
gap by developing techniques to normalize the aberrant society ... The dynamic 
is self-sustaining and indeed, as I shall argue, endless; each act of arrival reveals 
further horizons, each act of bridging further differences that international law 
must seek to overcome.
1211
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There are several salient features of this description. First and foremost, Anghie is 
describing a ‘universalising’ process, whereby a certain ‘particular’ identity expands to 
encompass the whole globe. Secondly, the process is endless, because the expansion has 
no internal limits. Thirdly, the process is not even, the reason for the endless expansion 
is that ‘aberrant societies’ are never fully normalised.1212  
 
As previously noted, in arguing for an essentially transhistorical concept of imperialism, 
Anghie’s account resembles those of Morgenthau or Cohen. However, when we 
examine the specific characteristics that Anghie has ascribed to the dynamic of 
difference, they seem to bear a much closer resemblance to another account of 
imperialism described in Chapter 1 (Section 4.2.), that of A.P. Thornton. As may be 
recalled, Thornton described imperialism as ‘energy’, ‘dynamic’, a ‘happening’.1213 He 
emphasised that what distinguished imperialism (from ‘Empire’) was the fact that it 
denoted motion and transformation. Interestingly, then, the very characteristics that 
Anghie describes as part of a transhistorical dynamic are precisely the characteristics 
that Thornton uses to denote the historical specificity of imperialism.  
 
Of course, we have come across the ascription of transhistorical characteristics to 
historical phenomena before. In Chapter 3 (Section 1.2.1.), it was noted that there was a 
more than superficial similarity between realist and Marxist theories of imperialism, 
both essentially held that what characterised the world order was an endless conflict 
between advanced powers. However, the Marxist position, as a critique rather than a 
mere criticism, was that such phenomena had to be historicised and located within a set 
of specific social relations. As previously mentioned, the task is to move beyond ‘fixed, 
immutable, eternal categories’ and instead ask ‘how these relations are produced’, 
locating them within ‘the historical moment which gave them birth’.1214 
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In this respect, one cannot help but note a similarity between the process Anghie 
describes and Marx and Engels’ famous remarks as to the nature of the bourgeoisie in 
the Communist Manifesto. There, Marx and Engels wrote that the ‘need for a constantly 
expanding market for its products chases the bourgeoisie over the whole surface of the 
globe’ and that it must ‘nestle everywhere, settle everywhere, establish connexions 
everywhere’.1215 This class, they continued, was forced to constantly revolutionise 
production, leading to ‘uninterrupted disturbance of all social conditions, everlasting 
uncertainty and agitation’.1216  
 
What this signals is that the ‘dynamic of difference’ that Anghie describes bears a close 
resemblance to those processes of imperialist capitalist accumulation described in 
Chapter 3 (Section 1.2.), which go beyond Marx in several important ways. In these 
accounts, imperialism was understood to be rooted in the endless capitalist imperative to 
accumulate and realise surplus value. Bukharin, Lenin and Luxemburg all insisted that 
capitalism is structured by a drive whereby it must constantly expand beyond national 
borders. It is only in so doing that the greater profits needed by the bourgeoisie are able 
to be secured and realised. At the same time, in order to realise these profits it is 
necessary to systematically transform peripheral societies: both to secure better 
conditions for capital accumulation and because these acts of transformation are 
profitable on their own terms. 
 
Thus, immediately, we can see that the drive to expand and universalise a certain form 
of social life is embedded deeply within the logic of the capitalist mode of production. 
Of course, these transformations cannot simply be ‘economic’. Capitalist processes 
necessarily carry with them a series of cultural, social and political mores. As 
Luxemburg emphasised, the universalisation of capitalism necessarily implies the total 
destruction or reconfiguration of pre-capitalist social and cultural forms. Moreover, this 
is not simply a transformative process, because – as emphasised by Bukharin and Lenin 
– we are not dealing with the simple ‘universalisation’ of capitalism, but the continued 
export of capital, that the conditions for favourable capital accumulation must be 
constantly enforced. The net result of this, is that one can link the ‘process of creating a 
gap between two cultures, demarcating one as “universal” and civilized and the other as 
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“particular” and uncivilized, and seeking to bridge the gap by developing techniques to 
normalize the aberrant society’1217 very concretely with the process of capitalist 
accumulation. 
 
At the same time, a key insight of the Marxist theorists surveyed above is that the need 
for capitalist accumulation is unceasing. As Luxemburg observed, it is the nature of 
capitalism to constantly engage in expanded reproduction on a greater and greater scale, 
always increasing profits and continually accumulating capital. This, of course, can help 
explain the endless nature of the dynamic described by Anghie. This endlessness owes 
less to the transhistorical nature of ‘othering’, and more to do with the fact that within 
the determinate coordinates of capitalist imperialism there are no internal limits to 
capital accumulation.
1218
  
 
The necessity of endless accumulation also goes some way towards explaining why 
‘each act of bridging [reveals] further horizons’. However, the issue is deeper than this. 
As noted in Chapter 3 (Section 1.1.), Marx and Engels’ own theories as to the 
international expansion of capitalism sometimes suffered from a kind of diffusionism, 
in which they thought capitalism would smoothly universalise through economic means. 
By contrast, Marxist theorists of imperialism thought that things were less 
straightforward. They argued that the particular connections between national states and 
capital and the uneven development of capitalism gave rise to a system in which there 
was an international division of labour, between an advanced core and a more 
‘backward’ periphery.  
 
Since the aim of capitalists is not ‘development’, but rather securing increased profit, 
the effects of capitalism upon the peripheral countries are uneven. As Luxemburg and 
Bukharin pointed out, capitalists frequently made use of pre-capitalist and ‘non-
capitalist’ forms of organisation and exploitation (such as slavery) in order to coerce the 
working class in the peripheral countries into working. Moreover, as the theorists of 
neo-colonialism observed, the particular structure of colonial and neo-colonial 
expansion produces extremely uneven development in a few sectors and the high 
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concentrations of wealth amongst a very narrow group of people (Chapter 1, Section 
5.4.).
1219
 
 
The point of this is that the ‘normal’ pattern of development in imperialist capitalism 
means that peripheral formations are always incomplete, hybrid forms characterised by 
extremely uneven development. Indeed, as Bukharin noted,
1220
 given the division of 
labour between agrarian and industrial regions, this is often desired by those in 
advanced capitalist formations. But it is precisely because of these low levels of 
‘development’ – occasioned by capitalism itself – that more intervention by ‘the 
international community’ and capitalists is legitimated. Here, we have the final aspect of 
the dynamic, whereby the ‘transformation’ is always ‘incomplete’ and therefore justifies 
further rounds of intervention and transformation.
1221
  
 
On a very basic level, then, the transhistorical characteristics ascribed by Anghie to the 
dynamic of difference are in fact the historical characteristics of (imperialist) capital 
accumulation. Just as Chapter 3 (Section 1.2.3.) sought to reconstruct how the classical 
Marxist theorists of imperialism articulated a materialist theory of Eurocentrism, we can 
here see the beginnings of a materialist theory of the ‘dynamic of difference’. 
 
3.3. Fanonian International Legal Theory? 
Having suggested that – at the very least – we can see a homology between the dynamic 
of difference and the process of capital accumulation, the issue becomes how this is 
related to international law. In other words, by what material process does international 
law come to express this logic. Here, it is useful to return to Lazarus and Varma’s 
account of Eurocentrism. They argue that when examining Eurocentrism it could either 
be examined as an ‘episteme’ or an ‘ideology’. In the former case, Eurocentrism was to 
be understood as ‘a trans-ideologically dispersed field of vision, or conceptual 
“atmosphere”’ which could not be subject to critique.1222 By contrast, ‘ideology’ is 
‘selective, partial, and partisan’.1223 On this basis, we might understand the above as an 
                                                 
1219
 Cabral 1979b, 127–128. 
1220
 See Chapter 2, Section 1.2.1. 
1221
 As noted in Chapter 2, Section 4.2. Anghie does acknowledge this to some degree, with respect to the 
economic programmes of the IFIs, but his in his account this economic dimension is subordinate to the 
broader ‘dynamic of difference’, rather than been a driving force behind it. See Anghie 2005a, 268. 
1222
 Lazarus and Varma 2008, 315. 
1223
 Ibid. 
259 
 
 
 
attempt to translate a reading of the dynamic of difference as an episteme, into one in 
which it serves an ideology. 
 
This immediately brings to mind Marks’ account of international law’s role as ideology. 
Straightforwardly, we can see that what Anghie has pinpointed is the way in which 
international law serves to establish and sustain the very particular conditions necessary 
for the accumulation of capital. On this basis, the social relations of imperialism are 
translated very directly into legal ideology. At this point, it is useful to return to the 
Marxist theories of ‘civilisation’ described in Chapter 3 (Section 3.1.), which described 
the ways in which the language of civilisation was in fact reflective of the needs for 
European expansion. As Baars notes, on this basis we ought to speak less of the 
‘civilising mission’ and more of the ‘capitalising mission’.  
 
Importantly, the resources to mount such a position are also to be found within Third 
Worldist theories of international law. One could, for instance, point to the accounts of 
Bedjaoui and Umozurike and their attendant focus on the relationship between 
international law and the material practices of imperialism. Perhaps more importantly, 
Chimni’s account has stressed the role of international law and institutions in the 
accumulation of capital. 
 
However, the mention of these authors flags up a very important point. As repeatedly 
noted, one of the problems with the first wave of Third Worldist jurists was that all of 
their plans failed, and failed quite spectacularly. Although they managed to articulate a 
coherent set of strategic perspectives for international legal reform, they ultimately 
depended on a kind of sociological functionalism as regards international law. 
Postcolonial TWAIL scholarship has attempted to go beyond this, and to locate the 
connection between international law and imperialism at a foundational level. Thus, in 
any serious attempt to elaborate a materialist – or Fanonian – dynamic of difference, it 
is not enough to say that the dynamic of difference is a reproduction of (imperialist) 
capitalist accumulation. It is also necessary to show how and why this dynamic 
constantly recurs in international law. What is needed, in other words, is a materialist 
account which goes beyond sociological functionalism.  
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Here it is useful to turn to Miéville’s appropriation of Pashukanis’ commodity-form 
theory. As previously noted, in Miéville’s account we can find two distinct but inter-
related reasons for the ‘bias’ of international law towards imperialism. The first is that 
because international law is indeterminate, interpretation will generally be resolved in 
favour of the stronger parties, which internationally will be imperialists and their allies. 
Whilst this may well be accurate – although it suffers from a number of problems1224 – 
it ultimately rests on a similar argument to the first wave of Third Worldists. Taken to 
its extreme it also becomes self-contradictory. Given that Miéville does believe it is 
ultimately possible to overthrow imperialism, he presumably believes that there are 
forces strong enough to do this. A logical consequence of this is that these forces could 
leverage that strength into international legal argument. This was precisely the wager of 
the Third Worldist jurists.  
 
It is therefore Miéville’s second, structural, argument which is the more compelling. 
Miéville, following Pashukanis, argues that on the level of form there is a direct 
connection between law and capitalism and that, consequently, there is a structural 
connection between international law and imperialism. One can see very directly how 
this would be of relevance to the above. When historicised, what Anghie identifies as 
the dynamic of difference embodies and is structured by the logic of capitalist 
expansion and accumulation. Insofar as the legal form is a ‘mystified expression’ of the 
logic of the commodity form, it makes perfect sense that these dynamics would also 
play out within the law itself.  
 
As has been argued repeatedly throughout this thesis, one of the main aims of TWAIL 
scholarship has been to go beyond the sociological functionalism that characterised the 
original Third World jurists. This functionalism suggested that international law is an 
essentially neutral vessel that ‘reflects’ and ‘expresses’ the global balance of forces, and 
so might be turned against imperialism. TWAIL scholars have sought to argue that there 
was something specific about international law which predisposed it towards 
reproducing imperialism. Theories of civilisation, development and the dynamic of 
difference all attempted to do this, however in so doing they reproduced the limitations 
outlined in this chapter. As suggested in Chapter 2 (Section 2.5) and developed in 
Chapter 3 (Section 2.2.1), Pashukanis’ theory was itself an attempt to grapple with 
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something very similar to sociological functionalism. Contesting those who thought that 
law was simply instrumentalised by the ruling class, he established a structural link 
between law and capitalism. By extension, and as developed by Miéville, this entailed a 
structural connection between imperialism and international law.
1225
 In this way, then, 
Pashukanis’ work was a materialist response to the limitations of a kind of sociological 
functionalism. As such, it is logical that it could inform a materialist theory of the 
‘dynamic of difference’. 
 
Once we examine this at the level of the form of law it is also possible to explain how 
this dynamic also structures various progressive attempts to invoke international law. 
The analysis of the commodity-form theory demonstrates that law cannot – on its own 
terms – actually go beyond imperialism. This is because the existence of (international) 
law presupposes the existence of (imperialist) capitalism. The primary conclusion one 
can draw from this is that, even if law might be effective at fighting some of the effects 
of imperialism, it can only ever do so within its material coordinates. At best it can only 
stop some of its excesses, but ultimately will remain wedded to the fundamentals of 
imperialist social relations and their necessary effects. 
 
Immediately, we can see how it is that the dynamic of difference plays out: attempts to 
fight imperialism within international law can only go so far, and so – in the long run – 
will be self-undermining. This is not least because, since the fundamental logics of 
capitalist accumulation are kept in place, new tactics and forms of accumulation can be 
articulated in order deal with even wide-reaching transformation. The classic example 
would be decolonisation. This also flags up an important point, one of the roles that 
international law plays is to capture mass resistance to imperialism (as in the case of 
decolonisation) and channel it through a form which ultimately remains wedded to it.  
 
The issue is not simply that international law is ultimately ‘compatible’ with 
imperialism. Because the legal form shares a logic with the commodity form, its 
categories and forms of argument mirror this logic. This means that any legal assertion 
will have to be framed in such a way as to mirror the categories of capitalism. In 
particular, commodity-form theorists argue that the law has an abstracting, 
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individualising tendency, whereby events are removed from their overall systemic 
context and instead presented in an individual right. In this way – as noted by Marks 
and Krever (Chapter 3, Section 2.3.) – international legal argument is structured in such 
a way as to be unable to address structural and systemic issues.  
 
On this reading, international law channels resistance through abstracted categories 
which reflect (imperialist) capitalism’s logic. This is the material foundation of the 
‘resistance-renewal’ dynamic described by Rajagopal: by acting through international 
institutions, resistance is always channelled into forms that mirror imperialism’s logic. 
As such, even at its most progressive, international law reproduces the logic of 
imperialism in what one can accurately characterise as a ‘dynamic of difference’. This is 
a dynamic of difference not rooted in a transhistorical account of ‘othering’, but rather 
in the determinate, material characteristics of capitalist imperialism. 
 
In this way, the best insights of the older radical traditions of Third Worldism – their 
focus on the material dimensions of imperialism and its interpenetration with 
international law – can be married with the crucial observations of TWAIL scholars as 
to the enduring connection between law and imperialism. Interestingly, there has 
perhaps been one figure in the radical Third Worldist movement who has attempted to 
mount such an analysis of international law: the previously mentioned Jacques 
Vergès.
1226
 
 
Vergès held that any breach of a social norm could, in theory, call into question the 
existing order. An act of theft, for example, could call into question the system of 
private property.
1227
 For him, the role of the trial was to deal with such offences in such 
a way as not prevent them from problematising the existing order.
1228
 As with some of 
the Marxist theories described above, Vergès drew attention to the abstracting character 
of the law and – without explicitly invoking this – the way in which it mirrored the logic 
of capitalism. Thus, for example, he argued that Eichmann’s trial in Jerusalem 
ultimately failed to understand the way in which the Nazi regime and its atrocities were 
rooted in the character of German imperialism. In this way, he argued, ‘the horrors of 
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Nazism became the monstrous nightmare of a kind of Germanic Marquis de Sade, a 
disease of the soul, of which Eichmann ... could claim to be a victim’.1229  
 
It is fitting that Vergès came closest to articulating this Fanonian point. Like Fanon, 
Vergès was an active supporter of and militant for Algerian liberation. Also like Fanon 
he was not himself an Algerian. The two were both born outside of France, raised in 
French colonies (now départements) and received professional educations in France. 
Both also were active in the Communist movement: Vergès a long time militant; Fanon 
working on Aimé Césaire’s Communist-backed campaign in Martinique. In their own 
ways, both exemplify the complex intertwining of Marxism and Third Worldism that 
occurred throughout the twentieth century.  
 
 
4. Stretch-Marx 
4.1. Subject Positions  
It is vital to note that the above approach does not simply mean ‘subsuming’ the insights 
of postcolonial TWAIL scholarship into a pre-existing Marxist framework. Instead, by 
putting the insights of postcolonial TWAIL scholarship on a materialist basis, much of 
the work described in Chapter 3 will have to be put on a different footing. In order to 
understand this, it is necessary to return to some of the insights outlined in Chapter 1. 
As may be recalled, Robert Young argues that the reason that the term ‘colonialism’, as 
opposed to imperialism, was deployed by the anti-colonial movement was because of 
the subject-position that this movement occupied.
1230
 Essentially, they accepted the 
Marxist critique of imperialism, but highlighted those aspects of it with which they were 
most confronted. Initially, of course, this was formal colonialism. Yet after formal 
colonialism ended, they continued to represent this distinctive subject-position through 
speaking of neo-colonialism.  
 
A materialist account of the dynamic of difference represents a similar manoeuvre. It 
takes seriously the Marxist critique of imperialism. It further extends this critique so as 
to understand the structural connection between international law and imperialism 
However, it does so from the perspective of the Third World. Some crucial points 
follow from this. The first is that in this way it is possible to return to the complex 
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intertwining of Marxism and Third Worldism. Rather than reading a materialist 
dynamic of difference as confronting TWAIL with Marxism, we can understand it as 
the recovery of TWAIL’s own historical legacy. As noted in the previous section, the 
radical Third World jurists all operated with a materialist concept of imperialism. This 
was true of the movement more broadly, with figures such as Fanon who – as described 
above – sought to give materialist accounts of the production of identity and 
‘civilisation’. 
 
This leads on to a second, vital, point. Insofar as adopting this understanding involves 
viewing the imperialist system from a distinct ‘subject-position’, it illuminates specific 
aspects of imperialism that more ‘metropolitan-based’ accounts of imperialism have 
missed. It is for this reason that the specific mechanics of colonialism – in particular the 
forms of racialisation that it generates – were catalogued by the anti-colonial Marxists. 
In this respect, it is quite telling that the Marxist accounts of international law described 
in Chapter 3 pay very little attention to the specific effects of colonialism on the 
colonies themselves. Of course, they necessarily recognise the massive social 
transformations occasioned by European colonialism to some degree. But even here, the 
focus is primarily on the European states as the prime actors, and the way in which the 
particular legal characterisations of the colonies played out internationally and among 
European states. There is little focus on what these characterisations meant ‘on the 
ground’ for the colonies, and how this shaped their ability to act within the international 
order.  
 
Perhaps the strongest evidence of this is the fact that, despite the centrality of the 
concept of ‘neo-colonialism’ to the Third Worldist Marxist understanding of 
imperialism, this term is almost nowhere to be found in contemporary Marxist 
international legal theory.
1231
 What this signals is an inattentiveness to the specific way 
in which imperialist capitalism plays out within its peripheries. Consequently, the 
‘subject-position’ that Young describes is not simply an arbitrary starting point. To 
return to the anti-colonial Marxists, whilst their accounts may have downplayed some 
aspects of imperialism,
1232
 their perspective did enable them to shed light on a number 
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of important but neglected elements of imperialist social relations. In particular they 
drew close attention to the way in which colonialism (and neo-colonialism) were 
intimately bound up with processes of racialisation. 
 
The relevance of this can best be captured through a reading of Miéville’s 
(aforementioned) ‘Multilateralism as Terror’. As previously noted (Chapter 3, Section 
3.3), in this article Miéville seeks to trace the role that international law has played in 
enabling and justifying imperialist intervention within Haiti. Ultimately, Miéville 
maintains that the dynamic at play in the intervention was that of ‘capital accumulation’. 
International legal argument was deployed to undermine the modest reforms of 
Aristide’s government, which had threatened several of the international capitalist firms 
operating within Haiti. Whilst this is a point well made, there is a strange absence from 
Miéville’s account. Haiti’s population is, of course, almost entirely black. Those agents 
that Miéville most condemns in the piece, namely the US, and the American 
international legal community, largely are not. One does not need to dramatise the facts 
so vulgarly to understand that it might be wise to consider what role ‘race’ and 
racialisation played in this intervention.  
 
Despite this, within Miéville’s account there are only two references to racism.1233 In 
both of these instances he makes notes that the ‘media’ had (mis)represented Haiti by 
mediating its reporting through racist stereotypes. Yet why just confine this to the 
‘media’? Surely a crucial part of Miéville’s insistence on the constitutive nature of 
international law is that it plays a vital role in constructing, mediating and structuring 
the way that facts play out ‘on the ground’. Insofar as there was ‘racist reporting’, it was 
reporting a situation that had been racialised (at least in part) through the international 
legal order. The contrast between this account and those of Anghie and Mutua regarding 
the law on the use of force is telling. Both argue that a crucial role played by 
international law lies in constituting peripheral territories as legitimate sites for 
intervention. This is in part achieved through casting them in particular ‘racialised’ roles 
– the ‘savage’ or the ‘uncivilised’ – which both draw upon and reinforce established, 
racialised tropes about non-Europeans.
1234
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An examination of Miéville’s own account of the Haitian situation seems to demand a 
similar form of analysis. One of the manoeuvres of MINUSTAH was to cast political 
activists of Aristides’ Fanmi Lavalas Party as ‘gang members’ and ‘armed bandits’ and 
its community leaders as ‘gang leaders’. On this basis, UN attacks on these activists 
could be justified in the name of repressing criminal activity.
1235
 The familiarity of this 
move should be obvious: casting political activity as mindless ‘gang activity’ or 
criminality is a classic racialising trope, and here it was a trope that was directly 
embedded in and legitimised by international law.
1236
 Yet, in Miéville’s account, this is 
all overshadowed by capital accumulation.  
 
Thus, whilst a non-materialist ‘dynamic of difference’ treats racialisation as a driving 
force in and of itself, the traditional Marxist account counterposes this dynamic to 
capital accumulation. This perhaps emerges most clearly in the Marxist discussion of 
the colonial period and the international legal construction of ‘civilisation’ (as discussed 
in Chapter 3, Section 3.1.). Both Neocleous and Miéville explicitly state that it was the 
material processes of capital accumulation as opposed to a form of racial ‘othering’ 
which drove international legal doctrine. There is both an implicit and explicit 
opposition between either capital accumulation or racialisation as structuring 
international law, each to the exclusion of the other. This is perhaps best captured in 
Baars’ re-casting of the ‘civilising mission’ as the ‘capitalising mission’.1237  
 
If Haiti’s present predicament might make us doubt such a hard and fast opposition, 
Haiti’s past completely obliterates it. Haiti – or rather the island of which Haiti is now a 
part – was first settled in the 1490s by the Spanish (as Hispaniola), who annihilated the 
indigenous population. It was later colonised by the French as Saint-Domingue, in time 
becoming one of France’s most important and productive colonies: exporting sugar and 
coffee and earning huge revenues. The labour that produced these goods for export was 
primarily composed of African slaves, with Haiti accounting for a huge percentage of 
the transatlantic slave trade. These slaves were later – in the shadow of the French 
Revolution – to rise up, and, eventually, declare the first black republic. Throughout 
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their struggle they would be caught up in the manoeuvrings of the European and 
American powers.
1238
 
 
This rather cursory gloss of Haitian history illustrates a very simple point. It is simply 
impossible to abstractly separate out the processes of the international expansion and 
accumulation of capital and forms of racialisation. Haiti’s very integration into the 
world market was dependent upon the most direct and overt form of racialisation – 
chattel slavery – and these racialised forms continued to play a vital role in structuring 
Haiti’s place in the global economy even after it had attained independence and 
abolished slavery.
1239
  
 
What this suggests is that rather than counterpose capital accumulation to racialisation, 
it is necessary to understand them as two aspects of the same process. As Brenna 
Bhandar notes, as a matter of historical fact, private property was ‘was constituted along 
with properties (whiteness, for instance) that circulated globally and were attached to 
particular bodies’. Because of this, she continues, ‘private property (to take one pillar of 
capitalist relations) and raciality (another pillar) are co-constitutive’. One can see how 
these processes necessarily also play out in (international) legal terms, with Bhandar 
insisting that, through the doctrine of recognition, ‘the legal form itself, with its at-
tendant notion of the civilised subject, was constituted through the violence inflicted on 
colonised subjects’.1240 In a materialist account of the dynamic of difference, therefore, 
racialisation cannot simply be seen as an optional extra which gives way to the ‘real’ 
processes of capital accumulation. Rather, the very process of capital accumulation is at 
the same time one of racialisation.  
 
This is not an insight without precedent within the Marxist tradition. Although not 
explicitly conceptualised in these terms, the Marxist attempts to elaborate a theory of 
Eurocentrism described in Chapter 3 (Section 1.2.3) described the way in which 
imperialism led to an stratification of the international working class. In these accounts, 
the metropolitan working class was able to accrue a series of privileges by virtue of its 
position. This can be understood as a theory of racialisation and was – at times – 
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explicitly understood in those terms.
1241
 It is telling that this aspect of the classical 
Marxist theory is not present in Miéville’s own account of imperialism. Instead, he 
takes from Bukharin purely the idea of militarised competition.  
 
However, in keeping with the insights about the ‘subject-position’ of the Third World, 
these positions did not go far enough, since it observed only how racialisation operated 
to privilege metropolitan labour, and not how it structured capital accumulation in its 
peripheries. As Fanon demonstrated, the forms of exploitation that are an integral part 
of capitalism on the world stage give rise to racialised categories, which then become 
the necessary accompaniment for the continued existence of accumulation. Insofar as 
international law is necessarily part of the process of capitalist accumulation, it too 
enacts and internalises these racialised forms.  
 
4.2. Racial Capitalisms  
4.2.1. Stretched Marxism 
The theoretical implications of this position are best illustrated in Fanon’s The Wretched 
of the Earth. In one of that book’s more famous passages, Fanon argued that 
‘traditional’ Marxist categories of capitalism and class could not adequately make sense 
of the reality of life in the colonies. This was because:  
 
The originality of the colonial context is that economic reality, inequality, and 
the immense difference of ways of life never come to mask the human realities. 
When you examine at close quarters the colonial context, it is evident that what 
parcels out the world is to begin with the fact of belonging to or not belonging to 
a given race, a given species. In the colonies the economic substructure is also a 
superstructure. The cause is the consequence, you are rich because you are 
white, you are white because you are rich. This is why Marxist analysis should 
always be slightly stretched every time we have to do with the colonial 
problem.
1242
 
 
Following Fanon, we can say that the flipside to any materialist theory of the dynamic 
of difference is a ‘stretched Marxism’. The question, of course, is what precisely such a 
stretched Marxism would look like. 
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Although Fanon’s own argument is distinct, he reflects more broadly the position 
outlined by many in the anti-colonial and Third Worldist movements. These theorists 
were convinced – in the words of Aimé Césaire’s resignation letter to the French 
Communist Party – that ‘the struggle of colonial peoples against colonialism, the 
struggle of peoples of color against racism ... is more complex, or ... of a completely 
different nature to the fight of the French worker against French capitalism, and cannot 
... be considered a part, a fragment of that struggle’.1243 Crucially, this did not mean 
abandoning Marxism, or the commitment to overthrowing capitalism, but rather 
insisting that ‘Marxism and communism be placed in the service of black peoples, and 
not black peoples in the service of Marxism and communism’.1244 This is the rational 
result of adopting the ‘subject-position’ of the colonised when examining 
imperialism.
1245
 
 
In many accounts, these anti-colonial figures are dismissed or celebrated for not being 
Marxists.
1246
 Yet if – as Lenin declared – ‘a concrete analysis of a concrete situation’ is 
‘that which constitutes the very gist, the living soul of Marxism’,1247 then the attempt to 
read Marxism through one’s own conditions appears to be one of the most important 
tasks of Marxism.
1248
 It is for this reason that Fanon’s language of ‘stretching’ is 
appropriate. It captures the fact that this is neither an attempt to apply pre-existing 
Marxist categories to the Third World, nor an abandonment of Marxism, but rather – in 
a materialist manner – an attempt to read the categories of Marxism through the 
experience of the Third World. 
 
Essentially, Fanon’s argument boils down to the fact that ‘in the colonial context’, race 
served a role in structuring the distribution of the political and economic benefits of 
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imperialist exploitation.
1249
 By virtue of their race, white settlers were placed in an 
advantageous material position and accrued a series of political and ideological benefits. 
For Fanon, this meant that traditional Marxist understandings of the role of class could 
not be mechanically applied to the colonial situation. Instead, what was required was a 
materialist analysis of race as a social form. This analysis must first outline how race – 
as a social relation – is produced and then unpack the material conditions that enabled it 
to serve a central role in structuring a given social formation. 
 
As noted earlier, for Fanon race is not a free-standing relationship; it is instead 
generated through the systematic economic logic of capitalist exploitation.. Because 
imperialist capital accumulation involves a geographically differentiated flow of surplus 
value away from peripheral (non-European) societies, it generates racial difference: 
since whiteness and wealth become directly associated, in order to justify, create the 
conditions for and manage the antagonisms of this exploitation. It is because these 
forms are so closely linked to the processes of capital accumulation – and so important 
to the latter’s continued existence – that they serve a dominant role in ordering 
imperialist social relations. Whereas some have read Fanon as simply saying that race 
‘trumps’ economics, or is more important than class,1250 we can also read him as 
making a more subtle point. Fanon’s analysis suggests that under the material 
conditions of imperialism, race will play a crucial role in organising and structuring 
social existence.
1251
 In this way, continuing with the idea of colonialism as viewing 
imperialism from a particular subject-position, we can see Fanon’s position as a flipside 
of the material account of Eurocentrism outlined in Chapter 3 (Section 1.2.3.).
1252
 
 
Because Fanon’s account traced the connection between capital accumulation and 
racialisation, he also paid close attention to the way in which specific racialised forms 
were thrown up by different regimes of capital accumulation. Since he saw race as a 
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social relation, Fanon understood that its targets were by no means fixed, but varied 
according to which particular population was subject to exploitation. Thus, as 
previously noted, Fanon argued that the ‘Negro problem’ was one of a ‘capitalist 
society that is only accidentally white’.1253 On this very basic level, patterns of 
racialisation would change depending on which particular territories or populations 
were at issue. Immediately for Fanon, then, there was a fundamental racialised division 
thrown up by imperialist exploitation, which would be subject to variation in terms of 
its targets. 
  
However, it was not simply that the subjects of racialisation that changed. Fanon also 
insisted that, owing to the close connection between capital accumulation and 
racialisation, changes in regimes of accumulation and techniques of production would 
also give rise to different forms of racialisation. He explained that in the initial period of 
capitalist expansion, involving ‘crude exploitation of man’s arms and legs’ and the mere 
plunder of resources, without implanting capitalist social relations, imperialism gave 
rise to ‘[v]ulgar racism in its biological form’.1254 However, with the ‘evolution of 
techniques of production’ and the limited industrialisation that came with colonial 
capitalism, racism evolved into ‘more subtle forms’.1255 Since capitalist social relations 
could not simply exterminate native populations but needed ‘various degrees of 
approval and support’ and the ‘cooperation’ of the exploited, racism assumed a ‘more 
“cultivated” direction’.1256 
 
Finally, aside from these more deep-rooted changes, Fanon also understood that these 
racialised forms would change in line with a series of conjunctural imperatives. Thus, as 
previously noted, Fanon described the process of the ‘racial distribution of guilt’, 
whereby racial categories would be used to stratify and manage exploited 
populations.
1257
 In this way, different racialised forms would be simultaneously 
deployed against different populations, in line with the changing need to protect capital 
accumulation. Similarly, Fanon understood that racialised social forms would change 
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insofar as they were challenged by anti-imperialist resistance, which again forced them 
to become less direct.
1258
 
 
4.2.2. A New Canon? 
It is through examining the work of TWAIL scholars that we see how this process has 
interacted with international law. International law has played a vital role in racialising 
the peripheries of capitalism, opening them up for the penetration of European capital, 
structuring their relationship to imperialism and providing rationales for military 
interventions in order to secure this. A ‘stretched Marxist’ account of international law 
is one which traces the way in which these racialised forms are generated by and 
structure the processes of capital accumulation. Given the role that stretched Marxism 
played in the thinking of the radical anti-colonial movement, one might expect that 
similar resources could be available for a theory of international law. Certainly there 
have been Third Worldist jurists and scholars who have also identified with the Marxist 
tradition. These figures – examined in Chapter 2 – include Bedjaoui, Umozurike, 
Chimni and Gathii. All of these figures understand imperialism as being driven by the 
process of capitalist expansion and accumulation, and further understand international 
law as mediating and articulating this process. 
 
However, none of these scholars quite captures the dynamics of stretched Marxism. 
Bedjaoui, in his concern to address the economic problems of neo-colonialism through 
his new international economic order, is not attentive to the racialised form that this 
economic order assumed. Umozurike was more forthright, claiming that ‘white racism’ 
remained a ‘fundamental element’ in the international legal order. However, he 
remained unable to specify the precise structural connection between racism, capitalism 
and imperialism, and consequently was unable to provide a materialist analysis of the 
recurrence of this phenomenon. Ultimately, the sociological functionalism to which 
these two scholars held meant they were unable to see how and why these racialised 
processes are reproduced within international law. 
 
Although Chimni is perhaps the author who best exemplifies the contemporary 
connection between Marxist and Third Worldist approaches international law, he 
ultimately falls prey to similar problems. Chimni’s attentiveness to the problems of 
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colonialism and neo-colonialism is second to none in the Marxist canon, and in this way 
he exemplifies the ‘subject-position’ of the colonised. However, his Marxism is not 
‘stretched’ enough, insofar as, for him, these relations are primarily economic. There is 
little expansion on its racial and cultural dimensions. Perhaps the closest author closest 
to the tradition of stretched Marxism is Gathii, who – as previously noted – urges that 
we hold to ‘both’ the Marxist critique and that of postcolonialism. Yet, in his account, 
these appear as two different traditions that operate at different registers. Therefore, 
there is no ‘stretched Marxism’ here; rather, there is ‘stretch’ on the one hand, and 
‘Marxism’ on the other.  
 
Thus, there are no easy examples that can be picked up here. However, retrieving a lost 
legacy is not as simple as locating a ‘canon’. If the preceding three chapters have argued 
anything, it is that there is a very complicated relationship between the Marxist and 
Third Worldist traditions. In particular, we can draw a line from the ‘stretched 
Marxism’ described in this section, to the early postcolonialism described in Chapter 1 
(Section 5.5.2.). Postcolonial theorists took seriously the idea that (as per Fanon and 
Césaire) the colonial was a distinct problématique which required a rethinking of 
categories. As a result, they foregrounded the role of race, culture and identity in the 
construction and maintenance of imperialism. However, rather than attempt a materialist 
explanation of these phenomena, they interpreted them as ‘displacing’ the logic of 
capitalism. Consequently, they mounted a theory of imperialism in which issues of 
identity drove it, and which required a supplemental understanding of imperialism by 
way of historical fiat. In this respect, one might say they were ‘all stretch and no 
Marxism’. 
 
It is this intellectual legacy that TWAIL scholarship has inherited. The task seems clear. 
Postcolonialism responds to a real historical, political and theoretical urge to understand 
imperialism, yet it does so by discarding the materialist method that had animated 
earlier accounts of imperialism. One can reclaim the insights of postcolonial theory by 
setting it within a material context which does not reduce ‘race’ or ‘culture’ to 
epiphenomena of capitalism, but understands them as social forms coextensive with and 
necessary to the accumulation of capital, which therefore come to assume a vital and 
structuring role within the imperialist system. 
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Fanon’s emphasis on the changing forms of racialisation provides a bridge in this 
respect. The relationship he describes between transformations in the process of capital 
accumulation and transformations in forms of racialisation would also – on the reading 
outlined above – be reflected in international law. As will be recalled, an analysis 
similar to this was one of the pivots around which Marxist-influenced Third Worldist 
legal scholarship has turned.  
 
As was argued in Chapter 2, Bedjaoui, Umozurike and Chimni all sought to trace the 
way in which transformations in the nature of imperialism were reflected in different 
international legal regimes. They understood the initial ‘encounter’ between Europe and 
the ‘new world’ to be one rooted in early capitalist expansion. This was an unsystematic 
process of primitive accumulation, which was achieved through trade and ‘looting’. 
Consequently, it did not require wholesale transformations of the internal life of 
peripheral territories. International law, therefore, was unsystematic and characterised 
largely by a silence about colonies. Often non-European sovereigns were recognised so 
as to facilitate trade and others such as the ‘Indians’ were compelled to engage in trade, 
or their resources were subject to European appropriation. 
 
As capitalism stabilised and grew within Europe, there was a stronger imperative to 
expand outwards. This expansion could no longer be simply concerned with the 
extraction of wealth; now societies would have to be transformed wholesale. This was 
because they were to be the markets for European goods and the direct sites for the 
export and accumulation of capital. European states would therefore often require a 
greater deal of control in order to carry out these transformations. For this reason, direct 
political control in the form of colonisation became more and more necessary. This was 
buttressed by the competition between European powers, which could better secure 
profits through the creation of tariff territory. International law mediated this through 
the standard of civilisation, which justified colonisation, mediated other European 
dealings with the non-European world and provided an external compulsion for non- or 
pre- capitalist states and empires to open themselves up to the logics of capital 
accumulation. 
 
Such a situation was unstable, however, both because of the resistance of colonised 
peoples to colonialism and because of the costs associated with direct colonial control. 
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International law served the role of channelling anti-colonial struggles within the 
colonies in such a way as to remain compatible with imperialism: both in terms of 
maintaining these struggles within the nation-state, and also by neutering the Third 
World’s demands for nationalisation. What this meant was that – given the continued 
existence of imperialism – international law mediated neo-colonial relations.  
 
With the collapse of even those marginal oppositional movements and the slow 
implosion of the USSR, there was even less restraint upon the capitalists in the 
advanced capitalist core. This, combined with stagnating conditions at home, led to a 
renewed round of capital accumulation under the auspices of neoliberalism and 
globalisation, which was facilitated by international institutions such as the World Bank 
and IMF. As a part and parcel of this process there has been a wave of military 
interventions, which were legitimised through an international law which both posited 
peripheral territories as open for military violence. 
 
It is this account which must be ‘reclaimed’ and built within Marxist and TWAIL 
scholarship. Following Fanon, we can see that these changing forms of capital 
accumulation are also changing forms of racialisation. The above story can be seen of 
international law casting the peripheries in different racialised roles in order to facilitate 
the continued process of capital accumulation. Over time his has shifted from a 
language based directly on ‘civilisation’, to one which draws on subtler tropes of 
‘chaos’, ‘disorder’ and rogue states. It has also (as outlined in Chapter 3, Section 3.3.) 
been shaped by the resurgence of inter-imperialist rivalries. 
 
Thus, this racialisation plays out in different forms in different periods, but nonetheless 
forms the real ‘dynamic of difference’ which fundamentally structures international law. 
Crucially, therefore, we are able to combine the insights of the Marxist and postcolonial 
wings of TWAIL scholarship. This is not achieved by throwing them arbitrarily tying 
them together, but rather by understanding their common ‘ancestry’ in the stretched 
Marxist tradition of the radical anti-colonial and Third Worldist movements. 
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4.3. Principled Opportunism? 
Armed with such an understanding, it is also possible to tackle the political challenge of 
an anti-imperialist international law. A stretched Marxism is able to take seriously the 
racial and cultural dimensions of imperialism, and account for how these are 
persistently produced in international law. However, it does so in such a way that allows 
us to negotiate the relationship between structure and agency and between strategy and 
tactics described in Section 2.4.2. of this chapter. This approaches roots the dynamic of 
difference – and its attendant racialised forms – within the Marxist tradition of thinking 
about imperialism. It argues that there is a structural connection between international 
law and imperialism, with a dynamic of difference occurring at the level of the form of 
international law.  
 
Since this position understands imperialism as a specific historical social relation, it is 
able to negotiate the problems thrown up by postcolonial theory. Imperialism has a 
beginning, and so can have an end. Yet at the same time, it is not just the historically 
contingent phenomenon of European colonialism; it is driven by a deeper logic of 
capitalist accumulation. Such an account is thus able to avoid both false necessity and 
false contingency. In specifically legal terms, the structural relationship between 
imperialism and international law means that any project that seeks to go beyond 
imperialism will ultimately also have to go beyond international law.
1259
  
 
It here that one runs up against the problem first discussed in Chapter 2 (Section 5). Is 
such a position not a nihilist one, which deprives the Third World of a shield (even if 
this shield is made of paper)? The answer to this question is no. Such a position only 
holds insofar as one is unable to differentiate between strategy and tactics. In 
understanding imperialism as a specific social form with a complex logic, it can be 
argued that its transcendence is a strategic goal, that is to say one which is both long-
term and structural. A corollary of this is that transcending international law is also a 
long-term structural goal. However, because strategy and tactics are not identical, this 
does not commit one to the idea of never using international law. Instead, the question 
is: given the strategic objective of transcending imperialism, how can international law 
be deployed (tactically) in aid of this? This leads to a second, related question, since 
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 Miéville 2005, 318. 
277 
 
 
 
international law embeds a ‘dynamic of difference’, how can one navigate this form 
without fatally reproducing its logic? 
 
Vergès’ position (outlined in Chapter 2, Section 2.4.) proves useful in answering this 
question. Although his account might have suggested a ‘nihilism’ towards law, Vergès 
instead maintained that anti-imperialists could and should use law, provided they did so 
on their own terms. This meant using law as a platform to launch direct attacks on the 
existing order, and as a propaganda platform for mobilising ‘extra-legal’ forces to fight 
against imperialism. In this way, the strategic goal was directly manifested through 
tactical actions.  
 
One need not follow Vergès exactly to see the possibilities that such an approach 
suggests. Once one has an overall strategy, it is possible to frame tactical actions with 
reference to this goal. Two points flow immediately from this. Firstly, tactical actions 
should not be pursued in such a way as to directly undermine the strategic goal. If it is 
necessary to transcend international law, then, when engaging in international legal 
action, one must take pains not to valorise international law. Secondly, and crucially, 
international law should not be pursued on its own terms. Rather, legal action should be 
pursued in such a way as to buttress those forces best able to transcend imperialism.  
 
One might dub such a position ‘principled opportunism’. It is opportunistic because it 
seeks to instrumentalise legal argument, but principled because it understands the 
structural connection between law and imperialism, and the consequent limitations that 
this places on any opportunistic intervention. The substance of this position requires:  
 
[T]hat the deployment of legal argument be openly subjected to political 
exigencies, with different arguments being deployed whenever necessary. As 
such, legal argument is being geared towards the strategic aim of building a 
movement to overthrow capitalism, rather than on its own terms. On the one 
hand, this will involve defensive struggles, where legal argument is deployed in 
order to defend political activists when the state seeks to attack them. ... Equally 
– provided rhetorically this is characterised as being for instrumental reasons – 
one might pursue a legal claim in order to attempt to prevent an action, or 
‘punish’ those involved with it, this could involve contesting the legality of 
certain state practices ... in order to publicly reveal these practices, and perhaps 
to constrain their future use (thus giving the movement a greater ability to 
organise).
1260
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A materialist conception of the dynamic of difference – in suggesting both the 
possibility of the transcendence of imperialism but also its structural interconnection 
with international law – is able to transcend the opposition between simple ‘legalism’ 
and ‘nihilism’ and so provide an international legal complement to the anti-imperialism 
of the radical Third Worldists. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
1. The Politics of Periodisation (and the Periodisation of Politics)  
The aim of this thesis has been to map the way in which a key concept in the social 
sciences – ‘imperialism’ – has been received within the international legal discipline. In 
order to do this, it focused on two schools: Marxist and Third Worldist approaches to 
international law. The thesis began by charting the debates about the causes, nature and 
driving forces of ‘colonialism’, ‘empire’ and ‘imperialism’. It demonstrated that the 
particular ways in which these concepts have been understood reflected the political 
concerns of the movements that took them up, as well as the particular political 
conjunctures in which they found themselves. One of the most important points that the 
first chapter attempted to make was that particular concepts of imperialism were 
particular ways of understanding its place in history.  
 
The term ‘empire’ is one that has remained relatively stable, with a usage that can be 
traced back as far as the Roman era. At the same time, it acquired a very specific 
meaning in the context of the expansion of European empires, referring to the territorial 
control which characterised them. Typically, this territorial control was matched by an 
assertion of formal legal jurisdiction. In invoking ‘empire’ therefore, one invokes 
something both historically general and historically specific. As this thesis has 
contended, these types of understanding have distinct political consequences. Insofar as 
empire is a perennial feature of the human experience, it is arguably an unavoidable 
one. What this suggests is that the best we can do is try and mitigate the bad 
consequences of empire. By contrast, insofar as empire is identified with the European 
experience – whether specifically or through an emphasis on formal control – we have 
already overcome it. 
 
The terms ‘imperialism’ and ‘colonialism’ were articulated in very different 
circumstances, and reflect different politics. Although ‘imperialism’ came from the 
same Latin root as ‘empire’ (imperium), its usage appeared much later, in relation to 
Louis Napoleon’s ‘Second French Empire’. Quickly it came to refer to an expansive or 
aggressive foreign policy. The term came to its own with the radical criticism of 
European expansion around the time of the ‘Scramble for Africa’. Initially, it was the 
term used by Hobson to describe the rapid international expansion of European capital 
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into underdeveloped areas. This was marked by a particularly vicious level of 
competition between these European powers.  
 
It was this sense of the term imperialism which was eventually taken up and popularised 
by the Marxist tradition. Imperialism was understood as specific stage of capitalism 
and, as such, a system driven by an economic logic. In terms of imperialism’s ‘place in 
history’, therefore, it was neither timeless feature of human existence, nor specifically 
tied to the European experience. At the same time, there were those who insisted that 
imperialism was not a distinct historical phenomenon but was rather a species of 
‘empire-ism’. For them, ‘imperialism’ was simply the ‘active’ part of empire, and so 
took on whatever characteristics were ascribed to empire.  
 
Colonialism too suffered from this tension. Like ‘empire’, the term had its roots in the 
Roman experience, describing the practice of granting citizens settlement rights over 
territory. This was the main sense in which it was understood until the period when 
‘imperialism’ was coined, after which colonies tended to be understood as the 
‘possessions’ of a dominating metropole. However, the term colonialism emerged later, 
with the anti-colonial movement. Here the ‘ism’ denoted that the colonialism was a 
system governed by a particular logic. In this way, colonialism was seen as the flipside 
to the Marxist concept of imperialism. It was not abstractly counterposed to the Marxist 
understanding, but rather was the view of that same system ‘from below’. Hence, 
colonialism too was not an inevitable feature of human society, and so could be 
transcended, but was governed by a logic that was wider than political and legal 
domination. 
 
As with the imperialism, this was contested. A more moderate group identified 
colonialism with the specific political domination of Europe. For them, once 
independence had been achieved, colonialism would be at end. Whereas those who 
understood imperialism as ‘empire-ism’ were not generally part of the anti-imperialist 
movement, this conservative concept of colonialism was embraced by elements of the 
anti-colonial movement itself. This, combined with the failure of independence to secure 
many expected gains, led the radical elements of the Third Worldist movement to 
articulate the concept of ‘neo-colonialism’. This was the logical extension of their idea 
281 
 
 
 
of colonialism as a system; if colonialism was driven by a logic beyond formal political 
domination, then it was feasible it could continue without formal political domination. 
 
However the political movements that deployed the concept of neo-colonialism 
ultimately failed in their attempts to use international institutions. It was in the shadow 
of this failure that postcolonial theory solidified as an intellectual current. Postcolonial 
theorists attempted to show the tenacious grip that Eurocentrism had on the former 
colonies and the social arrangements associated with ‘modernity’.  
 
Ultimately, what emerged was clear. The concept of ‘empire’ has always contained a 
tension between an account that foregrounded its existence since the beginning of time, 
and one that linked it to a very particular historical experience. In both such instances, 
the political impulse that derives from this historical situating is a passive one: either 
empire will always be with us, or it will end with the dismantling of Europe’s formal 
control. By contrast, the radical position saw things differently: imperialism could be 
transcended, but it also had a tenacious logic, and its abolition would require 
fundamental changes in the world order. Yet even there were constant pressures and 
attempts to re-impose the schema of empire and its attendant political conclusions.  
 
One of the insights that this thesis has sought to advance is that the historical and 
political understandings of colonialism, empire and imperialism are also carried over 
into the way they are related to international law. Hence, insofar these phenomena are 
purely identified with the formal domination of the European experience, international 
law ended imperialism, and so is anti-imperialist. By contrast, insofar as imperialism is 
a systemic phenomenon then international law did not end imperialism, but is actually 
entangled within its processes.  
 
This dynamic played out most clearly in the context of the original Third Worldist 
jurists. Those who adopted the radical, Marxist-inflected account of colonialism held 
that international law was intertwined with colonialism and imperialism. As a result, 
they insisted that the dismantling of the European colonial system had not meant an end 
to colonialism but had rather given rise to neo-colonialism. On this reading, 
international law was not ‘automatically’ anti-imperialist. Only a thoroughgoing 
shakeup of international law would be able to combat imperialism. 
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Those who adopted a more conservative concept of colonialism identified it almost 
wholly formal European domination. Since this colonialism lacked an underlying logic, 
the issue was not so much international law’s imbrication with colonial practices, as the 
fact that non-Europeans had been excluded from ‘making’ international law. On this 
reading, decolonisation and the universalisation of international law marked it out as 
anti-imperialist. However, what both of these positions had in common was a belief that 
international law was a neutral vessel that simply reflected the changing balance of 
forces. Even the radical wing ultimately thought that international law would reflect the 
rising tide of anti-colonialism. 
 
It was the systematic and repeated failure of this project that gave rise to TWAIL. 
Whilst a broad church, TWAIL scholarship has comprised a group of scholars more 
influenced by Marxist theory, and a group influenced by postcolonial theory. For the 
former, the connection between international law and imperialism was a material one, 
with international law being shaped by changing regimes of capital accumulation, and 
ruling classes pursuing their interests through the international law. The latter, 
attempting to respond to the sociological functionalism of the original Third World 
jurists, argue that international law is not neutral space, but part of a wider process of 
‘civilising’.  
 
Despite these differences, like the original Third Worldist jurists TWAIL scholars 
ended up in a similar political place, asserting that to abandon international law is to 
lose a vital ‘shield’ against imperialism. This similarity seemed to contradict the 
importance of their holding different concepts of imperialism. On further inspection this 
was not the case. Chimni, the outstanding Marxist TWAIL scholar, has a politics which 
flows from his analysis. He sees international law as potentially progressive because it 
expresses the contradictions of imperialism. By contrast, in the case of the 
postcolonialism-influenced scholars there is a radical break between theory and politics. 
The pessimistic account of international law constantly reproducing the civilising 
mission seems to leave no room for its progressive usage.  
 
However, Chimni’s account ultimately relies on a sociological functionalism similar to 
that of the early Third Worldist jurists. Like those accounts, it seems unable to explain 
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why the Third Worldist law reform projects failed so badly, except as a kind of 
accidental and contingent defeat. Accounts rooted in the ‘civilising’ character of the law 
represent an attempt to grapple with this false contingency, and point out the necessary 
and enduring character of the connection between law and imperialism. It is precisely 
for this reason that they turn to postcolonial scholarship. 
 
At this point, the interplay of different concepts returns with a vengeance. In order to 
emphasise the enduring character of imperialism, postcolonial scholars essentially 
reproduced the understanding of empire above. For them, it was a transhistorical feature 
of human life, rooted in certain psychic structures. Yet this account on its own terms 
was also inadequate, it could not explain how imperial forms change, or might be 
overcome. This meant it was also accompanied by a contingent account of imperialism, 
whereby its specificity was located in the distinctively European experience.  
 
This legacy has been reproduced by those TWAIL scholars who sought to go beyond 
sociological functionalism. Consequently, their account of the relationship between 
imperialism and international law seems to run in two opposed directions. In one 
account, imperialism is the untranscendable horizon that international law embeds and 
reproduces; in the other, international law embeds imperialism because of a specific 
historical encounter. In the former case, international law is inextricably linked with an 
untranscendable imperialism; this leads to an utterly pessimistic account in which 
international law constantly reproduces imperialism. In the latter case, the connection is 
a contingent one, with international law embedding a colonial legacy, which might be 
overcome. Given the necessity of both of these concepts of imperialism, neither account 
can be preferred. 
 
The question, then, is whether it is possible to make use of the radical periodisation of 
imperialism, whilst avoiding sociological functionalism, and highlight the cultural and 
psychic dimensions of imperialism? In this respect, it is startling that all of the accounts 
of the ‘civilising mission’ ultimately describe a process whose logic greatly resembles 
that of capital accumulation. Turning to the Marxist tradition’s attempt to theorise both 
Eurocentrism and its relationship to international law, it is possible to articulate a 
materialist account of the dynamic of difference, which roots it in capital accumulation. 
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However, in order to go beyond sociological functionalism, it is necessary to show why 
law specifically reproduces these dynamics. The commodity-form theory of 
international law proves invaluable to resolve this issue. In this account, law stems from 
and shares the same logic as capital accumulation. Since the ‘dynamic of difference’ is 
also part of this logic of capital accumulation, it will necessarily be reflected in 
international legal terms.  
 
Importantly, this is not just an attempt to read TWAIL insights ‘through’ the Marxist 
tradition, but rather to return to the ways in the two have always been closely bound 
together. Third Worldist Marxists emphasised that processes of racialisation were not 
‘optional extras’ added onto economic processes. Rather, capital accumulation is a 
process that necessarily produces racialised categories, and these racialised categories 
structure the distribution of imperialism’s material benefits. In articulating a materialist 
theory of the dynamic of difference, therefore, it is necessary to ‘stretch’ Marxism, and 
account for the way in which international law plays a role in producing racialised 
social forms which are redeployed within the process of capital accumulation.  
 
Such a ‘stretched Marxism’ is able to illuminate the enduring connection between 
imperialism and international law, and to signal the importance of race and culture, 
without falling foul of false necessity or false contingency.  
 
 
2. Why Imperialism? Why Now? 
As noted in the Introduction, there are several ways in which this work is important. 
Evidently, given the above, the most important contribution of this work is the attempt 
to sketch the outline of a ‘stretched Marxist’ position. This position, which attempts to 
draw together the historical and theoretical commonalities between Marxist and Third 
Worldist accounts of imperialism, does seem to embody the strengths of both, without 
falling foul of their weaknesses. More importantly, it is not simply an arbitrary cobbling 
together of different theoretical traditions, but rather represents an attempt to recover 
and re-articulate a historical legacy. Such an approach could form the basis for further 
work. 
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Even if one is not convinced by this particular argument, this thesis has attempted a 
number of other tasks. Firstly, it has presented a systematic survey and analysis of the 
way in which historians, theorists and social scientists have understood the concepts of 
‘colonialism’, ‘empire’ and ‘imperialism’. This is an issue to which international 
lawyers have not paid a great deal of attention, despite frequently invoking those terms. 
In setting out these debates, and the political consequences that flow from them, this 
thesis can hopefully contribute to a more rigorous understanding of these concepts.  
 
Secondly, advancing the first point somewhat, this piece has attempted to build on 
Marks’ claim that particular concepts of ‘empire’ also bring with them particular 
understandings of international law. The chapters on TWAIL and Marxism attempt to 
flesh out this insight. Even if one disagrees with the more ‘critical’ aspects of this 
argument, examining how different concepts of imperialism play out in international 
legal argument serves a useful role. 
 
These two points are particularly important given the historical nature of much 
international legal theorising about imperialism. In drawing out these debates, this thesis 
represents an attempt to move beyond the casual empiricism which marks many of these 
histories. Whilst such accounts do perform a vital function, by not explicitly reflecting 
on their use of categories and concepts they often end up subsuming distinct periods 
into a single narrative, or missing the commonalities between particular historical 
moments. 
 
The third task that this has achieved is rather straightforward. Although both TWAIL 
and Marxism have become prominent in recent years, there have been few attempts to 
systematically reconstruct them, or describe how they relate to each other. This thesis 
has attempted to do that, but also go further, situating both within a wider historical and 
theoretical trajectories. In so doing, it has been possible to emphasise their theoretical 
and historical continuities. 
 
 
3. Possible Futures  
The above considerations point towards further research projects. First and foremost, 
the conception of ‘stretched Marxism’ could be deployed directly, to examine both 
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historical and contemporary moments. It provides a specific set of analytical tools for 
doing this. Of these, perhaps the most significant concerns the structural interconnection 
between imperialism and international law, with imperialism being understood as a 
system driven by the logic of capital accumulation which systematically gives rise to 
changing forms of racialisation.  
 
Particularly important in this respect is to chart the way in which the changing patterns 
of capital accumulation have given rise to new configurations of imperial power, which 
manifest themselves in different forms of racialisation, achieved through international 
law. A very obvious place to start, and one area where this has already borne some fruit, 
is in the changing justifications for the use of force. Understanding the ways in which 
crises have made it necessary for major imperialist centres to intensify processes of 
capital accumulation, yet at the same time limited their ability to do so, is key in 
explaining the shift to a ‘lower intensity’ but constant deployment of violence under the 
war on terror and its drone programme. This, of course, is exacerbated by the possible 
rise of other powerful centres of capital accumulation. Accordingly, whilst the war on 
terror continues to deploy racialised tropes, it does so in very specific ways.
1261
  
 
Similarly, one might extend this backwards. A vital task would be to examine whether 
or not a ‘stretched Marxist’ conception of imperialism found its way into any of the 
Third Worldist accounts of international law. As has been illustrated, certainly there was 
a radical idea of imperialism underlying the early Third Worldism, but this was not a 
‘perfect’ reflection of the kind of work attempted by Fanon and Cabral. It would be 
interesting to inquire whether there were any jurists – apart from possibly Vergès – who 
shared such a conception. What seems more likely though, is that in the accounts of 
radical Third World activists or movements, it is possible to find some reflection upon 
international legal questions. More generally, this thesis has pointed to the need to 
understand Third Worldism not as a monolithic bloc but as a movement with various 
political wings. It has also insisted that these political differences were reflected in 
wider theoretical disagreements that have consequences for international law. In this 
respect, it is interesting to note that at the first Tricontinental Conference (described in 
Chapter 4, Section 1) rather than the usual paeans to the UN, it was vociferously 
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denounced as an instrument of imperialism by many of the participants.
1262
 An 
exploration of how these radical movements engaged with international law could be 
very productive.  
 
This also points to another possible project. One of the aims of the thesis was to 
illuminate how distinct understandings of imperialism bring with them distinct accounts 
of its relationship to international law. This is in contradistinction to the majority of 
international legal scholarship, which treats imperialism and its associated terms as 
black boxes, whose meanings are transparent. However, because the focus of this thesis 
has been primarily on Marxist and Third Worldist accounts of imperialism, questions of 
the wider theoretical trajectory of the international legal discipline have only been 
addressed tangentially. Consequently, it would be valuable to examine how the debates 
outlined in Chapter 1 were received by international lawyers. Inasmuch as they were not 
explicitly received, it would be fruitful to show how international lawyers nonetheless 
reproduced these arguments, and to trace how the political consequences play out within 
the international legal discipline.  
 
 
4. Conclusion  
What, then, is the ultimate conclusion? Perhaps the guiding intuition of this thesis has 
been Lenin’s observation that ‘without revolutionary theory there can be no 
revolutionary movement’.1263 Whilst one can clearly go too far in such a sentiment, it 
does flag up an important issue: the necessity of ‘knowing your enemy’. It is only in 
understanding how a system works that one is able to contest and possibly transcend it. 
Whilst one would hardly be so immodest, or rather delusional, as to think that a PhD 
thesis would be able to achieve the overthrow of imperialism, clarifying one’s concept 
of imperialism is an important step towards understanding how to overcome it.  
 
The elaboration of ‘stretched Marxism’ is a modest attempt to do this. It draws attention 
to the role that international law plays in solidifying and reproducing imperialist social 
relations, and the centrality of racialised forms to these relations. In pinpointing the 
logic of this system, and pointing out its structural interconnection with international 
law, stretched Marxism argues that although we can go beyond imperialism (and 
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consequently international law), this will not be a simple matter. One cannot simply 
denounce imperialism as being ‘against’ international law, and it is impossible to 
‘ignore’ international law. Rather, one must understand how to negotiate the 
international legal order in a tactical manner, whilst being aware of the strategic 
necessity of its overthrow.  
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